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CHAPTER I 
THE HYPOTHESIZED PRIMARY CAUSES OF 
ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY 
Remember the days of old, con-
sider the years of many genera-
tions, ask thy Father and he 
will recount it to thee, thy 
elders, and they will tell thee. 
--Deuteronomy, 32:7 
Father Edward Flannery (1965) commented in his intro-
duction to The Anguish of the Jews that 
Christians, even highly educated ones, are all but totally 
ignorant of it--except for contemporary developments. 
They are ignorant of it for the simple reason that anti-
semitism does not appear in their history books. His-
tories of the Middle Ages--and even of the Crusades--can 
be found in which the word "Jew" does not appear, and 
there are Catholic dictionaries and encyclopedias in 
which the term "anti-Semitism" is not listed. (Introduc-
~ion, p. xi). 
The present author, some twenty years later would 
add that Jews as well (specifically the present young adult 
generation) know little of the unfortunate circumstances which 
have befallen their ancestors throughout recorded history. 
Accordingly, a fixation, common among Jewish people today 
is to focus almost exclusively on the Nazi-German holocaust 
while bypas~ing millennia of savage persecution. In the 
opinion of the author, this semi-obsessive perspective per-
petuated repeatedly by Jewish organizations and institutions 
1 
--
2 
has inadvertently created an atmosphere of self-pity, help-
lessness and emotionally-directed behavior. Its repetitive 
nature may, in fact, become somewhat repulsive to the younger 
generation of Jew and Gentile alike, whose perception of the 
Jewish people is at variance with the depiction of the Jew 
as a totally helpless and hopeless individual. It is the 
author's opinion that such shortsightedness is unable to 
deal with the problem adequately, and needless to say, any 
' ·• constructive plan of action following therefrom is doomed 
to failure. This is not to imply in the least that the 
beastiality of the German people during World War II deserves 
a respite from condemnation, but only that the attempted 
genocide carried out by one of the most "civilized" nations 
in the twentieth century was no more (albeit in an extreme 
form) than the progression of an ongoing millennia old social 
cancer. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the author that 
only through a broad historical analysis can anti-Jewish 
hostility be properly understood. 
The above is not to imply that there exists a dearth 
of literature on the subject, but only that the information 
is not widely known either in America or in Israel. A further 
and probably more serious problem concerns the type of his-
torical analysis heretofore presented. Since world War II 
there have been several serious English works (e.g., Flannery, 
1965; ~rosser & Halperin, 1978; and Ruether, 1979) which 
have presented histories of anti-Jewish hostility with all 
3 
its bloody consequences, but have done little more than to 
delineate historical facts while concomitantly inciting horror 
and indignation toward those responsible for carrying out 
such atrocities. Their intent in exposing such activity 
was apparently in order to prevent further occurrences. 
However, it is the author's opinion that their writings (as 
conclusive works) are substantively inadequate for the fol-
lowing two reasons: (1) anti-Jewish hostility has taken 
various forms and has been perpetrated by considerably dif-
ferent ideological entities throughout hi story, and therefore 
without a cohesive theory delineating a common underlying 
cause, Jews may be too preoccupied searching out Nazis and 
condemning Christianity today to effectively deal with the 
contempozary threats facing Jewry, and (2) criticism and 
moral exhortations cannot be expected to change peoples' 
attitudes and actions (regardless of the emotional sincerity 
exhibited by the respective writer) but ironically may produce 
further frustration in the potentially hostile non-Jewish 
population which paradoxically could bring more Jewish suf-
fering in its wake (the "blaming the victim" effect). 
Correspondingly, the only seemingly constructive 
way to deal with the problem is through logical and unambigu-
ously directed activity based on solid theory and experience. 
Unfortunately, the above writers have failed on both counts. 
An exc~ption to the rule is Prager and Telushkin (1983) who 
unlike the others have developed a theory which is histori-
4 
cally consistent, but in the opinion of the present author 
is philosophically and psychologically shallow, and their 
strategies to combat the malady appear unrealistic and pos-
sibly harmful. For example, their historical-universal reason 
for Jew-hatred is specifically Jewish (unlike other theorists 
who postulate economic, social, psychological or political 
explanations for the problem and whose theories may be super-
imposed on any distinctive ethnic or racial minority). In 
· ·' a word , their explanation is Judaism itself, but their ex-
position of Judaism's "threat" appears incomplete. In fact 
their primary social-psychological emphases may be interpreted 
as bordering on the authors' own ethnocentric biases. For 
example, their claim that anti-Jewish hostility is in great 
part because Jews have been better educated, less habitually 
intoxicated, more charitable with one another, less prone 
to crime, and have had a more stable family unit than their 
non-Jewish neighbors is dubious, for these factors may be 
more a result of anti-Jewish hostility than a direct cause 
thereof. In addition, their primary solution is that Jews 
accept the challenge of spreading ethical monotheism to the 
world (not necessarily~to convert but to teach). Ironically, 
the authors themselves express the contradiction that it is 
"the ultimate cause of antisemitism (i.e., the perception 
that Judaism stands for something more ethically lofty) which 
must be fulfilled in order to end antisemitism" (p. 191)?1 
It must also be mentioned that several social scien-
5 
tists have developed overall theories of anti-Jewish hostility 
(as will be seen in Chapter III) but these theories are mostly 
ahistorical in nature and cannot deal, on their unilevel of 
analysis, with historical anti-Jewish hostility (i.e., their 
theories are at best dubious when superimposed on various 
cultures and times). In contrast to these above types of 
analyses and theories, the present author has attempted to 
develop a theory, firmly rooted in history, which lends itself 
· to empirical analysis and concrete strategies (for combating 
this social malady) following therefrom. 
In the present paper, the term anti-Jewish hostility 
is used in lieu of the more commonly applied "anti-Semitism" 
to denote antipathy toward the Jewish people. This is because 
the term anti-Semitism is a misnomer (Flannery, 1965). The 
word Semitism comes from the name Shem, who was Biblically 
one of Noah~s three sons. therefore, according to the Bible 
(and assuming that all three sons were equally proli fie), 
approximately one-third of the world's population today should 
be inhabited by Shemites (or Semites). In practice, anti-
semitism has been used exclusively to denote anti-Jewish 
hostility, and directed against a people who account for 
less than 1 percent of the total world population. The term 
anti-Semitism was originally coined in Germany in the 1870s 
to purposely signify a "racial" enmity toward Jews in lieu 
of the "dated" religious prejudice engendered in the past. 
According~y, if the term anti-Semitism was to be employed 
... 
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in the present study, the author would be implicitly further-
ing a myth rooted in anti-Jewish hostility. 
In order not to lose the reader at this point (and 
throughout the lengthy historical analysis which ensues) it 
is important that the author spell out in the beginning the 
direction and unorthodox approach taken in the forthcoming 
analysis. Prior analyses of historical anti-Jewish hostility 
are in general theoretically monolithic, varying only in 
their emphasis on detail and the particular era(s) of anal-
ysis. The factual horror-stories told by these various 
writers have aptly depicted the lowly state of humanity 
throughout the ages, but have failed in describing the unique-
ness of anti-Jewish hostility. Their main topic is ostensibly 
Jewish suffering, yet their emphasis focuses primarily on 
the non-Jewish antagonists (i.e., their savagery). These 
writers do not appear interested in portraying anti-Jewish 
hatred per se but rather the universal message of man's in-
humane treatment of his fellow man. Jews are seen as quali-
tatively replaceable by other persecuted minority groups 
such as Blacks, Women, the American Indian, etc., and only 
by virtue of the intensity and extensiveness of their suffer-
ing do they embody the most complete paradigm from which to 
portray humanity's sadistic nature. In other words, anti-
Jewish hostility is not considered different in kind from 
other forms of group-hostility, and lessons to be derived 
... 
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are not and never intended to be specifically Jewish but 
rather universal in content and application. 
It is the opinion of the present author that it was 
specifically this a priori intention of admonishing the world 
(arbitrarily via the Jewish experience) which precluded the 
analysis of anything exclusively Jewish. In contrast, the 
present author declares at the outset his disinterest in 
detailing man's universal active enmity towards his fellow 
man (a cursory reading of most contemporary newspapers would 
illustrate the same), but rather to inquire into the unique 
and specific nature of anti-Jewish hostility. As predicted 
(as will be seen in the following pages) by asking the ques-
tion "What is fundamentally different about anti-Jewish hos-
tility?" as opposed to the implicit question asked by most 
writers which is "What has been the general state of prejudice 
thro'ughout the ages?" the answers also turn out to be dis-
tinctly different. Where other writers present a sad commen-
tary on humanity, in which Jews are 1 i ttle more than arbitrary 
stimuli on whom frustration and contempt is heaped, the pres-
ent analysis will attempt to interpret the anti-Jewish process 
as something distinctively Jewish. Where most other writers 
attempt to derive universal lessons from history (which are 
hoped will benefit all persecuted minority groups) the present 
study attempts to derive Jewish specific lessons which may 
serve universal ends (i.e., for both majority and minority 
populations). 
... 
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Aspect No. 1 
Following from the above, it is little wonder why 
writers fail to see the following unique aspects of anti-
Jewish hostility. The first aspect deals with Jewish longev-
ity and resilience. Better put, the question is not why 
Jews have been attacked so savagely throughout four millennia, 
but rather how they continued to remain a distinct people 
under the most unbearable and ironic of circumstances (and 
most of the time in a foreign land). All other peoples 
throughout history have relinquished their national and/or 
religious identity (when given the opportunity to do so) to 
become one with the powerful majority population (small seclu-
sive sects which have little to no interaction with the major-
ity culture may be exceptions to this rule). Only the Jewish 
people amidst untold discrimination and persecution have 
reta'ined their own language, religion, national consciousness, 
and civil laws for over three thousand years, while simul-
taneously becoming an integral part of the larger society. 
The question "why the Jews suffer?" is less than profound 
for many minority groups throughout history have been targeted 
scapegoats. The present study, in contrast, asks how and 
why the Jews have remained a separate people in spite of 
the brutal consequences of being distinct? 
Aspect No. 2 
· A second aspect which differentiates the per~ecution 
... 
9 
and discrimination of Jews from that of most other minority 
groups (e.g., Blacks, Women, etc.), and is likewise overlooked 
by historians and social scientists, is the differential 
origins of discrimination when it comes to Jews as opposed 
to other minority groups. Historically, most other minority 
groups who have suffered never had a choice to do otherwise. 
They were never given the choice to be assimilated as equals 
into the majority culture. (For example, Blacks when taken 
from Africa were not given the option to be like their white 
Christi an or Arab Moslem captors or else accept slavery. 
For them slavery was the only viable "option.") 
In contrast, the Jews always had a chance to become 
one with the majority. In certain lands this opportunity 
was abrogated (e.g., Nazi Germany) but even in these lands 
the possibility of total assimilation had at one time 
existed. Not only had Jews the opportunity to totally assimi-
late, but they were quite often the primary focus of the 
ruling power (whether national or international) who went 
to great lengths in their attempt to totally assimilate them. 
It was always after-the-fact when Jews refused to totally 
relinquish their identity did discrimination and persecution 
follow in its wake. 
Hence, by failing to ~istinguish between the anti-
Jewish process and other anti-minority group processes we 
are, i~deed, learning about the barbarous hi story of mankind, 
but little concerning specific anti-Jewish activity. In 
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fact, by lumping the anti-Jewish process with others we are, 
in effect, leading the serious student astray, and blocking 
any understanding that the anti-Jewish phenomenon may be a 
process quite different in kind from others.. In essence, 
by failing to discriminate between the process of anti-Jewish 
hostility and others, the historians and social scientists 
are, at best, describing the symptoms (which may be portrayed 
as universal in kind) while blatantly ignoring the differences 
in origin (which may smack of particularism or even racism 
to some "enlightened" Western thinkers). 
Aspect No. 3 
A third interesting and unique aspect which follows 
from the first (and therefore writers who do not speak of 
the first aspect will inevitably fail to emphasize the third 
aspect) concerns the particular form of Judaism which has 
maintained itself throughout millennia. Although through 
history there have been several different forms of Judaism 
(e.g., Sadducees, Nazarenes, Karaites, etc.), and in each 
of their respective eras these groups have suffered as in-
tensely as the one form of Judaism that has consistently 
survived (i.e., Oral Law Judaism which has been called during 
different eras Pharisaical Judaism and Orthodox Judaism) only 
one group has consistently throughout the ages, in different 
lands and cultures, kept the spark of Judaism alive. Whereas 
other Jewish groups throughout hi story have claimed to be 
11 
the most modern, or truthful form of Judaism in whose destiny 
it was to replace the "antiquated" or "corrupt~ Oral-Law 
tradition, their claims were never actualized. When a par-
ticular epoch in hi story ended so did the various "adapt-
able" forms of Judaism. The only group to survive through 
every age and culture was ~he group which claimed that its 
detailed interpretation of the Bible (i.e., the Oral Law) 
was, in addition to the Bible (i.e., the Five Books of Moses), 
· handed down to Moses from G-d. The other transient forms 
of Judaism never claimed that their interpretation of Scrip-
ture was transmitted uninterruptedly from Moses to their 
respective era, but claimed (in the negative) that the Oral 
Law tradition (as embodied in the Talmud today) was man made. 
The corollary of their claim was obvious, if the scholars 
could make up their own intepretations, why should other 
Jewish groups be prevented from doing the same. Irrespective 
of their claims, these so-called man-made interpretations 
(i.e., the Oral Law) continued to lead the Jewish people in 
every era and culture whereas the other movements' interpreta-
tions never survived past a cul tu re or two (as viable leg isla-
tion for the Jewish people to live by). 
This point becomes all the more important when Jewish 
continuity becomes an integral factor in interpreting the 
anti-Jewish phenomenon. It dispels the myth that there is 
someth~ng inherently super-tenacious or super-obstinate about 
the Jewish people per se. It shows that only the Jewish 
12 
people following the Oral Law, which unlike all other minority 
groups under the same circumstances, have astoundingly pre-
served their distinct identity. This fact should not be taken 
lightly for if one of the unique aspects of anti-Jewish hos-
tility is specifically the longevity of the Jewish people, 
and if this longevity is exclusively a function of Oral Law 
tradition, then the serious student is obligated to investi-
gate the sustaining force of the Oral Law (as embodied today 
in the Talmud). Needless to say most other writers who have 
seriously investigated the anti ... Jewish phenomenon never seem 
to discern the above relationship between anti-Jewish activity 
and the Oral Law tradition. 
Because the Oral Law tradition will be talked about 
throughout the dissertation a short summary describing its 
origins and legislation will be presented here. The rationale 
behind this short presentation is that although many people 
are familiar with the Bible, the Oral Law interpretation of 
it is little known among modern American Jewry, and even 
less so in the non-Jewish world. 
The Talmud (Gi ttin 60B) which is today the embodiment 
of the Oral Law expresses the above thusly: "the Holy One, 
Blessed be He, did not establish His covenant with Israel 
except by virtue of the Oral Law." (Translation mine.) 
Support for the claim that there was detailed legis-
lation .given together with the Written Law (i.e., the Bible), 
and more specifically the Five Books of Moses) is that it 
13 
is difficult, if not impossible, to make tangible-pragmatic 
sense of the Written Law without an accompanying interpreta-
tion. For example, there are many terms in the Bible which 
are undefined, the term "work" in Sabbatical law (Exodus, 
31:14) or the term "slaughtering" in the dietary laws of 
Kosher (Deuteronomy, 12:21) are undefined and only via the 
oral Law are these concepts elucidated in order that they 
may be practically applied. In addition, there are basic 
legal concepts and institutions, the existence of which is 
' 
assumed by the Bible, but which are not further explained. 
For example, without previously specifying the formal insti-
tution of marriage and divorce, the Bible (Deuteronomy, 24:1-
4) states that a husband cannot re-marry the wife he has di-
vorced, if in the meantime she has been married to another 
man. Only via the Oral Law are Biblically assumed concepts 
thoroughly defined. 
A story is related in the Talmud (Shabbos, 31A) about 
a non-Jew who approached the two leading Sages of the time 
individually (Hillel and Shamai who were the heads of the 
Jewish Supreme Court some 2,100 years ago) and inquired of 
one "How many Divine bodies of legislation are there?" He 
(the Sage) replied, "two, the Written Law and the Oral Law." 
The non-Jew retorted, "the Written Law I believe in but the 
Oral Law I don't believe in, convert me on the condition 
that I _accept only the Written Law," the non-Jew was immedi-
ately escorted out. He then approached the other Sage and 
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made the same request, the Sage immediately started teaching 
him the Hebrew alphabet. When the new convert returned the 
next day he (the Sage)started teaching him the alphabet in 
reverse order. The convert exclaimed, "but yesterday you 
taught me the opposi tel" The Sage replied, "you see that 
you must rely on me even on this, then rely upon me also with 
respect to the Oral Law." (I.e., there must be a certain 
reliance upon authority before anything may be learned.) 
The Oral Law (as its nam.e designates) was passed 
down orally from generation to generation by the leading 
Sages and their Sanhedrin (i.e., the Jewish Supreme Court 
comprising 71 of the greatest scholars of the generation), 
and uninterruptedly disseminated to the Jewish people in 
the Land of Israel and the Diaspora (Maimonides, 1972). 
When the Roman empire prohibited the Sanhedrin from convening, 
the ~ask of teaching and clarifying the Oral Law was placed 
upon the various Sages and their educational institutions 
(i.e., in their Yeshiva). In light of the fact that there 
was no longer any real central legislative authority in Israel 
together with the ongoing persecution and dissemination of 
the Jewish people throughout the Roman and Persian empires, 
various versions of Oral Law legislation began to prolif-
erate (this proliferation of opinions concerned only the 
minute details of the Law, but in Jewish Law any deviation, 
however small, was considered a deviation from the will of 
G-d), and there was great fear that the true Law would soon 
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be forgotten. Although the law (Talmud, Gittin 60B) pro-
hibiting the public writing of the Oral Law had been in effect 
for 1,400 years the need to put it down in writing became 
irreversibly evident in the times of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (ap-
proximately 200 C.E.), so the Sages of the time decided that 
in order to preserve .Oral Law legislation one of its laws 
(i.e., the prohibition of publicly writing it down) had to 
be uprooted. 
The public redaction of the Oral Law which became 
better known as the Talmud (i.e., comprising both the Mishna 
and Gemara) began in the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (218 
c. E.) in the Land of Israel and was sealed in the form of 
the Talmud Bavli in Babylonia (500 C. E.). The Sages and 
their students collected, sorted, and redacted the ocean of 
literature known as the Oral Law tradition. In light of 
the fact that there were differences of opinion on many of 
the laws, which was a direct outgrowth of the persecution 
and dispersion during the Roman conquest, the Sages refused 
to accept the responsibility of throwing out any authoritative 
legislative opinion. They therefore entered all the various 
opinions into the Talmud. These multiple opinions are usually 
followed by heated dialectics, aimed at discerning the most 
valid of the various opinions. In addition to legislation 
of Sinatic origins (i.e., Laws considered given to Moses by 
G-d) . the Talmud is also replete with Rabbinic legislation 
which are in most cases protectives, which guard against 
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the transgression of Sinatic legislation. People well versed 
in the Talmud today are usually able to differentiate between 
sinatic legislation and the many Rabbinic enactments. 
The emphasis placed upon the spiritual quality of 
oral Law teachers, and not merely on the quality of their 
teaching is a distinctive feature of traditional Judaism 
(Talmud Sukkah 28A). It is also given as a reason for why 
it was prohibited to write down the Oral Law (Sefer Ha'Ikarim, 
· 1960). The writing down of the law enables any scholar, 
whatever his bias to present himself as an interpreter and 
teacher of the Oral Law. On the other hand, when the Law 
is handed down orally it is unlikely that teaching would be 
accepted from anyone whose character is not such as to make 
his tradition reliable (Schimmel, 1971). The Talmud itself 
(Hagigah, lSB) states "If the teacher is similar to an angel 
of G-d they should seek the Law from him and if not, they 
should not seek the Law from him." (Translation mine.) 
It is the opinion of the present author that the 
many Jewish groups which deviated from the Oral Law tradition 
did not do so out of intellectual honesty, but rather out 
of an emotional desire to be "free" (like the non-Jews who 
are not obligated or expected to follow the demanding Jewish 
Law), and only afterwards rationalized their deviation into 
something seemingly positive. Accordingly, it becomes compre-
hensible why most of these Jewish groups accepted the Divinity 
of the Written Law while negating that of the Oral Law. 
... 
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The written Law is general and ambiguous (i.e., when it comes 
to the specification and application of the Laws) and can 
be easily manipulated to fit the lifestyle of the manipu-
lator. The Oral Law in contrast, although dynamic in the 
sense that it can and has been adaptable in every society 
throughout history has concretely defined limits, and is 
detailed enough to make it virtually impossible to accept 
its Divine origins and still act according to one's impulses 
and desires. 
The present author believes that a true understanding 
of anti-Jewish hostility is only possible when viewed his-
torically. Only by delineating common anti-Jewish themes 
and objectives throughout history (in addition to those men-
tioned above) does the anti-Jewish phenomenon appear to take 
on an unique identity of its own. Therefore, in the following 
pages a rather lengthy historical analysis will be presented 
in an attempt to locate common themes and components of the 
phenomenon. In brief, the historical analysis is undertaken 
with the intent of locating the primary cause of anti-Jewish 
hostility. 
Chapter II in the present manuscript deals with the 
hypothesized secondary causes of anti-Jewish hostility which, 
as will be seen, represent a phenomenological-historical 
interpretation of the phenomenon. Chapter III presents the 
hypoth~sized tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility which 
are posited as psychological in nature. At the conclusion 
' t 
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of each of the three chapters a general plan will be presented 
for investigating empirically the hypotheses following from 
each of the respective chapters. Chapters IV, v, and VI 
present the methodology, results, and discussion, respectively 
of the dissertation's empirical investigation, and at the 
conclusion of Chapter VI a theological perspective on the 
origins of the problem will be discussed. 
The Development of a Nation and Egyptian 
Anti-Jewish Hostility 
The advent of the Jewish nation began with one man 
Abraham the Ivri (the Hebrew) in the seventeenth century 
B.C. E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973). The Mid rash (Bereshet 
rabbah) states that the word Ivri means "on the other side" 
where the idol worshipping population at that time was fig-
uratively on one side, and Abraham through his philosophical 
genius and unflinching ethical behavior stood on the other. 
Abraham suffered both persecution (Midrash: Bereshet rabbah) 
and exile (Genesis 12:1) because of his spiritual convic-
tions. He bequeathed his revolutionary philosophy and life-
style (with its concomitant responsibilities) to his son 
Isaac and sent Ishmael away at the urgings of his wife Sara 
Which was afterwards justified by G-d Himself (Genesis 
21:12). Isaac then passed the tradition along to the younger 
of his two sons Jacob (whose name was later changed to Israel) 
who th~n passed it down to his twelve sons who later became 
the Twelve Tribes of Israel. Because of sibling jealousy 
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the sons of Jacob sold their brother Joseph into slavery in 
which state he was brought down to Egypt (Genesis 37: 28). 
Joseph miraculously became great in Egypt and eventually 
attained the status of second in command (Genesis 41:43-44). 
He also singlehandedly saved the people of Egypt and other 
peoples from starvation and simultaneously procured for 
Pharaoh enormous wealth (Genesis 47:14-26). Because of the 
famine, which had also swept the Land of Canaan at that time, 
· ·' Jacob and his whole family came to Egypt where they were 
reunited with Joseph. Pharaoh, quite graciously, granted 
to Jacob and his sons the best of Egypt, the fertile land of 
Goshen (Genesis 47:6) to dwell in as free men. 
In Egypt, Jacob's family grew by leaps and bounds 
(Exodus 1:7) and within a relatively short period of time 
developed into the Hebrew nation. Within eighty years after 
the Hebrews had entered Egypt with the passing of Joseph 
and his brothers (Miller, 1968), they began to adopt for 
themselves several Egyptian customs (i.e., to assimilate) 
(Ezekiel 20: 5-7). The Midrash (Tanch.uma) states that they 
became ardent cosmopolitans, and that their presence was 
felt at all great cultural events of the time. Although 
the Hebrews were rapidly assimilating into Egyptian society 
(the most sophisticated society in the world at the time) 
the Midrash (Mekilta; Pischa) relates two distinctive beha-
viors of the Hebrews which helped to prevent their total 
assimilation, (1) they retained their Hebrew names, and (2) 
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they retained their Hebrew language. 
Suddenly, the new ruler of Egypt seemed struck by a 
sense of paranoia (a comm~n theme running throughout Jewish 
history) , "Lest they multiply and endanger the land" (Exodus 
1:10). (Translation mine.) In light of the fact that Egypt 
was considered a progressive land of culture and orderly 
rule a flagrant decree to subjugate the people of Joseph 
(who had saved them from starvation) would have been a black 
··mark against the progressive nature of its leaders (Hiller, 
1968). Therefore, Pharaoh and his advisors attempted an 
alternative plan of action. Pharaoh said: "Let us deal 
wisely with them" (Exodus 1:10). The Talmud (Sotah, llA) 
relates that he began his scheme by appealing to the Hebrew's 
patriotism by requesting their help in building his store-
house-cities. The children of Israel fell into the trap, 
and worked diligently (Hidrash rabbah) for the system which 
Joseph had originally instituted (Genesis 41:35). Gradually, 
the Hebrew volunteers were pressed into service until they 
found themselves unable to break loose. 
To the dismay of Egypt, Israel began to increase in 
proportion to the oppression (Exodus 1:12). The Egyptian 
Plan to uproot the Hebrew's stubborn national identity via 
slavery proved unsuccessful. The Hebrew tradition initiated 
by Abraham and predicated on ethical monotheism with its 
ultima~e fulfillment realized only in the Land of Canaan 
(i.e.,the land of Israel before the Jews arrived there as a 
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nation) as promised to Abraham (Genesis 17:8), was too strong 
a bond for even Egyptian bondage to sever. Egypt then im-
plemented its second stage of attack, physical back-breaking 
labor (Exodus 1: 13). If national identity could not be 
totally obliterated through forced labor, then bone-crushing 
demands were to be implemented in order to crush the spirit, 
creating in effect, national misfits. Apparently this second 
stage of action was also unsuccessful for Pharaoh then com-
. manded the murder of all male infants at the time of delivery 
(Exodus 1:16). When the Hebrew midwives shrewdly refused 
to carry out Pharaoh's command he openly decreed that every 
newborn Hebrew boy was to be cast into the river (Exodus 
1:22). Pharaoh's three-level strategy of oppression (1) 
discrimination and subjugation, (2) spirit crushing physi-
cal persecution, and (3) extermination was to be the prototype 
for all subsequent anti-Jewish activity throughout history. 
There are also other strong similarities between 
Egyptian anti-Jewish hostility and those that followed. 
Jews in Egypt were extraordinarily successful before their 
oppression. One of their founding fathers (Joseph) was second 
only to Pharaoh (Genesis 41: 43-44) and was revered by the 
·Egyptian populace (47:25). For instance, when Joseph's father 
Jacob died, all of Egypt was in a state of mourning for 
seventy days (50:3). Pharoah himself, gave the Hebrews the 
finest .land in Egypt, and offered them positions of prestige 
(Genesis 47:6). For the first eighty years of their sojourn 
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in Egypt the Hebrews were successful and prosperous and only 
afterwards were they bitterly oppressed. In other lands 
too, Jews would always succeed (when given the opportunity) 
only to be oppressed in the end. 
If the Hebrews would have completely assimilated 
into Egyptian society (as small groups, who are given the 
opportunity, consistently do in every great culture or soci-
ety), or had they not been so successful, the Egyptian op-
pression would probably have been greatly attenuated or may 
never have occurred. The threat of a distinctly success-
ful and dynamic non-Egyptian population burgeoning in the 
midst of Egypt (the cultural center of the world) was osten-
sibly the cause of Pharaoh paranoia, for there is no intima-
tion from any historical source that the Hebrews were any less 
loyal to the ruling Egyptian government than their indigenous 
Egyptian counterparts. As will be seen, this common theme 
characterized by a successful entry into mainstream society 
without a concomitant complete disassociation from anything 
distinctively Jewish has proved overwhelmingly threatening 
to many of the Jews' non-Jewish hosts throughout history. 
It is also important to repeat the distinction between 
Jewish oppression and most other types of minority group 
oppression as mentioned above. As discussed above other 
targeted minority groups throughout history were commonly 
thought of as inferior and were therefore discriminated 
against. The Jews, in contrast, were always prime targets 
. ' 
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for assimilation and only after they remained "stif £-necked" 
and refused to totally comply did discrimination and persecu-
tion follow. What began as a self-imposed desire to be sepa-
rate but equal turned into a universally accepted antipathy 
toward Jews. Following therefrom, it is not difficult to 
understand why .the persecution of Jewish populations through-
out history has transcended in scope and intensity the per-
secution of other minority groups. 
Another common theme which pervades Jewish history 
is that the people of Israel's chief antagonists (e.g., Egypt, 
Assyria, Babylonia, Greece, Rome, etc.), after having venti-
lated their wrath, were eventually always conquered by yet 
another up and coming national power. Most of these oppres-
sive powers retained their identity only through the annals 
of history, and others retained some semblence of identity 
while becoming virtually impotent internationally, but none 
ever reclaimed its former political status in world affairs. 
Ironically the only nation (i.e., the Jewish nation) which 
has ever risen to become a key player on the international 
scene repeatedly throughout millennia (usually without even 
living in its own land) is the very nation the great powers 
of the world have so assiduously attempted to destroy. 
Again, ancient Egypt can be seen as the prototype 
for the above theme. After the Egyptians had wreaked con-
sidera~le suffering on the Hebrews, the ten plagues befell 
Egypt where all water turned to blood (Exodus 7:20), a plague 
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of frogs invaded their homes (Exodus 8:2), lice overran the 
land (Exodus 8:13), and a mixture of fierce beasts ravaged 
the country (Exodus 8:20). After that, pestilence destroyed 
the livestock (Exodus 9:6), sores broke out pervasively on 
men and animals alike (Exodus 9:10), a hail of terrible vio-
lence descended upon the land (Exodus 9: 23), clouds of locusts 
came in as never before witnessed (Exodus 10:14), an intense 
tangible darkness covered the land for three days (Exodus 
10:22), and finally every first-born Egyptian man and animal 
in the land perished in one night (Exodus 12: 29). Three 
days after the Hebrew exodus, the Egyptians pursued them 
and in consequence were drowned in the Red Sea (Exodus 14: 
27). Egypt was ruined, for five hundred years until the 
days of Solomon Egypt was not heard from (Miller, 1965), 
and it played no critical part in the history of nations 
thereafter. 
Before moving chronologically onward the historicity 
of the above event demands intellectual affirmation for many 
scholars in both the physical and social sciences alike, 
tend to ignore religious sources, as if science and religion 
(in any form) are mutually exclusive. This rule is usually 
accepted as gospel (or perhaps more appropriately termed 
the dogma of scientism, as not to be confused with the scien-
tific method) in academia and perforce precludes any viable 
integr~tion of the two. The above phenomenon is a poignant 
case-in-point of how this seemingly provincial perspective 
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of scientism may create an impasse in understanding the 
"world's greatest hatred." According to the above analysis, 
to omit the episode in Egypt because it is based on Biblical 
and Talmudic sources would b~ to omit the prototype for all 
subsequent discrimination and persecution directed against 
the Jewish people. This type of thinking is so prevalent, 
that despite the fact that the historicity of Egyptian perse-
cution has never been disproven by nonbiblical sources (Prager 
··'et al., 1983), the present author has not found one secular 
source on anti-Jewish hostility which gives more than a para-
graph (in passing) to the happening in Egypt. 
The lack of direct Egyptian documentation does not 
disprove the persecution and subsequent miraculous emancipa-
tion from Egypt, for both democratic and particularly totali-
tarian governments have been known to historically emphasize 
(or invent) their "glorious" past and to minimize (or negate) 
embarrassing or incriminating events. For instance, after 
World War II despite the vast pictorial and eyewitness evi-
dence, the testimony of tens of thousands of survivors, and 
the confessions of thousands of perpetrators, dozens of books 
and articles have and continue to be published which, deny 
the Holocaust (Prager et al., 1983; Cawley, 1985). 
This lack of perspective when dealing with anti-Jewish 
Phenomena becomes all the more salient when one remembers 
that both traditional Christianity and Islam have never con-
tested the above events in Egypt (with its subsequent culmina-
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tion at the mountain of Sinai). On the contrary, both tra-
ditional Christianity and Islam are wholly dependent on the 
historical veracity of the above phenomenon, and invoke it 
as one of the most convincing proofs of the existence of 
G-d and His relationship to the social world of men and 
women. These religions taken together embrace over a billion 
people representing the majority of what we call today the 
"civilized world" (Cohen, 1984). Without this historical 
" foundation all three religions turn into human fabrications, 
or as Karl Marx, the "great emancipator" put it "the opiate 
of the masses." 
The episode in Egypt when viewed objectively appears 
to satisfy most (if not all) of the criteria needed to vali-
date an authentic historical event. An event claimed attested 
to by some six hundred thousand adult men (Numbers 2: 32), 
in addition to women, children, and the aged which changed 
the way of life of a nation and eventually of the whole world 
would seem impossible to smuggle into the annals of history 
for all time. Similarly, we accept as fact that there was 
a king called Alexander the Great or a Roman legislator called 
Cicero because it is almost impossible to introduce fictitious 
public figures or mass events into recorded history. This 
logic is corroborated by the fact that the people who wit-
nessed the miraculous events were not members of a primitive 
servil~-type tribe, but rather a stiff-necked individualized 
type people. In fact there are many accounts in the Bible 
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(e.g., Exodus 16:3; 17:1; Numbers 14:22) of the Hebrews' 
contentious attitudes and rebellious actions. However, among 
all the Israelites' varied criticism10 and skepticism there 
is never a question concerning the authenticity of the events 
in Egypt, which is frequently referred to in the Pentateuch 
(e.g., Exodus 6:6, 20:2; Deuteronomy 5:6). 
Further corroboration for the above event is its 
highly unflattering description of how the Jewish nation 
·' developed. A nationally proclaimed hi story claiming to have 
evolved via slavery is not to be easily dismissed. Based 
on the psychology of political entities which tend to exag-
gerate their past in the opposite positive direction, the 
history of the Jewish people based on the Bible is to be 
seriously considered. A further support (as mentioned above) 
is that immediately after the recorded Exodus from Egypt, 
the ·great Egyptian culture and society came to an abrupt 
halt, and was not to be heard from until some several hundred 
years later (Miller, 1968). 
A major reason why historians are reluctant to deal 
with Biblical history in any depth may be a consequence of 
the pseudo-science known as Biblical criticism, which was 
introduced in Germany in the early nineteenth century. In 
brief, this criticism denies the historical accuracy of the 
Bible and claims multiple authorship at various stages in 
histor~. Their criticism, in most part was based on the 
Hegelian thesis that civilization had advanced from the prim-
. . ' 
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i tive stage, and as it moved westward advanced to a higher 
stage until it reached its apex in Hegel's Germanic Culture. 
Accordingly, Israel's Bible and her hi story were reconstructed 
to fit this chauvinistic mold. Everything was neatly arranged 
I 
in logical progression, and the religion of Israel was de-
picted having developed gradually from a primitive idolatry 
to the advanced monotheism of the prophetic period (Feldman, 
1965). 
Unfortunately for these scholars, their elaborate 
intellectual edifice was crumbling as quickly as it was being 
built. The first telltale sign came in 1887 when the Tel 
El Amarna letters were discovered. The letters revealed 
a well-developed culture in the ancient Middle East as early 
as the fourteenth century B.C.E. It portrayed a world quite 
advanced in intellect, commerce, trade and diplomacy, and 
demonstrated that Israel's history (originating with the 
Jewish Patriarchs) began long before the times of Moses (Feld-
man, 1965). Since then, the maturing science of Biblical 
archaeology with its base in Israel has made literally hun-
dreds of discoveries which corroborate the times and hap-
penings cited in the Bible (e.g., Keller, 1956; Negev, 1972). 
In addition to these atheoretical archeological dis-
coveries which substantively upset the philosophical basis 
of Biblical criticism, Universities in Israel have attempted 
over th.e last several years to examine the literary foundation 
of Biblical criticism. The entire book of Genesis ·(in its 
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original Hebrew form) was put into a computer, and based on 
grammatic, textual, and overall literary form the computer 
concluded (contrary to Biblical criticism) that the book 
was most probably put together by a single author (Spieg-
ler, 1982) • 
In spite of the evidence suggesting the contrary, 
the "established conclusions" of Biblical Criticism have 
become part of the intellectual baggage acquired by the aver-
... age college graduate (Kapustiri, 1978). Paradoxically, as one 
modern scholar (G. Mendenhall) has pointed out concerning 
the liberal adherents of Biblical criticism that "it is at 
least a justified suspicion that a scholarly piety toward 
the past, rather than historical evidence, is the main founda-
tion for their position" (Kapustin, 1978, p. 438). 
A final reason why many social scientists may shy 
away' from Biblical support is that secular academia, predi-
cated on the ideals and objectives of the Englightenment, 
represents in its original form a severance from the dogmatism 
of organized religion. Although a severance seemed to be 
in order in 1 ight of the many barbarous activities legitimized 
in the name of G-d, an academia (based on the scientific 
method) ostensibly seeking truth which blatantly avoids the 
psychological, social, political, and historical ramifications 
of a religious perspective is itself dogmatically ignoring 
the most powerful social phenomenon known to man. Accord-
ingly, the historian's avoidance of the Biblical account in 
... 
30 
ancient Egypt, in its relationship to subsequent anti-Jewish 
activity seems to poignantly reflect this bias. Ironically, 
despite historians' passing gesture to it, very few historical 
facts have as much logical and empirical support as does 
the Jewish experience in ancient Egypt. The event in Egypt 
is seen as representing the prototype for all successive 
anti-Jewish oppression which implies a common theme throughout 
history (something that other historians or social scientists 
have seemingly never been able or willing to locate). 
Most historians and social scientists when evaluating 
anti-Jewish prejudice skip over the following 750 years (from 
approximately 1290-540 B.C.E.) of history following the 
Israelite exodus from Egypt to the Jewish sojourn in Persia. 
The most probable explanation is that during this time period 
the Hebrew nation was an independent nation with its own 
government, religion, and land. It therefore, not unlike 
other political entities fought numerous wars, conquered 
and was conquered, and was eventually expelled from the land. 
At a superficial level this course of events has nothing to 
do with anti-Jewish hostility, which in its classic form por-
trays a virtually helpless but distinctive minority group 
residing among (or adjacent to) the non-Jewish majority popu-
lation. This superficial description appears inadequate for 
reasons to be discussed later (see Discussion, Chapter VI), 
but suffice it to say that according to this paradigm the 
Present Communist and Arab-world gang-up on the state of 
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Israel would not be considered a variant form of anti-Jewish 
hostility. 
Before proceeding to the more classical forms of 
anti-Jewish hostility it is important to mention two histor-
ical facts whose relevance to the understanding of this phe-
nomenon will hopefully become clearer further on. One, the 
many nations or tribes which warred against Israel during 
this 750 year period (e.g., Amalelites, Cannanites, Philis-
.. tines, Assyrians, Babylonians, etc.) have all been lost to 
oblivion. There is no group of people today (or for that 
matter over the last 1,400 years) who can definitively claim 
descent from these tribes and nations, and needless to say 
their religious, governmental, and political institutions 
are, at best, kept alive in the historical annals of antiq-
uity. Two, at approximately 928 B.C.E. (Encyclopaedia Ju-
daica, 1973) the Jewish Kingdom was severed. The northern 
Kingdom was called Israel (and comprised ten of the twelve 
tribes of Israel), and the southern Kingdom was called Judah. 
Between 722-720 B.C.E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973) the 
northern Kingdom (Israel) was conquered by the powerful As-
syrian nation, and its people were deported en masse to vari-
ous regions of the Assyrian empire. These Israelites of 
the northern Kingdom descended from the same ancestors, and 
had the same historical tradition as their brothers in Judah, 
and ye~ after their expulsion were lost to antiquity (via 
assimilation like their ancient international counterparts 
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as discussed above). This point becomes all the more impor-
tant when discussing Judah's (i.e., the two remaining tribes 
together with the priestly tribe of Levi) staying power 
throughout millennia amidst tremendously adverse conditions. 
Persian Anti-Jewish Hostility 
The land of Judah was eventually captured by the 
great Babylonian empire, and with the destruction of the 
Temple in Jerusalem in 5 86 B. c. E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 
1973) the remaining Israelites were deported en masse to 
Babylonia. This group of Jewish people (unlike their northern 
counterparts) did not totally assimilate into Babylonian 
society. Even after the mighty empire of Babylon fell to 
the Media-Persia empire, the conquered Jews living in the 
conquered land remained voluntarily distinct. This self-
imp~sed distinctiveness almost brought upon them a genocide 
more heinous than the one originally attempted in Egypt. 
This voluntary distinctiveness was used against them 
by the infamous Persian prime minister Haman. In short, 
Haman claimed that the Jews refused to adopt the ways of 
the empire, and were undermining the king's authority, and 
therefore needed to be utterly destroyed (Ester 3: 8-9). 
The Talmud (Megillah llA) relates the King's favorable pre-
disposition to Haman's plan, and consequently an official 
edict was declared concerning its implementation (Ester 
3: 12-1"3). The Bible (Ester 3: 5) also reveals the reason 
.. ·' 
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for Haman's unbridled hostility. Mordecai, the leader of 
the Jews at the time, refused to bow down to Haman who wore 
an idol around his neck. Mordecai's obstinacy tore Haman 
apart internally (Ester 3:5, 5:13), and attempted genocide 
was the logical consequence. Fortunately for the Jews, 
Haman's pl an backfired (see Biblical Book of Esther) and 
following his demise Mordecai the Jew succeeded him as prime 
minister of the Persian empire (Ester 10:3) • 
As in Egypt the Jews' refusal to be totally subjugated 
like the other subjects of the empire infuriated the ruling 
power. When attempts to break the Jewish spirit by estranging 
them from their traditions (Midrash; Yalkut Shemoni) proved 
unsuccessful, the only recourse left for these tyrants (or 
m'ore appropriately, these self-proclaimed deities) was to 
annihilate the Jewish collective body. Consequently, the 
Jewish people continued to persevere in their already "anti-
quated" traditions, and in their relationship to the Land 
promised them forever by G-d (Genesis, 17: 8; Exodus, 6: 8; 
Jeremiah, 7: 7; Ezekiel, 28:25). In contrast, the Persian 
empire was totally dissolved along with its indigenous type 
of religion(s), form of government, and societal mores. 
Greek Anti-Jewish Hostility 
After the seventy year Babylonian-Persian exile the 
Jews were permitted to return to their land and build their 
Temple· once again. In 332 B.C. E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 
. . . 
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1973), Alexander (the Great) of Macedonia with his 40,000 
soldiers attacked and defeated the larger Persian army, and 
conquered much of the land previously governed by Persia 
including the land of Israel. Alexander showed favor to 
the Jews allowing them to continue their autonomous rule in 
the land, and even extended their borders, adding to it three 
zones that had previously belonged to the Samaritans under 
Persian rule (Scherman & Zlotowitz, 1982) • 
Alexander's ambitions were cultural as well as mil-
itary. He expected that the various segments of his newly 
founded Macedonian empire would mingle and evolve a common 
civilization and way of life, modeled after the highly pro-
gressive Hellenic culture. The dissemination and influence 
of the Hellenic spirit brought in its wake libraries, sci-
entific research, and technological advancement (Mason, 
1968). Unfortunately, as time went by this progressive spirit 
degenerated into an intensification of idol worship with 
its usual concomitant corruption of morals (Scherman et al., 
1982). 
For 150 years Greek civilization and Jewish culture 
(based on the Oral Law) were able to coexist, but with the 
advent of Antiochus IV (175 B.C.E.) the relationship became 
badly strained. Antiochus IV believed himself to be divine, 
and ordered all people under his rule to erect statues of 
him i~ their temples, and to prostrate themselves before 
his image. He physically imposed Hellenic culture, and would 
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not tolerate the Jewish unwillingness to become Hellenized. 
consequently, he gave orders that Judaism must be destroyed 
(Grayzel, 1968). He called for the cessation of sacrificial 
service in the Temple, and in its place temples were to be 
set up everywhere where hogs and other non-suitable animals 
were to be sacrificed. He also commanded that the Jewish 
Temple in Jerusalem be converted into a pagan temple (Miller, 
1968). The observance of the Sabbath and Festivals, the 
·"dietary laws, circumcision, the laws of family purity, and 
others were singled out for prohibiton. All copies of the 
Torah were to be burned and anyone found possessing these 
books would be executed. Even to profess one's Jewishness 
was punishable by death (Scherman et al., 1982). 
This form of anti-Jewish oppression was distinctly 
different from the attempted Persian genocide. In Persia 
the ,Jewish body was to be annihilated, while under Greek 
rule the Jewish spirit was to be dismembered. Nevertheless, 
according to the Egyptian archetype both Persian and Greek 
forms of anti-Jewish hostility follow a common pattern. 
The pattern begins with an innocuous attempt to foster total 
Jewish assimilation into the majority culture. When Jewish 
separatism obstinately continues (in some manner or form) 
the Jewish lifestyle and/or presence is seen as a competitive 
threat and relentlessly attacked. Accordingly, both the Per-
sian and Greek empires (like their predecessor in Egypt) 
enacted unbearably harsh legislation in their attempt to 
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deal with this Jewish "backward" type of philosophy and life-
style which was said to be "contaminating" the "progressively 
minded" majority population. And both forms of oppression 
(i.e., of body and of spirit) were used in Egypt some one 
thousand years prior. 
Antiochus (like his predecessor) did not succeed in 
uprooting the Jewish spirit or collective body. Mattisyahu 
the Hasmonean, with his five sons led a relatively small 
·· group of militarily undisciplined zealots against the vastly 
superior Syrian-Greek army and miraculously prevailed 
(Josephus, 1970). (This victory in behalf of the Jewish 
spirit is celebrated today and better known as Chanukah.) 
Roman Anti-Jewish Hostility 
During the next hundred years the Land of Israel 
(better known as Judea) was ruled by an independent Jewish 
government (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973), but the Roman Eagle 
was concurrently conquering the already severed Greecian 
empire (Josephus, 1970). In 63 B.C.E. the Roman general 
Pompey was invited, by the Jews of Judea, to intervene in a 
civil war that was taking place among the Jews themselves. 
Unfortunately for the Jews, Pompey did not leave after helping 
to quell the internal strife, but ended up conquering the 
land in a battle which exacted tens of thousands of Jewish 
lives (Scherman et al., 1982). Once again the sovereign 
state of Judea was reduced to an autonomous vassal state, 
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but this time under the auspices of the mighty Roman empire 
(Josephus, 1970). Theoretically, the Jewish people should 
have been able to live peaceably under Roman rule, despite 
economic hardships and loss of national self respect, as 
they did for a time under both Persian and Greek rule (Scher-
man et al., 1982). Although possible, it did not work out 
that way for the spirit of unity and independence was a con-
stant irritation to the Roman proconsuls governing Judea 
(Scherman et al., 1982). Rome made many attempts to fully 
integrate Judea into its vast empire, but each attempt to 
erase Jewish national identity was countered by a stronger 
Jewish resistance. 
When Rome realized that Jewish separatism (i.e., 
national identity) was not to be easily uprooted via peaceful 
methods other more forceful tactics were implemented. Follow-
ing therefrom, the Roman proconsul Gabinus decided to abolish 
the spiritual core of the land which was the Sanhedrin (i.e., 
the Jewish Supreme Court). He reasoned that by stripping 
the Court of all its powers the people would be lost, and 
would consequently become as docile and submissive as other 
conquered nations under Roman jurisdiction (Scherman et al., 
1982). This strategy was unsuccessful for the driving force 
Of Judaism (i.e., the Oral Law tradition) which propelled 
and directed the High Court was continually being propagated 
by the_ scholars (i.e., the Pharisees), and was still the 
lifeblood for most of the people. 
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The years between 60 B.C.E, to 70 C.E. proved a peri-
lous period for the Jewish nation. The Romans were unrelent-
ing in their efforts to subjugate toe minds and bodies of 
the people under their dominion, and the Jewish nation proved 
equally as obstinate in their refusal to be completely taken 
over. This set the stage for many brutal battles between the 
two nations in which literally hundreds of thousands of Jews 
were slaughtered (Encyclopaedia Judica, 1973), and reached 
· • its climax in the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem (70 
c. E.) • In addition to the slain, many more were taken captive 
before the Jerusalem siege. Tens of thousands were sold 
into slavery, sent to toil in ships and mines, or presented 
as gifts to non-Jewish cities adjacent to Judea to fight 
against wild animals in their amphitheatres. Cities and 
villages were burnt and destroyed either in the course of 
,the war or afterwards as acts of revenge and intimidation 
(Encyclopeadia Judaica, 1972). The tortures inflicted on 
the Jews in order to compel them to transgress their Oral 
Law tradition reached an apex of barbarity (Josephus, 1970). 
Not contented with the above destruction the Romans searched 
out the Jewish families said to be descended from the house 
Of David in order to eradicate the last remnant of hope for 
the restoration of the Davidic Kingdom (Scherman et al., 
1982). 
As uncanny as it may seem, the Jews al ready protacted 
appearance in the annals of history was far from over. Al-
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though several Jewish sects which had broken from the Oral 
Law tradition had been abandoned, the scholars were busily 
rebuilding the Jewish nation. Their revived communal life 
was reconstructed outside of Jerusalem in Yavneh. Unfortu-
nately again for the Romans, the scholars reawakened the 
people's national spirit as well. During the ensuing sixty 
years (70 C.E. to 130 C.E.) Jews started buying up and culti-
vating the land of Judea once again. They flocked once again 
to Jerusalem in the hope of rebuilding the Temple under the 
jurisdiction of Hadrian the Roman emperor. However, within 
a relatively short period of time Hadrian abandoned his plan 
of rebuilding Jerusalem as a Jewish city, and instead decided 
to continue its construction as a pagan Roman city (Encyclo-
paedia Judaica, 1973). 
Within that sixty year interval the Jewish people 
had consolidated their resources and under Simeon bar Kosiba 
succeeded in liberating the whole of Judea, which for a very 
short three year period came under independent Jewish rule 
(Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973). But, once again the Roman 
empire prevailed destroying 985 of Judea's most important 
settlements. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were once again 
killed and according to the Talmud on the ninth of Av (the 
summer of 135 C.E.), the anniversary of the destruction of 
both the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem, the last 
strong~old (Bethar) was captured (Ta' ani th 26B). The Romans, 
determined not to make the same mistake, massacred large popu-
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lations, laid the land waste, sent great numbers of Jews 
off to slave markets, and under Hadrian launched an all-out 
war against the study and observance of Jewish law. Jews 
were forbidden to live in Jerusalem, and in order to blot 
out all reference of the Jews' relationship to the Land of 
Israel (Judea), changed its name to Syria Palaestina. 
The Roman empire eventually faded from history and 
its indigenous and conquered populations adopted (or were 
forced to adopt) new political leadership fostering foreign 
ideologies, novel individual and group mores, and untried 
innovative religions. Ironically, its fierce little opponent, 
the people of Israel, continued as before (and even flourished 
in an intellectual, spiritual, and communal sense) as a dis-
tinct civilization based exclusively on the Oral Law. An-
other, almost miraculous, phenomenon is that the Land of 
Israel (Syria Palaestina) after being laid waste by Rome 
was to remain neglected for the next l, 750 years (despite 
Arab propaganda to the contrary) , was never to become a sov-
ereign or even autonomous separate political entity (until 
the creation of the modern State of Israel in 1948), and 
continued to be the lifeblood (together with the Bible and 
Talmud) of the Jewish people throughout its 1,800 year sojourn 
in the Diaspora. 
A descriptive example to support the above point comes 
from M~rk Twain in his The Innocents Abroad, who after visit-
ing Palestine in 1867 described it as: 
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• • • [a] desolate country whose soil is rich enough, 
but is given over wholly to weeds--a silent mournful 
expanse •••• A desolation is here that not even imagina-
tion can gr ace with the pomp of 1 i fe and action. • • • We 
never saw a human being on the whole route •••• There 
was hardly a tree or a shrub anywhere. Even the olive 
and the cactus, those fast friends of a worthless soil, 
had almost deserted the country. (Davis, 1984, p. 10) 
Another example comes from a Report of the Palestine 
Royal Commission which quotes an account of the Palestine 
Maritime Plain of 1913: 
The road leading from Gaza to the north was only a summer 
track suitable for transport by camels and carts • • • no 
orange groves, orchards, or vineyards were to be seen 
until one reached Yabna village. • • • Houses were all 
of mud •••• The sanitary conditions in the village 
were horrible. Schools did not exist •••• The western 
part, towards the sea, was almost a desert •••• Many 
ruins of villages were scattered over the area, as owing 
to the prevalence of malaria, many villages were deserted 
by their inhabitants. (Davis, 1984, p. 10) 
The British Government's Director of Development, 
Louis French, wrote in 1931 concerning the Arab inhabitants 
of Palestine: 
We found it inhabited by Fellahin who lived in mud hovels 
and suffered severely from the prevalent malaria •••• 
Large areas ••• were uncultivated •••• The Fellahin, 
if not themselves cattle thieves, were always ready to 
harbor these and other criminals. The individual plots 
••• changed hands annually. There was little public 
security, and the Fellahins lot was an alternation of 
pillage and blackmail by their neighbors, the Bedouin. 
(Davis, 1984, p. 10) 
In short, in almost supernatural terms, the flowering and 
populating of the land took place before the Jews were ex-
pel led en masse, and its regeneration occu'rred only with 
the massive return of the Jews to the region in the twentieth 
century. 
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Although Jewish suffering at the hands of Rome was 
much more intense than the oppression meted out by the other 
previous empires, Roman persecution does not deviate in kind 
from the Egyptian anti-Jewish paradigm discussed above. 
The irrepressible desire to mold the Jewish people to be 
and act like the ruling power became the catalyst for oppres-
sion aimed at destroying the Jewish national identity and 
the unique Jewish spirit. Despite the fact that hundreds 
• ·· of thousands of Jews were slain in battle or savagely mas-
sacred, Rome's objective never seemed to be the eradication 
of the Jewish collective body. Rather, these methods were 
used exclusively as a means to break the distinctive Jewish 
national identity and spirit. 
For the next 1,800 years (i.e., from 135 C.E. to 
the establishment of the modern Jewish state in 1948) Jews, 
together with their Oral Law traditions wandered, literally, 
around the world. Jewish wandering was usually precipitated 
by fierce spiritual and physical persecution or by forced 
expulsion. A partial understanding of the Jewish 1,800 year 
exile is reflected in the many lands from which they were 
expelled in light of their refusal to totally assimilate. 
In the third century (C.E.) they were expelled from 
Carthage (North Africa), in the fifth century from Alexandria 
(Egypt) ,in the sixth from provinces in France, and in the 
sevent~ from the Visigothic empire. In the ninth century 
they were expelled from Italy, in the eleventh from Mayence 
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(Germany), in the twelfth from France, the thirteenth from 
England, the fourteenth from France, Switzerland, Hungary, 
Germany, and in the fifteenth from Austria, Spain, Lithuania, 
Portugal, and Germany. In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries Jewish populations were expelled from Bohemia, 
Austria, Papal States, the Netherlands, the Ukraine, Lith-
uania, and Oran (North Africa). In the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries they were expelled from Russia, Warsaw 
· · (Poland), and Galatz (Romania). In the twentieth century 
all Jews living in Nazi-controlled areas were relocated as 
a step to, Hitler's Final Solution, and in 1948, in order 
to escape severe anti-Jewish persecution, hundreds of thous-
ands of Jews escaped with their lives (while leaving their 
possessions behind) from the lands of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, 
and Iraq (Grosser et al., 1978). 
Christian Anti-Jewish Hostility 
The next epoch of anti-Jewish hostility which lasted 
for approximately 1, 500 years (from approximately 400 C. E. to 
1900) was probably the most unfortunate and unforgettable 
oppression the Jews had experienced heretofore. Unfortunate, 
because the non-Jewish world never had a chance to objectively 
study and learn from the psychological, sociological, and 
Philosophical systems embodied in the Oral Law tradition 
(the Talmud). Unforgettable, because the group perpetrating 
this oppression was a direct outgrowth of Judaism itself, 
44 
and when all the auxillary manifestations (which came about 
only after the foundations were set) are removed, may be 
justifiably called a form of Judaism not too distinct from 
other historical Jewish groups who had broken with the Oral 
Law tradition (the main difference was that the other groups 
died out whereas Christianity became a non-Jewish religion). 
This new form of religion (i.e., Christianity) centers 
in the person of Jesus Christ. Jesus, however, was not a 
·'Christian but a Jew. It appears historically that Jesus 
had no intention of breaking with Judaism· and that he would 
have been profoundly shocked to know that his works and teach-
ings would become the basis for rejecting Judaism (Lamprecht, 
1955). Being that Christianity in its Pauline form is based 
on the spirit of the Jewish Law while rejecting the letter 
of the Law, the remarks in Mathew 5:17-18 would not have 
spuriously been attributed to Jesus if they were not true: 
Think not that I am come to destroy the Law, or the 
prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill. 
For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, 
one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the 
Law, till all be fulfilled. 
Any orthodox Jew of today following the precepts of 
Oral Law Judaism would feel right at home with the above 
statements. There is no doubt that Jesus did break with 
the Sages in his interpretation of the fundamental signifi-
cance of the Law, but he was at best a revolutionary force 
Within, not against, Judaism. This is seen, clearly, in 
Matthew 15: 24: "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the 
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house of Israel [i.e., as their Messiah]." Similarly the 
Apostles, the group of disciples chosen by Christ to preach 
his Gospel were Jewish and their message (in the beginning 
at least) was directed exclusively at the Jewish people. 
only after the great majority of Jews, led by the scholars, 
refused to accept their brand of Judaism did they then preach 
to the non-Jewish Roman population. Other movements in Juda-
ism had sprung up over the centuries (particularly during 
" the great Roman persecutions which were right before and 
after the destruction of the Temple) , but none had succeeded 
in swaying Jewish popular opinion (for any lengths of time) 
from the Oral Law tradition as communicated and passed down 
by the scholars in each generation. 
The Jewish Christian movement, unlike the others, 
when confronted with Jewish mainstream resistance turned to 
the non-Jews, but their relationship to Judaism was still 
far from severed. The Founding Fathers of Christianity (i.e., 
the Apostles) were split on the desired relationship to Oral 
Law Judaism, and two schools of thought (i.e., the Petrine 
and Pauline doctrines) hotly competed to become the official 
dogma of the up and coming Catholic Church (Ruether, 1979; 
Gager, 1983). The accepted argument is that the Petr ine 
(as advanced by Peter) school of thought rigorously advocated 
a Judaized Christianity where both Jew and Gentile would be 
Obligated to observe the Law, whereas the Pauline doctrine, 
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which eventually prevailed, called for a complete abrogation 
of the Law. 
Al though this has been the accepted argument for 
millennia it has recently been called into question by John 
G. Gager (1983) who brings strong support to justify his 
claim that the Pauline doctrine of Christianity had been 
considerably doctored by later Church Fathers, who desirous 
to wean the people from any Judaizing influence recreated a 
·· Paul totally antagonistic to Pharisaical (Oral Law) Judaism. 
Gager concludes that Paul's real intent was to propagate 
the message of Torah (based on the Oral Law) for Jews and 
Christ for Gentiles, but that the consequence of any positive 
Judaizing effect on the new burgeoning religion was too 
threatening for the later church fathers to handle, and de-
manded to be wiped out in-toto. 
The importance of the above cannot be over-estimated 
for it expresses the in extricable relationship of Christianity 
in its pure form via both the Petr ine and. Pauline schools 
of thought to mainstream (Oral Law) Judaism. The difference 
being that this new sect of Jews (and only later Gentiles) 
believed that Jesus was the Messiah, and although they did 
make inroads among Jews, the great majority refused to accept 
Jesus as the Messiah. According to Gager both Petrine and 
Pauline doctrines, which lay at the foundation of true Chris-
tianit_y as propagated by Jesus and his Apostles are not in-
herently anti-Jewish, but ironically philo-Jewish in their 
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relationship to Jewish Law (Peter) and benevolently tolerant 
of the Pharasaic Oral Law system (Paul). It was only after 
the Apostles, when Christianity in the second and third cen-
turies began to sev'er itself completely from Judaism did 
total intolerance of Judaism and the Jewish people begin 
(Flannery, 1965; Gager, 1983). The early Church Fathers (as 
distinct from the Petrine and Pauline doctrines) while trying 
to consolidate Christianity and formulate one official church 
··'dogma, viewed the Judaizing influence in Christianity (as 
fostered by Christians not Jews) as an intolerable competitive 
threat. This was especially true all the while a viable 
Jewish people following their own traditions existed (Flan-
nery, 1965). To uproot the Jewish tradition from Christianity 
meant to uproot Christianity, but to accept it as legitimate 
meant to shed doubt on the Church's role as the new Israel. 
The only alternative was to claim that the Church had. replaced 
the old Israel because of the latter's "grievous sins," and 
particularly the abomination of Deicide (Flannery, 1965). 
Only through conversion could Jews redeem themselves in this 
world and the next. It appears that it was this total sev-
erance of Christianity from Judaism which eventually supplied 
the justification for the ensuing discrimination, persecution, 
and massacre of Jews in the name of Christianity. 
Before proceeding further, it is important to briefly 
• 
note Judaism's view of Christianity for the point is not 
Often made in discussing Christian anti-Jewish hostility, 
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and when discussed is oftentimes misleading. The Church's 
gui 1 t for the oppression of Jews from the four th century 
onward (after it had become the state religion of Rome) is 
sometimes mitigated by relating individual and local Jewish 
hostility towards Christians during the first and second 
centuries. This approach is misleading for the Jewish perse-
cution of "Christians" (which is infinitesimally insignificant 
to the latter's persecution of Jews) was not aimed, by any 
stretch of the imagination, at the Church. This was rather 
the result of infighting among Jews themselves as to which 
movement in Judaism was to prevail. This was not an unusual 
occurrence in Judaism (especially at that critical period 
in time) where historically other Jewish movements (e.g., 
Hellenists, Sadducees), who claimed parity or even the right 
to succeed the "antiquated" Oral Law tradition, went to battle 
(both figuratively and literally) against the scholars and 
their adherents, and which at times had bloody consequences. 
However, Oral Law Judaism's view of Christianity as 
a legitimate religious creed for non-Jews is completely dif-
ferent. Not only is the Oral tradition tolerant of other 
monotheistic religions, but states explicitly that all non-
Jews, obeying the seven general commandments (e.g., prohibi-
tion against killing, stealing, etc.) handed down to the 
sons of Noah have a portion in the world to come (Talmud, 
Tracta~e S~nhedrin). In addition, several of the greatest 
Talmudic scholars throughout history (e.g., Moses Nachlnonides) 
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have explicitly stated that Christianity {the very religion 
in whose name the Jewish people have endured untold oppres-
sion) is a permissible religion for non-Jews, and may be 
conceived as a positive phenomenon "in fulfillment of G-d's 
ultimate purpose" {Kaplan, 1979). Paradoxically, as is the 
case with most of Jewish history, the above Pauline doctrine 
(as reevaluated by Gager (1983]) seems to be a near perfect 
fit (i.e., Oral Law Judaism for Jews alongside a Gentile 
'··population embued with the Christian spirit). Unfortunately 
for the Jewish body and Gentile soul this perfect fit never 
actualized, and only their total differentiation based on 
the "despicable" Jewish character in concert with the Jewish 
"heinous" type of lifestyle regulated the relationship between 
the two. 
The pattern of Christian anti-Jewish hostilities 
reflects the pattern of oppression mentioned above in relation 
to Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Rome and only in its intensity 
and extensiveness may qualify as a different form of oppres-
sion. The general themes of anti-Jewish hostility discussed 
above are all present here: 
1. The Jews refuse to assimilate (i.e., convert) into 
the ever-growing Christian empire. 
2. The Church feels threatened and reacts accordingly. 
3. This reaction takes two of the three forms mentioned 
above: 
>. 
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A. the attempt to uproot any positive national iden-
tity via ghettoization or expulsion, 
B. the attempt to break the distinctive Jewish spirit 
via bookburning (specifically the Talmud), forced 
conversions, and monetary and physical persecu-
tions, 
4. The continuity and flowering (in the intellectual 
and spiritual sense) of Oral Law Judaism. 
According to Grosser and Halperin (1978), during the 
early Christian period (325-500) after Christianity had been 
adopted as the official state religion of Rome: 
A. Christians were forbidden to interact with Jews. 
B. State policy restricted the political and civil rights 
of Jews. 
C. Jews were forbidden to live in Jerusalem. 
D. Marriage between a Jew and Gentile was punishable 
by death. 
E. Forced conversions were carried out, and 
F. Sporadic Christian mobs attacked Jewish quarters 
and synagogues. 
The Dark Ages (500-1000) ushered in a new era of Christian 
anti-Jewish hostility. In light of political instability at 
the time of what was the Eastern and Western halves of the 
Roman empire the Church proved to be the major unifying and 
stabil~zing force. Jewish settlements, at the time, existed 
throughout the Empire in virtually every province and city. 
.. 
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Although Jews were declared enemies of the state for refusing 
to convert to Christianity the hostility at this time seems 
to be an elitist phenomenon with an absence of popular anti-
Jewish feelings. Support comes from the almost constant 
and repetitive royal and Church decrees commanding the faith-
ful and lower clergy to refrain from interacting and from 
maintaining friendly relations with Jews (Grosser et al., 
197 8). 
It is also important to note the gradual development 
of Christian anti-Jewish hostilities at this point, for it 
mirrors the above Egyptian paradigm. During the early Chris-
tian period (325-500) activity was limited to discrimination 
in which the Jewish national identity was severely threat-
ened. The Land of Israel could no longer be called a Jewish 
state (except in the minds of the Jews themselves), and their 
civil, economic, political, and even marital rights were 
significantly restricted, making them totally dependent on 
the arbitrary whims of the ruling power. The refusal to 
convert brought in its wake greater oppression where the 
primary objective was no longer to break the Jew's sense of 
national identity, but rather to break his Talmudic spirit 
rendering him maleable to Christian influence. Forced con-
versions, confiscation of land, childnapping, and prohibi-
tions against observing the precepts of the Oral Law were 
some of the more salient forms of persecution used to destroy 
the people's distinctiveness. 
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Following therefrom, when this plan of action failed, 
the body of the Jew became endangered. Although there does 
not appear to be any direct decree issuing from the Church 
to annihilate the Jews, the random torture and slaughter of 
literally hundreds of thousands of Jews during the Crusades 
(1000-1348), the Black Death (the Bubonic Plague) (1348-1357), 
the Inquisition (1366-1500), and the Eastern European pogroms 
(seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) in the name of Chris-
' · · tian i ty (Grosser et al., 197 8) seems to belie the declared 
objective of spreading Christianity throughout the Jewish 
world. 
More astonishing than the brutal persecutions wrought 
on the Jewish people was their superhuman tenacity to per-
severe. While Christianity was losing its political clout 
with the formation of nation-states in the latter part of 
the Middle Ages and was being internally ruptured by the up 
and coming Protestant movement, the Jews in their poverty 
and total insecurity were turning out Talmudic scholars and 
literature which most contemporary Talmudic scholars consider 
vastly superior to the Jewish scholarship of today. (For 
example, present day Talmudists would be seriously hampered 
in understanding Talmudic literature if it were not for these 
medieval commentators who in light of their scope of knowledge 
from primary Talmudic sources were able to explain and clarify 
the intricacies and dialectics of Talmud to future genera-
tions.) 
' .. 
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Muslim Anti-Jewish Hostility 
Islam was the second major religion to spring forth 
from Judaism (Prager et al., 1983), but as distinct from 
Christianity, its founder was not a Jew and it was not orig-
inally a Jewish sect. Islam, like Christianity had a uni-
versal mission to save the world, but in contrast to Chris-
tianity was armed with the sword of the state almost at its 
inception (Grosser et al., 1978). 
With the advent of Islam in the seventh century C.E. 
there was a large Jewish population in Medina where the first 
Muslim community was established (Prager et al., 1983). 
Muhammad, the founder of Islam, was greatly influenced by 
Jewish reli.gious practices and ideas (Flannery, 1965). Moses 
is mentioned in the Quran (The Muslim scripture) over one 
hundred times and presents the predominant figure in it 
(Prager et al., 1983). In the Quran (Sura 46:11) Muhammad 
writes "Yet before it was the Book of Moses for a model and 
a mercy; and this is a Book [i.e., the Quran] confirming." 
Muhammad also adopted the Jews' founding Father Abraham as 
the new faith's founding father, and in complete disrespect 
for the Hebrew Scriptures from which he based his new reli-
gion, inserted Ishmael as one of the Hebrew Patriarchs 
(Baidawi on Sura 2: 27) 1 and subsequently traced his own 
geneology through Ishmael to Abraham. Muhammad also granted 
legiti~acy to Christianity and although he denied the divinity 
of Jesus, he accepted the Nazarene as the last of the Hebrew 
' .. 
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prophets while considering himself the Messenger of G-d and 
"the Seal of all the Prophets." Paradoxically while accepting 
most of the narratives of the Hebrew Bible he accused the 
Jews of deleting from the Bible predictions of his coming 
(Katsh, 1962). 
According to Abraham Katsh (1962) 
Muhammad never intended to establish Islam as a new re-
ligion. He considered himself the rightful custodian 
of the Book sent by Allah (G-d) to "confirm" the Scrip-
tures. It is for this reason that in the beginning he 
saw no difference between Judaism and Christianity and 
believed that both Jews and Christians would welcome 
him. It is only later, when he realized that he could 
never gain support from either of them, that he presented 
Islam as a new Faith. (Introduction, p. 10) 
For example, in the early days Muhammad's followers prayed 
in the direction of the Jew's holy city, Jerusalem, and ob-
served the most solemn Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur. Only 
when Muhammad concluded that the Jews were unwilling to accept 
him as their prophet did he substitute Mecca for Jerusalem, 
and the Fast of· Ramadan for Yom Kippur (Prager et al., 1983). 
It is important to note that Judaism was not intolerant of 
Islam as a viable monotheistic faith for non-Jews (as was 
the case concerning Christianity), but only rejected Islam 
as a subs ti tut ion for the over two thousand year old tradition 
of Oral Law Judaism. 
The consequence of the Jews' rejection of Islam was 
almost inevitable. No group could validate Muhammad's claims 
as cquld the Jews, and no group could so seriously undermine 
his claims as the Jews could. As a result Muhammad turned 
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against them. His hostile reactions concerning the Jews' 
rejection of him and his teachings were then recorded in 
the Quran, giving Muslims throughout history divinely based 
antipathy towards Jews everywhere (Prager et al, 1983). 
In response to the Jewish refusal to convert, the Jewish com-
munities in the area of Medina were attacked and either 
slaughtered or forced to migrate. The Jews 1 iving north of 
Ka ibher were besieged by the Army .of Islam and the siege 
· · was eventually 1 i fted in exchange for tribute. After Muham-
mad's death the Kaibhar Jewish commuity was expelled and 
the northern Arabian peninsula was purged of all infidels 
(Grosser et al., 1978). 
Although there were periodic physical persecutions, 
mass expulsions, and massacres of Jews in the name of Islam 
from the eighth through the nineteenth century (Grosser et 
al.,· 1978) in Muslim dominated lands, the primary focus of 
Muslim anti-Jewish hostility was one of political subjugation, 
social humil ia ti on, and off ic:: ially decreed religious inferior-
i ty (Peters, 1976). Islam's anti-Jewish activities focused 
almost exclusively on Jewish independence. Jews and Chris-
tians were able to physically exist in Muslim lands as "people 
of the book" as opposed to pagans who would have to choose 
Islam or the sword. They were also officially allowed (though 
not always in practice) religious freedom, thus allowing 
them to continue their Oral Law tradition. Thus it appears 
that Islam did not feel the need to attack the Jewish spirit 
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via religious persecution or to annihilate the Jewish collec-
tive body. Islam only required that Jews and Christians 
alike be relegated to inferior positions in society in order 
to retain a secure position as the true religion. 
Official Islamic legislation which delineated the 
restriction of liberties and conditions of life, for Jews 
and Christians, were proclaimed in the seventh-century Cove-
nant of Omar (Muhammad's successor) which if transgressed was 
·• punishable by death. According to the Covenant, Jews were 
compelled to wear a distinctive costume with a ribbon, and 
a yellow piece of cloth as a badge, they were not permitted 
to perform their religious practices in public, or to own a 
horse; they were forbidden to drink wine in public; and they 
were required to bury their dead without allowing their grief 
to be heard by Muslims. I slam' s law decreed the 1 ightest 
of penalties for killing a non-Muslim, and the testimony of 
a non-Muslim against a Muslim was considered invalid. As 
payment for being allowed to live, the non-Muslim paid a 
special head and property tax. These and other harsh res tr ic-
tions of the Covenant were carried down through the centuries, 
and implemented with varying degrees of cruelty depending upon 
the particular Muslim ruler (Peters, 1976). The guiding 
Principle of Islam's treatment of Jews and Christians was 
(and is) tha.t Islam dominates and is not to be dominated. 
Once non-Muslims were willing to forfeit the civil liberties 
enjoyed by the Muslim majority they were able to physically 
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and even spiritually exist, but once Jews would receive equal 
status in Muslim dominated territory, and needless to say, 
once they would forge their own independent state in the area, 
the Jewish "threat" would become overly intimidating and 
unbearable. 
This is what actually happened in the twentieth cen-
tury with the mass immigration of Jews back to their historic 
homeland. The "demeaned subjects" had the impudence to claim 
·• independence over "Muslim land." As Yehoshafat Harbabi, a 
leading scholar of the contemporary Arab world put it: "A 
Jewish state is incompatible with the view of Jews as humili-
ated or wretched" {Prager et al., 1983, p. 123). All the 
while Jews and Christians were subjugated to Muslims in the 
Middle East, Islam could claim (via extensive rationaliza-
tions) superiority as the true faith, which had displaced 
. the ~lder monotheistic creeds. With the advent of Israel 
as an independent Jewish state the foundations of Islam were 
shaken. The "inferior" somehow prevailed casting serious 
doubt on the legitimacy of Islam, and with each successive 
Muslim defeat the tension became that much greater. Conse-
quently, Muslim anti-Jewish hostility has reached such pro-
portions over the last sixty years that today it is not only 
three million Israeli Jews who are endangered but, in light 
of Arab fanaticism, the entire world. 
According to the above historical account it was not 
out of some utilitarian strategy manipulated to foster uni-
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fication that Khomeini in his book Confronting Israel pro-
claimed: 
Oh brothers! Let us not regard this holy and sacri-
ficial war as a war between Arabs and Israel. Let us 
regard it as a war of all Moslems together against Jews 
and their leaders. It is the responsibility of all the 
Islamic governments with their peoples, with all their 
forces, and potential to aid and support Fedayeen (guer il-
las) on the lines of fire. (Davis, 1984, p. 133) 
The similarities between Muslim anti-Jewish hostility 
and those preceding it are clearly visible. Judaism was 
·· considered a serious competitive threat to Islam from its 
inception. At the outset Jews (and Christians) obstinately 
refused to accept the majority religion even amidst harsh 
persecution and discrimination. Also, the type of anti-Jewish 
(or in this case anti-non-Muslim) hostility was one of the 
three forms delineated above, where strict limitations of 
civil liberties and a total negation of Jewish statehood 
(i.e., nationalism) were diligently enforced. Although re-
ligious and physical attacks have been constant since the 
early part of the twentieth century, the attacks are not 
targeted specifically at the Jewish body or religion (as 
distinct from Christianity), but rather at Jewish statehood 
which is anathema to any G-d fearing Muslim. 
Another common theme present here is the tenacity 
of the Jewish people. Athough it appears almost anticlimatic 
when placed vis a vis Jewish pertinacity prior to Islam, 
the remarkable perseverance of the Jews can al so be seen 
here when compared to Christian communities residing in 
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Middle East "Mus! im territory." As mentioned above Mus! im 
anti-Jewish legislation also applied to Christians. However, 
whereas Jewish communities often flourished (in spiritual 
I 
terms), few Christian communities even managed to survive 
amidst Muslim hostility. The above is often lost sight of 
when favorably comparing Islam's anti-Jewish hostility with 
Christian activity, but the conversion to Islam of nearly 
every pre-Islamic Christian community in the Mus! im world 
·' bears testimony to what the Jewish people endured under Muslim 
oppression (Prager et al., 1983). 
Russian and Communist Anti-Jewish Hostility 
Just as many scholars in the world of science today 
hold on almost religiously to the basics of Darwin's theory 
of evolution, [though plagued today with more problems than 
it had when it was originally formulated (Marcell, 1978; 
Goldman, 1978; Spetner, 1978)), many also implicitly believe 
in the tenets of social Darwinism, which loosely speaking 
stresses an evolution of progress in the social realm as 
well (Mason 1968). Both in Europe and America with the advent 
Of the industrial revolution, a promising economic order 
via capitalism, political upheavals ushering in democracy 
and socialism, and all pervaded by a spirit of enlightened 
liberalism, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were to 
be a positive turning point for mankind. Unfortuately for 
the Jews it turned in the wrong direction. For the .Jew the 
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nineteenth and particularly the twentieth century would wreak 
the likes of discrimination, persecution, and massacre here-
tofore never experienced. 
From almost the beginning of Russia's history, a 
tradition of autocracy and devotion to Eastern Orthodox Chris-
tianity shaped a policy of suspicion toward European influence 
and specifically toward Judaism (Flannery, 1965). This dis-
trust was heightened, almost to the point of paranoia when 
·' Poland was partitioned in the late eighteenth century. Russia 
then became governor over the largest body of Jews in the 
world. Almost simultaneously with their admission into the 
new empire Jews were restricted to live only in the newly 
won provinces, the "Pale of Settlement" (Flannery, 1965). 
Even within the Pale itself, Jews suffered severe economic 
restrictions, extra taxes, and other hardships. For example, 
in 1808 the Czar, Alexander I issued an edict for the expul-
sion of the Jews from the villages and countryside and ap-
proximately a half million were driven like cattle into the 
cities and left in the open squares (Grosser et al., 1978). 
Alexander's successor Nicholas I introduced hundreds 
Of disabling laws curbing Jewish activities and went further 
than his predecessors, who in most part only stripped the 
Jews of their civil liberties to live, own land and work 
Where and as they pleased. Nicholas I determined to complete 
the Russification of the Jews attacked the Jewish spirit by 
forcibly conscripting Jewish youths of twelve and even nine 
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to an extended military service of twenty-five years (the 
twenty-five year obligation did not begin until the boy turned 
eighteen). These boys were brought to the farthest outpost 
of the empire, and beaten and tortured in an effort to "per-
suade" them to convert to Russian Orthodoxy (Flannery, 1965; 
Grosser et al., 1978). When Nicholas failed to break the 
Jewish Or al Law spirit (i.e., they obstinately refused to 
convert) he turned his attention to Jewish education. He 
·· decreed that Jewish children were only to go to special Jewish 
schools where Talmud was not to be taught, and where Judaism 
was taught according to - Russian Orthodoxy (Flannery, 1965; 
Grosser et al., 1978). Nicholas eventually abolished the 
state schools, for conversion was not being achieved. 
A third type of Russian anti-Jewish activity was 
initiated in 1881, when Czar Alexander III, under the influ-
ence,of his chief advisor Pobedonstsev, formulated his "anti-
revolutionary program" with its primary target Russian Jewry. 
The Jewish problem was to be simply solved, one-third was 
to emigrate, one-third was was to die, and one-third was to 
convert (Flannery, 1965). On Easter of 1881 the massacres 
commenced and over a twenty-five year period (1881-1906) 
thousands of Jews were murdered while tens of thousands were 
left maimed and destitute (Grosser et al., 1978). 
In 1915 Grand Duke Sergei,. Commander-in-chief of 
Russia's military, relocated 600,000 Jews to interior Russia. 
Approximately 100,000 Jews died from exposure or starvation 
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during the relocation (Grosser et al., 1978). In 1917, during 
the Russian Revolution massacres of Jews were organized and 
implemented by the Ukranians and the Whites. In the Ukraine 
200,000 Jews were slaughtered, and 300,000 children were 
left homeless and orphaned. During the Revolution and the 
ensuing civil war Jewish civilian populations were accused 
by both sides as being members of the opposing forces, and 
were accordingly dealt with. During this period it was con-
. sidered a mercy to be killed outright instead of gradually 
being tortured to death. Parents were forced to watch the 
torture of their children, and children of their parents. 
Jewish women were subjected to obscene acts and mutilation 
before they were granted the privilege to die (Grosser et 
al., 1978). 
It was within the above context that the Russian 
people collectively "converted" to Marxism and set out, like 
their predecessors to bring salvation to the world. Para-
doxically, the pious Russian populace, metamorphosed almost 
overnight from devout religionists into progressive communists 
(i.e., the transition from Eastern Orthodoxy to Communism 
over a relatively short period of time did not appear particu-
larly overbearing). The Jews, on the other hand, remained 
"infamously" Jewish. The only real change was that while the 
Pre-revolutionary chauvinistic Russia attacked only those 
Jews r~siding within the borders of the Russian empire, the 
Marxist Russia would strike at Jews everywhere. 
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As depicted above the Jewish presence appeared too 
intimidating for Russian governments of the nineteenth century 
to peaceably cohabit with, and their paranoia was blatantly 
transparent. With the inception of the Marxist doctrine, 
the Russian government needed no longer to fear the indigna-
tion and repulsion of the Western world for oppressing Jews. 
They were now universalists, furthering the idealism of one 
of the century's greatest thinkers, and like a chapter out 
· · of a fiction novel, the ideology just happened to be inher-
ently anti-Jewish. 
Karl Marx, a Jew, whose father had him baptized at 
the age of six in order that he should not have to suffer 
from anti-Jewish oppression (Prager et al., 1983) became 
the new legitimizing force aimed at uprooting and destroying 
the Jewish "cancer." Karl Marx, who descended from a long 
list of distinguished rabbis (McLellan, 1973), but who knew 
little of the Oral Law tradition argued against emancipation 
for the Jews until they abandon their "exclusive religion, 
morality, and customs" (Rotenstreich, 1983). 
Marx theorized that the role of economics had been 
the key determinant in the development of human history • 
. He believed that world peace could be achieved once man would 
restructure the economic order (Fisch, 1984). Therefore, 
When he wrote in his book On the Jewish Question: 
It is from its own entrails that civil society ceaselessly 
en~enders the Jew. • • • 
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Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no 
other god may exist •••• 
The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nation-
ality of the trader, and above all of the f inane ier. 
. . . 
As soon as society succeeds in abolishing the empir i-
cal essence of Judaism-huckstering and its condi tions--the 
Jew becomes impossible, because his consciousness no 
longer has an object. (Bottomore, 1964, pp. 36-40) 
he irrevocably set the stage for hostility toward Jews in 
all lands his theories were accepted. 
Marxist nations today attack the Jewish people via 
•" all three anti-Jewish strategies mentioned above. They at-
tempt to break Jewish national ism by defining Zionism as "a 
reactionary movement • • • which denies the class struggle 
and strives to isolate the Jewish working masses from the 
general struggle of the proletariat" (The Great Soviet En-
cyclopedia, 1952, p. 144 in Prager et al., 1983). The Soviets 
continue on this line of strategy in associating Zionism 
with, Nazism, and ever since the Six-Day War in 1967, the 
Soviet media has consistently referred to the Jewish State 
as a Hitlerian state (Prager et al., 1983). In addition, 
requests by Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel are fraught 
with hardships ranging from losing one's job, to an extended 
prison term, to exile in Siberia. 
Concomitantly, the Soviets have been continually 
attempting t,o destroy the Jewish Oral Law spirit. Synagogues 
are seized and converted into Communist Youth Clubs. Rabbis 
and re~igious teachers are imprisoned. All forms of Jewish 
education are barred, and the teaching of the Hebrew language 
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is outlawed (Fisch, 1984). Their attempt to annihilate the 
Jewish collective body is more indirect today, but equally 
as contemptible as their other anti-Jewish activities. They 
do this by providing untold amounts of organizational and 
military training together with sophisticated military hard-
ware to Israel's most hostile Arab adversaries, while these 
adversaries openly call for the complete liquidation of 
Israel. Although it is tempting to say that the Soviet 
· · Union's opposition to Israel is based primarily on Israel's 
form of government together with its close ties to the United 
States, the fact that Soviet verbal and active antagonism 
toward Israel has immeasurably exceeded its opposition to 
other American allies seem to imply otherwise. 
After describing both Muslim and Marxist's sources 
and type of anti-Jewish hostility, it is interesting to note 
an overt historical contradiction. Following from the above 
analysis it should have been clear that any effort to create 
a third Jewish commonwealth in the Middle East would be met 
with zealous and unrelenting opposition from both Muslim 
and Marxist camps. If the people of Israel posed a dire 
threat in a stateless and powerless condition, how overwhelm-
. ingly intimidating they would be when living independently 
in their own land. Although these logical consequences should 
have been foreseen, they were not. In fact, Theodore Herzl, 
the father of "modern" Jewish nationalism (and also a Jew who 
knew little of Oral Law Judaism), and his successors d.eclared 
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throughout the decades preceding the establishment of Israel, 
that the creation of a Jewish homeland was the only effective 
response to anti-Jewish hostility (Grayzel, 1968). With 
all due respect to the Founding Fathers, modern history tends 
to support the above analysis that not only has a Jewish 
state failed to reduce anti-Jewish hostility, but it may be 
argued that the founding of Israel has actually exacerbated 
the already precarious Jewish predicament. 
German Nazi Anti-Jewish Hostility 
Theoretically, the juxtaposition of Soviet leftist 
ideology with Nazi rightwing fanatacism appears absurd. Is 
it logically possible (barring war-time alliances) for two 
radical movements which are ideologically at opposite ends 
of the spectrum, and accordingly anathema to one other claim 
as their most inherent enemy the same seemingly innocuous 
Jewish people? More ridiculous, it seems, is that each move-
ment casts on the Jews the guise of the other. Soviet left-
ists have often referred to Jews as Nazi collaborators and 
Israel as a Hitlerian state (e.g., Will, 1979; Kochan, 1967), 
and Nazis have often referred and continue to refer to Jews 
everywhere as Communists (e.g., Anti Defamation League, 1982). 
According to the present historical analysis this 
apparent contradiction is no contradiction. Just as the 
Russian incapacity to tolerate Judaism in all its various 
forms predated communism, so to did Hitler's pathological 
67 
hostility toward Jews predate Nazi rightwing ideology. Both 
movements merely bequeathed to their adherents an ideological 
base, from which to "justify" the persecution and mass slaugh-
ter of Jews. 
Hitler's paranoia of Jews was unusually blatant from 
the start. Hitler's Nazism was not an independent movement 
which gradually incorporated into it anti-Jewish dogma once 
Jews and their Judaism were deemed intolerable. Rather, 
'the foundation of Hitler's Nazism was specifically Aryan 
superiority over the Jew and the threat of the "Jewish 
peril." As early as the 1920s he called for the el imina-
tion of the Jews who were "contaminating" the "Aryan race" 
(Goldberg, 1981) • 
In Mein Kampf, which Hitler wrote while in prison 
in 1923-1924, he blamed the defeat of Germany in World War 
I on the "Marxist leaders," and argued that had "twelve or 
fifteen thousand of these Jews who were corrupting the nation 
been forced to submit to poison gas," the mill ions of deaths 
at the front "would not have been in vain" (Dawidowicz, 1975, 
p. 3). In Hitler"s twisted mind Jew-hatred came first, and 
only afterwards was Nazi racial ideology required to justify 
his "final solution." For example, neither the Japanese nor 
the Arabs were denigrated by the so-called racially ideologi-
cal Nazis (both were Nazi allies) (Prager et al., 1983). 
According to Hitlerian logic the racial impurities dissemi-
nated by Jews were the Jews' subversive value system and 
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alien ideas. As Hitler put it, "the Jews speak German, but 
they think Jewish" (Prager et al., 1983, p. 153). 
In truth, the "racial" war of Hitler was focused 
against the Jew. Most everything Hitler did in the political 
arena centered around the Jews. Hitler's first political 
speech as well as his last will and testament contained 
charges against the Jews. Even the swastika represented 
for Hitler the battle between the "pure" Germanic race and 
· the "inferior" Jew. In writing about the Nazi flag, he said 
the swastika symbolizes "the mission to struggle for the 
victory of the Aryan man and at the same time the victory 
of the idea of creative work, which is eternally anti-Semitic 
and always will be anti-Semitic" (Goldberg, 1981, p. 207). 
Albert Speer, one of Hitler's ministers wrote in Spandau: 
The Secret Diaries that Hitler was capable of tossing off 
quite calmly, between the soup and the vegetable course, 'I 
want to annihilate the Jews in Europe'" (Goldberg, 1981, 
p. 207). 
Fan ta st i c as it may seem, the Nazis under Hitler 
did not necessarily attack Jews in order to achieve power, 
but it can be argued that their drive for power was primarily 
propelled by their passion to destroy Jews (Dawidowicz, 
1975). For example, late in the war when the Nazis were 
being defeated, German troops were deliberately taken from 
Allied Fronts in order to continue the mass murder of Jews. 
In 1944, when the Germans needed every one of their trains 
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in order to evacuate Greece, not one train was diverted from 
those taking Jews to death camps. And, while addressing 
the German people for the last time in 1945, Hitler pro-
claimed: 
Above all I charge the leaders of the nation and those 
under them to scrupulous observance of the laws of race 
and to the merciless opposition to the universal poisoner 
of all peoples, international Jewry. (Davidowicz, 1975, 
p. 28) 
The insanity of Hitler abetted by a pervasive anti-
" Jewish prejudice worldwide (Morse, 1968; Gilbert, 1975) set 
the stage for the unprecedented massacre of 6, 000, 000 civilian 
Jews, in a war which consumed close to 50,000,000 people. 
In the authors opinion, Hitler's ultimate desire (in brief, 
making himself god) was aptly expressed in a simplistic but 
revealing Nazi youth song that went "Pope and Rabbi shall 
be no more. We want to be pagans once again. No more creep-
ing to churches. We are the joyous Hitler Youth. we do 
not need any Christian virtues. Our leader, Adolf Hitler, 
is our Savior" (Prager et al., 1983, p. 160). 
There is one minor inconsistency in the present an-
alysis when super imposed on the Nazi German era. The apparent 
Problem seems to be Hitler's explicit intent to exterminate 
the Jewish people from the outset. He, unlike his predeces-
sors, made no initial attempt to break the national identity 
of the Jew, and also neglected any attempt to uproot the 
Jewish Oral Law spirit. This particular deviation is unusual 
for as illogical as it may seem, Hitler's war of "race" was 
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based on the unbiological differences in mentality he dis-
cerned between the German Jew and the German non-Jew (Prager 
et al., 1983). Although the German anti-Jewish legislation 
did follow this pattern (i.e., [l] discrimination and subju-
gation, [2] physical and religious persecution, and ( (3] total 
annihilation), it was clear from the start (or it is clear 
now) what Hitler's original intentions actually were. 
Hitler's almost immediate intention to annihilate 
.. the Jews without going through the above general process is 
not necessarily problematic, and may in fact, lend support 
to the analysis. As with other anti-Jewish movements dis-
cussed above, Hitler found the Jewish people's failure to 
totally assimilate (in mind as well as body) unbearably 
threatening. This Jewish threat throughout history (as dis-
cussed above) has taken three forms: (1) Jewish nationalism, 
(2) Jewish Oral Law tradition, and (3) the Jewish physical 
presence, and anti-Jewish hostility was always directed 
against one or more of these three forms. Hitler's immediate 
intent to annihilate the Jewish Collective Body was possibly 
because that was what tangibly remained of the Jewish phe-
nomenon in twentieth-century Germany. 
In the one hundred years preceding Hitler the newly 
created Jewish Reform movement succeeded in stripping the 
Jewish masses in Germany of any separate national conscious-
ness, ~ased on the Jewish relationship to the Land of Israel. 
It is important to note that the Jews unflinching relationship 
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to the Land of Israel made them voluntary sojourners in 
strange lands for 1,800 years. The national and international 
movements of the world attempted to uproot this "insolent" 
nationalism by severely restricting Jewish civil liberties 
(for a subjugated people in a strange land is a far cry from 
independent nationalists) but failed. In contrast, the Reform 
movement totally severed its relationship to the "antiquated" 
Middle East wasteland, and endeavored in body and soul to 
·· become as German (or even more-sol) as the Gentile Germans 
themselves. 
The Reform movement in Judaism also denied the Divine 
origin of the Oral Law, and therefore its observance was 
not binding. Jews were finally "free" to flex their intel-
lectual muscles in the great universities of Europe. Without 
Talmud and its concomitant tradition of observance the his-
torical Jewish spirit and character were also lost. Without 
a trace of Jewish nationalism and stripped of any direct 
Talmudic influence the Jews absurdly still posed for Hitler 
a competitive threat. Hitler's paranoia of the Jewish col-
lective presence seemed to find no respite unless all Jews 
were annihilated. In the end the Hitlerian monster died out, 
while his crippled and badly beaten arch adversary lived on 
to create an independent state in the Land of Israel. 
Putting the Pieces Together 
Just as the subtitle states, in this subsection an 
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attempt will be made to explain the above historical analysis 
in order that a parsimonious, and unambiguous theory may 
emerge. Before proceeding further it should be emphasized 
that even without the following interpretations, the present 
historical account has gone two steps further than most 
others. One, consistent themes throughout hi story have 
brought all major periods of anti-Jewish hostility together, 
and two, the anti-Jewish process is depicted as existing from 
the inception of Jewish nationhood in ancient Egypt. Irre-
spective of the above novelties several questions still demand 
explication before the above historical analysis can be con-
sidered a legitimate theory of anti-Jewish hostility. It 
is the author's opinion that the major questions still needed 
to be addressed are: 
1. Conceptuallly, what are the social-psychological 
dynamics underlying the above historical processes? 
2. What is the significance of the three target areas 
(Nationalism, Torah, and Collective Body) which power-
ful movements throughout history have so diligently 
attempted to destroy? and 
3 • Is there any empirical method to test the above theo-
retical analysis or must it be accepted exclusively 
on the basis of history? 
1. Social-Psychological Dynamics 
Conceptually what are the social-psychological dy-
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namics underlying the above historical process? As depicted 
above the primary catalyst of anti-Jewish hostility was Jewish 
distinctiveness and the psychological threat it posed to 
national and international movements whose objective to 
totally dominate ran counter and collided with Jewish sep-
aratism. Two political and/or religious entities claiming 
"chosenness" (albeit in highly disparate ways) are, by defi-
nition, contradictory and throw doubt, from external and 
· · internal sources alike, on the true nature of the entities 
involved. 
In order to bring the world over to their way of 
thinking these anti-Jewish movements were psychologically 
pressured to crush all forms of resistance. As John Horrocks 
(1966, p. viii) put it, "Social norms that support group self-
concepts of superiority or nuture group awareness of inferior-
i ty 'lead only to intergroup hostility." If the activities 
and goals of the interacting groups conflict, then the char-
acter i sties attributed 'to the competing group are invariably 
negative and derogatory (Sherif, 1966). 
Unfortunately for these self-proclaimed deities the 
Jewish nation (with its Oral Law lifestyle) was not like 
other nations and refused to die. All the while the Jewish 
Presence existed (sometimes as free men, and other times as 
veritable slaves) the declared supremacy of the various move-
ments was brought into question and absolute dominion was 
psychologically withheld. Accordingly, in order to foster 
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a sense of political and/or spiritual security these various 
movements throughout history attempted to completely eliminate 
'I 
Jewish distinctiveness. 
This obstinate Jewish distinctiveness was already 
documented by Josephus in the first century of the common 
era when Jews were being relentlessly persecuted by the great 
Roman empire. He wrote: 
••• they have a passion for liberty that is almost 
unconquerable, since they are convinced that G-d alone 
is their leader and master. They think little of sub-
mitting to death in unusual forms and permitting vengeance 
to fall on kinsmen and friends, if only they may avoid 
calling any man master (Permutter, 1982, p. 54). 
This "in terolerable" distinctiveness was also ex-
pressed by Adolf Hitler some 1,900 years later: 
It is true we are barbarians that is an honored title 
to us. I free humanity from the shackles of the soul, 
from the degrading suffering caused by the false vision 
called conscience and ethics. The Jews have inflicted 
two wounds on mankind; circumcision on its body and "con-
science" on its soul. They are Jewish inventions. The 
war for domination of the world is waged only between 
the two of us, between these two camps alone; the Germans 
and the Jews. Everything else is but deception (Scherman, 
1985, p. xiv). 
As demonstrated above it was this self-motivated 
Jewish distinctiveness which lay at the foundation (or better 
put, the primary cause) of historical anti-Jewish hostility. 
·This perspective is supported by Muzafer Sherif (1966) who 
contends that the primary cause of inter-group conflict is 
not "displacement of individual aggressive tendencies, in-
dividual ignorance, individual observation, or experience 
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with members of .the despised group" but rather it is a primary 
outgrowth of competition among groups. 
If Jews would have totally assimilated into the ma-
jority cultures like most other conquered people (who had 
the chance to do so) then by definition, they would not have 
suffered as a minority group. Other discriminated-against 
groups (e.g., women, Blacks under Arab and White dominion, 
t le. .. 
American Indians, etc.) were not as fortunate as the,\Jews 
' for they lacked the capacity to physically mingle without 
being detected. These groups, in light of their distinct 
physical characteristics were forced to remain, to some ex-
tent, separate. The Jews, in contrast, could have totally 
integrated without being detected. 
The Jewish competitive threat was that they, logically 
speaking, could have totally assimilated into all of the 
above societies and yet, irrespective of their vast cultural 
interaction, most often refused to totally disavow their 
Jewish identity. This unusually adamant refusal to be one 
with the ruling or majority population inevitably created 
intergroup competition, which (according to the present an-
alysis) brought in its wake much Jewish suffering. And, 
when this competition was based, loosely speaking, on the 
concept of "ultimate truth" the di scr imina tion and persecution 
became understandably more intense. 
As Muzafer Sherif (1966), based on much·experimenta-
tion and analyses of intergroup processes concluded: 
.. 
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••• intergroup conflict has shown that neither 
cultural, physical, nor economic differences are necessary 
for the rise of intergroup conflict, hostile attitudes, 
and stereotyped images of out-groups. Nor are malad-
justed, neurotic, or unstable tendencies necessary con-
ditions for the appearance of intergroup prejudice and 
stereotypes. 
The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile 
and aggressive deeds • • • was the existence of two groups 
competing for goals that only one group could attain, 
to the dismay and frustration of the other group. (p. 85) 
2. Significance of Target Areas 
The second question, "What is the significance of 
the three target areas (i.e., Nationalism, Torah, and Collec-
tive Body) which powerful movements throughout history have 
so diligently attempted to destroy?, follows from the first. 
If the inherent competitive nature of Jewish distinctiveness 
lay at the core of anti-Jewish hostility, then an attack 
against the Jews should be, in effect, an attack against 
those Jewish components most responsible for creating and 
·maintaining divisiveness. 
All the while a relationship is perceived between 
the Jewish people and their distinctive (albeit universal) 
G-d, conflict and tension is maintained. The logical means 
of dealing with the competitive Jewish threat was to destroy 
those components which most emphasize this perceived relation-
ship. In the author's op in ion it was not fortuitous that 
anti-Jewish movements throughout history have attacked (1) 
Jewish nationalism, (2) the Jewish Oral Law spirit (as em-
bodied ·in the Torah and Commandments), and/or (3) the Jewish 
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collective Body individually or in combination. For it is 
these three components which seem to represent the source 
of Jewish distinctiveness (i.e., the relationship of the 
Jewish people to their G-d). 
Anti-Jewish movements throughout history have seem-
ingly detected the sources of Jewish distinctiveness and 
have focused their attacks accordingly. The first strategy 
usually employed (as discussed above) is an attempt to break 
Jewish separatism (which is a direct by-product of Jewish 
nationalism). 'This is accomplished by expelling the Jews 
from the Land of Israel, by prohibiting their return, and 
by denying them the same civil liberties granted to the rest 
of the population. By denying the Jews the usual liberties 
granted to others, they are in effect, relegated to vassal 
status where their communal existence becomes totally de-
pendent on the arbitrary whims of the ruling power. This 
type of treatment should theoretically create a servile type 
of people, far and irreversibly removed from the status of 
independent nationalists, and a seemingly easy prey to assimi-
late. When Jewish distinctiveness obstinately remains intact 
the strategy focuses next on the Jewish spirit via pillaging, 
childnapping, rape, torture, and prohibitions against the 
study of Talmud and the observance of the Laws following 
therefrom. When this eventually fails the only remaining 
alternative is to destroy the Jewish collective presence in 
toto. 
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The following paragraphs will attempt to explain, 
via traditional Jewish sources, the perceived significance 
(both for the Jew and Jew-hater alike) of (1) Jewish nation-
alism, (2) the Jewish Oral Law spirit, and (3) the Jewish 
presence which competitve movements throughout history have 
attempted to eradicate. 
Jewish Nationalism 
The following are examples of the relationship between 
the Land of Israel to the people of Israel according to the 
Jewish tradition. 
1. Nearly two-thirds of the Oral Law, as we have 
it today embodied in the Talmud deals with the Land of Israel 
(Wasserman, 1963). This fact becomes all the more prominent 
when understood that the Talmud, like no other literature, 
has literally molded Jewish individual and communal existence 
during the Jews' 1,800 year sojourn in the Diaspora. 
2. One of the leading Talmudic scholars of the thir-
teenth century (Moses Nachmonides) wrote in his Hosafot to 
Sefer Hamitzvot: 
The commmandment is that we should inherit the land given 
by G-d, exalted be He, to our forefathers Abraham, Isaac 
and Jacob and that we should neither let it fall to any 
of the other nations nor let it grow into a wasteland • 
• • • This is a positive commandment for all time unto 
eternity. It is obligatory on each and every one of 
us, even in times of exile and dispersion, as evident 
from many places in the Talmud. (Yaakobi, 1984, pp. 47-
48) 
.. 
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3. "For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it 
for His habitation" (Psalms 132:13). 
4. "A Land [The Land of Israel] which the Lord thy 
God cares for; the eyes of the Lord thy God are always upon 
it" (Deuteronomy 11:12). 
5. If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, 
Let my right hand forget her cunning. 
If I do not remember thee, 
Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; 
If I do not set Jerusalem 
Above my highest joy. (Psalms 137:5-6) 
6. "Everyone who lives in the Land of Israel is 
similar to someone who has a G-d and every Jew who dwells 
elsewhere is similar to one who hasn't a G-d as it is written 
(in Leviticus 25:38). 'To give to you the Land of Canaan, 
to be for you G-d'" (Talmud, Ketuboth llOB) • (Translation 
Kaplan, 1979) 
7. "Even after one dies it is important to be buried 
in the Land of Israel because of its holiness, for everyone 
who is buried in the Land of Israel is as if buried under 
the altar of the Temple" (Talmud, Ketuboth lllA). (Transla-
tion Kaplan. 1979) 
8. Probably the most important detail in understand-
ing the relationship between the Jews and the Land is to 
· point out their (unprecedented) active relationship to the 
Land over their 1,800 year period (135 c.E. to 1948) of ex-
~- The adherents of Oral Law Judaism (the only form of 
Judaism with any semblance of longevity) whether in neighbor-
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ing Persia, or in warm Italy or Spain, whether they found 
homes in cold Eastern Europe, found their way to North Amer-
ica, or came to 1 ive in the southern hemisphere where the 
seasons are reversed, celebrated the Land of Israel's seasonal 
change. They prayed for dew in May and for rain in October. 
on Passover, they ceremonioulsy celebrated the liberation 
from Egyptian bondage, the original national establishment 
in the Promised Land. They prayed three times daily facing 
·' Jerusalem, and requested in each prayer to be brought back 
to Israel with all the exiles. They asked for the rebuilding 
of Jerusalem after eating bread, and made explicit mention 
of their exile, their hope, and their belief in the return 
to the Land during weddings as well as deaths. 
9. A further remarkable phenomenon concerning Jewish 
existence {irrespective of contemporary Soviet and Arab prop-
aganda calling the Jewish mass movement to the Middle East 
illegitimate), is that Israel is the only country on earth 
today that is inhabited by the same nation, with the same 
religious culture (i.e., the Oral Law tradition), speaking 
the same language as that which lived in it some 3,200 years 
ago (despite two great exiles where the last one extended 
1, 800 years) • 
The Jewish Spirit 
The following is an attempt to explain the signif-
icance ·of the Torah (a term oftentimes used to denote both 
.. 
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the Written and Oral Law) which Jewish antagonists have so 
diligently tried to u~root via traditional Jewish sources. 
1. According to the Talmud (Shabbos SBA), G-d' s 
purpose in creation required that Israel accept the Torah. 
If not, all creation would have lost its reason for being, 
and would have ceased to exist. 
2. The Torah is the only means through which the 
Jews can fulfill His purpose in creation (Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, 
in the Kuzari, 1964). 
3. In Deuteronomy (6:24-25), "The Lord commanded 
us to do all these statutes ••• for our good always." 
4. The main immediate benefit of following the Torah 
is spiritual, bringing the per son closer to G-d ( Zohar Acharey 
Mot). Each law acts as nourishment for the soul, strengthen-
ing it, and increasing a person's spiritual fortitude (Talmud, 
Yoma 39A). 
5. The many laws associated with daily life serve 
to teach self discipline (Maimonides, 1960). The Talmud 
(Avodah Zarah SB) states "when Israel is occupied with the 
study and practice of the Torah they master their desire, 
and are not mastered by it." It is similarly expressed in 
Numbers (15:39) "You shall remember all G-d's commandments 
and keep them, and not stray after your heart or after your 
eyes, by which you are led astray" (translation Kaplan, 1979). 
6. Torah Law acts as a survival mechanism, enabling 
Judaism to remain vital even through the harshest persecutions 
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(Halevi in the Kuzar i). Only the Jewish people who have 
followed the complete Torah (Written and Oral) have existed 
throughout history, while a single generation's lapse has 
led to major spiritual (and physical) debilitation (Kaplan, 
1979) • 
7. The Torah sets limits through which a Jew can 
fulfill G-d's purpose while living in a world that is essen-
tially hostile to it. Through the Torah, one can be part 
.. of the world, and at the same time, dedicated to the spiritual 
(Talmud, Berakoth 35B). 
The Jewish Collective Body 
1. In Jeremiah (2:3) the people of Israel are seen 
as G-d' s ambassadors to the world: "Israel is holy to the 
Lord; the first fruits of his increase: all that devour 
him shall be held guilty; evil shall come upon them." 
2. According to the Jerusalem Talmud (Taanith 2:6), 
the Jewish people are to be the ones to continuously repre-
sent the fact of G-d's presence in the world. 
3. In Isaiah (43:10), Israel is seen as having a 
mission to bear witness to G-d's existence "You are my wit-
nesses ••• and My servant whom I have chosen." 
4. In Isaiah (59: 21) G-d made a covenant with Israel 
that they would continue to be the bearers of His word for 
all time. 
s. Isaiah (42:4) "[Israel) shall not fail nor be 
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crushed until he has rectified the world, for the islands 
await his teachings" (translation Kaplan, 1979). 
6. Isaiah (51:~6) "I have put My words in thy mouth, 
and I have covered thee in the shad ow of My hand, that I 
may plant the heavens and lay the foundations of the earth, 
and say to Zion, Thou art my people." 
7. The people of Israel are traditionally portrayed 
as having the incessant mission of proclaiming G-d' s teachings 
" to the world. The objective is not to convert anyone to 
Judaism with the burden of carrying out the 613 commandments, 
but rather to inform the peoples of the world G-d's universal 
message as it is stated in Isaiah (42:6): "I, G-d, have 
called you in righteousness ••• and have set you up as a 
covenant of the people, for a 1 ight to the nations" ( transla-
tion Kaplan, 1979). 
8. Israel is thus seen as being the means through 
which G-d' s essence becomes more strongly revealed in the 
world. It is thus written, "[to] give strength to G-d is 
the duty of Israel His pride" (Psalms 68:35) (translation 
Kaplan, 1979). 
Before proceeding onward it is important to explain 
in brief the concept of "Chosen People." The concept has 
negative connotations in contemporary western society for 
it smacks of racism with all its ugly manifestations (the 
very type of attitudinal and behavioral set the Jews have 
suffered so tragically from). In truth the Jewish concept 
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of "chosen" is quite different in thought and in deed from 
the many groups in history who have relegated to themselves 
the title of chosen (in one form or another). 
In contrast to most other groups, the Jewish meaning 
of chosen has considerably mare to do with obligations than 
it does with benefits. The Bible makes it clear that man 
was created to emulate G-d's righteousness on earth. At 
first, all of mankind was chosen for this task but early 
· man failed and allowed corru.ption and violence to predominate 
over justice and kindness. Thereafter punishment for failure 
was to be on a national rather than universal level. In 
addition, according to the Bible, G-d chose one nation who 
were to act as G-d' s model nation on earth whose purpose 
was to demonstrate to mankind how to individually and col-
lectively conduct themselves (Gervirtz, 1980). 
According to Biblical and Talmudic sources the people 
chosen for the above purpose were the descendents of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob. Abraham agreed to a pact with G-d which 
was considered a guarantee that Abraham's descendents would 
receive Divine favor provided they followed G-d's teachings 
as expounded in the Written and Oral Law. These commitments 
meant that Jews had to meet many obligations not required 
of others. They were expected to maintain a higher level 
of moral purity and their self-control and devotion to a 
spiritual ideal would be more severely tested than others. 
Jews who did not live up to the standards set by the Written 
.. 
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and Oral Law would be causing a lessening of G-d's esteem 
in the eyes of mankind, and would be held directly accountable 
for such behavior. In return for their allegiance to G-d's 
Law, the Jews would become an extraordinarly propserous na-
tion. They would play a positively unique role in the history 
of the world, and would acquire a homeland brimming with 
Divine favor (Gervirtz, 1980). 
3. Empirical Support 
The final question addressed in this section is: 
Is there any empirical method to test the above theoretical 
analysis, or must it be accepted solely on the basis of his-
tory? The present author is of the opinion that the theory 
can be empirically tested, and all that is required is a 
little imagination without going beyond the conceptual limits 
of the above theory. The conceptualized anti-Jewish paradigm 
portrayed above is that of a totalitarian world power at-
tempting to dominate mankind both physically and spiritually, 
and therefore seeing in the Jewish presence a formidable 
competitor. But this paradigm is not an absolute, and without 
deviating from the theory we could generalize and say that 
any movement whether non-Jewish or Jewish whose legitimacy 
C and therefore existence) is implicitly challenged by an 
inherently competitive Jewish presence should feel the need 
to strike out against this presence, as it is manifested in 
Nationalism, Torah, and/or Collective Body. The forms of 
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attacking Jews and Judaism has changed over the ages but 
the process (according to the present theoretical analysis) 
has been consistent. In addition, it has not been a random 
variation of Jews throughout history who have consistently 
presented this competitive threat, but rather one group (i.e., 
Oral Law or Orthodox Judaism) which has obdurately maintained 
a continuity throughout millennia. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable in the upcoming comparisons to posit Oral Law 
· (Orthodox) Jewry as a true manifestation of Judaism (this 
does not necessarily imply that other Jewish groups are il-
legitimate, but only that this millennia-old group is, beyond 
suspicion, representative). 
Following from the analysis any movement whose legit-
imacy is seriously threatened by the Jewish presence would 
perforce (1) attempt to sever Jewish nationalism, (2) attempt 
·to break the Jewish people's bond to the Torah, and (3) at-
tempt to destroy the Jewish collective body, each strategy 
by itself or in combination. One way to test empirically 
the above analysis is to locate a group whose basic ideology 
puts it in direct conflict with present day Oral Law Judaism, 
and to empirically investigate if this group (i.e., their 
leaders) is to some extent, fostering (whether implicitly 
or explicitly) the severance of the Jewish people from the 
Cl) Land, (2) The Torah, and/or (3) the annihilation of the 
Jewish Collective Body. There does seem to be movements today 
Whose legitimacy is threatened by the Jewish presence and 
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whose activity may lend itself to measurement. According 
to the theory, these movements should follow a pattern of 
activity similar to those historical anti-Jewish movements 
discussed above. 
The groups posited today as distinctively anti~Jewi sh 
are ironically two contemporary Jewish movements. Reform 
and Conservative Judaism are depicted in the subsequent anal-
ysis as fitting the present study's theoretical anti-Jewish 
profile. Although superficially these movements appear to 
have little in common with classical anti-Jewish hostility 
the following pages will attempt to explain the theoretical 
relationship between them and their non-Jewish counterparts. 
The Reform movement in Judaism originated in Germany 
in the early nineteenth century, and was transported to 
America during the large German immigration, which began in 
the 1840s. In the last half of the nineteenth century it 
appeared evident that the future of Judaism in America would 
be Reform (Sklare, 1983). The Conservative movement in 
Judaism is an American phenomenon originating as a reaction 
to Reform Judaism which it deemed as "too Reform" (Liebman, 
1983), and this brand of Judaism eventually achieved primacy 
(i.e., numbers of constituents) in America after World War 
II. Today these two movements constitute a major percentage 
of American Jewry. Although with seemingly different phi-
losoph~es both movements deny the binding authority of the 
Oral Law, and claimed from their inception the unadaptability 
.. 
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of Oral Law (Orthodox) Judaism in America (Sklare, 1983; 
Liebman, 1983). They declared themselves legitimate alterna-
tive forms of Judaism, and although they never called Oral 
Law Judaism illegitimate, they deemed it outdated, an anach-
ronism that must change with the times. They pictured their 
types of Judaism as succeeding the antiquated Oral Law tradi-
tion, and leading the Jews of America and elsewhere through 
the Space Age and ages to come. 
Reform and Conservative Judaism are posited in the 
present analysis as competing with Oral Law Judaism for the 
allegiance of the Jewish people. It is this theoretical 
competitive factor which would place these groups conceptually 
on par with other anti-Jewish groups throughout history. 
The competitive nature of these Jewish groups is not obvious 
for their purported intent at their inception was not to ag-
gressively displace Oral Law Judaism (as other anti-Jewish 
movements have explicitly declared) but rather to provide 
for the Jewish people, particularly in America, a viable 
and adaptable modern form of Judaism. They allegedly were 
not attempting to uproot traditional Judaism, but rather to 
Provide a positive spiritual experience for Twentieth-Century 
American Jewry who could "obviously" not adapt the American 
lifestyle to Oral Law Judaism. Therefore, there was appar-
ently no conflict of interests and no real competition, for 
these ~odern movements were presumably not competing with 
Oral Law Judaism but rather attempting to save those millions 
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of Jews who, without a viable alternative would have left 
Judaism completely. 
Accordingly, these movements should not be depicted 
as competing with Orthodoxy, but rather as complementary 
forms of Judaism whose purported goals did not conflict with 
oral Law Judaism. According to their claims, they were not 
trying to sever the Jews' relationship with traditional Juda-
ism, but were rather attempting to save those Jews who pre-
sumably could not adapt. Although this was their claim, 
the following three arguments present evidence which tends 
to support the theory that these movements (i.e., the leaders 
of the movements) were more interested in breaking with tradi-
tional Or al Law Judaism than they were in providing Amer ica.n 
Jewry with a positive spiritual experience. 
1. Their claim to succeed Oral-Law Judaism was based 
on the alleged inability of traditional Judaism to adjust and 
adapt to the American way of life. Historically, in complete 
contradiction to their claim (as delineated above) the only 
Jewish movement to ever adapt (i.e., adaptation as a viable 
contemporary Jewish entity within the majority non-Jewish 
population) to all types of cultures and societies throughout 
history was the very same so-called unadaptable form of Juda-
ism known as the Oral Law tradition. Therefore, either the 
Reform and Conservative leaders were ignorant of Jewish his-
tory or_ else the claim was a trumped up canard used to ration-
alize their break with tradition. The spuriousness of their 
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claim is so glaring that it is amazing how so few writers have 
taken these movements to task on it. (In fact, literally 
millions of Jews in the post World War II period seemingly 
accepted their claim as fact. The argument that Reform and 
conservative leaders' understanding of history was different 
than the understanding previously introduced implies that 
the transition from Central and Eastern Europe to America 
was qualitatively more pronounced than Jewish migrations in 
the past. It is the author's belief that to assume that 
the mass Jewish immigration to America was more diverse in 
type than, for example, the Jewish mass migration from Judea 
to Babylonia or from Babylonia to Spain, Spain to Western and 
Central Europe, or from Western and Central Europe to the 
Slavic lands of Russia appears historically unfounded. 
2. The second argument which casts serious doubt 
on the Reform and Conservative leaders' original intention 
concerns the "at tempt" made by these leaders to adapt the 
tenets of traditional Judaism to the new American lifestyle. 
Even if we do credit. the Reform and Conservative leaders 
with an abysmal ignorance of Jewish history, the question 
still needed to be asked is how much of an effort was made, 
and how many generations of Jews in America had passed before 
these leaders concluded that traditonal Oral Law Judaism 
was passe and unadaptable. The answers to both questions 
is nil. Support for the above argument is based on the number 
Of Jews residing in America during the turn of the century. 
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In 1880, and 1900 the percentage of Jews in America was ap-
proximately 5 and 15 percent respectively of what it was in 
1972. This astonishing growth rate was on account of the 
mass immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe (Gartner, 1983). 
The mores and language of America was completely foreign to 
these immigrants whose primary (and sometimes only) thought 
was to provide their families with food and shelter. In 
essence their lifestyle was and remained primarily Eastern 
.. European and the only thing that tangibly changed was their 
new residence. It was their children, the first generation 
of Jews en masse born in America who had the first opportunity 
to create an optimal synthesis between traditional Judaism 
and the American way of life. (The number of Jews who arrived 
from Germany in the 184 Os was insignificant in comparison 
with the number of Eastern European Jews who arrived at the 
turn of the century. In addition, these German Jews brought 
with them the religious "tradition" of Reform Judaism.) 
This opportunity was never capitalized on, for the first 
generation-born Jews in America, who started raising families 
of their own immediately preceding and following World war 
II, followed the Reform and Conservative leaders' claim con-
cerning the unadaptability of traditional Judaism. In es-
sence, this was the first generation of Jews in America who 
had the opportunity to test Oral Law Judaism's resilience, 
but in~tead accepted their mentors' ahistorical and non-em-
pirical claims concerning the "dated" Judaism of their fore-
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fathers. Further statistical support for the above anal-
ysis is that from 1940 to 1968 the total number of Jewish 
families in America affiliated with the Reform movement grew 
from 59, 000 to 260,000 (Schwartzman, 1971), and over the 
same span of time the conservative movement grew even faster 
(Sklare, 1983). 
3. Reform and Conservative Judaism are not too dis-
similar from other Jewish sects in the past (e.g., Saduccees, 
' Bitosim, and Karaites) whose objective (which was fully 
realized only after the damage was done) was to abrogate 
the binding authority of the Oral Law in order to free them-
selves from the "antiquated" and restraining precepts of 
their forefathers. Officially, both Reform and Conservative 
Judaism do not "believe" that the Oral Law was given by G-d, 
and in regards to the Written Law (the Pentateuch) there is 
a variation of opinion within the groups themselves. This 
denial of the Divine nature of the Oral Law (and to a lesser 
degree the Written Law) should not be taken lightly for it 
implies ( 1) that the redactors of the Talmud (the Sages) 
~ (to suggest that Reform and Conservative leaders knew 
ancient Jewish history better than the Sages who lived 1,500 
to 2,200 years prior, is ludicrous) when they officially 
stated that the Oral Law was given by G-d (e.g., Talmud Trac-
tate Shabbos 31A, Tractate Berochot SA, and Tractate Gittin 
60B) , and that some or most of the multiple places throughout 
the Pentateuch where it states "And G-d spoke to Moses" (and 
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other varied introductions with the same expressed meaning) 
is a fabrication. (To claim that these statements are open 
to interpretation like other more obscure passages in the 
Talmud and Bible is to deny objective communication among 
people, and in a sense objective reality), and (2) that the 
millions of Jewish men, women, and children who were savagely 
raped, pillaged, tortured and murdered throughout hi story 
only because they believed the Oral .and Written Law were 
given by G-d were dead wrong. 
The present author is not claiming to support or 
refute the Reform and Conservative leaders' assertions on 
the above point, but is rather attempting to illustrate the 
crucial implications of their seemingly benign ideology. 
In essence, to "save" Jewish souls from completely assimi-
lating they did not need to deviate so substantively in reli-
gious perspective. However, to intentionally sever the Jewish 
people's relationship to the Oral Law tradition this strategy 
of perspective was of utmost importance. 
In light of the above, it may be argued that Reform 
and Conservative leaders were more intent on breaking with 
the Oral Law tradition (and replacing it with their own form 
Of Judaism) than they were with developing an intellectually-
honest form of Judaism in America. In fact, their call to 
break with traditional Judaism (by positing and emphasizing 
its "u~daptabili ty") seems to be inextricably intertwined 
With the firm establishment of their own movements; which 
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is not dissimilar, in procedure, from anti-Jewish movements 
throughout history. 
It is important to remember that American Reform 
and Conservative Judaism are products of nineteenth and twen-
tieth-century America, whose "justification" in breaking 
with Oral Law tradition was that it was deemed unadaptable 
to contemporary life in America (Sklare, 1983; Liebman, 
1983). Following therefrom, the Oral Law tradition in 1985 
America should be a dying breed (if at all still in exis-
tence), and in contrast 1 the more "modern" Reform and Con-
servative movements should be the dynamic forces propelling 
American Jewry today. However, if the present hypothesis is 
correct the reverse (concerning present day young adult Jew-
ish America who are, in the vast majority of cases, first 
and second generation American born) may be occurring. he 
present study's first empirical analysis is to pit Reform 
and Conservative claims against the arguments presented 
above. Simply speaking, if these movements' assertions are 
correct, then the affiliation of second generation American-
born Jews should support their claim. In short, second gen-
eration American-born Jews should have significantly abandoned 
the "outmoded" and "unadaptable" Oral Law tradition. Con-
versely, if their claims were originally specious, with the 
ulterior intent of displacing Oral Law Judaism, then tradi-
tional Judaism should be in the process of adapting itself 
to American society (as it has done in every culture through-
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out millennia). [See Figure. 1 where four groups differ-
entiated on the variable of religious affiliation are compared 
on (1) rate of inter-movement increase or decrease over one 
2..eneration, and (2) overall growth rate over one genera-
tion.] 
-
In addition, if these two Jewish movements are truly 
complementary forms of Judaism only interested in saving 
Jews who seemingly cannot adapt Orthodoxy to the American 
· scene, then they themselves should be growing (or at least 
maintaining themselves). In contrast, according to the pres-
ent theory, if these movements are not complementary but 
rather competing for Jewish supremacy, in which their original 
objective was more to wean Jews from the Oral Law than to 
create something spiritually positive themselves, then their 
movements should have had difficulty in maintaining themselves 
over the last genera ti on (i.e., lack of positive spirituality 
should produce a lack of commitment among their respective 
Jewish constituencies). [See Figure 1] 
Other Hypotheses to be Tested Empirically 
According to the present theoretical analysis the 
Orthodox (Oral Law) presence should represent a competitive 
· threat to Reform and Conservative Judaism. Not because of 
its popularity, wealth, or power (it is probably least in 
all three categories), but its continuous presence is seen 
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A. Differences In Maintenance Among Jewish Religious Groups 
in America 
Independent Variable 
Jewish Religious Group 
Affiliation: 
A. Non-Affiliated 
B. Reform 
c. Conservative 
o. Orthodox (Oral Law) 
Dependent Variables 
1. Inter-Movement 
Rate of Increase-
Decrease Over One 
Genration 
2. Overall Growth-
Ra te Over One 
Generation 
B. Differences in Relationship to the Land of Israel 
Independent Variable 
Jewish Religious Group 
Affiliation: 
A. Non-Affiliated 
B. Reform 
C. Conservative 
D. Orthodox 
Dependent Variables 
1. Intention to 
settle in Israel 
2. Number of Visits 
to Israel 
3. Attitudes 
towards Israel 
4. Knowledge of 
Arab-Israeli 
Conflict 
c. Differences in Fundamental Knowledge of Judaism 
Independent Variable 
Jewish Religous Group 
Affiliation: 
A. Non-Affiliated 
B. Reform 
C. Conservative 
D. Orthodox 
Dependent Variable 
1. Level of Funda-
mental and El e-
men tar y Knowledge 
of Judaism 
Figure· 1. Diagramatic Representation of Variables Under 
Empirical Investigation for Chapter I 
97 
as silently challenging the legitimate nature of the two other 
Jewish religious movements. 
Obviously the threat of Oral Law Judaism cannot be 
dealt with in the same manner as in the past (via non-Jewish 
movements), for they would perforce, be proclaiming their 
own illegitimacy. Their level of attack must be considerably 
more concealed, but (according to the theory) equally as 
desperate as their precedessors. Following therefrom, they 
·· should attempt to attack Jewish nationalism and/or the Torah 
in order to quell the Oral Law (Jewish) competitive threat. 
They logically would not strike out against the Jewish col-
lective body for they would be reducing their own potential 
constituency (which apparently contradicts their purpose in 
being), but by significantly reducing the Jewish people's 
relationship to the Land and/or knowledge of Torah, would 
in effect, be suppressing the competition and concomitantly 
be given the opportunity to legitimize their own gods (i.e., 
by rewriting the traditional laws of antiquity they have in 
essence established for themselves new gods). 
Correspondingly, the ideologies of both the ·Reform 
and Conservative movements today officially emphasize their 
tangible positive relationship to the Land of Israel. For 
example, on the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding 
of the Hebrew Union College (The Reform movement's institution 
for training American rabbis) in 1975 the Reform movement 
issued their statement of principles called the Centenary 
. ·' 
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perspective and proclaimed in connection to the Land and 
state of Israel 
we are privileged to live in an extraordinary time, one 
in which a third Jewish commonwealth has been established 
in our people's ancient homeland. We are bound to that 
land and to the newly reborn State of Israel by innumer-
able religious and ethnic ties. We have been enriched 
by its culture and ennobled by its indomitable spirit. 
we see it providing unique opportunities for Jewish self-
expression. We have both a stake and a responsibility 
in building the State of Israel, assuring the security 
and defining its Jewish character. We encourage aliya 
(immigration) for those who wish to find maximum personal 
fulfillment in the cause of Zion (Rosenthal, 1978, pp. 69-
70) • 
The Conservative movement 1 ike its Reform counterpart 
has also declared officially its inexorable relationship to 
the Land of Israel. For example one of its founding fathers 
Solomon Schechter was active in the Zionist Organization of 
America and was a delegate at several Zionist congresses 
and conventions. As early as 1928 the Conservative Rabbinical 
· Assembly at its annual convention pub! icly called for support 
of colonists in Palestine and aid to the Zionist movement 
(Rosenthal, 1978). Rabbi Robert Gordis (1978) one of the 
leading proponents today of the Conservative movement writes: 
In particular, no other aspect of Jewish experience is 
even remotely comparable to the impact of the people 
and the State of Israel in rekindling the "spark of the 
Jew" in the hearts of our youth the world over. In a 
world that has seemed to vow death and destruction for 
the Jewish people, Israel has given us a new gift of 
life. (p. 100) 
The affinity to the modern secular state of Israel 
should_be all the more intense among Reform and Conservative 
constituencies in that Israel's official policy, like their 
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own, is not bound (in the great majority of situations) by 
oral Law tradition (although approximately 20 percent of 
the state could be described as Oral Law adherents). Accord-
ingly, there should be no significant differences among the 
adherents of the three movements concerning their relationship 
to the Land of Israel. However, according to the present 
theory, any movement whose leg~timacy is threatened by the 
Jewish "phenomenon" as reflected in (1) national ism, (2) 
·' Torah, and (3) the Jewish presence would perforce, strike 
out at one or more of the phenomenon's components. If the 
Reform and Conservative movements are truly competitive (and 
not complementary) forms of Judaism, then these movements 
should be psychologically pressured to sever any real rela-
tionship their adherents may have to the Land (even if it 
contradicts their official platform). Following therefrom, 
the present study expects to find a significantly weaker 
relationship among adherents of Reform and Conservative 
Judaism than among their Oral Law counterparts. 
It should be mentioned at this point that the type 
of data collected in the present study (irrespective of out-
come) are not sufficient to conclusively support the above 
hypothesis (alternative interpretations will be discussed 
in Chapter VI, Conclusions). However, these data are neces-
sary to support the hypothesis, and conversely sufficient to 
refute it (i.e., if Reform or Conservative adherents have 
as strong or stronger a relationship to the Land as their 
.. 
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oral Law counterparts, then the present theory's validity 
is seriously suspect). [See Figure 1 where four groups dif-
ferentiated on the variable of religious affiliation are 
compared on (1) intention to ever settle in Israel, (2) visits 
to Israel, (3) attitudes towards Israel, and (4) knowledge 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict.] 
Jewish Education (The Torah) 
Jewish education is another area where the official 
platforms of all three movements converge. In theory, all 
consider a broad Jewish education to be a highly important 
aspect of Judaism. For example, in the Guiding Principles 
of Reform Judaism, which was accepted by the Reform movement 
in 193 7, its emphasis on Jewish education was clearly as-
serted: "The perpetuation of Judaism as a living force de-
pends upon religious knowledge and upon the education of 
each new generation in our rich cultural and spiritual heri-
tage" (Schwartzman, 1971). 
The Conservative emphasis on Jewish education was put 
down very succinctly by Rabbi Robert Gordis (1978) in his 
Seven Principles of Conservative Judaism in Principle No. 4: 
Jewish knowledge is the privilege and duty of every 
Jew, not merely of the rabbi and the scholar. A Hebrew-
less Judaism that has surrendered to ignorance and has 
ceased to create new cultural and spiritual values, is 
a contradiction in terms, and must perish of spiritual 
anemia. The regular study of Torah on whatever level 
is incumbent on every Jew, a supreme commandment second 
to none. (p. 217) 
Although officially all three movements encourage the 
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strengthening of the Jewish spirit via Jewish education, 
according to the present theory this should not be realized 
in practice. If Reform and Conservative Judaism are psycho-
logically forced to uproot the traditionally competitive 
Jewish presence, their "best interests" would be served (con-
trary to their official platforms) by uprooting traditional 
Jewish knowledge. Following therefrom, the present study 
hypothesizes that the followers of Reform and Conservative 
· • Judaism wi 11 be significantly less knowledgable about fund a-
mental and elementary Judaism than their Oral Law kin. (It 
is important to emphasize that here also these data collected 
are not sufficient to conclusively support the present hy-
pothesis, but are sufficient to refute it.) [See Figure 1 
where four groups differentiated on the variable of religious 
affiliation are compared on the level of fundamental and 
elementary Jewish knowledge.] 
In conclusion, the above historical analysis has 
helped delineate the reoccurring process of anti-Jewish hos-
tility, and in consequence a theory has been developed which 
lends itself to empirical support. The theory as yet, falls 
short for it only describes the primary root cause of the 
malady, without explaining how or why the common people, 
the masses, have turned against the Jews so vehemently 
throughout the ages. It appears farfetched to compare the 
masses' motivation to the motivation of the leaders. 
Historically, the common people's savage at tacks 
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against Jews seem to be motivated by constant misinformation 
and slander about Jews and Judaism. The primary catalyst 
remains the Jewish "threat" but lies and their dissemination 
seem to be needed in order to push the masses into action. 
Slander about Jews and Judaism would then be considered a 
secondary cause of anti-Jewish hostility affecting the 
masses. Without the masses' assistance the leaders' efforts 
to destroy the Jewish phenomenon would be greatly hampered. 
In the following two Chapters the hypothesized sec-
ondary (Chapter II) and tertiary (Chapter III) caus,es of 
anti-Jewish hostility will be explored. It is important to 
keep in mind that in exposing the multiple lies used against 
the Jewish people throughout history we are indirectly lending 
support to the above theory. Lies are only necessary when 
truth is too embarrassing or unbearable to utter, but para-
doxi'cally, the more lies, the clearer the truth actually 
becomes. 
CHAPTER II 
THE HYPOTHESIZED SECONDARY CAUSES OF 
ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY 
Several theories have been advanced to explain the 
phenomenon of anti-Jewish hostility. According to Gordon 
·Allport (1954), in his book The Nature of Prejudice the theo-
rist usually selects for special emphasis one of six ap-
proaches to explain the forces operating in the formation 
of prejudice. These six general categories are: (1) his-
torical, (2) sociocultural, (3) situational, (4) psychody-
namic, (5) phenomenological, and (6) the stimulus object 
approach. Although the present analysis cannot claim that 
all of the above categories are theroetically and simultane-
ously operative in the etiology of anti-Jewish hostility, 
it may be able to integrate most of these theory types if 
depicted hierarchically. According to the above historical 
analysis a primary factor in the etiology of anti-Jewish 
hostility could be considered psychodynamic in nature. The 
Jewish "competitive threat," as explained above is usually 
created by the anti-Jewish movements' unrelenting drive to 
totally dominate (both physically and spiritually) in which 
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the Jews' relationship to their G-d (as specifically mani-
fested in three forms) p~esents a formidable impasse. 
It is interesting to note the correspondence between 
the above historical analysis and the widely acclaimed psycho-
dynamic interpretation of prejudice which focuses on the 
"Authoritarian" personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levin-
son, and Sanford, 1950). Regarding some features which char-
acterize the authoritarian character type Erich Fromm (1941) 
· · writes: 
• The most important feature to be mentioned is the 
attitude towards power. For the authoritarian character, 
there exists, so to speak, two sexes: the powerful ones 
and the powerless ones. His love, admiration and readi-
ness for submission are automatically aroused by power, 
whether of a person or an institution. (pp. 44-45) 
Maslow (1943) further corroborates the above histori-
cal analysis by postulating the basic philosophy or world-
view. of the authoritarian personality. He states: 
Like other psychologically insecure people, the authori-
tarian person 1 ives in a world which may be conceived 
to be pictured by him as a sort of jungle in which man's 
hand is necessarily against every other man, in which 
the whole world is conceived of as dangerous, threatening, 
or at least challenging, and in which human beings are 
conceived of as primarily selfish or evil or stupid. 
To carry the analogy further, this jungle is peopled 
with animals, who either eat or are eaten, who are either 
to be feared or despised. One's safety lies in one's 
own strength and this strength consists primarily in 
the power to dominate. (p. 46) 
T. w. Adorno (1950) further interprets the dynamics 
of the relationship between the "Authoritarian" personality 
and hostility toward the Jewish people in reference to the 
Jews' "intolerable" instituted separateness. He elucidates 
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in the following the "Authoritarian" personality makeup: 
••• they are highly projective and suspicious. An af-
finity to psychosis cannot be overlooked: they are 
"paranoid." To them, prejudice is all-important: it 
is a means to escape acute mental diseases by collec-
tivization, and by building up a pseudoreality against 
which their agressiveness can be directed without any 
overt violation of the "reality princple." Stereotypy 
is decisive: it works as a kind of social corroboration 
of their projective formulae, and is therefore institu-
tionalized to a degree often approaching religious be-
1 iefs •••• In order to confirm to each other their 
pseudoreality, they are likely to form sects, often with 
some panacea of "nature," which corresponds to their 
projective notion of the Jew as eternally bad and spoiling 
the purity of the natural. Ideas of conspiracy play a 
large role: They do not hesitate to attribute to the 
Jews a quest for world domination, and' they are 1 ikely 
to swear by the Elders of Zion (an early twentieth cen-
tury Czarist Russian forgery alleging a Jewish conspiracy 
to control the world). (p. 765) 
According to Sanford, Adorno, Frenkel-Br.unswick, 
and Levinson (1950): 
••• hostility that was originally aroused by and di-
rected towards ingroup authority is displaced unto out-
9roups ••• the authoritarian must, out of an inner 
necessity, turn his aggression against outgroups. He 
must do so because he is psychologically unable to attack 
ingroup authorities. (p. 233) 
The above statements when super imposed on the present 
problem implies that it may not be Jews or Judaism per se 
that so frustrates the ruling power, but rather their in-
ab i 1 i ty (and the frustration which follows therefrom) to 
create the'ir desired form of society. In essence, it seems 
to be their own failure to create a smoothly running society 
which then breeds discontent among the masses, and corres-
pondingly calls into question their divine authority which 
so disturbs and frustrates these leaders. To forcefully 
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and explicitly silence the questioning within their own group 
would be to openly cast doubt on their self-proclaimed divin-
ity. This ultimate frustration is then best displaced on 
some out-group, whose antagonistic nature is not too dissimi-
lar in kind from those disturbing "voices" within their own 
fol lowing. In addition, attacking the out-group would be 
more easily rationalized as something positive and may in 
the process help to create an artificial unification among 
members of the in-group. In consequence, this hypothesized 
unification based on some external "competitive threat" may 
help suppress internally any physical or spiritual challenge 
that may arise. 
On a secondary level, the ways and means by which 
these leaders have been able to foster general animosity 
towards Jews has been via the simple but vile tactic called 
slander. It is the author's opinion that only through the 
incessant propagation of malicious lies have leaders succeeded 
in directing the anger of the masses at Judaism and at the 
Jew. According to the above categorization then, the second-
ary causes of anti-Jewish hostility would be phenomenological-
historical in nature. Phenomenological in the respect that 
a person's prejudiced behavior proceeds immediately from 
his view of the situation confronting him, and his reactions 
to the world correspond to his definition of that world (All-
port, 1954) •. The propagation of misinformation, misconcep-
tions, and outright lies have precipitated anti-Jewish 
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activity consistently throughout history (Flannery, 1965). 
As Josef Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda expert and leading 
proponent of the Big-Lie tactic claimed, "If a lie is repeated 
often enough, it will come to be perceived as truth" (Cohen, 
1984, p. 22). In fact, according to the research done over 
the last twenty-five years, negative stereotyping has often 
been found to be related to anti-Jewish prejudice (Bettelheim 
& Janowitz, 1964; and Quinley & Glock, 1983). 
It is historical in the sense that a continuous bom-
bardment of anti-Jewish slander over the centuries has seemed 
to set the stage for subsequent slander and its bel ievabil-
i ty. Correspondingly, just as present-day slander needs 
the support of prior slander in order to effect the desired 
results, so do present truths need the staunch backing of 
prior truths. Therefore before describing the present propa-
ganda being used against the Jewish people today it is impor-
tant to note their historical antecedents. Accordingly, 
the following exposition will attempt to reveal several gen-
eral-historical forms of slander oftentimes used to wreak 
havoc on the Jews, and only afterwards will attempt to de-
scribe contemporary slander and its potentially dire conse-
quences. At the conclusion of this chapter an empirical 
study will be presented with the proposed objective of study-
ing (with the hope of effectively countering) the anti-Jewish 
propag~nda programs of today. 
It may be difficult for some people to accept the 
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premise that truth can be so totally manipulated. On a common 
sense level it may sound absurd that large populations of 
individuals throughout history have literally believed that 
"up is down and down is up" w):}en it comes to Jews. In order 
to make the following anti-Jewish exposition more believable 
the slander heaped on another target group (the United States 
of America) will be briefly described. 
In his address to the Assembly of Captive European 
· Nations (September, 1984), Constantine Visoianu, Former Min-
iste:tM'of Foreign Affairs of Rumania stated: 
The United States is one of the very rare guiltless 
powers. America has set free territories that were under 
its jurisdiction; it has assisted in the liberation of 
many nations; it has helped almost every country you 
can name to save its independence and to restore its 
economy. In one way or another the United States has 
displayed a generosity that is without parallel in his-
tory. 
Now let us look at Soviet Russia. That country has 
set at nought every treaty it has ever signed; it has 
violated every principle of international law; it has 
never ceased working by subversive means to overturn the 
political order and to destroy the independence of other 
countries; it has, most notably of all, subjugated by 
force nine countries of Europe, each of which has an 
impressive record of freedom and independence. It can 
be asserted without hesitation that Soviet Russia's ag-
gressions are ummatched both in number and in scope. 
And yet the United States is criticized and suspected 
throughout the greater part of the world, whereas Soviet 
Russia has become the champion--if you please--of anti-
imper ial ism and anti-colonialism, and the defender of 
the independence of states (Dunham, 1961, pp. xiii-xiv). 
From 1960 to 1980 the powerful Soviet propaganda ma-
chine, which is rigorously deployed throughout the world, 
religiously disseminated "information" which consistently 
accused the United States of exploiting the developing world, 
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e,romoting the Cold War, opposing Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT), etc. (Shultz & Godson, 1984). The United 
states, not unlike the Jewish people throughout history, is 
not the Soviet's scapegoat but rather the Soviet's most for-
midable adversary. America represents one of the last real 
threats standing between Soviet Russia and total world dom-
ination. It is within this context that a brief (non-exhaus-
tive) historical review of slander used against the Jewish 
· · people beg ins. 
Ancient Egyptian and Persian 
Anti-Jewish Teachings 
Consistent with the historical analysis in Chapter 
I, the propagation of misinformation concerning Jews origi-
nates in ancient Egypt. It should be reemphasized that 
only 80 years before Pharaoh (King of Egypt) began offering 
his "reasons" for enslaving the Jews (Miller, 1968), Joseph 
the son of Jacob (Israel) had singlehandedly saved Egypt 
from ruination. In addition, Jewish tradition relates how 
the Hebrews had made themselves integral features of cosmpoli-
tan Egypt (Midrash-Tanchuma), and also their patriotic activ-
ity in respect for Pharaoh himself (Talmud-Tractate Sotah 
lla). Despite the above setting, Pharaoh, emperor of the 
most powerful and cultured nation of the world (during that 
particular time period) and self-proclaimed divinity (Midrash-
Shemot rabbah) declared: 
Behold, the people of the children of Israel are too 
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many and too mighty for us [they had arrived eighty years 
earlier with no more than seventy males 1; come let us 
deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come 
to pass, that, when there happens any war, they will 
join our enemies, and fight against us (Exodus 1:9-10). 
Haman (the prime minister of the vast empire of Per-
sia), with the explicit intent of totally annihilating all 
of Jewry, convinced King Achasverosh with the following argu-
ment: 
There is a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed 
among the people in all the provinces ••• and their 
laws are diverse from those of every people, neither 
keep they the king's laws, therefore it profiteth not 
the king to suffer them (Ester 3:8). 
The speciousness of Haman's argument is that according to 
the Laws themselves, there is "an obligation upon all Jews 
to follow the civil laws of the ruling country in which they 
reside (Talmud, Tractate Gittin lOB). 
Greek and Roman Anti-Jewish Propaganda 
Hecataeus of Abdera, a Greek historian of the early 
third century B.C.E. in an account of Jewish origins asserted 
that Moses "in remembrance of the exile of his people, in-
sti tuted for them a misanthropic and inhospitable way of 
life" (Reinach, 1895). Manetho, an Egyptian priest and his-
tor ian, embroidered the story by describing how the Jews, 
who were in "actuality" Egyptian lepers and diseased, were 
expelled by the Egyptian king and led by Moses who taught 
them impudently "not to adore the gods" (Reinach, 1895). 
The themes of leprous origins and misanthropy were rarely 
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absent from Greek and Roman anti-Jewish literature (Flannery, 
1968). It is important to note that the allegation of mis-
anthrophy was also employed against the early Christians 
(Flannery, 1968). Democritus, in his On the Jews, following 
his predecessors, claimed that Jews adore the golden head 
of an ass and, according to the historian Suidas, charged 
that "every seven years they capture a stranger, lead him 
to their Temple, and immolate him by cutting his flesh into 
small pieces" (Reinach, 18 95). The infamous "ritual murder" 
libel was born which (in various forms), was to be used 
<ti' 
against the early Christians and again against the Jews from 
the twelfth century on. This ritual murder libel would even-
tually leave an untold trail of Jewish blood in its wake 
(Flannery, 1965). 
According to Flannery (1965) Roman fabrications con-
cerning Jews can be traced back to Cicero in 59 B.C.E. Oc-
casion to display his feelings was presented in a trial for 
the defense of a Roman official Flaccus who had despoiled 
the Jewish treasury. "Their kind of religion and rites," 
he stated 
has nothing in common with the splendor of the empire, 
the gravity of our name, and the institutions of our 
ancestors ••• and, conquered and enslaved, how little 
the immortal gods care for them (Flannery, 1965, p. 19). 
The full realization of Roman anti-Jewish slander was ex-
pressed well by Tacitus. According to this celebrated his-
torian· Jews descended from lepers expelled from Egypt, and 
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followed a band of wild asses out of the desert. From the~e 
repugnant origins the Jewish rites were derived. According 
to Tacitus Jews worship the ass, which is "consecrated in 
Jewish temples." They abstain from pork in remembrance of 
their leprosy, an affliction to which the pig, Tacitus 
thought, is subject. Their use of unleavened bread on Pass-
over symbolizes the food they stole in Egypt, their Sabbath 
represents the day on which they escaped and to which in 
their indolence became attached. The other institutions of 
theirs are "sinister, shameful, and have survived only because 
of their perversity" (Flannery, 1965). It is interesting 
to note that as Christianity became more and more differen-
tiated from Judaism in the second and third centuries they 
were likewise fanatically accused by Roman writers of ritual 
murder, infanticide, sexual perversion, worshipping an ass, 
and cannibalism (Grosser et al., 1978). 
Christian Anti-Jewish Propaganda 
Christian anti-Jewish slander, consistent with the 
above historical description of Christian anti-Jewish hos-
tility (see Chapter I), does not appear to lay at the base 
of Christianity. It seems that the most vicious and destruc-
tive vilification of Jews by the Church came about decades 
(and possibly even centuries) after Jesus and his Apostles 
had laid the foundations of Christianity. Only after Chris-
tianity had severed its integral relationship to Judaism 
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did Pontius Pilate, known throughout history for his ruthless-
ness, become vindicated in his execution of Jesus (Goldberg, 
1979). Accordingly, early Gospels do not single out the Jews 
in general as at fault for the crucifixion, but the last in 
the series of Gospels to be written down does, and ironically 
turns out to be the most anti-Jewish and pro-Roman of the 
Gospels (Goldberg, 1979). Hence, Pontius Pilate, the Roman 
ruler, is sympathetically portrayed in deferring to Jewish 
· · · pressure, a deference he failed to exhibit in his other deal-
ings with the Jews (Goldberg, 1979). This image of the Jew 
as Christ killer (until of course, he or she converts) became 
the foundation and progenitor for multitudes of ritual murder, 
desecration of the Host, and Jew as Devil charges. These 
libels continued for 1,500 years and accounted for countless 
occurrences of pillage, rape, torture, and slaughter (Flan-
nery, 1965; Grosser et al., 1978; Ruether, 1974; and Trachten-
berg, 1943) • 
In light of the injury the portrayal of the Jew as 
Christ killer has wreaked, a brief exposition of its inac-
curacy is deemed necessary. First, crucifixion was never a 
Jewish form of punishment. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 49B) spe-
cifically describes the legal forms of capital punishment, 
and crucifixion is not one of them. This was a Roman form 
of punishment, used by Romans to kill enemies of the state. 
In fact, during the siege of Jerusalem, the Romans crucified 
as many as five hundred Jews a day (Goldberg, 197 9) • As 
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for the alleged influence of the Pharisees (i.e., Oral Law 
adherents) on the Roman ruler to carry out the crucifixion, 
the English churchman James Parkes in his book Anti-Semitism 
writes concerning the Christian Clergy: 
With sublime indifference to the evidence of the Synoptic 
Gospels themselves (which contain no mention of the Phar-
isees in the events of the arrest, trial, and death of 
Jesus) they lay the blame for the crucifixion on Pharisaic 
shoulders (Goldberg, 1979, p. 55). 
The Catholic Church in 1965 finally put to rest much 
· of this destructive falsehood with its statement on the Jews 
issued by the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council. According 
to The Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-
Chr istian Religions it was offically declared that the cruci-
fix ion of Jesus 
cannot be charged against all the Jews, ~ithout distinc-
tion, then alive, nor against the Jews of today. Although 
the Church is the new people of G-d, the Jews should 
not be presented as rejected or accursed, as if this 
followed from the Holy Scriptures (Goldberg, 1979, 
p. 57). 
Vatican II finally broke the long-standing theme of Jewish 
collective and eternal complicity in the crucifixion of 
Christ, but in the process much immeasurable destruction and 
suffering was wrought. 
Muslim Anti-Jewish Propaganda 
Unlike Christianity, the negative stereotype of the 
Jew in Islamic literature is as old as the religion itself. 
In fact, one need not go further than the Ouran (i.e., Islam's 
sacred texts believed to contain the revelations made by 
115 
Allah to Mohammad) to understand. Islam's official stereotype 
of the Jew (and Christian) which has given rise to severe 
oppression over the centuries. Not only has Islamic dogma 
led to a life of degradation and insecurity for Jews in Muslim 
lands (as depicted above in Chapter I), but since the incep-
tion of Israel in 1948, has been used to justify the ongoing 
attempt to liquidate the Jewish state. 
Muhammad charged the Jews with falsifying their Bible 
· by deliberately omitting the prophecies of his coming. 
And when a book came unto them from G-d, confirming the 
scriptures which were with them, although they had prayed 
for assistance against those who believed not, yet when 
that came into them which they knew to be from G-d, they 
would not belief therein: therefore the curse of God 
shall be on the infidels (Quran: in Grosser et al., 
1978, p. 376). 
In several other places in the Quran Muhammad speaks 
unabashedly about the "vile disbelieving" Jews. " • • • they 
brought on themselves indignation on indignation; and the 
unbelievers shall suffer an ignominous punishment" (Quran: 
in Grosser et al., 1978, p. 376). 
They are smitten with vileness wheresoever they are 
found; unless they obtain security by entering into a 
treaty with G-d [i.e., convert to Islam] ••• and they 
draw on themselves indignation from G-d, and they are 
afflicted with poverty. This they suffer, because they 
disbelieved the signs of G-d, and slew the prophets un-
justly; this because they are rebellious, and transgressed 
(Quran: in Grosser et al., 1978, p. 376). 
"Thou shall surely find the most violent of all men 
in enmity against the true believers to be the Jews, and 
the id~laters" (Quran: Grosser et al., 1978. p. 37~). 
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Muhammad also declared that Jews, as their Christian 
counterparts, were not true monotheists, a charge he supported 
by claiming that the Jews believed the prophet Ezra to be 
the son of G-d. "The Jews say: Ezra is the son of God' 
. . • God assail them! How they are perverted!" (Quran 
9:30) ." 
Russian and Communist Anti-Jewish 
Propaganda 
The father of Marxist ideology and modern Communism 
was Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-1883). Marx's father had con-
verted to Christianity before Karl's birth in order to retain 
his law practice (forbidden to Jews under the new Prussian 
laws), and baptized his children so that they would not have 
to suffer from further anti-Jewish legislation. It was into 
this identity negating world that Marx was born (Prager et 
al., 1983). The poisonous anti-Jewish rhetoric sowed by 
the great "emancipator" was to set an intellectual precedent 
which would be subsequently manipulated to "justify" the 
ongoing Communist oppression of Soviet Jewry, and denunciation 
of Jewry worldwide. 
On the Jewish Question Marx writes: 
Let us consider the real Jew: not the Sabbath Jew 
••• but the everyday Jew. 
Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, 
but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real 
Jew. 
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical 
need, self interest. What is the worldly cult of the 
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money. 
Very well: then in emancipating itself from huckster-
. ' 
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ing and money, and thus from real and practical Judaism, 
our age would emancipate itself •••• 
We discern in Judaism, therefore, a universal anti-
social element of the present time, whose historical 
development, zealously aided in its harmful aspects by 
the Jews, has now attained its culminating point, a point 
at which it must necessarily begin to disintegrate. 
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews 
is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism •••• 
Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no 
other god may exist •••• 
The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation 
of society from Judaism (emphasis added). (In Fisch, 
1984, pp. 173-174). 
Lest the reader believe that Russian anti-Jewish 
slander originated with the advent of the Russian revolution, 
it is important to note other vile misinformation Russian 
governments had previously disseminated. The infamous govern-
ment instigated pogroms (1881-1906) which destroyed hundreds 
of Jewish communities (Grosser et al., 1978) was blamed (by 
the Czarist government) on Jewish "exploitation" of the 
peas.ants, and on Jews as Christ-killers (Flannery, 1965). 
The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion the for-
gery of the century was the handiwork of Czarist Russia (Flan-
nery, 1965). The Protocols first appeared in 1905 printed 
by the government press and were alleged to be extracts from 
the 1897 world Zionist Congress in Basel which dealt with 
plans to conquer the world that date back to King Solomon 
in 929 B.C.E. In essence, the Protocols were claimed to be 
a series of lectures on plans and techniques for subjugating 
the worl~ and establishing a Jewish world state (this alleged 
Jewish· conspiracy was similar to its medieval forerunner, 
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where the Jews were held responsible for the Black Death 
in their "attempt" to destroy all of Christendom) • Despite 
the Protocols' exposure as a crude forgery they received 
excited attention throughout Europe and beyond, and reached 
their peak of influence in Nazi Germany (Flannery, 1965). 
During the Russian revolution (1917) and subsequent 
Civil War it is estimated that over 250,000 Jewish civilians 
perished. These civilians were slaughtered primarily by 
the Ukranians and the Whites who were convinced of the Jewish 
communist nature (Grosser et al., 1978). It is interesting 
to note that these "avid Marxist-Communist" Jews according 
to the Russian Whites, were none other than the same "ex-
ploiting capitalists," as described in length by Marx himself. 
Nazi Anti-Jewish Propaganda 
The foundation for most (if not all) of the patho-
logical lies used by Nazi Germany to "justify" the annihila-
tion of six million Jews can be found in Hitler's Mein Kampf. 
Mein Kampf, which Hitler wrote in 1923-1924 while serving a 
prison term, was an attempt by Hitler to put his ideas to-
gether in the form of an autobiography, ideological doctrine, 
and party manual all in one. The following are excerpts 
from Mein Kampf taken from Lucy Davidowicz's (1975) classic 
The War Against the Jews which vividly describe, along with 
the ludicrous lie's, Hitler's unrelenting paranoia of the 
Jewish.presence. 
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The effect of Jewry will be racial tuberculosis of 
nations. (p. 21) 
If the Jews were alone in this world, they would 
stifle in filth and offal. (p. 24) 
Concerning democracy, he stated "only the Jew can 
praise an institution which is as dirty and false as he him-
self" (p. 26). 
"The Jewish doctrine of Marxism," Hitler contended, 
rejects "the aristocratic principle of Nature." The goal 
· of Marxism "is and remains the destruction of all non-Jewish 
national states." Marxism itself, Hitler believed "system-
atically plans to hand the world over to the Jews" (p. 26). 
It is the inexorable Jew who struggles for his dom-
ination over nations. No nation can remove this hand 
from its throat except by the sword. Only the assembled 
and concentrated might of a national passion rearing up 
in its strength can defy the international enslavement 
of peoples. Such a process is and remains a bloody one. 
The Jew would really devour the people of the earth, 
would become their master. 
, The international world Jew slowly but surely 
strangles us. 
The Jew destroys the racial foundations of our ex-
istence and thus destroys our people for all time. 
(p. 211) 
Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance 
with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending 
myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of 
the Lord. (p. 220) 
On April 15, 1945, after six million Jews had been 
systematically slaughtered, Hitler gave his last military 
order: 
For the last time our mortal enemies the Jewish Bolsheviks 
have launched their massive forces to the attack. Their 
aim is to reduce Germany to ruins and to exterminate 
oui people. (p. 223) 
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Contemporary Anti-Jewish Propaganda 
Although the Western world (both Jews and Christians 
alike) would probably like to believe that the propaganda 
process against Jews is no longer a serious problem, the 
post World War II period has brought with it a new wave of 
virulent propaganda aimed at vilifying the same millenia-
old target group. However, this time the allegations are 
not directed against a highly vulnerable mi nor i ty group, 
and this time the group is not seen as craftily attempting 
to undermine society. Rather, today the allegations are 
directed against a powerful majority population (the Jews 
of Israel), a group portrayed by Communist and Arab-Muslim 
propagandists alike, as savagely and imperialistically sub-
duing and attempting to eradicate an entire Palestinian Arab 
nation. The primary platform for disseminating this vile 
slander is none other than the beacon of "Fraternity," and 
"good will toward men" itself, the United Nations (Givet, 
1982; Seidman, 1982). 
Israel's former chief delegate to the United Nations, 
Yehuda Blum, while addressing the United Nations general 
assembly succinctly asserted: 
In this building [U.N. J, Southern Yemen, East Germany, 
or Afghanistan are democracies. In this building, Libya, 
Vietnam, and Iraq are peace loving states. In this build-
ing, Cuba is a non-aligned country. In this building, 
the Soviet Union is the leader of an alleged peace camp, 
and any challenge in this regard is always refuted by 
the representatives of Budapest, Prague, Kabul, and War-
saw, who can testify to the Soviet Union's peaceful in-
tentions. In this building, the Arab aggressors who 
.. 
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are ganging up on my country since its establishment as 
an independent state, and who openly profess their desire 
to see it disappear from the face of the earth--are pro-
claimed as victims of aggression, and Israel, the target 
of their sinister design, is branded an aggressor. (Seid-
man, 1982, p. 5) 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former u.s. ambas-
sador to the United Nations, wrote in an article for The 
New Leader in November, 1979: 
It would be tempting to see in this propaganda nothing 
more than bigotry of a quite traditional sort that can, 
sooner or later, be overcome. But the anti-Israel, anti-
Zionist campaign is not uninformed bigotry, it is con-
scious politics. We are dealing here not with the primi-
tive but with the sophisticated, with the world's most 
powerful propaganda apparatus--that of the Soviet Union 
and the dozens of governments which echo it. Further, 
this fact of world politics creates altogether new prob-
lems for those interested in the fate of democracies in 
the world, and of Israel in the Middle East. It is not 
merely that our adversaries have commenced an effort to 
destroy the legitimacy of a kindr.ed democracy through 
the incessant repetition of the Zionist-racist lie. It 
is that others can come to believe it also. Americans 
among them. (Gi vet, 1982, pp. xii-xiii) 
Former United States ambassador to the United 
Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick seemed to sum it up when she 
declared: 
The Holocaust did not begin with building gas cham-
bers. It began with uttering evil words, with defama-
tion. The United Nations, today, is following the same 
path by poisoning the atmosphere with hatred against 
Israel, Zionism, and Judaism. (Seidman, 1982, p. vii) 
In the present author's opinion, the more sophi s-
ticated Arab propaganda themes, based on scholarly written 
Pro-Arab English literary works (which are currently dis-
seminated in the West), goes something like the following: 
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At the onset of the British mandate of Palestine 
there was close to three-quarters of a million Arabs 
living in Palestine who had been on the land since time 
immemorial. The land of Palestine was a land flowing 
with milk and honey adorned with beautiful mountains 
and luxurious valleys; the rocks producing excellent 
water; and no part empty of delight or profit. The Pal-
estinian people were a socially, culturally, politically, 
and economically identifiable people whose language and 
religion were Arabic and Islam respectively. The Pales-
tinian people are a people with an indissoluble bond to 
the land. 
Contrary to the popular view, Zionism is not rooted 
in the history and culture of the Jews. It is a very 
recent movement. Palestine was revered, as it has always 
been in Judaism, but only in a purely religious, not a 
political sense. Zionism is a product of the modern 
age. It represents the translation of diasporan religious 
orientation into a secular ideology inspired by the polit-
ical thought of Gentile Europe. The crucial advantage 
eventually achieved by Zionism in Palestine resulted 
from the identification of the movement with the histor-
ical phenomenon of Western imperialism as it expanded 
and consolidated its dominance over the Afro-Asian world 
during the course of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. 
What the Zionists had failed to buy, they eventually 
expropriated when they announced the establishment of 
the State of Israel. The Palestinian Arabs fled their 
homes and possessions for fear of death. The terrorism, 
made convincing by local measures, to which the Israelis 
resorted in order to clear the Arabs out was the prime 
motivating force behind the Palestinian exodus. The 
Israelis, by force of arms, accomplished within little 
more than a year what decades of Jewish migration had 
failed to do, namely, to effect a complete demographic 
transformation of Palestine. Except for the extermination 
of the Tasmanians, modern history recognizes no cases 
in which the virtually complete supplanting of the in-
digenous population of a country by an alien stock has 
been achieved in as little as two generations. 
It is a very sad commentary that there is such an 
avoidance or ignorance of the existence today of about 
four million Muslim and Christian Arabs who are known 
to themselves and to others as Palestinians. In order 
to mitigate the presence of large numbers of natives on 
a desired land, the Zionists convinced themselves that 
these natives did not exist, then made it possible for 
them to exist only in the most rarefied forms. This is 
not only the policy of the Zionists toward the native 
Arabs, but also the policy of Israel toward its Arab 
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colonies, and the true character of the Israeli occupying 
forces on the West Bank and Gaza after 1967 (Abu-Lughod, 
1971; Said, 1979). 
The above reconstruction of history has been taken 
up and embellished by Third World leaders of all kinds, by 
the ,Chinese, by the Soviet Communist Bloc, by many "progres-
sive" Europeans and by United Nation officials. In the United 
States elements of the Left, "liberal" Clergy, Reform Rabbis, 
Jewish university students, and even alienated Israelis have 
·· all been spokespeople promoting and disseminating a similar 
historical account as the one depicted above (Guttman, 1975). 
A major problem in attempting to expose current and 
popular propaganda themes is that while they are in vogue, 
any efforts to uproot the prevailing misconceptions are them-
selves depicted as fabrications politically serving the other 
side. For example, trying to convince the European populace 
of the Middle Ages that the Jews were not responsible for 
the Black Death, and that the Jews themselves were drinking 
from the same supposedly poisonous wells would probably have 
been a very difficult task. In Nazi Germany, explaining 
to the German people that Hitler's accusations and hostility 
toward Jews were based on little more than the man's patho-
logical hatred would probably have been totally futile. 
In 1 ike fashion, attempting to explain the Palestinian problem 
in a light which completely contradicts the Arab and Soviet 
versions would, at best, appear to many Americans (Jews in-
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eluded) as a second biased version of the same historical 
phenomenon. 
Unfortunately, historical accuracies usually only 
surface after the issues have lost political and social im-
port. Historically for Jews, it is usually only after the 
destructive consequences that, in retrospect, the untruths 
behind the tragedy are revealed. In light of this social-
psychological reality the author will not attempt to portray 
·· the pro-Israeli version of the Palestinian problem as factual, 
but will call the pro-Israeli version simply the pro-Jewish 
version. In the present author's opinion the pro-Jewish 
version of the Palestinian refugee problem could read some-
thing like the following: 
The land called Israel today was governed by its 
own inhabitants only during the periods of Jewish sov-
ereignty (i.e., there never was an independent or even 
autonomous Palestinian Arab nation). The Land of Israel 
'was depopulated and laid waste by the Romans (second 
century C.E.) in which condition it remained until the 
mass Jewish immigrations began in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century. Jewish presence on the Land 
(albeit as a minority) has been continuous during the 
Jews 1,800-year period of exile. This presence was main-
tained despite consistent discrimination and persecution 
usually perpetrated by the Arabs of the region. 
Only after the Jews had started cultivating and build-
ing up the land did the great majority of Arabs immigrate 
in order to find work. This Arab immigration process 
was fostered by the British government who stringently 
upheld the Jewish immigration quota (despite British 
cognizance of the fact that masses of Jews were being 
slaughtered in German dominated territories), but were 
flagrantly negligent when dealing with Arab immigrants. 
Israeli independence was declared in 1948 and the infant 
state was immediately attacked by six Arab states from 
without in conjunction with the Arab army from within. 
Many Arabs were urged by their Muslim leaders. outside 
the Land to leave until victory was assured. After the 
.. 
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victory they were to return to gather in the spoils. 
Only when the Jewish forces began to prevail, and panic 
overwhelmed the hostile Arab population (for two basic 
reasons: · (1) their own malicious propaganda concerning 
Jewish "savagery" which had been used in the past to 
incite Arabs against Jews now worked against them and 
created a mass panic, and (2) they were familiar with 
their own forms of brutal revenge and failed to comprehend 
another type of justice) did Arab leaders begin commanding 
their people to stay put. Ironically the embryonic Jewish 
government in several cases also urged the Arab populace 
to remain in their places via radio and leaflets. 
The less than 600,000 Arabs that left the land were 
then refused citizenship in all the surrounding Arab 
lands except Jordan. They were instead placed in refugee 
camps where a great bulk of them still remain today, 
some thirty-seven years later I The 160, 000 Arabs who re-
mained, are full Israeli citizens today. Conversely, 
during approximately the same time period some 800,000 
Jewish refu ees fled their homes and ossessions from 
Arab ands after facing increased discrimination and 
persecution. They (i.e., the approximate 600,000 who 
came to Israel), in contrast, were immediately given 
Israeli citizenship. 
Two generations of Arab refugees in the Arab refugee 
camps have been fed continuous hate propaganda regarding 
Israel. They have also been indoctrinated on their glori-
ous national and cultural Palestinian past which, his-
torically speaking, never was. The product of living 
.in these camps with their "unique" educational process 
has been the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO). The PLO is little more than an inter-
national terrorist organization backed by Saudi Arabia 
and the Soviet Union, with its prime objective being 
the liquidation of the State of Israel (Davis & Deeter, 
1982; Peters, 1984). 
The logical consequences in adopting one of the above 
versions are more profound than most people believe. Belief 
in the pro-Arab version which bestows legitimacy on the Pal-
estinian national movement and creates genuine sympathy for 
the Palestinian cause while simultaneously condemning Israeli 
"racist" an~ "imperialistic" actions is potentially the 
"moral'' justification needed to carry out a future genocide. 
'. 
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Looking at the conflict from a secular perspective, American 
weaponry in the hands of the Israelis is the factor most 
responsible in preventing the Arab eradication of Israel. 
This opinion becomes more clear when one realizes the virtu-
ally unlimited monetary and military (via Arab Oil States 
and the Soviet Union respectively) resources the.Arab states 
have at their disposal, in their relentless attempt to totally 
annihilate the Jewish State of Israel. 
It is the author's opinion that the American public's 
abandonment of Israel on "moral" grounds (i.e., via the pro-
Ar ab version of the Palestinian problem) could lead to a 
world supported Arab attack against a completely isolated 
(both economically and militarily) Israeli people. An Arab 
victory may not mean a small state for the Palestinians, 
for both King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO have declared 
that Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan (Davis et 
al., 1982), but it would mean the total eradication of Israel 
as officially canonized in the Palestinian National Covenant 
of 1968. Even a position of indifference adopted by the 
United States (based on the middle-of-the-road belief that 
a symmetry of truth and non-truth exists in both versions) 
could also produce seriously harmful consequences for the 
Jewish state. In effect, this apathy or neutrality would 
be pitting Israel'against Arab money and Soviet armaments. 
Consistent with the pro-Arab version is that the 
Palestinian refugee plight lays at the heart of the more 
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general Arab-Israeli conflict. This theme is regularly ex-
pressed by Arab leaders (e.g., Hussein, 1982; Johnson, 1982; 
Muller, 1982). The. implications of this seemingly innocuous 
theme is that the Arab States of the Middle East are not 
directly inimical to the Jewish State of Israel, but rather 
their hostility reflects the injustice done to their Pales-
tinian brethren by the Israelis. The tacit corollary of 
this theme (at least the one circulated in the Western world) 
·· is that once the Palestinians have their own small state, 
the Arab nations would then recognize Israel's right to exist. 
The pro-Jewish version of the Palestinian refugee 
plight does not depict the refugee problem as the source of 
the conflict, but rather as a result of it (Davis et al., 
1982). For example, in 1937 the British government recom-
mended a tripartite partition of Western Palestine (Eastern 
Palestine had already been severed by Britain in 1922 and 
comprises the Arab state known today as Jordan) which would 
entail a small Jewish state, a larger Arab state, and a con-
tinued British Mandate over the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area, 
with a corridor to the sea. The Palestinian Arab leaders 
unflinchingly rejected the proposals. The pro-Jewish version 
would also cite the fact that six Arab states (in 1948) to-
9ether with the Arab population from within, attempted to 
destroy the State of Israel before there ever was a refugee 
Problem. In addition, when the United Nations voted to par-
tition Palestine giving both Jews and Arabs approximately 
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half the land in 1947, the Arab world unanimously refused 
another opportunity to form a second independent Palestinian 
Arab State (the country of Jordan being the first). Pro-
Jewish proponents also cite the fact that while the country 
of Jordan had sovereignty over the West Bank from 1948 to 
1967 no attempt was ever made to establish a second inde-
pendent Palestinian Arab State in the area. Jordan, in fact, 
annexed the west Bank making it officially part of Jordan. 
In addition, the belief that the Arab nations have initiated 
four wars with Israel in behalf of the Arab refugees seriously 
contradicts other activity of theirs in the region. For 
example, from the inception of the problem in 1948 to the 
present, none of the Arab nations, except one, have been 
willing to grant the Arab refugees citizenship. This is 
despite the Arab's vast oil resources, their limited popula-
tions, and their total area which comprise 640 times more 
land than the State of Israel. By refusing to absorb the 
refugee population, they have in effect, forced them to remain 
in their wretc~ed refugee camps. Jordan, the only country 
to grant the refugees citizenship, showed its "love" for 
the refugees in 1970-1971. During that period, King Hussein's 
army slaughtered thousands of civilian refugees and forced 
20,000 others to flee to Lebanon (Muller, 1982). 
-. 
According to the pro-Jewish version, the Arab States 
themselves created the Arab exodus from the land. They have 
also deliberately maintained them in refugee camps to be 
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used as political and military pawns. The claim that the 
Palestinian plight is at the heart of the conflict is seen 
as no more than a powerful propaganda ploy used to cast as-
persions on the Jewish State while concealing the Arab and 
Muslim States' ultimate objective, which is the total eradi-
cation of Israel. To advocates of the pro-Jewish version, 
this would constitute another form of the Big Lie tactic 
with the potential of producing another Jewish holocaust • 
. . By repeatedly emphasizing Israel Is guilt for the Palestinian 
problem in conjunction with the problem's key position in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab States and their allies 
ostensibly purge themselves of any reproach or responsibil-
ity. They are seemingly undeserving of reproach and bear 
no moral responsibility regarding their continual active 
hostility toward Israel, or for their terrorist tactics di-
rected against pro-Israeli Western targets, for Israel has 
"stolen" their brethren's land, "subjugated" its people, and 
therefore has in effect, "forced" the poor Arab refugees to 
remain in their deplorable condition over the last thirty-
seven years! 
By way of contrast it is interesting to note that 
the number of refugees throughout the world in 1982 totaled 
more than 10 million, including well over 2 million African 
refugees, 1 million Asians, and the 2.6 million Afghans flee-
ing Pakistan. Yet that figure was significantly reduced 
from the number reported two years prior in 1980 where 12.6 
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million refugees, including 6 million Africans and 2 million 
Asians were reported. As the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees reported "communities, institutions, cities 
and nations have generously opened their doors to refugees" 
(Peters, 1984). Ironically, the "peace-loving" Arab-Muslim 
nations seem to be an exception to the rule when dealing 
with their own people. 
The United States Committee for Refugees noted that 
more than a million Indochinese refugees were resettled be-
tween 1975 and 1981. That report also made mention that 
among those African refugees recorded, "substantial numbers 
of the refugees ••• are 'settled in place.'" To be "settled 
in place" or "resettled in a third country" is considered 
by the United Nations as a "durable solution" for the Indo-
chinese, the Africans, and in fact all the world's refugees 
(Peters,, 1984), unless the refugees happen to be Arabs vying 
for the Land of Israel. 
Unlike the Afghans, or the Ethiopians, or the Viet-
namese, or the Cambodians, the Arabs largely went to places 
only a few miles from where they left. Most of the Arab 
"refugees" who fled still remained within "Palestine." Yet, 
it is the Arab refugee problem toward which the United Na-
tions, the media, and consequently the public focus the great 
majority of their attention (Peters, 1984). 
Unfortunately for the Jews the pro-Arab version, in 
one form or another, is the version adopted by most of the 
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world today (not unlike other popular anti-Jewish propaganda 
circulated in the past). The Communist bloc, the Third World 
bloc, and even the majority of Western European nations (as 
represented by the European Economic Community) all hold 
Israel responsible for the ongoing Palestinian refugee 
plight. Following therefrom, they have also adopted the 
Arab thesis that the refugee problem is at the core of the 
conflict (Seidman, 1982). 
The ingenuity of Arab propaganda is that while the 
world accepts the assertion that the Palestinian plight is 
the core issue (and is therefore caught up in attempts to 
force Israel's hand at making territorial concessions) the 
assertion (much less the tangible actions to accompany it) 
concerning Arab responsibility for the refugee plight never 
becomes an issue. In other words, if the pro-Jewish version 
is correct, the energy, the money, and the time spent for 
what the vast majority of the world believes (or at least 
rationalizes) is a humanitarian and altruistic endeavor may 
be the very foundation for another Jewish holocaust. 
It should be reemphasized at this point that pro-Arab 
advocates (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1971; and Said, 1979) have their 
own "irrefutable facts" and interpretations of the Arab-Pales-
tinian refugee problem which when presented alone also appear 
quite convincing. However, in light of over three millenia 
of vil~ slander (with its horrid consequences) used repeatedly 
against Jews and Judaism, several thoroughly documented his-
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torical facts which are conspicuously missing (or are bla-
tantly misrepresented) in scholarly pro-Arab works, and the 
fact that the pro-Arab version is the version most often 
accepted and presented throughout the world today (e.g., 
united Nations), the present author feels little compunction 
in presenting a seemingly biased portrayal of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in general, and the Arab-Palestinian refugee problem 
in particular. 
At present, the United States is Israel's closest 
ally. As stated above, without American weaponry Israel 
would probably not be able to contend with its Arab neighbors 
and their allies. Although public and congressional support 
for Israel has been strong over the last ten years (Kessler 
& Schwaber, 1984), Arab propaganda has started to make inroads 
via the mass media and among senior government officials. 
The American news media's latent "sympathy" for the Arab 
cause surfaced during Israel's 1982 invasion into Lebanon. 
During the three- to six-month interval immediately following 
the intial invasion, the news media of television, newspapers 
and magazines seemed to unite in a holy war aimed at condemn-
ing the State of Israel. Gross exaggerations of casual ties, 
fatalities, and displaced persons were a common phenomenon 
during this period. Scenes of wanton destruction juxtaposed 
to Israeli war-like activities were shown nightly on national 
television despite the tenuous relationship between the two 
(Muravchik, 1983). 
.. 
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A salient example of this type of biased news coverage 
was reported by Ilya Gerol, a correspondent for The Citizen 
daily newspaper of Ottawa, Canada. Mr. Gerol visted Lebanon 
a few months after the outbreak of the war. The following 
are excerpts from his article in The Citizen dated October 
30, 1982. 
With a group of other Western correspondents, I 
crossed the Israeli-Lebanese border expecting to see 
destroyed cities, burned villages and other signs of 
fierce battles. Like everyboy in the Western world, we 
arrived there after watching daily reports from Lebanon 
via NBC, CBS or ABC. 
NBC commentator John Chancellor, only a few days 
before my departure for the Middle East, was talking 
about the destroyed cities of Sidon and Tyre. The films 
of destroyed houses, falling bombs, the sounds of screams 
and fear were shocking indeed. Who would have doubted 
Chancellor's statements about tens of thousands of 
civilian victims and cities being in ruins during the 
first weeks of the Lebanon conflict.? 
Those were my thoughts when I arrived in the city 
of Tyre. For the first few minutes after driving through 
the streets it looked as if we had missed our road and 
were maybe even in a different country. 
There was no destruction. The cafes were full of 
people, schools were operating, stores were open and 
Lebanese policemen regulated the traffic. We asked one 
policeman how to get to the mayor's office. "It's just 
around the corner," he said. "Not far from Television 
Alley." 
Later the mayor showed us "Television Alley"--the 
only street where several blocks had been destroyed by 
bombs. He said: "All 11 destroyed buildings were occu-
pied by the PLO headquarters and offices." 
The mayor was very busy. After our conversation, 
he had to accompany a new group of television crews to 
the same famous alley to film the "total destruction" 
of Tyre. I asked an ABC man: "How did you manage to 
make a picture of apocalyptic destruction out of only 
11 ruined houses? 
"We just had to film them from different angles," was 
the answer. 
Another example demonstrating the media's a priori 
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intent to condemn Israel may be seen in its coverage of the 
Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres. In early Septem-
ber, 1982, 460 people (425 of them were adult men) were killed 
by Lebanese Christian units. The nation's four leading 
dailies (i.e., the Los Angles Times, the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, and the Christian Science Monitor) de-
voted nearly 8,000 column-inches of news copy to the mas-
sacres, focusing primarily on Israel which, at worst, had 
only indirect responsibility. Yet, the same four newspapers 
allocated only 6,000 column-inches of news space to the com-
bined coverage of the ten bloodiest massacres of the past 
decade in which a total of over three mill ion men, women 
and children were put to death. Furthermore, the word ~ 
sacre appeared at least 99 times in headlines related to 
Sabra and Shatilla while showing up in just 24 headlines 
pertaining to the other ten massacres combined (C.O.M.A., 
1983) • 
Probably the mass media's most demonstrated bias 
had to do with its failure to report the Israeli invasion 
in its historical context. It is the opinion of the author 
that had Americans known about the PLO bombings of civilian 
targets in northern Israel (Davis et al., 1982), PLO terrorist 
attacks against Jews and non-Jews throughout the world (Mer-
ar i, 1983), the PLO 's massive stockpiling of arms in southern 
Lebanon (Mendel, 1982), the PLO's official platform to liqui-
date the State of Israel (Palestinian National Covenant, 
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1968), the PLO's terrorizing of Lebanon from 1975 to 1982 
(Britain Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1982), and the 
PLO's use of large civilian populations as human barricades 
against the advancing Israelis (Tal, 1982) that public support 
for Israel would probably not have dropped to a ten-year 
low (Kessler et al., 1984). 
Notwithstanding much anti-Israeli sentiment in the 
American news media (by Gentile and Jew alike) possibly but-
tressed by the power of Arab monies, the question of how 
these media giants who argue so vociferously and self-righ-
teously for their prerogatives under the First Amendment, 
could collectively so pervert such explicit realities demands 
interpretation. An inkling to the process, which sheds much 
light on the above question, is furnished by Zeev Chafets 
(1985), Director of the Israeli Government Press Office, is 
his book Double Vision. The following excerpts should help 
to significantly clarify the media's biased coverage of hap-
penings in the Middle East. 
During the past decade no reg ion in the world has 
been more important to the United States than the Middle 
East •••• And yet, despite the torrent of media coverage 
and commentary, surprisingly little is actually known 
about the reg ion. (p. 17) 
This has a great deal to do with the fact that: 
American journalists in some parts of the Arab world have 
been the victims not only of exclusion but of physical 
intimidation. The Syrians, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, and to a lesser extent, some other Arab 
regimes have practiced terror as a tool of news manage-
ment. They have subjected unfriendly reporters to 
threats, harassment, assault, and even murder. (p. 19) 
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As John Kifner of the New York Times once wrote (in 
February, 1982): "To work here [in Beirut] as a journalist 
is to carry fear with you as faithfully as your notebook. 
It is the constant knowledge that there is nothing you 
can do to protect yourself, and nothing ever happened 
to any assassin. In this atmosphere a journalist must 
decide when, how, and even whether to record a story." 
(p. 51) 
The decision to practice self-censorship is often 
humiliating and many reporters justify it to themselves 
by rational iza ti on. "Faced with undefined threats, 11 says 
Mort Rosenblum, "reporters may inadvertently withhold 
sensitive information by convincing themselves that their 
perfectly reliable sources are not good enough." (pp. 51-
52) ' 
To work in Beirut one needed the help and sponsorship 
of the PLO. Bill Marmon put it this way: "The PLO was 
able to play on the willingness of journalists to meet 
it more than half way. Generally in the Arab world it 
is necessary, to an extent unknown in Israel or the West, 
to prove you are a friend, and you try to do this to 
the extent possible without totally sacrificing your 
integrity. I did it myself. Often you must have a pa-
tron. He's crucial, and sometimes that relationship 
comes at the expense of hard hitting journalism." After 
a while, though, the pretense of friendship and sympathy 
can ripen into the real thing! There is a sort of con-
tract you make with organizations like the PLO--and they 
are skillful at extracting a good price from the press. 
One way it's done is through the "I'm a Friend, you should 
talk to me" kind of arrangement. You know, you tel 1 
the guy, I'm pro-PLO and anti-Israel, that sort of thing. 
The problem is that once you start that, some people 
really begin to believe it." (p. 78) 
If the press in Beirut was not reporting fully out 
of a fear of Arab reprisal, then Israel was being forced 
to fight the war for western public op in ion with one 
hand tied behind its back. People who knew little about 
the PLO's operations in southern Lebanon or its connec-
tions with international terrorist groups or about the 
internal situation in Syria often found Israel's concern 
about these matters "paranoid" and its attempt to deal 
with them overreactive. Moreover, when Israel tried to 
point out what was happening in Lebanon or Syria, its 
arguments had little credibility--after all, people 
reasoned, there were plenty of American and European 
reporters in Beirut who would surely be aware of a Pal-
estinian "mini-state" in south Lebanon if one existed, 
or.of large-scale massacres in Syria. (p. 93) 
Another disquieting phenomenon to advocates of the 
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pro-Jewish version is that important American government 
officials today seem to be accepting, to a significant extent, 
the Arab version of the Palestinian problem. For example, 
United States Presidents Carter and Reagan have both 
expressed, with only slight variation, the claim of the PLO 
leader, Yasser Arafat, that the main issue of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is the Palestinian problem (Peters, 1984). Former 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Charles Percy, stated that "there is no real basis of lasting 
peace without resolving the Palestinian problem." The Arab 
mayor of Bethlehem told reporters that Percy had agreed that 
the Palestinian issue was the crux of all problems in the 
region (Chicago Tribune, 1981). Former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and the current Secretary of State George 
Shultz have both expressed the urgent need to settle the 
Palestinian refugee problem as a major step in resolving 
the Arab-Israeli conflict (Sancton, 1982; Smith, 1982), and 
Vice President George Bush in his 1984 nationally televised 
vice presidential debate lectured to Congresswoman Ferraro 
on the core issue of the Mideast conflict, of course "the 
Palestine problem." 
As emphasized above (via the pro-Jewish version) 
the thesis which depicts the resolution of the Palestinian 
Arab plight as a precursor to an Arab-Israeli peace treaty 
is based on fundamentally untenable assumptions. As the 
Arab leaders shifted (after the six-Day War in 1967) from 
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outraged proclamations calling for .the total destruction 
of Israel to sympathetic rhetoric in behalf of the Palestin-
ians, the adjusted approach granted a rationalization to 
those already opposed to the existence of a strong Jewish 
state, and blurred general understanding of the Arab world's 
role in the conflict. The peculiar aspect of the above phe-
nomena unique to the present study is that (according to 
the pro-Jewish version) once again the Jews are victimized 
by propaganda based on misconceptions and distortions. Once 
again, the group most responsible for propagating this mis-
information is the same group which has publicly declared 
its intention of eradicating a large Jewish population. 
And, once again the great majority of the surrounding popula-
tion (this time the entire world) accepts most of the asser-
tions at face value. (This assertion is most aptly repre-
sented by the United Nation's General Assembly adoption [No-
vember, 1975) of the resolution which labeled Zionism as a 
form of "racism and racial discrimination." The vote was 
72 to 35 with 32 abstentions.) 
The Objectives and Hypotheses Following 
from Chapter I I 
Arab propaganda directed against the Jewish State 
of Israel has achieved a new level of sophistication and 
credibility in the Western World today (Kessler et al., 
1984). Pro-Jewish organizations in America have endeavored 
to counter this propaganda process by attempting to explain 
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to both Jewish and Christian audiences alike, the irrational-
ity of Arab allegations. It is the opinion of the present 
author that these accusations and defensive elucidations by 
pro-Arab and pro-Jewish factions respectively, over crucial 
Middle-East issues are, in the long run, only to the detriment 
of the Jews in Israel. The reason being that it creates an 
image of mutual culpability which will become increasingly 
more difficult to diffuse as time goes by. 
This symmetry of blame in the context of a virtually 
inexhaustible supply of Arab petrodollars, continued Western 
dependency on Arab oil, and the threat of a nuclear war re-
sulting from tension in the Middle East will inevitably weaken 
public support that has, in the past, been based on percep-
tions of Israel's moral and ethical superiority. Unless 
Jewish organizations offensively initiate programs to explain 
the pro-Jewish version of the Mideast conflict, support for 
Israel in the United States may begin to dissipate at a rapid 
pace. 
However, in order to educate the public, it is first 
necessary to recognize what the public does and does not 
know. Thousands of dollars are allocated by Jewish organiza-
tions yearly to ascertain the American public's perception 
and attitudes toward Israel (e.g., Gallup 1973-1983), but 
little money, if any, is allocated to measure the public's 
level ~f knowledge concerning the broader Arab-Israeli con-
flict. Being that knowledge about Jews and their activities 
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bas been found to significantly correlate with the public's 
perception and attitude toward them (Quinley et al., 1983), 
the present study will attempt to measure the American pub-
lic's general awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
then to correlate what people know about the conflict to 
their attitudes toward Israel. [See Figure 2]. 
Consistent with the above discourse concerning the 
news media's coverage of the Middle East, the author expects 
to find that the American public knows little concerning 
several fundamental and crucial Middle East issues. Based 
on the assumption that misinformation is correlated with atti-
tudes, the public's level of knowledge on the above key issues 
are expected to correlate significantly with attitudes toward 
Israel. 
A second goal of the present study will be to address 
the relationship of attitudes toward Jews to attitudes toward 
Israel. This association has been theoretically advanced 
and argued against (e.g., Forster & Epstein, 1974; Pilzer, 
1981), but hard data to empirically support or refute the 
relationship is conspicuously lacking. The present study 
will attempt to test this relationship empirically. [See 
Figure 2] 
Although according to the historical analysis pre-
sented in Chapter I, which portrayed the attack against Jewish 
nationalism as an integral aspect of anti-Jewish hostility, 
a more empirical measurement which would correlate attitudes 
A. News Media 
Usage 
Knowledge and 
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Perceptions of 1--~~~~~~~~ 
Arab-Israeli 
Conflict 
Attitudes Towards 
Israel. 
. T. 
Attitudes 
Towards 
Jews 
The above diagram can be understood by positing each box as 
a variable and each arrow as a relationship between vari-
ables. The dull side of each arrow represents the causative 
variable, whereas the sharp side represents the effected 
variable. For example, Knowledge and Perceptions of the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict are hypothesized as producing an effect 
·· on Attitudes Towards both Jews and Israel, and is inversely 
depicted as being effected by News Media Usage. 
B. Corn arison of Various Ma azines and Their H othesized 
E ects 
Pro-PLO 
Magazine 
Anti-Israel • 
Jewish non-Oral 
Law Based 
Hag Tine 
American 
News 
Magazine 
• • • • • • • • Neutrality ••••• 
Jewish 
Oral-law 
Based 
Magazine 
.Pro-Israel 
The above diagram depicts the hypothesized effects different 
magazine-types are to produce in the general non-Jewish popu-
lation. For example, the Pro-PLO Magazine and Oral-Law based 
Magazine are hypothesized to produce an inverse polarization 
of opinions towards Israel. The two other magazines are 
depicted as producing rnodrately pro-Arab opinions. 
Figure 2. Diagrammatic Representation of Variables Under 
Empirical Investigation for Chapter II 
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towards Jews with attitudes towards the Jewish state is deemed 
necessary. In essence, if attitudes towards Jews were not 
related to attitudes towards Israel the above historical 
analysis which posits the inextricable relationship between 
the two would be seriously challenged. Inversely, if a re-
lationship is detected then the above historical analysis 
is further supported. If a significant relationship is found, 
reactions towards Israel should not be viewed as reactions 
·· towards just another political entity, but rather towards 
something specifically Jewish in nature. Consequently, in 
application any educational campaign on behalf of Israel 
would then need to take into account the "Jewish factor" 
when planning its educational strategy. 
A third objective concerns the news media. Although 
the propagation of misinformation is not deemed the primary 
cause of anti-Jewish hostility, it is seen as the vehicle 
most often used to express such attitudes. In light of the 
role slanderous material and misinformation has played his-
torically in both the expression and cause (secondary in 
nature) of anti-Jewish hostility, the effects of various 
news media will be investigated. The effect these news media 
have on individuals will be experimentally tested in the 
present study. Four magazines seen as representing American, 
Arab, Jewish Secular, and Jewish Religious (Oral Law) orien-
tations will be content analyzed (see Chapter IV, Methodol-
ogy) concerning their portrayal of the Palestinian Arab 
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refugee problem. Subsequently, the perceptual effect these 
seemingly different magazines have on the American non-Jewish 
and non-Arab public will be compared and analyzed. 
In light of the negative coverage Israel received 
during its invasion into Lebanon in June, 1982, it is hypoth-
esized that the magazine representing mainstream America, 
and needless to say the Arab sponsored magazine, will portray 
the Arab Palestinian problem, given a latitude of variation, 
in consonance with the Arab version as discussed above. In 
addition, the effect these two magazines have on the public's 
perception of Israel should be significantly more negative 
than the effect produced by a Jewish religious magazine. 
Furthermore, according to the above theory (see Chapter I), 
the Jewish secular magazine, indirectly echoing the philosophy 
of Reform and Conservative Judaism, should be no less hostile 
toward Israel nor less sympathetic for the Arab refugee plight 
than its American counterpart (i.e., If the Reform and Con-
servative movements have in practice attempted to sever the 
Jewish relationship to Israel, then the magazine following 
their lead should represent more an American orientation 
than a Jewish one). [See Figure 2) 
CHAPTER III 
THE HYPOTHESIZED TERTIARY CAUSES OF 
ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY 
Although an attempt has been made to interpret and 
elucidate the primary and secondary causes of anti-Jewish 
hostility there still remains at least two serious problems 
which need to be addressed before the theory can claim any 
semblance of completeness. The first problem is based on 
common sense while the second is based on empirical support. 
It is the author's belief that although the two problems 
are distinctly different in type, their solution is one and 
the same. 
The first problem simply asks: How could the cog-
nitive process of slander (albeit malicious and vile) motivate 
large populat.ions throughout history to pillage, torture, 
and murder literally millions of innocent Jewish men, women 
and children? we all, at times become recipients of negative 
misinformation about various minority groups, but unrestrained 
and brutal violence is not necessarily a direct corrolary 
of misinformation and perception. The second of the two 
problems, asks the question: How does the present theoretical 
analysis interpret the various theories which posit the rel a-
144 
145 
tionship between pathological-type variables and anti-Jewish 
prejudice without dogmatically ignoring or denying their 
existence, particularly when these alternative theories are 
ernpir ically based? 
In the author's opinion a parsimonious resolution 
to the above questions can be made by temporarily leaving 
the theoretical realm of prejudice and entering that of ~ 
gession. More specifically, the drive theory of aggression 
as defined by L. Berkowitz (1978) may be implemented to ex-
plain away both of the above problems. Berkowitz suggests 
that various adversiveexternal conditions (e.g., frustration, 
harsh physical conditions, or loss of face) serve to arouse 
a strong motive to engage in aggressively directed behavior, 
and that this drive, in turn, leads to the performance of 
overt assaults against others. Several experiments (e.g., 
Green, 1968; Berkowitz, Cochran, and Embree, 1981) have em-
pirically corroborated the claim that negative affect from 
almost any source can produce an aggressive drive. Therefore, 
individuals who are suffering pain (in a potentially unlimited 
number of ways) may be predisposed to attack and harm other 
individuals simply because of the discomfort or displeasure 
they are experiencing. 
Berkowitz (1978) also suggested some of the stimulus 
characteristics which are associated with the target recipi-
ents, and which prepare them as ready stimuli for this seem-
ingly arbitrary automatic aggressive response. He states: 
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My guess is that these characteristics involve associa-
tions with two types of events: with earlier painful 
incidents or with prior reinforcements for aggression. 
Thus, a potential target will be attacked more strongly 
than it otherwise might have been to the extent that it 
is associated with aversive experiences, while other 
objects can intensify the violence that is performed if 
they are connected with positive reinforcement for aggres-
sion. (p. 703) 
Historically, Jews have seemed to fit Berkowitz's 
stimulus paradigm throughout millennia. In light of the 
vile and treacherous misinformation religiously disseminated 
about Jews (as depicted in Chapter II) by the leaders (with 
the avid assistance of the intelligentsia) in most anti-Jewish 
epochs, the non-Jewish perceptual association of Jews should 
be, at best, disturbing. The perception of the Jew as Christ-
killer, as the exploiter of the masses, or as the heretic 
par-excellance are images that evoke aversive experiences 
whether vicariously or otherwise. In addition, the positive 
reinforcement achieved by doing the "will" of G-d (plus the 
added bonus of pillage and rape) has probably made the ruth-
less slaughter of Jews by aggressively driven individuals 
highly appealing. 
Correspondingly, it is no secret that many mass kill-
ings of Jews by the non-Jewish masses were pr~~_p_i tated by 
growing frustration and pain. For example, the exploitation 
of the Ukrainian peasants by the Polish nobility in the seven-
teenth century brought in its wake retaliation against the 
Poles. During this retaliatory period 100,000 to 500,000 
Jews were savagely tortured and massacred (Grosser et al., 
r 
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1978). Accordingly, the German peoples' understandably great 
frustration after their defeat in World War I, and temporary 
loss of nation al self-respect accompanied by economic disaster 
would be considered in the previous theory as Ber:kowi tz' s 
aggressive-drive-component which only required an adequate 
stimulus object upon which to aggress. 
According to the above exposition the original two 
problems (stated in the beginning of the present chapter) 
· may be resolved by positing tertiary causes of anti-Jewish 
hostility. The first of the two problems is resolved by 
postulating media ting variables (i.e. I Berkowitz Is aggression-
drive hypothesis) which would be the key in interpreting 
how highly negative perceptions are transformed into overt 
aggression. The second problem is equally interpretable. 
These aggression-type tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility 
may be those suggested by the empirically based theories 
mentioned above, but as yet untouched in the present anal-
ysis. In essence, the present theory postulates that the 
more frustrated or in pain the individual is (for any number 
of reasons, some of which will be discussed below) the more 
tangibly affected he or she will be by Big Lie propaganda •. 
,,. .. -· 
_.---~·"'" 
Therefore, the forthcoming approaches and theories which 
Allport (1954) and others would describe as viable theories 
of prejudice are depicted in the present theoretical context 
as not~ing more than theories which have identified various 
aggression-arousing mediating variables, which indirectly 
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throughout history have become part of the overall prejudice 
process. The following pa tho logical-type variables to be 
discussed represent the variables investigated in the present 
study and are not meant to be theoretically exhaustive. 
The primary reason these variables were selected (other than 
their hypothesized relationship to anti-Jewish prejudice) 
had to do with their facile implementation in a telephone 
interviewing setting. 
The Sociocultural approach of prejudice emphasizes 
cultural causation. One theory of this type contends that 
the predisposition toward prejudiced behavior is heightened 
during tr ansi ti on periods of changing societal conditions. 
Rapid social change may be accompanied by a loss of predic-
tability in life, accelerated disruption of social structure, 
and an abrupt diminution of preexisting social values. This 
disintegration of societal structure and values in times of 
social change has been called anomie and has been found to 
--- -"~ 
correlate significantly with anti-Jewish attitudes (Hoge & 
Carroll, 1975). Individuals in society suffering from anomie 
are predisposed to feelings of anxiety and insecurity, and 
in short, heightened emotional stress. 
Another general approach formerly used to describe 
the direct causes of anti-Jewish hostility is the Situational 
approach. This approach may be differentiated from the socio-
cultural perspective in that it deals exclusively with the 
current forces (as opposed to the development of these forces) 
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impinging on the individual and society. It is proposed by 
several social scientists (e.g., Ettinger, 1969; Parsons, 
1980) that threatE; <>! economic, politic al, and military di sas-
ter reinforce anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior. The fear 
- -· 
of a serious up and coming economic, political, or military 
crisis which the individual is not directly in control of, 
is conceived as a disturbing and frustrating experience.' 
Bettelhe im and Janowi tz (1964) have interpreted these aggres-
sive-type attitudes and actions as reflecting a regressive 
response, which enables the individual to combat insecurje 
feelings threatening his or her emotional well being. 
A different and more individual type approach is 
the Psychodynamic approach. These types of theories contend 
that prejudicial attitudes and behavior are a reflection of 
the individual's personality traits, in contrast to the his-
torical and social points of view mentioned above. A popular 
theory of this type is the frustration theory of prejudice 
(which is also known as the scapegoat theory). The theory 
posits that when the cause of frustration is either too in-
timidating or obscure, people often redirect their hostility 
against an available, identified group unlikely or unable to 
fight back. The fact that the group is innocent of the evils 
which have befallen the frustrated individual or .group is 
irrelevent (Meyers, 1983). 
Another psychodynamic variable found related to 
prejudicial attitudes and behavior is the individual's sense 
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of identity (Rosenman, 1977; Tumin, 1971). It is hypothesized 
that those who fail to achieve an effective personal identity 
may be predisposed to promote discriminatory behavior in 
their attempt to establish a "solid" sense of self. In light 
of the fact that traditional paths for establishing a sense 
of identity through, for example, one's occupation or religion 
have become less readily available, the individual may seek 
to secure this sense-of-self in various ways, including the 
· · path of aggression. Acts of aggression (whether verbal or 
physical) may temporarily block a diffusion of self by pro-
jecting on others unacceptable tendencies residing within 
the unstable individual himself (Bettleheim et al., 1964). 
It also reduces anxiety, for it suggests to the person or 
group that he or they are better than others. 
In the present empirical analysis the several vari-
ables mentioned above will be measured, and their relationship 
to attitudes toward both Jews and Israel will be examined. 
[See Figure 3] 
Israeli 
Attitude _.,,,, 
~-....... 
·· Scale "' 
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1. Sociocultural Approach 
A. Demographics 
B. Anomie 
2. Situational Approach 
A. Political Threats 
B. Military Threats 
c. Economic Threats 
3. Psychodynamic Approach 
A. 1. Life Satisfaction 
2. Purpose in Life 
B. Ego Strength 
Jewish 
Attitude 
Scale 
The three rectangles in the middle and arrows jutting out 
from. each represent (1) The three theoretical approaches 
discussed above, (2) the variables utilized in the present 
study which represent each approach, and (3) the hypothesized 
relationship of these variables to attitudes towards Jews 
and Israel. For example, two variables represent the Psycho-
dynamic Approach in the present study. The Life Satisfaction 
Scale, and the Purpose of Life Test were used to represent 
the frustration theory of prejudice , and the Ego-Strength 
Scale was implemented to represent the individual's sense 
of identity. All scales were hypothesized as being related 
to both the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales. 
Figure 3. Diagrammatic Representation of Variables under 
Empirical Investigation for Chapter III 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
The present project was carried out in two stages 
in which at each stage a distinct population was examined. 
Therefore, the present chapter is divided into two studies 
· (one study for each stage) and is presented in the order 
which represents the above theoretical analysis. 
Study No. I 
A. Participants 
A sample of 811 Jewish adults (over twenty-one) from 
Chicago proper participated in the present study. Three-
fourths of the respondents were randomly selected from the 
Chicago city phonebook on the basis of "Distinctively Jewish 
Names." This sampling procedure is commonly used when con-
ducting surveys of Jewish populations, and no differences 
have been found between Jews with commonly Jewish names and 
those without (Cohen, 1983). In the present study seventy 
common Jewish names were taken from Kaganoff's (1977) A Dic-
tionary of Jewish Names and Their Hi story, and only those 
names which had, at least, sixty listings in the Chicago 
telephone book were randomly sampled from. 
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Approximately 200 (one-fourth) of the participants 
were randomly drawn from mailing lists of all large orthodox 
(Oral Law) Jewish organizations in the city of Chicago. 
These lists were said to cover anywhere from 80 to 100 percent 
of all Orthodox Jewish household in Chicago. The reason 
for this deviation in procedure was because Orthodox house-
holds in Chicago account for less than 10 percent of the 
city's total Jewish population and a relatively large sample 
of Orthodox (Oral Law) Jewry was crucial for the present 
empirical analysis. In light of the fact that the mailing 
lists comprised a vast majority (if not all) of the Orthodox 
households in the city, comparisons among the Reform, Con-
servative, and Orthodox were seen as representing valid com-
parisons among the three populations. 
In any case, the comparison between Orthodox Jews and 
others is only superficial for not all people who consider 
themselves Orthodox a~e consistent followers of the Oral 
Law tradition (although it could be assumed that the great 
majority do follow the tradition). The only way to reliably 
differentiate between Oral Law adherents and others was to 
construct a Religious Observance Scale, and the only effective 
and acceptable way to obtain a large and representative sample 
of Oral Law adherents was to sample a population, which in 
name at least, represented the Oral Law tradition. In addi-
tion, because many telephone numbers were on more than one 
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mailing list, all numbers were fed into a computer which 
subsequently deleted all duplicates. 
B. Materials 
In this study all participants received the same 
demographic, knowledge, behavioral, and attitudinal ques-
tions. The following types of questions and scales consti-
tuted the complete questionnaire. 
1. The Israeli Attitude Scale. Items were constructed 
by the present author in conjunction with Professors 
Edwards and Bryant from Loyola University of Chicago. 
The content of the scale in part is based on anti-
Israeli literature currently being disseminated in 
.the United States. In addition, thirty people from 
Chicago proper were randanly sampled and asked (by 
telephone) their thoughts and feelings concerning 
the State of Israel. Their comments together with 
the above literature formed the content base from 
which 20 items were then developed. These 20 items 
were administered to 75 undergraduate students from 
Loyola University of Chicago. The eleven items with 
the highest item-total correlation then underwent 
factor analysis with varimax rotation. The remaining 
nine items which loaded highest on two factors pro-
duced a Cronbach alpha of .83. 
2.· The Mideast Knowledge Scale. Twenty original items 
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were produced by the present author based on histori-
cal and contemporary literature. These 20 items 
were then sent to four Jewish activists who were 
considered to have some level of expertise on the 
subject. The four activists were asked to study 
the questions, and to delete any questions they 
thought were inappropriate and/or add those they felt 
were missing. Professors Edwards and Bryant were 
also involved in the refinement of the original 20 
items. A 17-item scale was then developed based on 
the comments and criticisms of the above. These 
items were then distributed to the 75 undergraduates 
from Loyola University of Chicago and underwent the 
same type of statistical analyses as above. Based 
on the analyses, 8 items produced a Kuder-Richardson-
20 reliability coefficient for dichotomous response 
categories of .69. In the light of the difficulty 
in reaching a consensus of scholarly opinion concern-
ing the Arab-Israeli conflict, Middle East historical 
and current-day information as presented by Peters 
(1984), and Davis et al. (1982) were chosen as refer-
ences from which to score the present Mideast Knowl-
edge Scale. 
3. The Religious Observance Scale. These questions were 
devised by three Orthodox Rabbis, and were piloted 
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on 15 respondents in order to weed out any ambiguity 
in interpretation. The Kuder-Richardson 20 reliabil-
ity coefficient for dichotomous response categories 
was • 91 when computed for 546 participants. In addi-
tion, when correlated with movement identification 
(i.e., Non-affiliated, Reform, Conservative, Ortho-
dox coded 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively) the obtained 
concurrent validity coefficient was .84. 
4. The Jewish Information Scale: These questions were 
devised by two Orthodox Rabbis and one religious 
school teacher, with the objective of broaching sev-
eral fundamental Jewish subjects in the most ele-
mentary manner possible. The questions were then 
piloted on the above 15 respondents. The KR-20 was 
computed for 637 respondents and a reliability coef-
ficient of .92 was obtained. 
5. Demographic Questions: Questions concerning educa-
tion, religious affiliation, and family tree informa-
tion were constructed by the present author and 
piloted on the above 15 respondents. 
6. Attachment to the Land Questions: Questions con-
cerning the participant's behavioral relationship 
to the Land of Israel were constructed by the present 
author and piloted on the above 15 respondents. 
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The complete survey instrument used in Study No. 1 
is presented in Appendix c. 
C. Procedure 
The present data were collected at the Bernard Horwich 
Jewish Community Center of Chicago where two rooms and ten 
telephones were obtained for a period of four weeks. The 
telephones were the property of the Jewish United Fund of 
Chicago who generously donated their services for the above 
prescribed period of time. 
The interviewing took place five nights a week (Sunday 
through Thursday) from 6:30 P.H. to 9:30 P.H. Twenty young 
men and women with university degrees or presently working 
on their degrees underwent training (given by the author) 
before the actual proce~s of collecting data began. Coding, 
key punching, and verification procedures were done by several 
of the above interviewers in an effort to significantly limit 
any experimenter bias effect. Accordingly, managerial work 
was also carried out by trained personnel other than the 
author himself. (See Figure 4, flow chart representing the 
present study's major variables.) 
Study No. II 
A. Participants 
A sample of 400 non-Jewish and non-Arab adul tsl (ages 
lJews and Arabs were screened out from the present 
study i'n order to obtain data from a seemingly disinterested 
population. 
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on their degrees underwent training (given by the author) 
before the actual process of collecting data began. Coding, 
key punching, and verification procedures were done by several 
of the above interviewers in an effort to significantly limit 
any experimenter bias effect. Accordingly, managerial work 
was also carried out by trained personnel other than the 
author himself. (See Figure 4, flow chart representing the 
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Religious 
Observance 
Scale 
Group Maintenance 
Drop-Out Rate 
Overall Growth Rate 
Relationship to Land 
Intention to Settle 
in Israel 
No. of visits to 
Israel 
Attitudes towards 
Israel 
Mideast Knowledge 
Jewish Knowledge 
Elementary Knowledge 
of Judaism 
Figure 4. Flow Chart Representing Major Variables Examined 
in Study No. 1. 
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twenty-five and over)l was randomly selected from the city 
of Chicago proper to participate in a telephone research 
survey. The selection process was executed via random digit 
dialing according to computer-generated sets of random num-
bers. 
B. Materials 
In the present survey, the same demographic, knowl-
edge, and attitudinal questions were asked of each respon-
dent. The following types of questions and scales constituted 
the complete questionnaire. 
1. Demographic Questions. Questions were taken from 
Asking Questions (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982). 
2. Political, Economic, and Military Two-Item Rating 
Scales. These scales were constructed by the present 
author in conjunction with Professors Edwards and 
Bryant from Loyola University of Chicago. 
3. Media Usage Questions. These questions were con-
structed by the present author in order to locate 
the public's primary sources of Middle-East informa-
tion. 
4. Life Satisfaction Scale, by Converse and Robinson 
(1965). The authors "found a correlation (Kendall's 
lA general effort was made to sample from the general 
working class population. 
'. 
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Tau) of .59 between reported satisfaction at one 
time and satisfaction reported in an interview four 
to six months earlier." In addition, consistent 
relationships between life satisfaction and other 
psychological variables (e.g., social adjustment 
and personal competence) were found. 
S. The Thomas-Zander Ego Strength 6-Item Guttman Scale, 
by Thomas and Zander (1960). The authors found a 
.71 test-retest correlation. 
6. Anomie Measure, this 4-item anomie scale was imple-
mented by Bryant and Veroff (1984). Two of the items 
were adapted from comparable items in Srole (1956). 
7. An Abridged Purpose-in-Life Test. The present author 
distributed the Purpose-in-Life test (Crumbaugh, 
1968) to 75 undergraduate students from Loyola Uni-
versity of Chicago. The 10 items with the highest 
item-total correlation were then selected from the 
original 20-item scale. These 10 remaining items 
underwent factor analysis in which only one factor 
was extracted precluding further rotation analysis. 
A Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .87 was 
then obtained for four of the most heavily loaded 
items. In addition, response categories were modified 
for telephone usage. 
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8. The Jewish Attitude Scale: Twenty items were selected 
from Levinson and Sanford's (1944) Anti-Semitism 
Scale, Selznic and Steinberg's (1969) study on Anti-
Semi tism in Contemporary America, and from the Harr is 
Poll (1975) of Attitudes of Americans Toward Jews. 
The 20 items were administered to 75 undergraduate 
students from Loyola University of Chicago. The 
eleven items with the highest item-total correlation 
then underwent factor analysis with var imax rota ti on. 
Eight of the remaining items with the highest loadings 
on factor one produced a Cronbach alpha coefficient 
of .90. Two additional items from Selznic et al. 
(1969) were eventually added onto the scale. 
9. The Israeli Attitude Scale (see Study No I) 
10. The Mideast Knowledge Scale (see Study No. I) 
11. Paragraphs and Questions on the Arab-Palestinian 
Refugee Problem. Four sets of eight sentences each 
were developed, which attempt to reflect how four 
seemingly different magazines portray the Arab-Pales-
tinian refugee plight. The four magazines were chosen 
because they represent four dissimilar orientations. 
The news magazine representing America (based on 
national circulation), and the magazine represent-
ing secular (i.e., non-Oral Law) Jewish America (based 
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on a survey of over 800 Jews) were both content-ana-
lyzed for their portrayal of the Palestinian plight. 
Over 80 percent of the weekly issues of both magazines 
from June, 1982 to January, 1983 were content-ana-
lyzed. The less than 20 percent not analyzed was 
in light of the fact that some of the American maga-
zine issues could not be located, and some of the 
Jewish issues were missing a table of contents. 
The reason this time period was chosen was that it 
represented the first six months of the Israeli in-
vasion in to Lebanon. During this period, the American 
mass media was said to have collectively censured 
the State of Israel (Muravchik, 1983). 
Articles in the two weeklies mentioned above were 
analyzed via their table of contents. Anything in their 
table of contents intimating, however slightly, an Israeli-
Arab conflict was thereupon studied and categorized. The 
Arab-Palestinian problem was divided (on an a priori basis) 
into ten categories and any paragraph (regardless of length) 
relating to one of the ten categories was then recorded. 
The categories were found to conceptually exhaust all refer-
ences to the Arab-Palestinian problem. The ten categories 
were: 
1. Jewish right or connection to the land 
2. Arab right or connection to the land 
3. Arab mistreatment of Jews 
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4. Israeli mistreatment of Arabs 
s. Origins of Jewish Middle-East refugees 
6. Origins of Arab-Palestinian refugees 
7. The Jewish (Middle-East) refugee present condition 
(sympathetic) 
a. The Jewish (Middle-East) refugee present condition 
(unsympathetic) 
9. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present condition (sympa-
thetic) 
10. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present conditon (un-
sympathetic) 
After the number of paragraphs for each of the ten categories 
was tallied, the percentage of paragraphs for any given cate-
gory in relation to the total number of paragraphs was then 
calculated. For example, if there was found a total of 100 
paragraphs which discuss the Arab-Palestinian problem as 
defined by the ten categories above, and if Category I had 
10 paragraphs, then Category I would comprise 10 percent of 
all that was found (for that magazine) on the Arab-Palestinian 
problem. Subsequently eight sentences were constructed ac-
cording to these percentages. For example, if for any given 
magazine 100 percent of all. its paragraphs were located in 
the first four categories and these paragraphs were evenly 
distributed among categories (i.e., 25 percent each), then 
its eight-sentence representation would be comprised of two 
sentences for each of the four categories. Obviously, in 
this p~rticular case, the other six categories would not be 
represented. The other two magazines used in the analysis 
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were a pr:o-Arab monthly (recommended by the PLO office in 
Chicago), and a religious (Oral-Law based) Jewish weekly 
(the most widely circulated English-speaking Jewish magazine 
in the world). The same type of 8-sentence construction 
was done for these magazines as descr: ibed above, but the 
process of analysis was a little different. One difference 
was the time period of analysis. Issues of the pr:o-Ar:ab maga-
zine were studied from June, 1982 (as above) to August, 1984. 
This was due to the 1 imi ted number of issues available dur: ing 
the above specified six-month interval. Another discrepancy 
in procedure was that a random sample of ten issues only was 
used for analysis in contrast to the fir:st two magazines, 
wher:e the gr:eat majority of issues wer:e analyzed. The ra-
tionale was that the portrayal of the problem by each of 
these two magazines would be so apparent fr:om the very begin-
ning, that a more extensive analysis would be useless. This 
rationale proved to be accurate. The final deviation in 
procedure had to do with the religious Jewish magazine. 
This magazine had no specified table of contents, so in order: 
to conduct the analysis the present author inspected each 
issue, page by page, studying the captions of all articles 
(instead of the table of contents) for each of the issues 
under analysis. 
A reliability check was then carried out on 36 percent 
of all material analyzed. The reliability check was done 
by a male accountant with a Bachelors degree from Northwestern 
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university. The accountant did not independently begin to 
analyze the material until he and the author reached a con-
sensus on ten consecutive paragra,phs, taken from magazine 
articles not relevant to the analysis proper. Dividing the 
number of paragraphs agreed upon by the total number of para-
graphs analyzed, the present analysis had a reliability ratio 
of • 83. 
Each respondent in the study was read eight sentences 
over the telephone representing the view portrayed in one 
of the four types of magazines, as explained above. The 
respondent was then asked several questions on the Arab-Pales-
tinian problem, and was urged to answer based only on the 
eight sentences he/she had just heard. The complete survey 
instrument used for both the experimental and correlational 
aspects of the present study may be found in Appendix D. 
C. Procedure 
The present study entailed both a correlational re-
search design and a controlled experiment which were both 
part of a single telephone interview. 
In the correlational part of the interview, the atti-
tude questions and scales used in the survey fac il i ta ted 
the investigation of situational, psychodynamic, and socio-
cultural variables, in an attempt to measure their relation-
ship to attitudes toward Jews and Israel. As discussed in 
Chapte'r III, one hypothesized sociocultural factor producing 
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prejudice is anomie (i.e., the disintegration of societal 
structure and values). The 4-item anomie scale implemented 
by Bryant and Veroff (1984) was employed in the present study 
to measure this variable. 
The situational emphasis in explaining prejudice 
deals with the current forces impinging on the individual. 
Fear and insecurity concerning threats of economic, political, 
or military disaster are seen as reinforcing anti-Jewish 
attitudes and actions. In order to empirically test this 
relationship, the author constructed one-item rating scales 
for each of the above variables. 
Two psychodynamic approaches mentioned above (see 
Chapter III) postulate that frustration and a fragmented sense 
of self predispose the individual to prejudicial thinking 
and action. The present study has attempted to measure in-
dividual frustration via the Life Satisfaction Scale (COI\Verse 
et al., 1965), and by the author's abridged and modified 
Purpose in Life Test (Crumbaugh, 1968). The Thomas-Zander 
Ego Strength Scale (Thomas et al., 1960) was employed to 
investigate the individual's sense of identity, and as the 
above variables, was studied in its relationship to attitudes 
toward Jews and Israel. In addition, several demographic 
variables (e.g., Age, !!.£,!1 Gender, etc.) were examined in 
their relationship to attitudes towards Jews, attitudes to-
wards Israel, and level of Mideast knowledge. The phenomen-
ological approach was investigated via the Mideast Knowledge 
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scale, direct questions on various Arab-Palestinian Issues, 
and Media Usage in their relationship to attitudes towards 
Jews and Israel. 
During the experimental phase of the interview all 
respondents participated in an experiment where four dis-
tinctly different types of magazines were manipulated. They 
were: (1) a popular American news magazine, (2) a secular 
(non-Oral Law based) Jewish magazine, (3) an Arab-oriented 
magazine, and (4) a religious (Oral Law based) Jewish maga-
zine. 
Eight sentences representing one of the four maga-
zine's portrayal of the Arab-Palestinian problem was read over 
the telephone. Subsequently, all respondents were asked the 
same questions regardless of the news source being repre-
sented. Subjects were urged to base their responses exclu-
sively on the sentences just read. 
In summary, in the experimental part each respondent 
listened to one of the four news-source representations con-
cerning the Arab-Palestinian problem, and was then questioned 
on the perceptions the sentences evoked. (See Figure S, 
flow chart representing the present study' s major variables.) 
Sociocultural Approach 
Demographics 
Anomy 
Situational Approach 
Political Threat 
Military Threat 
Economic Threat 
Psychodynamic Approach 
Life Satisfaction 
Purpose in Life 
Ego Strength 
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Figure S. Flow Chart Representing Major Variables Examined 
in Study No. II 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Chapter 1 Hypotheses and Results 
The statistical analyses conducted to test the stated 
hypotheses in Chapter I were based on an all-Jewish sample 
· · of 811 respondents (see Methodology for sampling procedures) • 
A. The following demographics are presented here 
in order to give the reader some understanding of the sample 
used in the upcoming analyses. 
Gender 
Male (N=407) = 50% 
Female (N =4 04) = 50 % 
Synagogue Affiliation 
Reform (N = 80) 
Conservative (N=ll4) 
Orthodox (Oral Law Judaism) 
Non-Affiliated (N•324) 
Other (N =4 9) 
Born in u.s. 
= 10% 
= 14% 
(N =2 31) = 3 0 % 
= 41% 
= 6% 
Yes (N=702) = 87% 
No (N=l04) • 13% 
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Age 
21 to 40 (N=370) = 47% 
41 to 54 (N=ll4) = 14% 
55 and over (N=309) = 39% 
Formal Education Level 
Last Grade Completed 
12 and under (N=l41) = 18% 
Some College or Vocational School 
Bachelors Degree (N=l79) 
(N=l83) = 23% 
• 23% 
Some Graduate School (N=67) 
Masters Degree (N=l29) 
*Doctorate Degree (N=97) 
= 8% 
= 16% 
= 12% 
B. The analysis in Chapter I attempted to show his-
torically that the anti-Jewish phenomenon is different (both 
quantitatively and qualitatively) from other minority group 
experiences. According to the historical analysis the primary 
attack against the Jews is not against the Jews per se, but 
rather against what they have represented. This representa-
tion, was seen as manifesting itself in three Jewish-core 
components. Accordingly, primary attacks against Jews were 
seen as attempts to uproot (1) the Jewish people's relation-
ship to the Law, and/or (2) the Jewish people's relationship 
to the Land, and/or (3) the Jewish collective body. It was 
theorized that historical anti-Jewish movements (i.e., the 
leaders of the movements), whose explicit or implicit ideol-
ogies were competitively threatened by the "Jewish presence" 
(as manifested in one or more of the above components, were 
*In the present study a Law degree was considered a 
doctorate degree. 
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psychologically pressured to eradicate this "presence" by 
attacking one or more of its three core components. 
It was also explained that there has been only one 
form of Judaism (i.e., Oral Law Judaism, which is known today 
as Orthodox Judaism) which has persevered throughout mil-
lennia, and that this variable of longevity has been a major 
factor in creating an atmosphere of anti-Jewish activity 
(i.e., if Jews would have assimilated like other groups that 
had the opportunity, they would obviously not have suffered 
as Jews). Given the above, Orthodox Judaism was posited in 
the forthcoming analysis as a true representation of Judaism 
(not to suggest that other Jewish movements are illegitimate 
in light of their lack of longevity, but only that this mil-
lennia-old group is, beyond suspicion, representative). 
The groups posited in Chapter I as potentially anti-
Jewish (anti-Jewish in the respect that the nature of Oral 
Law Judaism poses a competitive threat, and that this threat 
has been challenged historically by attacking one or more of 
the above three components) were the Reform and Conservative 
Jewish movements in America. The present study's first em-
pirical analysis was to investigate the reliability of the 
claims made by Reform and Conservative Judaism concerning 
the unadaptability of Orthodox Judaism. According to their 
claims, the younger generation of American Jews (ages 21 to 
40) should have significantly abandoned the "outmoded" Oral 
Law tradition. In addition, if these two contemporary Jewish 
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movements are not inherently competitive (and therefore their 
prime objective would not be to wean the Jewish masses from 
the Oral Law tradition), but rather true complementary forms 
of Judaism then their respective constituencies should, at 
the very least, be maintaining themselves (i.e., any con-
temporary positive expression of spirituality should be able 
to maintain itself over one generation). 
Group maintenance over one generation was computed 
in the following ways: (see Methodology Study No. 1 for 
sampling and questioning procedures). 
1. All 811 Jewish respondents were asked what type 
of synagogue they and their children and/or grandchildren 
(over the age of 20) belong to. A cross-tabulation based on 
the religious affiliation of parents to that of their children 
(between the ages of 21 to 40 years old) was then computed. 
The percentages in Table 1 stand for the affiliation-scatter 
of children whose parents were affiliated with any one move-
ment. 
An example of how Table 1 is to be understood can 
be seen in the following description of parents who are pres-
ently affiliated with the Reform movement: 94 parents who 
had children between the ages 21 to 40 were affiliated with 
the Reform movement. Of their children (between 21 and 40) 
61% today are non-affiliated, 21% affiliated with the Reform 
movement, 12% affiliated with the Conservative movement, 3% 
affiliated with the Orthodox movement, and 3% affiliated 
173 
TABLE 1.--Parent-Child Intergroup Moyewent 
Children's Reli2ious 
(N=253) (N=44) 
*NA 
NA 83% 
(N=92) 
R 61% 
Parents (N=94) 
Religiious 
Affiliation c 47% 
(N=l82) 
0 17% 
(N=l 73) 
*NA = Non-Affiliated 
R = Reform 
C = Conservative 
R 
4% 
21% 
8% 
3% 
(N=84) 
c 
3% 
12% 
35% 
2% 
Affiliation 
(N=l64) 
0 **Total 
7% = 97% 
3% = 97% 
8% = 98% 
76% = 98% 
O = Orthodox (i.e., Oral Law Judaism) 
**Respondents and children belonging to other Jewish 
religious movements were deleted in the present analysis. 
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with other Jewish religious movements unspecified in the 
present table. 
The one-generation affiliation differential between 
children between the ages of 21 and 40, and their parents, 
based on responses of parents and grandparents was: 
Non-Affiliated= +175% 
Reform = - 53% 
Conservative = - 54% 
Orthodox = - 5% 
These percentages were obtained by dividing the num-
ber of children presently affiliated with one of the four 
groups by the number of parents presently affiliated with 
one of the four groups. For example, 44 children (between 
the ages of 21 and 40) are presently affiliated with the 
Reform movement as opposed to 94 parents who are Reform af-
filiated. By dividing the number of children (44) by the 
number of parents (94) the nummer .47 (or 47%) is obtained 
which represents the movement's maintenance level over one 
generation. In more understandable terms we can say that the 
movement has decreased 53% (as represented above) over one 
generation (i.e., 100% - 47% = 53%). By using the same for-
mula for the non-affiliated groups we obtain 253 • 92 = 2.75 
(or 275%), and in order to depict the pure rate of increase 
we subtract 100% (or 92) from the above equation and obtain 
a one-generation increase of 175% (as represented above). 
2. When examining inter-group movement from the 
perspective of the child between the ages of 21-40 (i.e., 
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instead of basing the statistics on what parents and grand-
parents knew about their children and grandchildren, the 
following statistics were based on what children knew con-
cerning their parents' religious affiliation) the following 
cross-tabulation was obtained: 
*TABLE 2.--Child-Parept Interaroup Moyeroent 
Children's Reli~ious Affiliation 
(N=l55) (N=2 3) (N=36) (N=l29) 
NA R c 0 Total 
NA 77% 0% 3% 18% = 98% 
(N=34) 
R 69% 22% 4% 3% = 98% 
(N=73) 
Parents 
Religious c 51% 5% 25% 18% = 99% 
Affiliation (N=ll4) 
0 15% 1% 2% 75% = 93% 
(N=l30) 
*Respondents in Table 2 were mutually exlusive of 
those in Table 1, In addition, chances that the same parent-
child relationship was being tapped twice ~as insignificantly 
slight. 
Table 2 is to be read in the following manner: 155 
respondents (ages 21 to 40) claimed to be non-affiliated, 
23 affiliated with the Reform movement, 36 affiliated with 
the Conservative movement, and 129 affiliated with the Ortho-
dox movement. Of their parents, 34 were non-affiliated, 73 
were Reform, 114 were Conservative and 130 were Orthodox. 
Of the 34 parents said to be (or had been if deceased) non-
affiliated 77% of their children remained non-affiliated, 
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0% became Reform, 3% became Conservative, and 18% became 
orthodox. 
The one-generation differential between children 
(21-40 years old) and their parents based on the responses 
of the children was: 
*Non-Affiliated = + 
Reform = -
Conservative = -
Orthodox = -
356% 
68% 
68% 
1% 
3. When both above samples were pooled in which 
the number of children = 916, the change over one generation 
was: 
Non-Affiliated • + 
Reform • -
Conservative = -
Orthodox = -
224% 
60% 
59% 
3% 
For example the number of children (ages 21 to 40) 
who were non-affilaited in the two tables were 253 and 155 
respectively. The sum of these numbers {i.e., 253 + 155 = 
408) divided by the number of non-affiliated parents in the· 
two tables (92 and 34 respectively) produced a quotient of 
3. 24 (408 • 126 = 3. 24). In order to calculate the pure 
rate of increase, 100% (or 126) was subtracted from the above 
equation and a one-generation increase of 224% was obtained 
(as represented above). 
In brief, the Non-Affiliated Group was the most pro-
ductive over the last generation (+224%) whereas both the 
*These percentages were computed in the same manner 
as in Table l. 
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Reform and Conservative movements' appear to have substantially 
diminished (-60% and -59% respectively). The Orthodox move-
ment over the last generation appears to be maintaining itself 
(-3 % ) • 
4. The maintenance of any group is not exclusively 
dependent on the inter-generational drop-out rate. It is, 
in addition, dependent on the birth rate of its members to-
gether with converts from other religions. Because the con-
version rate to Judaism today is trivial only the birthrate 
among the four groups will be compared in the following anal-
yses. The birthrate of respondents ages 55 and over were 
compared. The birthrate of these middle-aged to elderly 
Jews is seen as representing another criterion for judging 
the maintenance of the various groups over one generation: 
TABLE 3.--Differential Birth Rate Respooaents 55 and Over 
(N=l22) 203 (zero) Non-Affiliated= (No. of Children) • 2.1 (replacement)=.79 
(N =50) 
Reform 
(N =65) 
Conservative 
(N =61) 
Orthodox 
122 (level) 
85 
= so • 2.1 = • 81 
144 
= 65 • 2.1 = 1.05 
149 
= "6T. 2.1 • 1.16 
F = 7.85, df (3,294), p < .001. 
When differential birthrate was taken into account 
together with inter-group movement (based on the pooled sample 
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of children ages 21-40 [N•916]) the change over one generation 
has been: 
Non-Affiliated 
Reform 
Conservative 
Orthodox 
= + 177% 
= - 68% 
= - 57% 
= + 13% 
For example, the pooled rate of increase over one 
generation for the Non-Affiliated group was 224%. When the 
birthrate of the Non-Affiliated group was taken into con-
sideration the overall increase over one generation was 177% 
(i.e., 224% x .79 = 177%). In light of the differential 
birthrate among the groups the Non-Affiliated group has in-
creased 177% over one generation, the Reform and Conservatiuve 
have decreased -68% and -57% respectively and Orthodoxy ap-
pears to be on the increase (+13%). 
C. According to the theoretical analysis in Chapter 
I, Orthodox Judaism was hypothesized as representing a com-
petitive threat to both Reform and Conservative Judaism. 
If (according to the hypothesis) the Reform and Conservative 
movements are genuinely competing with Orthodox Judaism, 
then these movements should be psychologically pressured to 
break any real relationship their adherents may have to the 
Land of Israel (notwithstanding their official claim to the 
contrary). Accordingly, the present statistical analyses 
expected to find a significantly weaker relationship among 
adherents of Reform and Conservative Judaism than among their 
Orthod·ox counterparts. It was already mentioned in Chapter 
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t that the following findings (regardless of outcome) are 
not sufficient to unequivocally support the hypothesis, but 
they are considered sufficient to refute the hypothesis. 
The criterion for measuring respondents' relationship 
to the Land was based primarily on two behavioral indices, 
and on a secondary level of importance on respondents' atti-
tudes towards the Jewish state together with their general 
level of Mideast knowledge. According to Biblical and Tal-
· mud ic sources (as expressed in Chapter I) the Jewish relation-
ship to the Land is not some intangible ideal, but rath~r 
the concrete desire of actually living and being there. 
Therefore the first index in measuring the Jewish 
people's relationship to the Land was to ask: 
If things in the u. s. remain as they are, do you 
have any real intention of ever settling in Israel? 
Results to the above question (N=788) when compared according 
to synagogue affiliation were: 
TABLE 4.--Inten)ion to Settle in Israel 
Synagogue Affiliation 
Intention to 
Settle in Israel 
Yes: 
No: 
(N=318) 
NA 
8% 
92% 
(N•79) 
R 
1% 
99% 
F = 84.26, df (3,727), p < .001. 
(N•113) 
c 
7% 
93% 
(N=221) 
0 
51% 
49% 
According to the above table, the percentages of 
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Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Conservative respondents who 
had the intention of someday settling in Israel were 8%, 
1%, and 7% respectively. In contrast, the percentage of 
orthodox Jews (51%), who intended to someday settle in Israel 
vastly exceeded the other three groups. 
When Non-Affiliated, Reform, Conservative, and Ortho-
dox synagogue affiliations are coded 1, 2, 3, and 4 respec-
tively and then correlated with the *10-item Jewish Religious 
Observance Scale (N = 676) an r statistic of • 79 was 
obtained. This extremely strong relationship was expected 
in light of the fact that, officially, Orthodox Judaism as-
sumes the binding authority of all the Laws, Conservative 
Judaism less so, Reform Judaism advocates less ritual obser-
vance than Conservative, and Non-Affiliated is as its name 
implies non-binding, and non-advocating. The religious 
observance group breakdown can be seen in Table 5. 
In order to conceptually simplify and methodologically 
economize the statistical analysis an **Abridged 3-item (items 
2, 3, and 7) Observance Scale was constructed which produced 
a KR-20 reliability coefficient of .93 (N • 800) and cor-
related .90 with the larger 10-item Observance Scale. These 
particular three items were chosen because (1) they repre-
*On an N of 546 the Jewish Observance Scale produced 
a Kinder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient of .91. 
**The higher the scaled score the more observant the 
individual. 
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TABLE 5,--Jewish Obseryance Scale 
(N•79) (N•ll4). (N•231) (N=322) 
R c 0 NA 
1. Do you refrain from eating bread and bread products on 
Passover? 
Yes 56% 75% 99% 37% 
No 44% 25% 1% 63% 
2. Do you refrain from driving on Saturday? 
Yes 1% 9% 91% 8% 
No 99% 91% 9% 92% 
3. Do you keep Kosher? 
Yes 5% 31% 96% 10% 
No 95% 69% 4% 90% 
4. Do yo believe in G-d? 
Yes 92% 91% 100% 81% 
No 8% 9% 0% 19% 
5. Do you fast on Yon Kippur? 
Yes 69% 80% 99% 48% 
No 31% 20% 1% 52% 
6. Do you eat pork? 
Yes 61% 40% 1% 67% 
No 39% 61% 99% 33% 
7. Do you fast on Tish Ab av? 
Yes 1% 8% 87% 5% 
No 99% 92% 13% 95% 
8. Do you believe in a "world to come" after one dies in 
this world? 
Yes 16% 39% 92% 34% 
No 84% 61% 8% 66% 
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(N =7 9) (N=ll 4) (N=231) (N=322) 
R c 0 NA 
9. Do you believe that the Bible was given to the Jews 
by G-d? 
Yes 38% 70% 97% 46% 
No 62% 30% 3% 54% 
10. Do you attend Synagogue services weekly? 
Yes 21% 22% 73% 4% 
No 79% 78% 27% 96% 
*ll. [FOR MEN ONLY] Do you put on Tefillin daily? 
(N=38) (N=68) (N=96) (N=l 74) 
Yes 3% 6% 90% 6% 
No 97% 94% 10% 94% 
*12. [FOR WOMEN ONLY] Do you light Sabbath candles? 
(N=42) (N=4 7) (N=l35) (N=l48) 
Yes 48% 60% 99% 18% 
No 52% 40% 1% 82% 
*This item was not part of the 10-item scale for it 
pert,ained exclusively to only one of the genders. 
sented the three highest item-total correlations among the 
ten items, (2) in light of their extremely high reliability 
coefficient, and (3) in light of the strong relationship 
between the three-item scale and the total observnce scale. 
An interesting property of this abridged scale was that 86% 
of all respondents either observed all three religious activi-
ties or none at all. Therefore in order to accentuate the 
following differences while still representing the vast 
majority of these data (i.e., 86% of it) only these two groups 
in the forthcoming analysis will be shown. However, a Pear-
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son's r Statistic and the probability level representing these 
entire data (i.e., all levels of the Jewish observance vari-
able) will be presented as well. 
When comparing respondents who observe all of the 
above three religious activities with those who do not observe 
any of the three we are, in effect, comparing the Orthodox 
group against the others combined. For example, 85% of all 
Orthodox respond en ts were found to observe all three religious 
activities, whereas among the Non-Affiliated, Reform, and 
Conservative only 5%, 0%, and 5% respectively observed all 
three. Conversely, the percentages of Non-Affiliated, Reform, 
and Conservative respondents who do not observe any of the 
three were 87%, 93%, and 67% respectively. In contrast, 
only 3% of Orthodox respondents reported not to observe any 
of the three. Accordingly, separating respondents into the 
above two groupings (i.e., those that observe all three and 
those that do not observe any of the three) re presents a 
slightly finer delineation between Oral Law adherents and 
non-Oral Law adherents than the distinction produced by com-
paring Orthodox adherents with the other three groups sep-
arately. In other words, Oral Law adherents are specifically 
Jews who observe the Oral Law, and therefore by comparing 
Jews who keep the Laws with Jews who do not, we are in effect, 
creating a purer comparison between Oral Law adherents and 
non-Oral Law adherents. 
When the Intention to Settle in Israel variable was 
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correlated with the Abridged Observance Scale (N•763) results 
were r = .53, p < .001. When the comparison presented in 
Table 6 was analyzed, results were: r = .55, p < .001. 
TABLE 6.--Intention to Settle in Israel CII) 
II 
Yes 
No 
Observe all 
Three (N=222) 
54% 
46% 
Do Not Observe 
Any (N=453) 
5% 
95% 
The above results demonstrate that the more observant 
the individual is the more inclined he/she will be to someday 
settle in Israel. For example, 54% of Oral Law adherents 
(as defined by observing all three religious activities) 
intend to someday settle in Israel whereas only 5% of non-
Or al Law adherents (as defined by not keeping any of the 
three observances) intend to someday settle in Israel. 
The second index used to measure the relationship to 
the Land, albeit more indirect than the first but nevertheless 
a tangible-behavioral criterion, was based on the number 
of visits to Israel. Although two blatant confounding vari-
ables appear to favor the Reform and Conservative constitu-
encies on this index (they are: (1) Being that a trip to 
Israel is very expensive, the wealthier of the constituencies 
should have greater opportunities, and (2) the following 
questions did not inquire into the lengths of stay, which 
would not take in to account the many Orthodox ind i.v iduals 
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and families who spend extended periods of time in Israel) 
the comparisons were still carried out. 
The first question asked was: 
1. Have you ever visited Israel? 
TABLE 7.--Visits to Israel CI> 
Synagogue Affiliation 
(N=323) (N•80) (N•ll3) (N=227) 
NA R c 0 
Have you Yes: 37% 61% 58% 83% 
Ever 
Visited No: 63% 39% 42% 17% 
Israel 
According to Table 7 the percentage of Orthodox Jews 
(83%) who have ever visited Israel appears to significantly 
exceed the other three groups. In addition, the percentages 
of Reform and Conservative Jews who have ever visited Israel 
(61% and 58% respectively) seem to significantly exceed the 
percentage of Non-Affiliated Jews. 
The second question asked was: 
2. How many times have you visited Israel? 
Results based on the total sample (N=802) are shown in Table 
B. 
Using the Non-Affiliated group as an example, Table 
8 may be understood according to the following description. 
The mean number of visits to Israel per person for the Non-
Affiliated group was .75. In addition, when the number of 
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TABLE 8,--Number of visits to Israel 
Non-Affiliated (N=323): Mean = .75; 1st Quartile= O, 2nd 
Quartile = O, 3rd Quartile • 1 (Range was from 0 visits to 
19 visits) 
Reform (N=80): Mean= 2.53; 1st Quartile= O, 2nd Quartile 
= 1, 3rd Quartile = 2 (Range was from O visits to 38 visits) 
Conservative (N=ll3): Mean = 1. 27; 1st Quartile = O, 2nd 
Quartile • 1, 3rd Quartile = 2 (Range was from 0 visits to 
25 visits) 
Orthodox (N=227): Mean = 2. 89; 1st Quartile= 1, 2nd Quartile 
= 2, 3rd Quartile= 3 (Range was from 0 visits to 50 visits) 
F = 18.42, df (3,739), p < .001. 
visits per person was broken down into quartiles the following 
results were obtained. Starting from the least number of 
visits to Israel and working upward the maximum number of 
visits for any one person in the Non-Affiliated group in 
the first quartile (i.e., the first 25% of all Non-Affiliated 
respondents) was o. In the 2d quartile (50% of all Non-Af-
fil iated respondents) the maximum number of visits per person 
remained O, and in the third quartile (75% of all Non-Af-
filiated respondents) the maximum number of visits per person 
was 1. 
Six individual comparisons between the four groups 
were then implemented. The following comparisons were found 
significant at the .005 level: 
1. Non-Affiliated (Mean= .75) vs. Reform (Mean= 2.53) 
t = -4.03, df (739), p < .001 
2. Non-Affiliated (Mean .75) vs. Orthodox (Mean= 2.89) 
t = -7.00, df (739), p < .001 
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3. Conservative (Mean = 1.27) vs. Orthodox (Mean = 2.89) 
t = -4.00, df (739), p < .001. 
Although the mean number of visits between Reform 
and Orthodox respondents did not significantly differ, there 
did seem to be a substantial difference when quartiles were 
compared. The possibility that a few very high numbers had 
arti fie ially inflated the Reform group's mean was investigated 
by deleting all respondents who had traveled to Israel 11 
or more times. Over 98% of all respondents had visited Israel 
10 times or less so the deletion of less than 2% had little 
effect on the individual Ns. 
A one-way analysis of variance produced: 
F = 39.19, df (3,725), p < .001. 
When individual comparisons were subsequently done the follow-
ing comparisons were found significant at the .005 probability 
level. 
(N=219) (N=322) 
Orthodox (Mean = 2.31) vs. Non-Affiliated (Mean = .69) 
t = -10.72, df (725), p < .001 
(N=219) (N==76) 
Orthodox (Mean= 2.31) vs. Reform (Mean= 1.24) 
t = -4.68, df (725), p < .001 
(N=219) (N=ll2) 
Orthodox (Mean = 2.31) vs. Conservative (Mean = 1.05) 
t = -6.27, df (725), p < .001. 
According to the individual contrasts above, the 
Orthodox group has visited Israel significantly more times 
than the other three groups. In addition, there did not 
appear to be any significant difference among the othe·r three 
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groups themselves (i.e., after the maximum number of visits 
to Israel had been truncated to 10). 
When the variable Have You Ever Vi sted Israel was 
related to Oral Law adherence (i.e., respondents who observe 
al 1 three religious activities vs. respondents who do not 
observe any of the three) results were: 
TABLE 9.--yisits to Israel (II) 
Have you ever 
Visited 
Israel 
Yes: 
No: 
Observe All 
Three (N=229) 
86% 
14% 
Don't Observe 
Any (N=458) 
43% 
57% 
According to the above table the percentage of Oral 
Law adherents who have at one time visited Israel is twice 
as large as the percentage of non-Oral Law adherents who 
have ever visited Israel (i.e., 86% to 43%). 
When Number of Visits to Israel was then correlated 
with the Abridged Observance Scale, results were r = .41, p 
< .001. Following therefrom, the breakdown between respon-
dents who observe all three activities and respondents who 
do hot keep any is presented in Table 10. 
Results show that the more religiously observant 
the individual is, the more often he/she will ever likely 
visit Israel. In addition, Oral Law adherents have visited 
Israel.significantly more (M = 2.98) than non-Oral Law ad-
herents (M = 1.06). 
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TABLE 10,--Number of visits to Israel (II) 
Observe All Three (n•229) 
Mean • 2. 98 
(Range was from 0 to 50 visits) 
1st Quartile • 1 
2nd Quartile • 2 
3rd Quartile == 4 
Don't Observe Any (N=458) 
Mean = 1.06 
(Range was from 0 visits to 38 visits) 
1st Quartile == 0 
2nd Quartile = 0 
3rd Quartile • 1 
r = .43, p < .001 
The following two variables (i.e., Israel Attitude 
Scale and the Mideast Knowledge Scale) were deemed secondary 
in importance when evaluating the relationship between Ameri-
can Jews to the Land of Israel in 1 ight of the variables' 
intangible and overly general nature. Intangible in the 
respect that attitudes and knowledge concerning Israel may 
demonstrate an interest in the Jewish State, but are far 
removed from the traditional relationship (which all three 
religious movements ostensibly advocate) Jews throughout 
history have ma in ta ined. Overly general in the respect, 
that a positive Jewish identity (regardless of movement af-
filiation) should by itself predispose the individual to 
positive attitudes and a heightened interest in the modern 
state of Israel. 
Theoretically, positive attitudes and knowledge con-
cerning the secular State of Israel should be innocuous and 
non-threatening to the Reform and Conservative movements. 
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Furthermore, the attitude and knowledge scales address spe-
cifically the modern secular State of Israel, and not neces-
sar ily the traditional relationship between the Jewish people 
and the Land of Israel (this distinction may appear to be 
too fine, but in reality this distinction is consistently 
expressed in many Orthodox circles). Therefore it would not 
be surprising to find strc:>nger positive attitudes and a 
heightened awareness concerning the secular State of Israel 
per se, among Reform, and Conservative adherents than among 
their Orthodox counterparts. 
Individual mean scale scores for the *Israel Attitude 
Scale in the upcoming analyses have been categorized in the 
following manner: 
1.00 to 1.49 =Strong Negative Attitudes 
1.50 to 2.49 = Somewhat Negative Attitudes 
2.50 to 3.49-= Somewhat Positive Attitudes 
3.50 to 4.00 = Strong Positive Attitudes 
The significant individual contrasts (i.e., p < .005) 
among the four groups based on separate variance estimates 
were: 
1. Conservative (M=3.63) vs. Non-Affiliated (M=3.46) 
t = -4.12, df (238), p < .001 
2. Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Non-Affiliated (M=3.46) 
t = -9.42, df (547), p < .001 
3. Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Reform (M=3.54) 
t = -4.75, df (118), p < .001 
4. Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Conservative (M=3.63) 
t = -3.08, df (183), p < .002 
*Based on a N of 637 the Israel Attitude Scale pro-
duced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .72. 
191 
TABLE 11,--Israel Attitude Scale 
overall 
Frequency 
*Israel Attitude Scale (SCI) (N=809) 
Strong Negative Attitudes 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes 
Strong Positive Attitudes 
Non-Affiliated (N=324) 
0% 
2% 
29% 
69% 
Strong Negative Attitudes 0% 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes 5% 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes 41% 
Strong Positive Attitudes 54% 
Reform (N=80) 
Strong Negative Attitudes 0% 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes 0% 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes 40% 
Strong Positive Attitudes 60% 
Conservative (N=l13) 
Strong Negative Attitudes 0% 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes 1% 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes 26% 
Strong Positive Attitudes 73% 
Orthodox (N=230) 
Strong Negative Attitudes 0% 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes 0% 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes 12% 
Strong Positive Attitudes 88% 
F = 27.63, df (3,743) I p < .001. 
*The full 9-item scale with individual response 
breakdown among groups can be found in Appendix A. 
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According to the above comparisons Orthodox adherents 
have significantly more positive attitudes' towards the modern 
state of Israel (Mean= 3.75) than do adherents of the other 
three groups. These results become all the more pronounced 
when one realizes that the scale, which was originally de-
signed for a non-Jewish population, seemed to produce a ceil-
ing effect in the Jewish sample. The Conservative group 
also produced significantly more positive attitudes towards 
Israel (Mean= 3.63) than did the Non-Affiliated group (Mean 
= 3.46). 
When the Israeli Attitude Scale is correlated with 
the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) the resulting r = .29, 
p < • 001. When the Abridged Scale was then dichotomized 
results were: 
TABLE 12.--Israel Attitude Scale CIIl 
Observe All Three (N=233) 
Strong Negative Attitudes = 0% 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes = 0% 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes = 15% 
Strong Positive Attitudes = 85% 
Don't Observe Any (N=460) 
Strong Negative Attitudes = 0% 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes = 3% 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes = 38% 
Strong Positive Attitudes = 59% 
r = .30, p < .001 
According to the above the more religiously obser-
vant the individual is the more positive attitudes towards 
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the modern state of Israel he/she is likely to have. Cor-
respondingly, the Oral Law adherents had significantly more 
pro-Israel attitudes than did non-Oral Law adherents. For 
example, 85% of Oral Law adherents registered strong positive 
attitudes towards Israel whereas only 59% of non-Oral Law 
adherents produced strong positive attitudes towards Israel. 
The following variable was Mideast Knowledge Level. 
Table 13 represents the breakdown in scores among the four 
groups. 
TABLE 13.--Mideast Knowledse 
Overall 
Frequency: 
NA (N=324) 
9% 
i'7% 
40% 
24% 
C (N=ll4) 
5% 
25% 
44% 
26% 
*Mideast Knowledge Scale (N = 811) 
0-2 correct 5% 
3-4 correct 23% 
5-6 correct 42% 
7-8 correct 30% 
0-2 correct 
3-4 correct 
5-6 correct 
7-8 correct 
0-2 correct 
3-4 correct 
5-6 correct 
7-8 correct 
F = 12.23, df (3,745), p < .001 
R (N=BO) 
5% 
28% 
43% 
25% 
0 (N=231) 
1% 
15% 
45% 
39% 
*Based on an N of 637 the Kuder-Richardson 20 reli-
ability coefficient was .47. The full 8-item scale with 
individual response breakdown among religious groups can be 
found in Appendix A. 
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The significant individual constrasts (i.e., p < 
.005) among the four groups were: 
1. Orthodox *(M=l.74) vs. Non-Affiliated (M=l.64) 
t : 5.89, df (745) I p ( .001 
2. Orthodox (M=l.74) vs. Reform (M=l.65) 
t : 3.39, df (745) I p ( .001 
3. Orthodox (M=l.74) vs. Conservative (M=l.66) 
t = 3.37, df )745), p < .001 
According to the above comparisons, the Orthodox group seems 
to have significantly greater knowledge of Mideast happenings 
than the other three groups. No significant differences 
(i.e., p < .005) were found when the other three groups were 
compared with one another. 
When the **Mideast Knowledge Scale was correlated 
with the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) the resulting ~ 
= .22, p < .001. When the Observance Scale was then dichoto-
mized results were as shown in Table 14. 
According to the analyses below, the more religiously 
observant the individual is, the more Mideast knowledge he/she 
is likely to have. In addition, Oral Law adherents' level 
of Mideast knowledge was significantly greater than the level 
of Mideast knowledge registered by the non-Oral Law group. 
For example, only 16% of Oral Law adherents obtained a score 
*The maximum range of mean scores went from 1.00 
(none correct) to 2.00 (all correct). 
**The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable 
the individual. 
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of 50% or less whereas 35% of non-Oral Law adherents scored 
50% or less. 
XABLE 14.--Mideast Knowledae Scale (II) 
r = .24, p < .001 
Observe All Three (N=234) 
0-2 correct = 2% 
3-4 correct = 14% 
5-6 correct = 43% 
7-8 correct = 41% 
Don't Observe Any (N=461) 
0-2 correct = 8% 
3-4 correct = 27% 
5-6 correct = 43% 
7-8 correct = 23% 
D. A solid Jewish education is another area where 
the official platforms of all three movements positively 
conv~rge (see Chapter I). Officially, all three movements 
consider a strong fundamental Jewish education highly impor-
tant. Although officially they encourage the strengthening 
of the Jewish spirit via Jewish education, according to the 
theoretical analysis presented in Chapter I this should not 
be realized in practice. If Reform and Conservative Judaism 
are internally pressured to uproot the traditionally competi-
tive Jewish presence, their "best interests" would be served 
by uprooting traditional Jewish knowledge among their respec-
tive constituencies (to implicitly uproot Jewish knowledge 
from among other constituencies would be virtually impossible, 
196 
and therefore any attempt would be highly impracticable). 
Following from the theoretical analysis in Chapter I, the 
forthcoming statistical analyses expected to find that Jews 
affiliated with the Reform and Conservative movements are 
significantly less knowledgeable about fundamental and ele-
mentary Judaism than are Jews affiliated with Orthodox Juda-
ism. As in prior analyses, the *findings presented below, 
regardless of outcome, are not sufficient to conclusively 
support the above hypothesis, but are considered theoretically 
sufficient to refute the hypothesis. 
**The index for measuring Level of Fundamental Jewish 
Knowledge was a set of ten questions (see Methodology for 
scale construction details) which covered the areas of Jewish 
history, Jewish holidays, Bible, Talmud, Prophets, Prayer, 
and Hebrew Language in the most elementary and superficial 
manner the scale's authors could conceive. Based on a N of 
546 the scale produced a Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability 
coefficient of .91. The following results in Table 15 were 
based on a N of 805. 
The percentages of Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Con-
servative respondents who obtained scores of 25% correct or 
lower were 72, 58, and 48 respectively. In contrast, only 
*See Append ix A for other comparisons among the 
four groups. 
**A comparison among groups on all ten questions 
can be found in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 15. --Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale 
NA (N=323) R ~N =80 ~ 
72% 0-2 Correct 58% 
16% 3-5 Correct 30% 
7% 6-8 Correct 11% 
5% 9-10 Correct 1% 
c (N=ll2) 0 (N=231) 
48% 0-2 Correct 7% 
31% 3-5 Correct 10% 
16% 6-8 Correct 25% 
5% 9-10 Correct 58% 
F = 241.26, df (3, 742) I p < .001 
7% of Orthodox respondents scored 25% or lower. 
Correspondingly, the percentages of Non-Affiliated, 
Reform, and Conservative respondents who obtained scores of 
90% correct or higher were 5, 1, and 5 respectively. In con-
trast, 58% of Orthodox respondents scored 90% or higher. 
Six individual comparisons between the four groups 
were then made. The following comparisons were found signif-
icant at the .005 probability level. 
1. Conservative *(Mean• .33) vs. Non-Affilated (Mean= .23) 
t = -3.66, df (742), p < .001 
2. Orthodox (Mean • .80) vs. Non-Affiliated (Mean = .23) 
t = -25.81, df (742), p < .001 
3. Orthodox (Mean • .80) vs. Reform (Mean = .28) 
t = -15.83, df (742), p < .001 
- 4. Orthodox (Mean = .80) vs. Conservative (Mean = .33) 
t = -15.83, df (742), p < .001. 
*The maximum range of mean scores was from .oo (none 
correct) to 1.00 (all ten correct). 
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The above data demonstrate the vast differences in 
level of elementary Jewish knowledge between the Orthodox 
group and the other three. In addition, there appears to 
be no substantial differences among the mean scores of the 
three other movements. [Although a statistically significant 
difference was obtained when the Conservative group was com-
pared to the Non-Affiliated group, in actuality the slight 
difference between their extremely low mean scores (.33 to 
· .23) attenuates any serious implications of the difference 
between the two.] 
When the Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale was cor-
related with the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) the re-
sulting r = .77, p < .001. When the Observance Scale was 
then dichotomized results were: 
TABLE 16.--Elewentary Jewish Kpowledae Scale CIIl 
r = .81, p < 001 
Observe All Three (N=233~ 
0-2 Correct = 4% 
3-4 Correct = 9% 
5-6 Correct = 23% 
7-8 Correct • 64% 
Don't Observe Any (N=458) 
0-2 Correct = 69% 
3-4 Correct = 22% 
5-6 Correct = 9% 
7-8 Correct = 1% 
· According to the above analyses, the more religiously 
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observant the individual is, the greater his or her knowledge 
of elementary Judaism will be. In addition, Oral Law ad-
herents' level of elementary Judaism was vastly greater than 
the Jewish knowledge elicited by the non-Oral Law group. 
For example, only 13% of Oral Law adherents scored SO% or 
lower, while an extremely large 91% of the non-Oral Law group 
scored SO% or lower. 
Chapter 2 Hypotheses and Results 
The statistical analyses conducted to test the stated 
hypotheses in Chapter II were based on an American non-Jewish, 
and non-Arab sample of 400 respondents (see Chapter IV, 
Methodology for Sampling and Interviewing Procedures). 
A. The following demographics are presented here 
in order to give the reader some understanding of the sample 
used in the upcoming analyses. 
Gender (N=397) 
Female = S3% 
Male = 47% 
Religion (N=396) 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Other 
= 46% 
= 39% 
= 1S% 
(N=396) 
Country of Citizenship 
U.S.A •. 
Other 
= 98% 
= 2% 
Race (N=396) 
White = S7% 
Black = 36% 
Other = 7% 
Age (N=381) 
2S to 40 = 49% 
41 to S4 = 32% 
SS and Over = 19% 
(N=3 96) 
Born in U.S. 
Yes 
No 
= 92% 
= 8% 
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*Primary Country of Ancestors (N=238) 
Ireland • 17% 
Germany = 17% 
Poland • 14% 
Italy = 8% 
England = 6% 
Sweden = 6% 
Other = 32% 
Last Year of Formal Education Completed (N=387) 
Grade l thru 11 = 13% 
= 27% 
= 26% 
= 16% 
= 5% 
High School Degree 
Some College 
Bachelors Degree 
Some Graduate School 
Masters or Doctorate Degree = 12% 
Individual 1984 Income Before Taxes (N=366) 
Less than $10,000 = 37% 
Less than $15,000 • 10% 
Less than $20,000 = 13% 
Less than $30,000 = 20% 
Less than $50,000 = 16% 
More than $50,000 = 3% 
Employed or Retired (N=368) 
Employed or Retired = 82% 
Unemployed = 18% 
*Only white respondents were asked country of .ancestors. 
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*Occupational Status Level (N•213) 
Value 
1 = 3% 
2 • 16% 
3 • 5% 
4 = 10% 
5 = 24% 
6 = 5% 
7 = 1% 
10 = 1% 
11 • 3% 
12 = 3% 
13 = 21% 
14 
-
2% 
15 = 3% 
16 = 1% 
17 • 4% 
*The higher the value the lower the occupational status level 
as devised by Otis Dudley Duncan's "A Socioeconomic Index 
for All Occupations" (Backstrom & Hursh-Cesar, 1981). 
B. The following analysis attempted to measure the 
American public's general awareness of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict and to correlate this awareness with attitudes toward 
Israel. Consistent with the discourse in Chapter II (con-
cerning the American news media's coverage of the Middle 
East), the author expected to find the public's lack of in-
formation about various fundamental and crucial Middle East 
issues substantial. 
1. Eight questions were constructed (see Methodology 
for details) with the intent of measuring the public's general 
knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Response categories 
were~' False, or Don't Know. This implies that by guess-
work o~ly, respondents should have scored on the aver age 
50%, which would be represented as an individual score of 
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41 and an approximate 50% breakdown would have resulted for 
each of the eight items separately. 
was: 
The actual frequency breakdown for the total scale 
N=400 
0 to 2 correct = 41% 
3 to 4 correct • 38% 
5 to 6 correct = 18% 
7 to 8 correct = 3% 
Median = 3; Mean = 2.94 
According to the above figures 79% of all respondents 
received a score of 50% or less. These scores, as predicted, 
imply that the public's knowledge of relatively recent events 
in the Middle East is extremely limited. 
The following is the 8-item Mideast Knowledge Scale 
with the response breakdown for each item. The correct re-
spo~se for items 4, 7, and 8 is True and the correct response 
for the other five items is False. 
Middle-East Knowledge Questions (N=400) 
1. Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over the 
last 300 years until the creation of Israel. Is this 
true or false? 
True = 37% False = 28% Don't Know= 36% 
2. From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine 
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948, 
thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the 
Jewish settlers. Is this true or false? 
T • 35% F • 32% DK = 33% 
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3. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of Jewish 
nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true or false? 
T = 25% F = 36% DK = 40% 
4. Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State 
of Israel have spent over three times the amount of money 
in military equipment than Israel has. Is this true or 
false? 
T = 41% F = 25% DK • 34% 
s. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting record 
in the United Nations has shown a strong connection be-
tween itself and the United Startes. Is this true or 
false? 
T = 40% F = 24% DK = 36% 
~ 
6. Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that 
it now almost equals in size the area of all its Mid-
dle-East enemies put together. Is this true or false? 
T = 23% F = 48% DK = 29% 
7. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been openly 
dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is this true 
or false? 
T = 40% F = 37% DK = 24% 
8. In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth of 
the land identified by the League of Nations as Pales-
tine. Is this true or false? 
T = 45% F • 15% DK = 41% 
For instance in item No. 1, 28% of all respondents answered 
correctly while 37% had misinformation, and another 36% had 
lack of information. In total, 73% of all respondents did 
not know that Palestine was !!,2! an independent Palestinian 
state over the last 300 years. 
Based on the theory that misinformation is correlated 
with attitudes, the public's level of Mideast knowledge was 
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hypothesized as correlating significantly with attitudes 
toward Israel. In order to examine this relationship an 
Israel Attitude Scale was constructed (see Chapter IV, 
Methodology) and was then correlated with the above 8-item 
*Mideast Knowledge Scale. Based on a N of 234 the Israel 
Attitude Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coef-
ficient of • 76. The Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=400) produced 
a Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient of .ss. Several attempts 
were made to bring up the .SS reliability coefficient (via 
deletion of items, factor analysis, and alternate coding 
strategies) but all proved unsuccessful. 
The Pearson Product-Moment correlation (based on an 
N of 360) between the two scales resulted in a correlation 
of .26 where p < .001. Although equivocal (in light of the 
small reliability coefficient) there does appear to be a 
significant relationship between the two, but the actual 
strength of that relationship needs to be further investigated 
pending a more reliable Mideast Knowledge Scale. Tentatively, 
it does appear that attitudes toward Israel may be signif-
icantly enhanced if the public were more factually aware of 
fundamental Mideast issues. 
In light of the Mideast Knowledge Scale's relatively 
weak reliability coefficient (.SS) all eight items were cor-
*In the present and forthcoming correlational analyses 
the eight-items were coded in the following manner: 1 = 
Incorrect (irrespective of whether the value was based on 
misinformation or lack of information), and 2 •Correct. 
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related individually with the Israel attitude scale. Of 
the eight items, four turned out to be significantly related 
(i.e., p < .005) to the Israel scale. They were: 
N=370 
*Item l; r = .22, p < .001 
Item 2; r = .24, p < .001 
Item 3; r = .24, p < .001 
Item 6; r = .33, p < .001 
It is important to note that the first three items (i.e., 
items 1, 2, and 3) deal with the Palestinian Arab's historical 
relationship to the Land and/or to the Jewish people. In 
addition, an incorrect response to Item 6 bespeaks an abysmal 
knowledge of Mideast issues, and particularly this item cor-
related highest (.33) with attitudes towards Israel. Accord-
ingly, this item more than any other seems to reflect the 
relationship between lack of information and negative atti-
tudes towards Israel. 
c. Another objective of the study was to examine 
the relationship between attitudes towards **Jews with atti-
tudes toward Israel. Based on an N of 360 the Pearson Prod-
uct-Moment Correlation produced an r of .57, p < .001. This 
finding implies a very strong relationship between attitudes 
towards Jews with attitudes towards israel in which 32% of 
the variance was accounted for (i.e., r2 = .32). These data 
*See pp. 202-3, which presents each item in full. 
**Individual items on the Jewish and Israel attitude 
scale with their response breakdown can be found in Appendix 
B. 
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support the theory that there does exist a real and integral 
relationship between the above two variables. 
D. The final objective in Chapter II was to study 
the news media and its relationship to attitudes and informa-
tion towards and about Israel. The first media question was: 
What is your primary source of news about International 
Affairs? 
The closed-ended response breakdown was: 
(N=395) 
Radio = 10% 
Television = 50 % 
Newspapers = 28% 
Magazines = 11% 
Other = 2% 
When these five response categories were compared 
(via Analysis of Variance) on both The Middle East Knowledge 
Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale no significant differences 
(i.e., p > .005) were found. 
Another news-media question asked was: 
From which local channel do you get most of your inter-
national news and information? 
The closed-ended response breakdown was: 
(N • 211) 
Channel 2 = 32% 
Channel 5 = 12% 
Channel 7 • 48% 
Channel 9 = 5% 
Channel 11 • 2% 
Other = 1% 
When ~hese six response ca·tegories were compared on both 
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the Middle-East Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale 
no significant differences were detected. 
A third news-media question was: 
From which TV news person do you get your largest amount 
of international news? 
The op~n-ended response breakdown was: 
(N = 116) 
Dan Rather 
Ted Koppel 
Walter Jacobson 
Peter Jennings 
Other 
= 23% 
= 15% 
= 13% 
= 15% 
= 35% 
When a general comparison was made, no significant differences 
were found on either the Middle-East Knowledge Scale or on 
the Israel Attitude Scale. 
A fourth question was: 
From which newspaper do you get your largest amount of 
international news? 
The open-ended response breakdown was: 
(N = 92) 
Chicago Tribune = 47% 
Chicago Sun-Times • 39% 
Other • 14% 
When these three response categories were compared on both 
the Mideast Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale 
no significant differences were found. 
The final news media question was: 
From which magazine do you get most of your international 
news? 
The open-ended response breakdown was: 
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(N = 4 7) 
Time = 47% 
NeWsweek = 23% 
Other • 30% 
When these three categories were then compared on both the 
Mideast Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale no 
significant differences were detected. 
E. In the forthcoming analysis the content and per-
ceptual effects of four news periodicals were examined. Peri-
odicals representing American, Arab, Jewish Secular, and 
Jewish Religious (Oral Law) orientations were content analyzed 
(See Chapter IV, Methodology) with regards to their portrayal 
of the Palestinian-Arab refugee problem. Subsequently, the 
perceptual effect these seemingly different periodicals have 
on the non-Jewish, non-Arab American public were compared 
and analyzed. Samples from three of the periodicals (i.e., 
Amer.ican, Jewish secular, and Jewish religious) were drawn 
from issues dated anywhere between June 6, 1982 and December 
31, 1982. It was believed that during this seven-month period 
the American news media devoted much time and space to the 
Lebanese invasion in general, and the Arab-Palestinian problem 
in particular. Issues of the Arab periodical were drawn 
from publications dated between June, 1982 and August, 1984. 
In light of the negative news coverage Israel received 
during its invasion into Lebanon, it was hypothesized that 
the pe~iodical representing mainstream America, and needless 
to say the Arab periodical, would portray the Arab-Palestinian 
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problem, given a latitude of variation, significantly less 
pro-Israel than the Jewish religious periodical. Accordingly, 
it was also predicted that these two magazines would produce 
significantly less positive perceptions of Israel, than per-
ceptions evoked via the Jewish religious periodical. In 
addition, according to the theoretical analysis discussed 
i~ Chapter I, the Jewish secular magazine, depicted as in-
directly echoing the philosophy of Reform and Conservative 
Judaism, should be no less hostile towards Israel, nor less 
sympathetic for the Palestinian Arabs than its American coun-
terpart. 
The following ten categories were used to content-
analyze all of the news literature compared in the present 
analysis. 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
IX. 
Categories 
Jewish right or connection to the land. 
Arab right or connection to the land. 
Arab mistreatment of Jews. 
Israeli mistreatment of Arabs. 
Origins of Jewish Middle-East refugees. 
Origins of Arab-Palestinian refugees. 
The Jewish Middle-East refugee present condition 
(sympathetic). 
The Jewish Middle-East refugee present condition 
(unsympathetic). 
The Ar ab-Palestinian refugee present condition ( sympa-
thetic). 
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x. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present condition (un-
sympathetic). 
The category breakdown for each periodical was then 
done according to (a) Number of paragraphs in each category, 
(B) Percentage of paragraphs for any given category in rela-
tion to total number of paragraphs, and (C) Number of sen-
tences per category allocated to each 8-sentence set based 
on the above percentages. 
TABLE 17. -Septence Breakdoo fgr tbe foµr cer iodisals 
1. Secular American Periodical: 
Category I II III IV 
A. No. of Par agra?ls 6 i2 6 22 
B. Percentage 5 11 5 19 
c. No. of Senten::es 0 1 0 2 
2. Secular Jewish Periodical: 
3. 
4. 
A. No. of Par agra?ls 2 18 
B. Percentage 1 8 
c. No. of Senten::es 0 0 
Pro-PLO Periodical: 
A. No. of Paragra{ils 3 24 
B. Percentage 3 22 
c. No. of Sentences 0 2 
Reli2ious Jewish Periodical: 
28 71 
12 31 
1 3 
1 37 
1 36 
0 3 
V VI VII VIII IX X 
o oocr~o 
0 0 0 0 600 
0 0 0 0 5 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 *12 
0 11 
0 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 104 5 
0 46 2 
0 4 0 
0 30 0 
0 28 0 
0 2 0 
A. No. of Paragra{ils 25 2 82 0 **l **3 0 0 11 38 
B. Percentage 15 1 51 0 1 2 0 0 7 23 
c. No. of Senten::es 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
*Pro Arab 
**Pro Israeli 
After a reliability coefficient of .83 was obtained 
for 36% of all material analyzed, the following four sets 
of sentences were constructed. The vast majority of.wording 
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was taken directly from the respective magazines themselves. 
Arab Magazine 
A Jewish professor stated that the Israeli army has committed 
atrocities against the Palestinian people. 
The racist character of Zionism is amply manifested in Is-
rael's imperialistic and settler-state policies. 
During Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army trampled 
on its victims destroying everything in its pa th and unleashed 
on Beirut a rain of death and destruction. 
The Palestinians have been victims of extermination, perse-
cution, and indifference since 1948. 
Most of the world's governments today have come to recognize 
that the Palestinian problem is the root-cause of the Arab-
Israel i conflict. 
The Jews have displaced the Palestinians from their land 
via abominations. 
Jews have no real Biblical justification for building a Jewish 
State in Palestine. 
The po 11 s have shown that the American people think that 
the Palestinian struggle to return to their land is justified. 
American News Magazine 
President Carter said that the continued deprivation of Pal-
estinian rights by the Israelis is contrary to moral and 
ethical principles of both the U.S. and Israel. 
The Israelis arranged for the Christian militiamen to enter 
the Palestinian refugee camps in 1982 where there were very 
bloody consequences. 
Senior American officials feel the necessity for solving 
the Palestinian plight on the West Bank. 
An Israeli victory in Lebanon did not settle the issue of a 
place for the Palestinaians to live. 
Because the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, 
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suffered defeat in Lebanon, the moderate policies of Yasser 
Arafat may be rejected for more ruthless tactics. 
The Arab leaders of the Middle-East have called for the crea-
tion of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem 
as its capital. 
The leader of the PLO Yasser Arafat has unflagging energy and 
absolute determination to regain a homeland for his people. 
The Lebanese President stated that the Palestinians should 
be allowed to live in peace and freedom with self-determina-
tion in their land. 
Jewish Secular Magazine 
Israel will never ob ta in the security it wants by using force. 
The Israeli government has tried to destroy the Arab political 
elite in the occupied territories by ousting mayors, closing 
universities, and restricting the circulation of literature 
in the Arab-dominated areas. 
Many governments throughout the world have held Israel re-
sponsible for the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the 
Palestinian refugee camps. 
According to the u.s. State Department, there are 4,300,000 
Palestinians scattered around the world. 
The European Parliament Assembly has expressed solidarity 
with the Palestinian people. 
The Arabs call for a Palestinian State represented by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO. 
The moderate Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, 
are troubled by the Palestinian plight. 
A PLO leader who surrendered to the Israelis said that he 
was ashamed of its terrorist tactics. 
Jewish Religious (Oral-Law) Magazine 
The State of Israel is the historic homeland of the Jews. 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, is an un-
pr inci~led terrorist organization. 
The PLO has vied for the total liquidation of Israel. 
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PLO operations in Lebanon up to 1982 was the center for in-
ternational terrorism worldwide. 
Up until 1982, Israel's northern border has been consistently 
bombed by PLO terrorists. 
Since June of 1981 to December of 1982, a total of 150 ter-
rorist attacks have been made against Israel by the PLO. 
The President of Lebanon said, in Paris, that Arafat, the 
leader of the PLO, is the cause of the Palestinian's problems. 
Jordan is the key obstructionist in settling the Palestinian 
refugee problem by not admitting that his state is actually 
Palestine. 
Eight fixed-response questions followed the reading 
of each set of sentences (the questions may be found in Ap-
pend ix D). The eight questions (N=348) based on the readings 
produced a Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient of *.69. The 
mean for the 8-item scale was 1.53 with a standard deviation 
of • 317 (the higher the scaled score the more pro-Israel 
the responses, the minimum possible mean score was 1 and 
the maximum possible mean score was 2). 
An analysis of covariance, comparing the four peri-
odicals on the subsequent eight questions while controlling 
for differences attributed to~' Age, Gender, and Attitudes 
Toward Israel, was then done. A highly significant F sta-
tistic of 28.23, df(3,339), p < .001 resulted. 
Version: 
Mean: 
(N=84) 
American; 
; 
Adjusted Mean: 
1.51 
1.51 . 
' 
(N=88) 
Jewish Secular 
1.45 
1. 46 
*Attempts to bring up the reliability coeffic.ient 
via deletion of items and factor analysis were unsuccessful. 
'. 
(N=90) 
version: Jewish Religious; 
Mean: 
Adjusted Mean: 
1.76 
1.75 
; 
. 
I 
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(N=86) 
Arab 
1.38 
1.38 
Subsequently, the six possible individual comparisons 
were statistically analyzed. The following contrasts repre-
sent only those which produced statistically significant 
differences (p < .005). 
Significant Contrasts 
Jewish Religious-Arab : t=-7.49, df(369), p<.001 
Jewish Religious-Jewish Secular: t•-5.84, df(369), p<.001 
Jewish Religious-American t=-8.65, df(369), p<.001 
According to the above mean scores, the mean value 
as predicted, of the Jewish religious periodical (M•l. 76) 
represented the most pro-Israel of the four periodicals. 
The Arab magazine produced the most anti-Israel responses 
(M=l.38), and the American and Jewish secular magazines pro-
duced mean scores of 1.51 and 1.45 respectively. After in-
dividual comparisons were implemented, only differences be-
tween the Jewish religious periodical and each of the other 
three magazines proved statistically significant. 
Afterwards, four questions (three of them taken di-
rectly from the eight questions asked at the end of each 
respective reading) were asked at the conclusion of the inter-
view in order to examine the carryover effect of the read-
ings •. With the four readings posited as the independent 
variable; F = 1.94, df(3,351), p > .005. 
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In addition, the Israel Attitude Scale (which was 
also administered at the end of the interview) was examined 
concerning the readings' effect on it. Again, with the four 
readings posited as the independent variable; F = 2.25, df 
(3,374), p > .005. 
In conclusion, it appears that the results were 
specifically a function of the readings themselves, and had 
1 i ttle to do with the respondents' prior attitudes. Cor-
respondingly, the effects of the readings were shortl ived 
which was probably a function of the repetitive nature of 
the directions given. For instance, immediately preceding 
the readings respondents were told to base their responses 
only on their understanding of the sentences. In addition, 
they were told that the sentences they were about to hear 
"come from an actual magazine which does not necessarily 
represent the real situation." Immediately following the 
reading of the sentences they were told again to base their 
"answers only on the sentences" they "just heard and !!.2!. on 
any prior knowledge or attitudes" they might have. To further 
affirm the directives, respondents were asked to respond 
only according to t;he readings on each question (e.g., "Ac-
cording to what you heard who is to blame for the continuing 
Palestinian refugee probelem. Is it ••• ) .* 
*Other incidental statistics pertaining to the above 
readings and questions thereof can be found in Appendix B. 
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Chapter 3 Analyses and Results 
The forthcoming analyses deal with variables which 
are commonly depicted as factors directly involved in pro-
moting prejudice. However, in the present theoretical context 
they are viewed as aggression-arousing mediating variables 
which have only indirectly become part of the overall preju-
dicial process. The following social-psychological variables 
have been shown in the past to correlate significantly with 
anti-Jewish prejudice (see Chapter 3--Tertiary Cause of Anti-
Jewish Hostility). In the present study these variables 
have been analyzed in relation to attitudes towards both 
Jews and Israel. 
F. The disintegration of societal structure and 
values in times of rapid social change has been coined anomie 
and has been found to correlate significantly with anti-Jewish 
attitudes (Hoge et al., 1975). Individuals suffering from 
anomie are seen as being prone to feelings of anxiety and 
insecurity, in short, heightened emotional stress which may 
predispose them to hate propaganda against Jews or any other 
group who happens to be the target of the respective propa-
ganda. 
The 4-item Anomie Scale, as implemented by Bryant 
and Veroff (1984), produced in the present study a Cronbach 
Alpha reliability coefficient of .65 based on a N of 382. 
No sig~ificant relationship (i.e., p > .005) was registered 
between the Anomie Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale· (N=360, 
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r = .14).* However, a significant Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation (r • .25, p < .001) was obtained when correlated 
with the **Jewish Attitude Scale (N=360). 
Despite the fact that the scale's reliability coef-
ficient was a bit below the usual minimal-level of acceptance 
(i.e., .70), a small but substantive relationship does appear 
to exist between the Anomie and Jewish Attitude Scales. In 
other words, the emotional stress brought about by anomie 
could be seen as a contributing factor promoting anti-Jewish 
attitudes, and to a lesser and non-significant extent, anti-
Israel attitudes. 
G. It has been advanced that threats of economic, 
political, and military disaster reinforce anti-Jewish atti-
tudes and behavior (e.g., Ettinger, 1969; Parson, 1980). Fear 
of an economic, political, or military catastrophe, which is 
out of the individual's personal control, was depicted (see 
Chapter III) as a potentially disturbing and frustrating ex-
perience. Theoretically, this fear was conceptualized as 
predisposing the individual to hostile-type attitudes and 
actions directed against vulnerable individuals or groups. 
In the present analysis a ***6-item Opinion-Fear 
*The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. 
**The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. 
***The higher the scaled score the more negative the 
attitude. 
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Rating Scale was correlated with both the Jewish and Israel 
attitude scales. The 6-item scale based on a N of 361 pro-
duced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .76. Re-
sul ts were: 
1. Jewish Attitude Scale 
(N-=360), r = -.17, p = .001 
2. Israel Attitude Scale 
(N=360), r = -.22, p < .001. 
The 6-i tem scale was then broken down into two 3-i tem 
scales which conceptually represented (1) Fear of an impending 
economic, military, or political crisis, and (2) Opinions 
concerning impending economic, military, or political crises. 
Based on a N of 361 (for both scales) the Fear Scale produced 
a Cronbach Alpha of .72, and the Opinion Scale produced one 
of • 5 9. when these scales were then correlated independently 
with the Jewish and Israel attitude scales results were: 
*3-Item Fear-Crisis Scale 
1. Jewish Attitude Scale 
(N=360), r = -.13, p > .005) 
2. Israel Attitude Scale 
(N =3 60) , r = - • 17, p = • 001 
*3-Item Opinion-Crisis Scale 
1. Jewish Attitude Scale 
(N=360), r = -.17, p = .001 
2. Israel Attitude Scale 
(N=360), r • -. 21, p < • 001 
*The higher the scaled score the more negative the 
attitude. 
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As discussed above and corroborated in the present 
analysis t~ere does seem to be a significant correlation 
between respondents' perceptions of an impending national 
crisis and attitudes towards both Jews and Israel. In other 
words, the apprehension and/or frustration created by per-
ceived impending crises is seen (according to the present 
analysis) as a contributing factor promoting anti-Israel, 
and to a lesser extent anti-Jewish attitudes. However, after 
a multiple regression analysis was performed in which both 
the Israel and Jewish scales were simultaneously regressed 
on the 6-item Opinion-Fear Rating Scale only the Israel 
Scale's partialed correlation obtained *significance. Beta 
values were: 
Israel Attitude Scale= -.19, p = .002 
Jewish Attitude Scale= -.07, p > .05 
This implies that the relationship between Attitudes toward 
Jews and the Opinion-Fear Scale may be primarily a function 
of the relationship between the Israel Attitude Scale and 
the Jewish Attitude Scale. 
The complete 6-item scale was, in addition, broken 
down into three 2-item scales which conceptually represent 
*In the present analysis as well as other forthcoming 
mutliple regression analyses where Beta values are examined, 
the level of significance usually employed in both studies 
(i.e., p <.005) was lowered to .OS in light of the Beta sta-
tistic's inherent nature, whose value may be considerably 
reduced because of the possibility confounds or collinearity 
among independent variables. 
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(1) Military Crisis Scale, (2) Economic Crisis Scale, and 
(3) Political Crisis Scale. Based on a N of 361 for all 
scales the Military Crisis Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha 
of .59. The Economic Crisis Scale and the Political Crisis 
Scale produced Cronbach Alphas of .62 and .47 respectively. 
When the above scales were correlated with the Jewish and 
Israel attitude scales results were: 
*2-Item Military Crisis Scale 
1. Jewish Attitude Scale 
(N=320) I r = -.13, p > .005 
2. Israel Attitude Scale 
(N=320) I r = -.20, p < .001 
*2-Item Economic Crisis Scale 
1. Jewish Attitude Scale 
(N=320) I r = -.13, p > • 005 
2. Israel Attitude Scale 
(N=320) I r = -.15, p > • 005 
*2-Item Political Crisis Scale 
1. Jewish Attitude Scale 
(N=320), r = -.19, p = • 001 
2. Israel Attitude Scale 
(N=320), r = -. 22, p < .001 
According to the above analyses, the perceived im-
pending crises found to be related to attitudes towards Israel 
are more of a military and political nature than they are 
*The higher the scaled score the more negative the 
attitude. 
221 
economic. When related to attitudes towards Jews, only those 
of a political nature proved to be significant (although 
the differences between the political r and the other r's 
are probably not significant). 
H. The frustration (scapegoat) theory of prejudice 
postulates that when the cause of frustration is either too 
intimidating or obscure, people often redirect their hostility 
against an available, identified group unlikely or unable 
to fight back. The present analysis attempted to measure 
individual frustration via the *Life Satisfaction Scale (Con-
verse et al., 1965), and the abridged and modified (for tele-
phone usage) 4-item *Purpose in Life Test (Crumbaugh, 1968). 
The Life Satisfaction Scale (N=353) did not signif-
icantly correlate (i.e., p > .005) with either the Jewish 
(r = .06) or Israel (r = .OS) attitude scales. However the 
4-item Purpose-in-Life Test, which produced a Cronbach Alpha 
of .56 (N=358), correlated significantly with both the Jewish 
and Israel scales as demonstrated below: 
1. The Jewish Attitude Scale 
(N =3 60) 1 r • • 2 2 1 p ( • 0 01 
2. The Israel Attitude Scale 
(N =3 60 ) 1 r • • 15 1 p • • 0 04 
Although the above relationships were statistically signif-
icant, the fact that the scale's reliability coefficient 
was only .56 throws a damper on the reliability of the 
*The higher the scaled score the more posi t.i ve the 
attitude. 
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results. However, based on the above exploratory analysis 
it does appear that the lack of meaning (purpose) a person 
experiences in life (and consequently the more existential 
frustration) the more inclined he/she may be to anti-Jewish 
and/or anti-Israel activity. 
In Chapter 3 the hypothesis was presented that an 
individual who fails to achieve an effective personal identity 
may be predisposed to prejudicial behavior in an attempt to 
establish a stable sense of self. The Thomas-Zander Ego 
Strength Scale (Thomas et al, 1960), was employed in the 
present analysis, and like the above variables was studied 
in its relationship to attitudes towards Jews and Israel. 
Based on a sample of 370 the *7-item Ego-Strength 
Scale produced a reliability coefficient of only .40 (deleting 
itern(s) and factor analysis proved unsuccessful in substan-
tially inreasing the reliability coefficient). Neither the 
Jewish (r = .06) nor Israel (r = .12) attitude scales were 
significantly correlated (i.e., p > .OOS)with the Ego-Strengh 
Scale, but pending a more reliable measurement the results 
are, at best, inconclusive. 
In light of the Ego-Strength Scale's inadequate re-
liability coefficient, all seven items individually were sub-
sequently correlated with both the Jewish and Israel scales. 
Of the seven i terns, two i terns turned out to be significantly 
*The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. 
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correlated (i.e., p < .005) with the Jewish Attitude Scale, 
and none of the seven items correlated significantly with 
the Israel Attitude Scale. Correlations for the two Ego 
strength Items (Items No. 1 and 2 in the Scale) were: 
Jewish Attitude Scale 
Ego Strength Item No. 1 (N•361) 
r = .16, p = .002 
Ego Strength Item No. 2 (N•369) 
r = .21, p < .001 
Israel Attitude Scale 
Ego Strength Item No. 1 (N=361) 
r = .10, p > .005 
Ego Strength Item No. 2 (N=369) 
r = .13, p > .005 
To repeat, as can be seen from the above, both Ego-Strength 
Items 1 and 2 correlated significantly (.16 and .21 respec-
tively) with the Jewish Attitude Scale, while neither of 
the two items were found to be significantly related to the 
Isra'el Attitude Scale. 
Two simultaneous-multiple-regression analyses were 
then implemented in which all the psychological variables 
mentioned above (in addition to Level of Formal Educati<:>n) 
were regressed on both the Jewish and Israel attitude scales. 
Results were: 
1. Jewish Attitude Scale (N=370) 
Independent Variables 
Anomie Scale 
Ego-Strength Scale 
Life Satisfaction Scale 
Abridged Purpose in Life Scale 
Partial Correlations 
.15, p < • 006 
-.05, p > .05 
-.05, p > .05 
.20, p < .001 
opinion-Fear Rating Scale 
Level of Formal Education 
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-.10, p < .os 
.14, p < • 02 
Multiple R • .36, p < .001 
2. Israel Attitude Scale (N=367) 
Independent Variables 
Anomie Scale 
Ego-Strength Scale 
Life Satisfaction Scale 
Abridged Purpose in Life Scale 
Opinion-Fear Rating Scale 
Level of Formal Education 
Partial Correlations 
.02, p > .os 
.04, p > .os 
-.os, p > .os 
.11, p > .os 
-.19, p < .001 
.09, p > .os 
Multiple R = .28, p < .001 
Based on the above, it does appear that various 
social-psychological variables are independently associated 
with attitudes towards Jews. The present analysis supports 
prior research which has shown that the more emotionally 
disturbed, frustrated, or fearful the individual, the more 
pred~sposed he/she may be to develop anti-Jewish attitudes. 
It should also be made clear that although a substantial 
relationship has been detected (R • .36, which indicated 
that 13% of the variance is accounted for) the great majority 
of the variance (i.e., 87%) is still unexplained. In other 
words, the above social-psychological variables should not 
be considered more than minor contributions in the overall 
etiology of anti-Jewish attitudes. 
In examining the beta values it was found that the 
variables (i.e., Anomie, Purpose in Life, and Opinion-Fear 
Scale) ·which were significantly correlated with the. Jewish 
scale in bivariate relationships remained significantly cor-
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related in a multivariate analysis. This implies that the 
four significant correlations (i.e., the three scales above 
plus Level of Formal Education) are independently associated 
with attitudes towards Jews. 
Not only was the Multiple R less for the Israel at-
titude scale than it was for the Jewish scale (i.e., .28 
and .36, respectively), but five of the six beta values failed 
to reach the .OS level of significance. The only variable 
found to correlate significantly both separately, and after 
the par ti al ing process was the 6-i tem Opinion-Fear Ra ting 
Scale. 
I. According to the phenomenological approach to 
prejudice (Allport, 1954) individuals' prejudiced behavior 
proceeds immediately from their view of the situation con-
fronting them, and their reaction to the environment cor-
responds to their def ini ti on of that world. As depicted 
in Chapter II misperceptions of Jews and Judaism have his-
torically precipitated anti-Jewish activity. Furthermore 
(as shown in Chapter II), the most virulent anti-Jewish (anti-
Israel) propaganda currently being propagated concerns the 
Arab Palestinian refugee problem. According to the discussion 
in Chapter I I, the propaganda which bestows legitimacy on 
the Palestinian "national" movement and arouses sympathy 
worldwide for the "palestinian cause" while simultaneously 
castin9 aspersions on the "racist" and "imperialist" nature 
of the Jewish state, was conceptualized as providing the 
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"moral j us ti fication" (in the eyes of the world) for the 
implementation of another Jewish holocaust. 
In light of the above, four questions pertaining 
specifically to the Arab Palestinian refugee problem were 
asked of all respondents. A KR-20 reliability coefficient 
was computed for the four items *(N=l54) and resulted in 
• 3 9. Various combinations of these four i terns failed to 
substantially increase the reliability coefficient (the high-
est reliability coefficient based on a scale of items 1 and 
2 was .50). It was therefore deemed necessary to correlate 
each i tern separately with both the Jewish and Israel attitude 
scales. In the following analyses each i tern will be presented 
in full. 
**Item No. 1 (N=219) 
"In your op1n1on, who is to blame for causing the Palestinian 
refugee problem. Is it Israel or the Arabs"? 
Jewish Attitude Scale; r = .18, p > .005 
Israel Attitude Scale; r = .39, p < .001 
Item No. 2. (N=237) 
"In your op1n1on, who are the rightful inhabitants of the 
land which today is called Israel and before 1948 was called 
Palestine. Are the rightful inhabitants the Arabs or the 
Jews"? 
*Many respondents were unwilling to answer these 4 
i terns in 1 ight of their inherent nature which demanded either 
a pro-Israel or pro-Arab response (i.e., there were no mid-
dle-of-the-road response categories). 
· **Coding procedures for Items 1, 2, and 4 were: 
Pro-Arab response • l; Pro-Israel response • 2 
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Jewish Attitude Scale; r = .19, p = .003 
Israel Attitude Scale; r = .25, p < .001 
*Item No. 3 (N=275) 
"The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would 
be resettlement in Israel, Jordan, or some other place"? 
Jewish Attitude Scale; r = .06, p > .005 
Israel Attitude Scale; r = .22, p < .001 
Item No. 4 (N=297 
"In your opinion, is the Palestinian Refugee Problem, the 
underlying and central problem, in the Arab-Israeli cOii=' 
flict?" (The implicit response categories were Yes or No.) 
Jewish Attitude Scale; r = .32, p < .001 
Israel Attitude Scale; r = .35, p < .001 
According to the above, all four items correlate 
significantly with the Israel attitude scale, but i terns l 
and 4 in particular, correlate most highly (.39 and .35 re-
spectively) with attitudes towards Israel. These results 
impl'y that perceptions of the Arab Palestinian refugee problem 
may play an important part in the formation of attitudes 
towards Israel. 
The Jewish attitude scale correlated significantly 
(p < .005) with items 2 and 4. However, the relationship 
between the the Jewish scale and item 2 appears to be more 
an artifact of the relationship between attitudes towards 
~with attitudes towards Israel. This was seen by simul-
*The coding procedure for Item 3 was: Resettlement 
in Isr~el = l; resettlement in Jordan or some other place = 
2. 
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taneously regressing both scales on Item 2. Results were: 
Dependent Variable: Item 2 
Independent Variables 
Jewish Attitude Scale 
Israel Attitude Scale 
Beta Values 
.oa, p > .os 
• 20, p < • 007 
When the same analysis was done on Item 4, results were: 
Dependent Variable: Item 4 
Independent Variables 
Jewish Attitude Scale 
Israel Attitude Scale 
Beta Values 
.17 I p ( • 02 
.25, p < .001 
Although a considerable amount of the Jewish scale's vari-
ance is accounted for when the Israel scale is introduced 
into the equation, enough remains to imply that the Jewish 
attitude scale is independently related to Item 4. 
J. The following statistical analyses examine several 
demographic variables in their relationship to (1) Attitudes 
towards Jews, (2) Attitudes towards Israel, and (3) Knowledge 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
1. Independent Variable:* Primary Country of Ancestors 
Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale; 
F ::: l.70, df(6,222) I p > .os 
Israel Attitude Scale; 
F == .97, df (6,222), p >.OS 
Mideast Knowledge Scale; 
F == .96, df (6,231), p >.OS 
*Black respondents were not asked country of ances-
tors. 
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Based on the above analyses, the variable of primary 
country of ancestors does not appear to significantly dif-
ferentiate on attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast 
Knowledge. 
2. Independent Variable: Occupational Status (N=200) 
Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale; 
r = -.07, p > .OS 
Israel Attitude Scale; 
r = -.11, p > .OS 
Mideast Knowledge Scale; 
r = -.11, p > • 5 
The variable of Occupational Status does not appear to be 
significantly related to attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or 
Mideast Knowledge. 
3. Independent Variable: *Religion 
Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale; 
F = .70, df(2,381), p >.OS 
Israel Attitude Scale; 
F • l.S2; df(2,371), p >.OS 
Mideast Knowledge Scale 
F = 2.65, df(2,393), p >.OS 
The variable of Religion does not appear to significantly 
differentiate on attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast 
Knowledge. 
4. Independent Variable: 
Dependent Variables: 
Individual Income for 1984. 
Jewish Attitude Scale (N=320) 
r = .13, p > .oos 
*Jews and Arabs were initially screened out in the 
present study. 
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Israel Attitude Scale (N=320) 
r • .18, p • .oo! 
Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=320) 
r = .15, p > .o 5 
The variable of Individual Income for 1984 does not appear 
to significantly differentiate on attitudes towards Jews, 
or on Mideast Knowledge, but was significantly correlated 
with attitudes towards Israel. However, there does not seem 
to be significant differences among the three r's. 
5. Independent Variable: 
Dependent Variables: 
*Are You Employed or Retired, 
(Yes or No)? 
(N=J3G) 
Jewish Attitude Scale; 
r • .68, p > .oos 
Israel Attitude Scale; 
r = .03, p > .oos 
Mideast Knowled6e Scale; 
r • -.oi, p > • os 
The variable of Are You Employed or Retired, (Yes or No)? 
does not appear to be significantly related to attitudes 
towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast Knowledge. 
6. Independent Variable: 
Dependent Variables: 
Age (N=320) 
Jewish Attitude Scale; 
r = -.oi, p > .os 
Israel Attitude Scale; 
r = .17, p = .oo3 
Mideast Knowled~e Scale; 
r = .OS, p > .o 
*Direction of coding was: Unemployed = l; Employed 
or Retired = 2. 
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The variable Age does not appear to be significantly related 
to attitudes towards Jews or Mideast Knowledge. However, 
there does seem to be a slight but significant relationship 
between Age and Attitudes Towards Israel. The direction of 
the relationship implies that the older a person is the more 
pro-Israel he/she is likely to be. 
7. Independent Variable: 
Dependent Variables: 
*Gender (N=360) 
Jewish Attitude Scale; 
r • .64, p > .oos 
Israel Attitude Scale; 
r = -.14, p > .005 
Mideast Knowledge Scale; 
r = -.06, p > • os 
The variable of Gender does not appear to be significantly 
related to attitudes towards Jews, Israel or Mideast Knowl-
edge. However, there does seem to be a slight non-significant 
relationship between Gender and Attitudes Towards Israel. 
The direction of this relationship implies that males may 
have stronger pro-Israel attitudes than females. 
8. Independent Variable: Formal Education Level (N=360) 
Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale; 
r = .27, p < .001 
Israel Attitude Scale; 
r = • 18, p = • O Ol 
Mideast Attitude Scale; 
r = .18, p = .002 
The variable Formal Education Level appears to correlate 
*Directional key: Male = l; Female = 2. 
232 
significantly with all three of the above scales. 
9. Independent Variable: 
Dependent Variables: 
*Race 
Jewish Attitude Scale; 
(N=341) 
r = .19, p < .001 
Israel Attitude Scale; 
(N=336) 
r = .16; p = .003 
Mideast Knowledge Scale; 
(N=352) 
r = • 04, p > • 05 
The variable Race does not appear to be significantly related 
to Mideast Knowledge. However, Race did correlate slightly 
but significantly with attitudes towards both Jews and 
Israel. White respondents were found to be more pro-Jewish 
and pro-Israel than their Black counterparts. 
However, after a multiple regression analysis was per-
formed in which both the Jewish and Israel scales were simul-
taneously reressed on~ only the Jewish Scale's partialed 
correlation proved significant (Beta values were: Jewish 
Scale= .17. p < .008; and Israel Scale= .06, p > .OS). 
This suggests that the relationship between Race and Attitudes 
towards Israel is primarily a function of the relationship 
between Attitudes towards Jews with Attitudes toward Israel. 
K. Two simultaneous-multiple-regression analyses 
*In light of the fact that the third racial group 
"Other" had a N of only 23, and because of its heterogeneous 
character, only tqe racial groups of White and Black were 
compar~d in the following analyses. Coding for ~ was 
Black = 1, and White = 2. 
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were then implemented where the demographic variables of 
Gender, Age, Race, and Education were regressed on all three 
scales. Results were: 
1. Dependent Variable: Jewish Attitude Scale (N=341) 
Independent Variables Beta Values 
Gender .06, p > .OS 
Age -.02, p > .os 
Race .ls, p < .007 
Education .22, p < .001 
Multiple R = .29, p < .001 
The two variables (~ and Education) which were signif-
icantly correlated with Attitudes Towards Jews in bivariate 
relationships remained signficantly correlated in the above 
multiple correlation analysis. 
2. Dependent Variable: Israel Attitude Scale (N=336) 
Independent Variables Beta Values 
Gender 
Age 
Race 
Education 
-.14, p < .01 
.13, p < .02 
.17, p = .001 
.16, p = .003 
Multiple R = .31, p < .001 
Three of the above four variables were found significantly 
correlated with Attitudes Towards Israel in bivariate rela-
tionships, and remained significantly correlated in the above 
multivariate analysis. The variable Gender, which failed 
to reach the .oos level of significance in its bivariate 
relationship with the Israel scale reached significance in 
the above multivariate analysis after the significance level 
was lowered to • OS. 
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3. Dependent Variable: Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=3S2) 
Independent Variables Beta Values 
Gender 
Age 
Race 
Education 
-.10, p > .OS 
p > • OS 
.02, p > .OS 
.23, p < .001 
Multiple R = .26, p < .001 
The one variable (Education) which was found significantly 
correlated with the Mideast Knowledge Scale in a bivariate 
relationship remained significantly correlated in the above 
multivariate analysis. 
L. The following interaction effects failed to reach 
the .OOS level of significance on each of the three dependent 
variables (i.e., Jewish Attitude Scale, Israel Attitude Scale, 
and Mideast Knowledge Scale). 
1. Race x Age 
2. Race x Gender 
3. Race x Education 
4. Race x Income 
s. Education x Gender 
6. Education x Age 
7. Gender x Age 
8. Race x Education x Age 
M. In conclusion, four simultaneous mul tiple-regres-
sion analyses were conducted in which most of the above psy-
chological and demographic variables were regressed on both 
the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales. Two analyses for 
each scale were implemented. The first analysis combined 
most of the demographic variables and all of the psychological 
variab~es (except for the Arab-Palestinian issue questions). 
The second analysis included the four Arab-Palestinian issue 
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~uestions. The reason for this rather awkward strategy was 
that by integrating one or more of the 4 Arab-Palestinian 
Items into the analyses the N was substantially reduced. 
Therefore, in order to maximize the N while not deleting 
th~ Arab-Palestinian items (in light of the significant cor-
relation between these items and both scales) it was deemed 
necessary to carry out both types of analyses. Results were: 
TABLE 18.--Multiple Regression Analysis on 
Attitude Scale (N=306) 
Independent Variables 
Race 
Mideast Knowledge Scale 
Ego-Strength Item 2 
Age 
Gender 
Religion 
Life Satisfaction Scale 
Ego-Strength Item 1 
Income 
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale 
Anomie Scale 
Purpose in Life Scale 
Education 
Multiple R • .41, p < .001 
the Jewish 
Beta Values 
.12, p = .os 
.12, p = • 04 
.10, p > .os 
-.04, p > .os 
• 02 I p > .os 
• 01, p >. OS 
-.10, p > .os 
• 08 I p > .OS 
--, p > • OS 
-:. OS, p > .os 
.10, p > .os 
.19, p = • 003 
• 10, p > .os 
In Table 18 in which the Jewish scale was simultane-
ously correlated with most of the demographic and psychologi-
cal variables previously discussed, and where N=306, the 
multiple R = .41 (p < .001). This means that 17% of the 
scale's variance was accounted for by the thirteen variables 
in the_ equation. The three variables which remained inde-
pendently related (based on the probability level of .OS or 
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less) were Race, the Mideast Knowledge Scale, and the abridged 
Purpose in Life Scale. The five other variables (i.e., Edu-
cation, Anomie scale, Opinion-Fear scale, and Items 1 and 2 
of the Ego Strength scale) which proved to be slightly but 
significantly correlated in bivariate analyses, but failed 
to achieve significance in the above analysis was probably 
due either to confounds or to error variance engendered by 
the thirteen independent variables, or to a combination of 
the two. This point becomes clearer when one recognizes 
that many of the psychological and demographic variables 
correlated significantly (albeit their correlations were not 
strong enough to assume multi-collinearity) with one another, 
and yet the differences between their significant bivariate 
correlations and their insignificant Beta values were not 
too dissimilar. For example, Ego-Strength Item 1 correlated 
significantly (r = .16) in a bivariate equation, but proved 
insignificant (Beta = .08) when twelve other variables were 
entered into the analysis. 
In Table 19 in which the Jewish scale was simultane-
ously correlated with most of the demographic variables and 
all of the psychological variables previously discussed (and 
where N=l33), the mutliple correlation (R) obtained was .53 
(p < .001). In this analysis, when the four Arab-Palestinian 
Issue Items were included, the Multiple R was significantly 
increased, and the proportion of the Jewish scale's variance 
accounted for, by these seventeen variables, was 28%. Al-
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TABLE 19.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Jewish 
Attitude Scale CN=l33l 
Independent Variables 
Arab-Palestinian Item 4 
Religion 
Arab-Palestinian Item 3 
Age 
Gender 
Arab-Palestinian Item 2 
Education 
Ego-Strength Item 1 
Mideast Knowledge Scale 
Life Satisfaction Scale 
Ego-Strength Item 2 
Arab-Palestinian Item 1 
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale 
Purpose in Life Scale 
Income 
Anomie Scale 
Rase 
Multiple R = .S3, p < .001 
Beta Values 
.Is, p > .os 
-.13, p > .os 
.18, p = • 03 
.09, p > .OS 
--, p > .OS 
.17, p > .os 
.05, p > .05 
• 07, p > • 05 
.03, p > .05 
-.12, p > .05 
.16, p > .05 
.19, p = .03 
-- , p > • 05 
.07, p > .05 
.07, p > .05 
-. 04, p > • 05 
• p > .OS 
though the proportion of variance accounted for in the present 
analysis was considerably greater than in the prior analysis 
(Table 18), the amount of variance unaccounted for (i.e., 
72%), was still substantially large. In this analysis the 
Arab-Palestinian Issue Items 1 and 3 only, remained indepen-
dently related to the Jewish attitude scale. 
In Table 20 in which the Israel Attitude Scale was 
simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic and 
psychological variables in the study and where N=302, the 
Multiple R was .47 (p < .001). In other words, 22% of the 
scale's variance was accounted for by the present thirteen 
predicting variables. Most of the variables which were sig-
nifica~tly correlated with the Israel scale in bivariate 
analyses remained significantly correlated (i.e., p < .OS) 
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TABLE 20.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Israel 
Attitude Scale CN=302l 
Independent Variables Beta Values 
Race .10, p > .OS 
Purpose in Life Scale .16, p = • 007 
Mideast Knowledge Scale • 21, p < .001 
Age • ls, p < .006 
Gender -.16, p < .006 
Religion --, p > .OS 
Ego Strength Item 2 • 07 I p > .os 
Ego Strength Item 1 • 06, p > .OS 
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale -.13, p = • 02 
Income • 01, p > .os 
Life Satisfaction Scale -.oa, p > .os 
Anomie Scale • 04 I p > .os 
Education • 04 t p > .os 
Multiple R = • 4 7 t p < .001 
in the present multiple correlation analysis. Exceptions 
to the rule were the variables ~' Education, and Income 
which in the present analysis failed to reach the .OS level 
of significance. (The interpretation rendered above for 
the slight discrepancy between bivariate analyses previously 
described and Beta values in table 18 is equally appropriate 
in the present context.) 
In Table 21, in which the Israel scale was simul-
taneously correlated with most of the demographic variables 
and all of the psychological variables discussed above (and 
N=l34), the Multiple R was .66 (p < .001). Accordingly, 44% 
of the scale's total variance was accounted for in the present 
analysis. However, in spite of the significant increase 
from the prior analysis in Table 20, the amount of variance 
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TABLE 21.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Israel 
Attitude Scale CN=l34l 
Independent Variables 
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item 4 
Religion 
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item 3 
Age 
Gender 
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item 2 
Education 
Ego Strength Item 1 
Mideast Knowledge Scale 
Life Satisfaction Scale 
Ego Strength Item 2 
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item 1 
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale 
Purpose in Life Scale 
Income 
Anomie Scale 
Race 
Multiple R = .66, p < .001 
Beta Values 
.15, p < .os 
--, p > .OS 
• 21, p = • 005 
.18, p = .02 
-.14, p > .os 
.13, p > • 05 
-.os, p > .os 
• 04, p > • 05 
.17, p < • 03 
-.06, p > .os 
-.01, p > .os 
.27, p < .001 
-.12, p > .os 
.14, p > .os 
.09, p >.OS 
.03, p > .os 
-- , p > • 05 
sti 11 undetermined was 56%. The five variables which re-
tained a significant independent relationship with the Israel 
Attitude scale were Items 1, 3, and 4 of the Arab Palestinian 
Issue Items, the Mideast Knowledge Scale, and Age. 
The considerable change in predictor values once 
the Arab-Palestinian Issue Items were entered into the equa-
tion (for both the Jewish and Israel scales) suggests that 
several of the variables.may be artifacts of the relationship 
between perceptions of the Arab-Palestinian problem and at-
ti tudes towards both Jews and Israel, 2.! that the respondents 
who answered either pro-Arab or pro-Israel to these· i terns 
(as mentioned above, other responses to these items were 
discarded) were a distinctly different subgroup. In light 
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of the difficulty in conceptualizing the relationship between 
the Arab-Palestinian items and the other psychological and 
demographic variables, it appears more likely that a distinct 
subgroup produced the difference in models. This subgroup 
seems to be affected (i.e., concerning attitudes towards 
both Jews and Israel) almost exclusively by their perceptions 
and information level (i.e., the phenomenological approach) 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
When the two scales' set of predictors are compared 
(i.e., without the Arab-Palestinian Items in the equation) 
some differences, but many more similarities appear. For 
instance, the Beta values of nine of the thirteen predicting 
variables in the equation do not appear to be significantly 
differentiated on the two scales. The Beta values of three 
of the remaining four predictors (i.e., Age, Gender, and 
the Opinion-Fear Rating Scale) reached significance in rela-
tion to the Israel scale, but not in relation to the Jewish 
attitude scale. The Mideast Knowledge Scale was independently 
related to both the Jewish and Israel scales (.12 and .21 
respectively), but its relationship to attitudes towards 
Israel appears significantly greater. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The final section of this manuscript is divided into 
four major sections. The first three sections present a 
review and discussion of the hypothesized primary, secondary, 
and tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility based on the 
studies' major empirical findings. In each of the three 
sections, when applicable, the subject matter of alternative 
interpretations, limitations of study, significance of the 
findings, and direction for future empirical work will be 
addressed. The final section will deal with the broader 
implications of anti-Jewish hostility based on a synthesis 
of the dissertation's historical and empirical analyses. 
Chapter I Conclusions 
As portrayed in Chapter I the primary catalyst of 
anti-Jewish hostility was Jewish distinctiveness and the 
psychological threat it posed to national and international 
movements whose objective to dominate ran counter and collided 
with Jewish separatism. In order to bring the world over 
to their way of acting and thinking these movements were 
obligated to crush all forms of resistance. Unfortunately 
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for these psychologically intimidated movements the Jewish 
nation (with all its Oral Law ramifications) was not like 
the other nations and refused to be extinguished. All the 
while the Jewish presence existed (sometimes as free men, 
and other times as veritable slaves) the declared supremacy 
of the various movements was brought into question and abso-
lute dominion was perforce withheld. Accordingly, these 
movements in order to foster a sense of political and/or 
spiritual security attempted throughout history to eradicate 
Jewish distinctiveness. 
This process of eradication has taken three general 
forms. The first form was usually to break Jewish nationalism 
(i.e., the Jewish people's relationship to the Land of 
Israel). When this failed, the Jewish spirit (based on the 
Oral Law tradition) ,was then attacked, and when the Jewish 
presence obstinately refused to capitulate, total annihilation 
remained the only viable alternative. 
This Jewish stiffnecked effrontery was documented 
by Josephus in the first century of the Common Era when Jews 
were being relentlessly persecuted by the great Roman empire. 
He wrote: 
• • • they have a passion for liberty that is almost 
unconquerable, since they are convinced that G-d alone 
is their leader and master. They think little of sub-
mitting to death in unusual forms and permitting vengeance 
to fall on kinsmen and friends, if only they may avoid 
calling any man master (Perlmutter, 1982, p. 54). 
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Or again, poignantly expressed by Adolf Hitler some 
1900 years later: 
It is true we are barbarians that is an honored title 
to us. I free humanity from the shackles of the soul, 
from the degrading suffering caused by the false vision 
called conscience and ethics. The Jews have inflicted 
two wounds on mankind; circumcision on its body and "con-
science" on its soul. They are Jewish inventions. The 
war for domination of the world is waged only between 
the two of us, between these two camps alone; the Germans 
and the Jews. Everything else is but deception (Scherman, 
1985, p. xiv). 
This self-motivated distinctiveness appears to have 
been the cause or catalyst of anti-Jewish discrimination 
and persecution throughout history. If Jews would have 
totally assimilated into the majority culture like most other 
conquered people (who had the chance to do so) then by defini-
tion, they would not have suffered as a minority group. 
Other discriminated-against groups (e.g., women, Blacks under 
Arab, and White dominion, American Indians, etc.) were not 
as fortunate as the Jews for they lacked the capacity to 
physically mingle without being detected. These groups, in 
light of their distinct physical characteristics were forced 
to remain, to some extent, separate. The Jews, in contrast, 
could have totally integrated (i.e., by accepting the ruling 
powers' laws, customs and religions as subjugated people 
throughout history have done) without being thereafter de-
tected. The Jewish threat was that they, logically speak-
ing, could have totally assimilated into all of the above 
societies (see Chapter I) and yet, irrespective of their 
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vast cultural interaction, refused to totally disavow their 
Jewish identity. This unusually adamant refusal to be one 
with the ruling or majority population inevitably created 
seemingly unwarranted intergroup competition, which brought 
in its wake untold Jewish suffering. 
As Huzafer Sherif (1966), based on much experimenta-
tion and analyses of intergroup processes put it: 
••• intergroup conflict has shown that neither 
cultural, physical, nor economic differences are necessary 
for the rise of intergroup conflict, hostile attitudes, 
and stereotyped images of out-groups. Nor are malad-
justed, neurotic, or unstable tendencies necessary con-
ditions for the appearance of intergroup prejudice and 
stereotypes. 
The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile 
and aggressive deeds ••• was the existence of two groups 
competing for goals that only one group could attain, 
to the dismay and frustration of the other group. (p. 85) 
The glaring lesson to be learned from Professor Sherif (which 
Jews have seemingly failed to learn throughout millennia) is 
that positive human interaction is based on commonalities 
and similarities and where possible (especially in areas as 
highly sensitive as religion) differences should be kept to 
a bare minimum. The non-Jewish world throughout hi story 
has understood this reality and has, in consequence, allowed 
itself to be fully integrated into the majority or ruling 
culture. The Jews, in contrast, have failed to learn what 
seems so obvious to everyone else that when you are not forced 
to be distinct or separate, don't. 
The Jewish threat was that, historically, Jews were 
unwilling to call any man or deity (except their own), G-d. 
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They were not willing to fully accept any ruling power whose 
acceptance meant the abandonment of their perceived incor-
poreal, indivisible, omniscient, omnipresent, and universal 
G-d. In essence, the psychological intimidating character-
istic of the Jew which has been felt throughout four millennia 
seems to have been, as Josephus put it, the Jewish "passion 
for liberty that is almost unconquerable, since they are 
convinced that G-d alone is their leader and master" (Perlmut-
ter, 1982). It was appears that it was this distinctive, 
competitive Jewish threat which was the primary cause of 
anti-Jewish hostility. In addition, it has not been any 
random variation of Jews throughout history who have consis-
tently presented this competitive threat, but rather, only 
one group (i.e., Oral Law Judaism) which has been the only 
Jewish group to have stubbornly survived. Therefore, it 
seemed logical in the present study to designate Oral Law 
Judaism as a true representation of Judaism. 
One way to test empirically the above historical 
analysis was to locate a group whose legitimacy appears psy-
chologically threatened by present-day Oral Law Judaism (i.e., 
Orthodox Judaism) and to see if this movement (i.e., the 
leaders) has fostered or is fostering (whether implicitly 
or explicitly) the severance of the Jewish people from the 
(1) Land, (2) the Law, or (3) an attempt to destroy the Jewish 
collec~ive body, each strategy by itself or in combination. 
Ironically, two present day Jewish groups · (i.e., 
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Reform and Conservative Judaism) were depicted as competing 
with Oral Law Judaism for the Jewish people's allegiance. 
It was this competitive factor which placed these groups 
conceptually on par with other anti-Jewish (anti-Jewish in 
the sense that an attack was made on, at least, one of the 
three integral Jewish components) groups throughout history. 
The competitive nature of these Jewish groups was not obvious, 
for their claim at their inception was not to aggressively 
displace Oral Law Judaism (as other anti-Jewish movements 
throughout history have declared) but rather to provide for 
the Jewish people, particularly in America, a viable and 
adaptable modern type of Judaism. Their objective was os-
tensibly not to usurp traditional Judaism, but rather to 
provide a positive spiritual experience for Twentieth Century 
American Jewry who could "obviously" not adapt Oral Law Juda-
ism to the American scene. Therefore, there was superficially 
no conflict of interests and no real competition, for these 
modern movements were allegedly not competing with Oral Law 
Judaism but rather attempting to save those millions of Jews 
who without a viable alternative would have left Judaism 
completely. 
According to their respective platforms, these move-
ments could not be portrayed as competitive Jewish movements 
whose goals conflicted with Oral Law Judaism. Rather (accord-
ing to_ their claims) they were not competitive but comple-
mentary. Although this is what they promulgated, the dubious 
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nature of their assertions was outlined at the end of Chapter 
1. In brief, the three arguments which seem to seriously 
challenge the sincerity of their assertions were: 
(1) Historically in contradiction to their claim of 
unadaptability (as delineated throughout Chapter I) the only 
Jewish movement to ever adapt to all kinds of societies 
throughout history was the same "unadaptable" Oral Law tradi-
tion. Therefore, either the Reform and Conservative leaders 
were ignorant of Jewish history, or else the claim was an 
excuse used to favorably rationalize the Jewish people's 
break with tradition. 
(2) Even if we do credit the Reform and Conservative 
early leaders with an abysmal ignorance of Jewish history, 
the question still needed to be asked is how much of an effort 
was made, and how many generations of Jews in America had 
passed before these leaders concluded that traditional Oral 
Law Judaism was unadaptable? In essence, the answer to both 
questions is nil. The attempt to adapt Oral Law Judaism 
to the lifestyle of America was never really given a chance 
by the leaders of these movements. This was seen by the 
fact that first generation-born American Jews, who in the 
vast majority of cases started raising families of their 
own immediately preceding and following World War II, followed 
faithfully, en masse, the Reform and Conservative leaders' 
religious assertions. This was the first generation of Jews 
in America who had the opportunity to test Oral Law Judaism's 
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resilience (German Jews who had arrived earlier came, already, 
with a Reform orientation), but instead accepted their men-
tors' ahistorical and non-empirical assertions. 
(3) The denial of the divine origin of the Oral 
Law (and to a lesser extent the Written Law) implies: (a) 
that the redactors of the Talmud lied (whether knowingly or 
unknowingly) when they declared that the Oral Law was given 
by G-d, and that many places in the Pentateuch where it states 
that G-d communicated with the Jewish people, Moses, etc., 
is a canard, and (b) that the millions of innocent Jews who 
have been brutally massacred throughout history only because 
they believed in the divinity of the Oral and Written laws, 
terribly erred for themselves and posterity. It was the 
present author's belief that Reform and Conservative Judaism 
did not need to deviate so substantively from tradition if 
thefr real objective was only to prevent American Jewry from 
totally assimilating. However, in order to intentionally 
sever the Jews' traditional relationship to the Oral Law 
this ideological strategy was sorely needed. 
The first empirical analysis was to pit the Reform 
and Conservative claims against the arguments presented 
above. Very simply if their assertions are accurate, then 
the present young adult genera ti on of American-born Jews 
(i.e., ages 21 to 40) should support their claim. In essence, 
the yo_ung adult generation of American-born Orthodox Jews 
should have significantly abandoned this "outmoded" and "un-
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adaptable" form of Judaism. In contrast, following from 
the three arguments above, Oral Law Judaism may very well 
be maintaining itself. In addition, if these two Jewish 
movements are truly complementary forms of Judaism only in-
terested in saving Jews who seemingly cannot adapt Orthodoxy 
to the American scene, then they themselves should be growing 
(or at least maintaining themselves). In contrast, according 
to the present theoretical analysis, if these movements are 
not complementary, but rather competing for Jewish supremacy 
in which their original objective was more to wean Jews from 
the Oral Law than to create something spiritually positive, 
then their movements should have had difficulty in maintaining 
themselves (i.e., lack of real spirituality should produce 
a lack of commitment among their Jewish constituencies). 
Obviously the mere finding that Oral Law Judaism 
has maintained itself over the last generation is not conclu-
sive proof that the other movements had ulterior motives 
when declaring the unadaptability of Oral Law Judaism (which, 
in effect, created a need for a more "adaptable" form of Juda-
ism). However, the present hypothesized outcome taken into 
conjunction with the above three arguments (expressed more 
fully in Chapter I) would seem to support the theory, which 
posits the Reform and Conservative movements as competing 
and not complementary forms of Judaism. In contrast, results 
substantially corroborating their claim as to the unadapt-
ability of Oral Law Judaism would significantly challenge 
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the present theoretical analysis. In addition, the extent 
of the Reform and Conservative' s accretion or diminution 
over the last generation is admittedly inconclusive in and 
of itself, but when combined with the above arguments and 
data, may help to more fully support or refute the present 
theoretical analysis. 
Before discussing the present results, which theo-
retically pertain to the primary cause of anti-Jewish hostil-
ity, it is important to mention the discontinuity which exists 
between the study' s theory and the methodology used to examine 
the theory. According to the theory the primary impetus of 
anti-Jewish hostility is attributed to the leaders of various 
movements, who, historically have been "threatened" by Jewish 
distinctiveness and have attacked accordingly. However, 
the present study does not directly measure leaders' attitudes 
and behavior, but rather knowledge, attitudes, and behavior 
of followers, which are interpreted as indirectly representing 
the attitudes and behavior of their leaders. This gap be-
tween theory and methodology attenuates the confirmatory 
strength of the present study, for it does not rule out alter-
nati ve conceptual analyses which will be discussed below. 
According to the results, Oral Law Judaism in Chicago 
seems to have maintained itself over the last generation, 
and when birthrate is taken into consideration has grown by 
13 per~ent. In contrast, Reform and Conservative constitu-
encies in Chicago have decreased approximately 68 percent, 
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and 57 percent respectively, over the last generation. The 
results fail to refute the present theory and, in effect, 
lend support to the theory that Reform and Conservative Juda-
ism are competing forms of Judaism and could therefore, in 
the present context, be described as competitive religious 
movements whose thrust should be to uproot one or more of 
the three distinctly Jewish components, in an at tempt to 
firmly establish their own legitimacy. 
The above results in conjunction with the above three 
arguments seem to imply that the original objectives of Reform 
and Conservative Judaism were more of a competitive rather 
than complementary nature. Therefore, according to the pres-
ent theoretical analysis, these movements should be psycho-
logically pressured to attack and uproot the essence of tra-
ditional Judaism as represented by (1) the Jewish relationship 
to the Land, (2) the Jewish relationship to the Torah, and/or 
(3) the Jewish collective body. The Reform and Conservative 
movements would logically not strike out against the Jewish 
collective body (for they would be reducing their own numbers 
in the process), but by significantly severing the people's 
relationship to the Land and/or to the Torah would be sub-
stantially reducing the historical Jewish "threat." 
Notwithstanding the Reform and Conserva tivemovements' 
claim concerning their indisoluable relationship to the Land 
of Israel, the present analysis expected to find a signif-
icantly weaker relationship among adherents of Reform and 
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conservative Judaism than among their Oral Law counterparts. 
Results implied, as hypothesized, that the Reform and Con-
servative movements are failing in their "attempt" to foster 
a strong and tangible relationship between their constitu-
encies and the Land of/ Israel. Not only was the Orthodox 
group substantially more attached to the Land, but these 
two groups failed to significantly differentiate themselves 
from Jews who are not affiliated with any synagogue or temple. 
In light of the large discrepancy between what the 
Reform and Conservative movements officially say and what 
they have accomplished (i.e., in light of the discrepancy 
between themselves and Orthodoxy in conjunction with the 
insignificant differences recorded between themselves and 
the Non-Affiliated group), it appears that their failure 
is more systematic than fortuitous. When these results are 
combined with the above three arguments (which seriously 
question their original sincerity), and in conjunction with 
the dissertation's historical analysis which predicted these 
results on an a priori basis, a case can be made that these 
two movements (like other anti-Jewish movements throughout 
hi story) have at tempted (whether consciously or unconsciously) 
to attenuate the historical relationship between the Jewish 
people and the Jewish land in light of this relationship's 
intimidating characteristic. 
A solid Jewish education is another area where the 
official platforms of all three Jewish movements positively 
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converge. Officially, they all consider a strong fundamental 
Jewish education highly important. Although formally they 
encourage Jewish education, according to the present theory, 
this should not be realized in practice. In short, the re-
sults did demonstrate a disastrous failure on the part of 
the Reform and Conservative movements to educate their con-
stituencies on the basics of Judaism. In these analyses 
there was an extremely large discrepancy in scores between 
the Orthodox group and the other three. Although, statis-
tically speaking, there appeared to be a significant differ-
ence between the Conservative and Non-Affiliated group, this 
difference (mean scores of .33 and .23 respectively) on a 
practical level was trivial. For example, their mean scores 
imply that the Conservative group received an average of 
approximately three items (per 10-item scale) corrrect while 
the Non-Affiliated group averaged approximately two items 
correct. In real terms, the abysmal ignorance reflected in 
the scores of the three groups on the Elementary Jewish Knowl-
edge Scale is substantially more revealing (based on the 
present theory) than the trivial one-answer difference between 
the Conservative and Non-Affiliated groups. This point is 
further corroborated by the fact that the Reform Group (mean 
= .28) failed to differentiate itself from either the Con-
servative or Non-Affiliated group. According to the present 
theor~tical analysis this failure may be seen as a result 
of attempting to displace the traditional Jewish spirit, 
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which historically, has been based on knowledge of the Written 
and Oral Law. 
In brief, the relationship between non-Jewish anti-
Jewish movements and the present hypothesized Jewish anti-
Jewish movements is not readily apparent. However, it is 
the opinion of the author that once this surface dissimilarity 
is broken down, the underlying dynamics appear quite com-
parable. As hypothesized, the first stage posits a compet-
itive conflict which makes it virtually impossible for the 
two groups to live ideologically in harmony. The second 
stage is to create lies (see the three arguments above which 
call into question the claims of Reform and Conservative 
Judaism) which would legitimize the activity of uprooting 
the traditional Jewish presence. And the third and final 
stage is to motivate the masses (wh,ether non-Jewish or Jewish) 
at a psychologically and/or socially vulnerable period in 
history. 
Limitations of the Above Analyses 
The first limitation of the above analyses which 
would affect all three variables (i.e., [l] intergroup move-
ment, [2] relationship to the Land, and (3] basic Jewish 
knowledge) is the restriction in population from which the 
sample was selected. The sample was drawn from a Jewish 
population living in Chicago proper, who have commonly Jewish 
names,· and who are listed in the Chicago telephone book. 
255 
The last two restrictions (i.e., common Jewish names and 
being listed in telephone book) do not appear to be too severe 
for most (metropolitan or national) polls of Jewish popula-
tions are equally or more circumscribed than the present 
population. 
However, selecting individuals exclusively from 
Chicago proper presents two major problems. (1) Suburban 
Jews might be signifcantly different from city Jews on the 
above variables, and (2) Jews living in New York or conversely 
in small cities and towns throughout the United States may 
be distinctly different from those in the Chicago area. 
Although it does not seem logical to postulate that suburban 
Reform and/or Conservative Jews are different from their 
city counterparts concerning their relationship to the Land 
of Israel or to the Torah, it is possible that suburban Jews 
id en ti fy more with the Reform and Conservative movements 
(as opposed to being Non-Affiliated or Orthodox) than do 
Jews in the city. The reason is that suburbia usually at-
tracts families with children as opposed to single individ-
uals. Many Jewish parents (even today) like to give their 
children some sort of religious identification and in many 
cases the child's religious education, perforce, creates a 
temporary bond between parents and the educational insti-
tution (i.e., the synagogue or temple). In addition, most 
synago~ues in suburbia are not Orthodox (primarily because 
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of the distances involved in driving on the Sabbath which 
orthodoxy prohibits). 
Correspondingly, Jews living in other geographical 
areas of the United States (other than the Midwest) may have 
had different religious experiences than have Jews in Chi-
cago. Jewish experiences in the New York area where there 
are over two million Jews, or the Jewish "experience" in 
the south or west (excluding Florida and California) where 
there are relatively few Jews, may be quite different than 
those experienced by Chicago Jews who are surrounded by a 
substantial number of other corel ig ionists, but who still 
represent a trivial proportion of the total population. 
These demographic differences may be reflected on the above 
variables, but the fact that Chicago does represent a balance 
between large concentrated areas of Jews and its opposite 
appears to make Chicago an ideal place to sample from, if 
resources and time are limited (as they were in the present 
study) • 
A further limitation of the above analyses is that 
the variables of Relationship to the Land could have been 
more thorougly explored. One tangible expression of Jews' 
relationship to the Land of Israel which was not investigated 
was the amount of money given or invested in Israel. The 
reason this variable was not investigated was that the author 
felt that the greater proportion of investment or charity, 
per income, obviously favored Orthodoxy, and was therefore 
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a foregone conclusion. Afterwards he discovered that many 
Reform and Conservative Jews do not share the same opinion. 
For example, Reform and Conservative adherents cite figures 
from large Jewish organizations (e.g., J.U.F.) which show 
that the vast majority of money is donated by non-Orthodox 
Jews. However, these individuals forget that (1) there are 
many times more non-Orthodox Jews in Chicago than there are 
Orthodox, (2) the wealth is primarily in the hands of the 
non-Orthodox, and (3) many Orthodox households give directly 
to Torah institutions and the poor in Israel, which these 
large Jewish organizations tend, for the most part, to ignore. 
Another limitation of the above analyses concerns 
the Jewish Knowledge Scale. This scale was constructed by 
Orthodox rabbis and teachers, and it is possible (though 
improbable) that a fundamental Jewish knowledge scale when 
constructed by Reform or Conservative rabbis or teachers 
would produce significantly different results than those 
obtained in the present study. 
The final limitation of the above analysis concerns 
the time frame or cross sectional nature of the study. Ac-
cording to the present analysis it is difficult to discern 
whether the vast majority of original adherents to Reform 
and Conservative Judaism (i.e., anywhere between 30 to 60 
years ago) were less committed to the Land and/or to basic 
Jewish knowledge than were their Orthodox counterparts, or 
whether the discrepancy found in the present study is really 
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(as hypothesized) a function of the movements themselves. 
If archival data of this type were present the above dilemma 
would be resolved, but given that these types of data cannot 
be obtained, a longitudinal study measuring the above vari-
ables on new members of the three movements over a period 
of several years, would apparently help to resolve the above 
problem. A major difficulty here may be to obtain a sizable 
sample of newly involved Reform and Conservative constituents 
who will remain affiliated for more than just a few years (in 
the present study these groups do not seem to be attracting 
many new members) • In addition, it is generally accepted 
today that the differences in overall Jewish religious per-
spective between the adherents of all three movements some 
40 years ago, was considerably less polarized than it is 
today. Therefore, any longitudinal study initiated today 
may be of little help in interpreting the results obtained 
in the present study. 
Alternative Interpretations 
The most obvious interpretation of the above results 
is, plainly speaking, that the Reform and Conservative move-
ments have just failed. Not that they had any original in-
tention of competing with or displacing Oral Law Judaism, 
but rather that their purely "complementary" nature proved 
unsuccessful. Without the above historical analysis and a 
Priori· predictions following therefrom, together with the 
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above three arguments which make their orig in al claims highly 
suspect, in conjunction with the present results which depict 
a ca ta strophic failing on the part of both Reform and Con-
servative Judaism, the innocuous claim of "just failing" 
could be accepted. However, when the above is taken into 
consideration the dissertation's theoretical analysis appears 
to be the more valid of the two interpretations. 
Another alternative interpretation asks; why would 
a significant difference Qetween Oral Law Judaism and the 
other American Jewish movements, concerning Jewish education 
and the Land of Israel, imply that these movements have de-
liberately attempted to uproot these traditional Jewish com-
ponents? Is it not possible that the Jews who have flocked 
to these movements have different lifestyles, different at-
titudes, and different experiences than their Oral Law coun-
terparts, and that it is these very differences among group 
adherents, which makes for differences concerning the above 
core components and not necessarily the movements themselves? 
In response, it may be argued that most social-psychological 
differences seen today between the groups are perfectly con-
founded with group classification. In other words, the basic 
factor differentiating Oral Law adherents from others, on 
various social-psychological indices, may be considered their 
very allegiance to the Oral Law tradition. Judaism in its 
tradit_ional (Oral Law) form is not merely a system of beliefs 
and rituals, but rather an elaborate societal blueprint which 
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carefully delineates the everyday pragmatic laws by which 
Jews historically have patterned their behavior and attitudes 
on both the individual and collective levels. Therefore in 
the present comparison, most behavioral-attitudinal differ-
ences presently existing between Oral Law adherents and others 
may be considered attributed to the ideological and legisla-
tive differences among the movements rather than differences 
in the people themselves. Correspondingly, when the groups' 
official platforms and ideologies do converge on various 
Jewish issues (e.g., Jewish education and the Jewish rela-
tionship to the Land of Israel) no significant discrepancy 
among groups should logically be found. 
In essence, the present data are inconclusive con-
cerning whether it was the movements themselves which af-
fected the present findings, or whether it was the original 
differences in commitment among the various types of adher-
ents. In other words, was it the lack of Jewish commitment 
(which should have been general, taking into account all as-
pects of Jewish life) among the different constituencies, 
or was it primarily the Reform and Conservative movements 
themselves who promoted this lack of religious commitment? 
If Reform and Conservative Judaism have, indeed, been the 
primary agents affecting religious commitment (or better 
Put, lack of it), then their adherents' lack of elementary 
Jewish knowledge and tangible relationship to the Land should 
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be seriously questioned in light of their official platforms 
which substantively advocate both activities. 
In truth, the real cause probably 1 ies somewhere 
in-between the two arguments, and therefore the most appro-
priate question would not be if the movements themselves 
have produced a lack of commitment among their constituencies, 
but rather; how much of this lack of commitment can be at-
tributed to the movements, and how much to the original dif-
ferences among the adherents themselves? However, it should 
be emphasized again that in light of the historical analysis 
presented on Chapter I with its a priori hypotheses following 
therefrom, together with the above three arguments (which 
cast the Reform and Conservative movements in a more competi-
tive than complementary light) in conjunction with the present 
data, the present theoretical claim that Reform and Conserva-
tive, Judaism have unofficially attempted to sever the Jewish 
people's relationship to the Land and to the Torah should not 
be taken lightly. 
A further interpretation of the above results, specif-
ically concerning the variables of Relationship to the Land, 
and Fundamental Jewish Knowledge, has to do with these vari-
ables inherent relationship to the three movements. It may 
be a~gued that since adherence to the Oral Law means adher-
ence, by definition, to the Torah and to the Land of Israel, 
then c~mparing these apparently inherent relationships with 
the same relationships which are seemingly not inherent among 
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other groups would, by definition, produce group differences. 
In response, the author believes that the relation-
ships between Reform and Conservative Jews with the above 
two variables should be no less "inherent" than that of their 
Oral Law counterparts for two major reasons. (1) Reform 
and Conservative Judaism did not spring out of a vacuum but 
rather (as they rightly declare) were outgrowths of tradi-
tional (Oral Law) Judaism which have the same history, Bible, 
and the same Talmud as their Oral Law kin. The only things 
not inherently Oral-Law in these movements is where they 
themselves decided to deviate (e.g., disbelief in the di-
vinity of the Oral Law and abrogation of many Laws which 
they felt were outmoded), but in areas where they officially 
did not deviate (e.g., relationship to the Land and, funda-
mental Jewish education), these areas should be considered 
as inherently Jewish to them as they are to Orthodoxy. (2) 
Even if we could say that Reform and Conservative Judaism are 
distinctly different representations of Jewish spirituality, 
the fact that their official platforms call for a strong 
relationship to the Land of Israel and basic Jewish knowledge, 
would seem to make these variables as inherent for them, as 
does the Orthodox platform for its adherents. 
Two examples of historical groups to support this 
second point.are the Kutheans and Christians. The Kutheans, 
better known as the Samaritans came from Assyria and after 
the explulsion of the 10 tribes (approximately 722 B.C.E.) 
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occupied the vacant cities in the northern part of Israel, 
and became half assimilated with the remaining native Israel-
ites. Although they worshipped the G-d of Israel and kept 
many of the commandments they also clung to their idols 
(Isaacs, 1975). It is about these very people which the 
Talmud (Gittin, lOA) states "Whatever commandments the 
Kutheans kept (i.e., officially observed) they kept more 
diligently than the Israel is themselves." (Translation mine) 
Christianity is another case in point where according 
to the above contention it may be argued, that being that 
Christianity is a direct offshoot from Oral Law Judaism, 
and being that the precepts of ~' compassion, and humility 
were originally Oral Law concepts, only later adopted by the 
Christian faith, then Oral Law adherents should be signifi-
cantly more loving, compassionate, and humble than Christians 
because these concepts were originally and therefore inher-
ently Oral Law commandments. Without belaboring the issue 
it is assumed that many intelligent people would argue 
vociferously against the above contention. Accordingly, the 
argument that the relationship to the Land and to the Torah 
is more inherent in Orthodox Judaism (in light of their estab-
lished precedent in time) than they are to Reform and Con-
servative Judaism is serously rebutted by the above two ex-
amples. 
The final alternative interpretation of the present 
data (which superficially seems to refute the entire t.heoreti-
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cal analysis concerning the Reform and Conservative movements) 
contends that the fact that Reform and Conservative Judaism 
are not drawing substantial numbers away from the Orthodox 
movement and vice versa implies that these movements are 
truly complementary. Notwithstanding a more detailed rebuttal 
of this argument (which follows immediately) it should be 
noted, that according to this logic the Non-Affiliated group 
is the most competitive (and therefore, potentially anti-
Jewish) movement of them all! 
There appears to be little doubt that if Reform and 
Conservative Judaism are indeed competitive movements, that 
they would seriously attempt to attract Oral Law adherents. 
However, their success or failure in such a venture is ir-
respective of their competitive or complementary nature. 
In short, they may be attempting to attract current Oral 
Law adherents, but are failing in the process. Hence, their 
competitive or complementary nature must be investigated 
according to the parameters extant (as in the present anal-
ysis where their claims and constituencies could be examined) 
and not according to hypotheticals of what would have hap-
pened, if they would have succeeded. 
Conversely, the fact that Orthodox Jewry is not at-
tracting large numbers from the other three groups (although 
over 10 percent of both the Non-Affiliated and Conservative 
group ~ave come over to Orthodoxy within the last generation) 
says little concerning the present theoretical analysis. 
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Although in the present analysis Reform and Conservative 
Judaism are depicted as ideologically threatened by Orthodoxy, 
orthodoxy is not seen as threatened by either movement as 
was the case throughout history. Orthodox Judaism would 
certainly like to see all Jews observing the Oral Law, but 
not because it is psychologically pressured to delegitimize 
the other movements. Oral Law Judaism's self worth or legiti-
macy has never been and is not currently psychologically 
threatened by other Jewish movements, and therefore Ortho-
doxy's competitive or complementary nature was never con-
sidered in the present dissertation a theoretical issue. 
Significance of the Findings 
Besides helping to support the present theory con-
cerning the primary origins and common processes of anti-
Jewish hostility throughout history, the above findings may 
also provide pragmatic benefit in the following five ways. 
Stated briefly, starting from the more seemingly trivial 
and proceeding to the more important the five perceived bene-
fits are: 
1. To Refute Arab Propaganda: One of the many prop-
a~anda themes circulated by Arabs throughout the world is 
that Zionism or the resettlement of the Jewish people in 
the Middle East has nothing to do with Judaism, but is rather 
an outgrowth of secular European imperial ism. Notwithstanding 
the non-reality represented in the above contention based 
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on the activities of modern Zionism since 1880 in conjunction 
with historical Judaism, the present study adds an extra 
dimension by showing clearly that the concept of Zionism 
(i.e., the living and being in Zion, a name used by the 
Prophets some 2, 700 years ago in reference to the Land of 
Israel and/or Jerusalem) in Chicago, at least, is an almost 
exclusively Oral-Law religious concept and phenomenon far 
removed from secular European imperialism. 
2. To Foster a Sense of Historical Ethics: For over 
three thousand years, literally millions of Jews have been 
pillaged, raped, tortured, and mercilessly massacred because 
they would not renounce their Jewish nationalism or Torah, 
and yet according to the present findings (and extrapolating 
to the entire United States) literally millions of Jews have 
sign,ificantly relinquished both their national ism and. Torah 
within one (at maximum two) generations in the name of Judaism 
itself! The present study indicates that Jews in America 
have been led into abandoning their rich cultural and spir-
itual heritage without being fully cognizant of their abandon-
ment. Jews (like all other groups) deserve the right for 
their own sake, and for the sake of their ancestors to £.2!!::.. 
sc iously choose to abandon their traditions without being 
implicitly pressured into doing so while unaware of what is 
truly transpiring (i.e., by remaining ignorant of Judaism 
and believing, without doubt, in the legitimacy of the Reform 
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and Conservative movements, the Jewish masses are perforce 
prevented from making any well thought out decision regarding 
their abandonment of traditional Judaism). 
3. To Protect Young and Naive Spiritual-Seeking Jews: 
An inordinate amount of young American Jews (i.e.,many times 
over their proportion in the general American population) 
who had reached adolescence in the 1960s and 70s have been 
recruited over the last twenty years into religious cults 
such as the Moonies, Hare Krishna, or imported to America 
eastern religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism in their 
search for spirituality (whether the cult or religion is 
intellectually gratifying is immaterial) (Fisch, 1984). 
These Jewish youth seeking sincere religious experiences 
are not products of Orthodoxy, but rather (in the vast major-
ity _of cases) from families who have had some sort of affili-
ation with the Reform or Conservative movements (Fisch, 
1984). All the while Reform and Conservative Judaism are 
depicted as legitimate forms of true Judaism these youth 
will never return to their indigenous culture, and other 
Jewish youth will inevitably follow their lead. Their sincere 
response is simply "We know all about Judaism (i.e., Reform 
and Conservative) for we grew up in it and found it devoid 
of any true meaning, and therefore we are looking elsewhere." 
Without exposing Reform and Conservative Judaism for what 
they appear to be according to the present study' s historical 
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and empirical analyses, many other Jewish youth will probably 
become emotionally entangled in these and other various re-
ligious cults. (Although the adoption of Hinduism or Buddism 
would seem as legitimate as converting to any established 
age-old religion, the fact is that when these religions are 
imported to America by various Hindu Gurus or Zen Buddhists 
they take.on a cult-like appearance which tends to disorient 
young American Jews and create serious familial problems 
[Fisch, 1984].) 
4. To Attenuate Jewish Suffering: According to the 
historical analysis in Chapter I the primary factor respon-
sible for anti-Jewish hostility is the Jewish people's self-
proclaimed distinctiveness. This distinctiveness can be 
looked at as a blessing or as a curse, but concerning Reform 
and _Conservative Judaism can only be regarded as a curse. 
Jewish distinctiveness can have its origins in only one of 
two ways. Either G-d wants the Jewish people to remain dis-
tinct and therefore, perforce, they will continue to remain 
distinct, or else this distinctiveness is a man-made artifact 
obstinately displayed by the Jewish people which has no real 
historical precedent or imitation thereafter. 
If the latter is true, then all Jewish people holding 
on presumptously to their Jewish identity, in one manner or 
form, have indirectly generated their own suffering and the 
suffering of succeeding generations. Conversely, .if the 
269 
former is true then we need only look at the blessings and 
curses outlined in two books of the Bible (i.e., Leviticus 
and Deuteronomy). In these Biblical passages it states very 
clearly that when Jews collectively are acting according to 
the Law they will be blessed, and cursed when they are not. 
Reform and Conservative adherents do little of what 
is required of them according to Jewish Law (this fact is 
widely known, and was corroborated in the present study when 
questions of religious observance were asked). Therefore, 
without pulling punches, the Reform and Conservative leaders 
and adherents could be literally described (whatever the 
reason may be for Jewish distinctiveness) as being the primary 
agents of their own suffering. In other words, whichever 
position one takes, Reform and Conservative Jews are respons-
ible for their own suffering. If Judaism is a man-made phe-
nomenon, then by obstinately retaining their Jewish identity 
instead of completely assimilating like most other national 
and religious groups (who had the opportunity) have done 
throughout history, their obstinance (and arguably arrogance) 
has, and probably will, continue to cause them great suffer-
ing. Inversely, if the Torah is accurate they are also (as 
is clear from the Bible) sowing the seeds of affliction (this 
point will be more fully elaborated on in the last Section 
of the present chapter). 
· s. To Promote Universal Peace and Brotherhood: Tra-
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ditional Judaism may have pragmatic and workable answers for 
world peace, but as long as Reform and Conservative Judaism 
are allowed to dominate American Jewry these insights, proph-
ecies, and knowledge will probably never reach a large mass 
audience. For instance, if the world knew (or at least the 
American public) the vivid descriptions of what the world will 
be like before the coming of the Messiah according to the 
Jewish Prophets, the Talmud, and the Zohar (i.e., Jewish 
mysticism) and its unusual correspondence with present-day 
happenings, the entire world (according to Jewish theology) 
may be spared untold grief and suffering if the proper pre-
ventive measures are taken accordingly. 
Although the above may appear to many as hollow 
platitudes for other groups, as well, claim similar benefits 
if everyone would adopt their brand of religion or ideology, 
there are, at least, two substantive differences between 
traditional Jewish claims and others. (1) Traditional Juda-
ism, in contrast to most other major national or international 
movements, does not demand or even suggest that the world's 
population turn Jewish, but rather that the Jewish people 
follow their many Laws in order that the peoples of the world 
may reap the benefits. (2) Jewish prophecy via many various 
prophets has concretely materialized over a period of approx-
imately 1,000 years (our present knowledge comes from recorded 
history accepted by most of the "civilized" world today, 
and the historical validity of these records has been cor-
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roborated by literally hundreds of archaeological finds over 
the last century). No other movement can compete with the 
above assertions. Therefore in light of Judaism's unusually 
accurate prophetical track record (which is theologically 
based on G-d' s active presence in the world) , prophecies 
which seem to describe the present era should not be taken 
lightly. 
The present author is not denying the fact that 
wonderful values can be learned from all religions, but rather 
that if traditional Jewish theology goes tangibly beyond 
the worldly (as its accurate prophesy seems to indicate) 
then its predictions and advice concerning the present era 
demands further scrutiny. 
Direction for Future Investigation 
The direction for future investigation corresponds 
to the present study's limitations which are: 
1. Suburban as well as city dwellers should be sampled. 
2. Other areas of the country should be sampled. 
3. The variable "Amount of Money Invested or Donated to 
the Land of Israel" and others (e.g., investment of 
time) should be included in examining the Jews' re-
lationship to the Land. 
4. Reform and Conservative leaders should be recruited 
in the development of a "Fundamental Jewish Knowledge 
Scale." 
5. A longitudinal study spanning several years should 
be undertaken to measure the above variables in rela-
tion to the movements' new members. In doing so, 
the experiementer should effectively obtain a base 
and, 
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rate for all participants (something missing in the 
present analysis). 
6. To more conclusively determine whether the Reform 
and Conservative movements are s igni f ican tly directing 
Jewish commitment among their constituencies, or 
if their constituencies' original commitment remains 
primarily unchanged. To accomplish this, other var i-
ables which the Reform and Conservative movements 
officialy advocate, and which theoretically would 
not be considered psychologically threatening should 
be investigated. If there were no differences between 
these groups and Orthodoxy, or if substantial differ-
ences were found between them and the Non-Affiliated 
[in conjunction with the present findings which show 
the groups differing on what they should (i.e., re-
ligious observance)] the claim that these movements 
are significantly effecting the present results would 
be greatly enhanced. 
7. Although brief comparisons between Judaism and other 
social movements were made sporadically throughout 
Chapter I, a more thorough investigation via arc hi val 
and/or contemporary research on group ideology and 
conflict would be appropriate. It appears highly 
relevant to the historical analysis in Chapter I to 
compare and contrast (in a more complete manner) 
other social movements, their ideologies, their activ-
ities, their history, and their sources of conflict 
(both internal and external) with Juda·ism. 
Chapter II Conclusions 
The historical analysis in Chapter I attempted to 
explain the root cause of anti-Jewish hostility but it failed 
to explain why the masses have so vehemently attacked the 
Jews throughout millennia. In Chapter II it was theorized 
that the savage attacks of the masses were primarily motivated 
by constant propagation of misinformation and slander about 
Jews and Judaism. The primary catalyst remained the d istinc-
tive Jewish threat but the dissemination of vile slander 
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was required in order to drive the masses into action. The 
defamation of Jews and Judaism was then postulated as the 
secondary cause of anti-Jewish hostility which, historically, 
has been manipulated to foster Jew-hatred on a mass scale. 
It was theorized that without the assistance of the common 
individual, anti-Jewish hostility would have remained more 
a potential threat than an actuality. 
Although the Western world would like to believe 
that vile propaganda against Jews is a thing of the past, a 
new wave of virulent propaganda is again today directed 
against the Jews. , Today the aspersions are directed against 
the Jews of Israel, a group depicted by Communist and Arab-
Muslim propagandists alike, as brutally subduing and attempt-
ing to eradicate an entire "Arab-Palestinian nation." 
Arab propaganda directed against the Jewish state 
has 'achieved a new level of sophistication and credibility 
in the West today. It was the opinion of the author in Chap-
ter II that accusations and counter arguments by pro-Arab 
and pro-Israel factions respectively are, in the long run, 
only to Israel's detriment. The reason being, that it creates 
an image of mutual culpability that will become increasingly 
more difficult to change as time goes on. This symmetry of 
culpability in the context of a virtually inexhaustible supply 
of Arab petrodollars, continued Western dependency on Arab 
oil, a~d the threat of World War III erupting from tension 
in the Middle East favors the Communist-Arab strategy which 
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aims to seriously weaken the relationship between America 
and Israel. It was postulated (at the end of Chapter II) 
that unless pro-Israel advocates begin to offensively initiate 
research, and programs following therefrom, to effectively 
disseminate the pro-Jewish version of the conflict, Israel 
may find itself isolated among nations in the not too distant 
future. The following analyses and conclusions were aimed 
specifically at providing research, which would help prevent 
the above hypothetical consequences from occurring. 
Although according to the historical analysis in 
Chapter I which depicted the attack on Jewish nationalism 
as an integral aspect of anti-Jewish hostility, a more empiri-
cal measure which would correlate attitudes towards Jews 
with attitudes towards the Jewish state was deemed necessary. 
In essence, if attitudes towards Jews were not related to 
attftudes towards Israel the above theory which postulates 
the integral relationship between the two would be considered 
by some, equivocal at best. Inversely, if a relationship 
is detected then reactions and activity towards Israel cannot 
be portrayed as reactions toward just another political en-
tity, but rather towards something specifically Jewish in 
nature. 
The results Cr= .57) supported the hypothesis that 
attitudes towards Israel are a characteristically Jewish 
phenomenon, where the state of Israel and American Jews are 
(in the minds of the American public) closely intertwined. 
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In addition, the correlates of both attitude scales consider-
ably converged. For example, of the fifteen major variables 
examined in the present study six were significantly related 
(i.e., p < .005) to both scales, six were found unrelated 
to either scale, and only three proved to be related to one 
of the attitude scales without being significantly related 
to the other. The significance of this finding appears two-
fold: (1) In attempting to counter anti-Israeli propaganda 
the presentation of historical facts concerning the conflict 
is incomplete without a concommitant elucidation of historical 
anti-Jewish slander. Without the later presentation the 
former will probably be held suspect, at best, or considered 
fraudulent propaganda at worst. 
( 2) The American government's and/or the American 
public's hypothetical antagonism towards Israel (most probably 
created by a seemingly objective news media) could have dire 
consequences for American Jews. The relationship appears 
strong enough to suggest that a future oil embargo or pro-
tracted tension involving the killing or kidnapping of non-
Jewish Americans by Arab terrorists may have the unwarranted 
effect of creating heightened animosity against American 
Jews in general. 
Knowledge and Perception of Israel and 
the Mideast Conflict 
A second objective following from Chapter II was to 
measure the American public's general perception of the state 
276 
of Israel, their general knowledge of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, and to correlate the two. It was reasoned, that in 
order to educate the public, it is first necessary to recog-
nize what people do and do not know. The author found that 
much money is allocated yearly by Jewish organizations to 
ascertain the public's perception of Israel, but was unable 
to find one study which measured the public's level of knowl-
edge concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
In light of the news media's seemingly anti-Israeli 
stance (which is usually rationalized as an evenhandedness, 
irrespective of who the murderer and who the victim are) 
which was discussed in Chapter II (and will be elaborated 
below) the author expected to find that the American public 
knows 1 i ttle concerning several fundamental and crucial Middle 
East issues. The results, based on responses to the 8-Item 
Mideast Knowledge Scale, supported this hypothesis and showed 
that despite the barrage of Mideast news coverage over the 
last several years, very little is actually known about the 
area and the history of the conflict. 
An area (as discussed above) where Jewish organiza-
tions funnel much money into, is the area of polling public 
opinion concerning Israel. For instance, over the last ten 
years the Gallup Poll has been commissioned to gauge the 
American public's sympathy for Israel as opposed to their 
sympa~hy for the Arabs. Consistently, over the last ten 
years, when the public is asked "In the Middle East situation, 
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are your sympathies more with Israel or the Arab nations?" the 
public has sided four to seven times more with Israel than 
with the Arabs (Kessler et al., 1984). These results cor-
respond somewhat with the present study's findings (based 
on the Israel Attitude Scale) which found that 70 percent 
of the public appeared pro-Israel. 
However, the above general findings are misleading 
and when the Israel Attitude Scale is factor analyzed two 
conceptually distinct factors become apparent. The fir st 
factor deals promarily with Arab-Communist propaganda themes 
currently being disseminated in the West (Goot & Rosen, 1983), 
and the second factor deals with themes particularly inter-
esting to Jewish and Israeli advocates, but considerably 
ignored by Arab and Communist propagandists. For instance, 
Arab propaganda over the last three years has emphasized 
strongly (1) the Arab-Palestian plight, (2) the "belligerent" 
Israeli war machine, (3) Israel's "brutality" in Lebanon, 
and (4) Israel's "imperialistic" tendencies (e.g., the mili-
tary administration of the so-called West Bank). These themes 
are the very topics which the public seemed to have mixed 
feelings about (i.e., 50 percent positive and 50 percent 
·negative). In contrast, when general topics which Arab prop-
agandists rarely touch upon were asked, such as (1) Israeli 
People are hard working, (2) I respect the State of Israel, 
and (3 >. Israel must be military strong, then the public proved 
overwhelmingly pro-Israel (i.e., 87 percent positive, 13 
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percent negative). The above findings imply that the Arab-
backed propaganda process is highly effective, possibly with-
out even Israel or the American Jewish public consciously 
aware of it (i.e., its efficiency). 
Correlation Between Knowledge 
and Attitudes 
The complete Israel Attitude Scale was then correlated 
with the Mideast Knowledge Scale in which a significant cor-
relation of .26 was generated. However, in light of the low 
reliability coefficient (. 55) of the Mideast Knowledge Scale, 
the actual strength of the relationship is unclear. The"refore 
in order to more fully examine the relationship between knowl-
edge and perceptions of Mideast happenings with attitudes 
towards Israel, individual items were examined separately. 
In the 8-item Mideast Knowledge Scale 4 items correlated 
significantly (i.e., p < .005) with the Israel Attitude 
Scale. Three of the items have a very important historical 
bent, while the fourth bespeaks total ignorance of Mideast 
happenings (which apparently plays right into the hands of 
Arab and Communist propagandists). 
was: 
The first significantly correlated item (r = .22) 
Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over the 
last 300 years until the creation of Israel. Is this 
true or false? 
Seventy-three percent of all respondents failed to 
know that the correct answer to this question was False (if 
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they would have guessed, approximately 23% more would have 
scored correctly). Factually speaking, there never was a 
separate Arab state in Palestine and there never was a sepa-
rate Palestinian Arab nation. Palestinian Arab nationalism 
was a post-World War I (British Mandate) phenomenon. Pales-
tinian Arabs were never, at any time, autonomous. They never 
created their own self contained unit nor any semblance of 
separate political or social identity (Davis, 1984) until 
1948 when masses of them left or fled the Land following 
the War of Independence, which they and their Arab brethren 
initiated. In essence, only after 1948 (primarily in the 
refugee camps) was a distinct Arab-Palestinian "national 
character" created. 
In the author's opinion the above information is a 
mandatory prerequisite for properly understanding the Arab-
Israeli conflict. To understand present day Palestinian 
"nationalism" in the context of a hostile response to an 
independent Jewish state, as opposed to a hi st or ical positive 
entity in and of itself, sheds light on the subject which 
should have (and according to the correlation apparently 
does have) far-reaching ramifications. On an ethical level, 
this difference in understanding should make a substantive 
difference regarding whether to support Israel's claim for 
secure defensible borders, or Arab claims for a second Pales-
tinian state ·(Jordan being the first). 
was: 
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The second significantly correlated item (r = • 24) 
From the time many Jews started arr1v1ng in Palestine 
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948, 
thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the 
Jewish settlers. Is this true of false? 
Sixty-eight percent of the respondents failed to know 
that the correct answer was false. Not only were Arabs not 
kicked out of the land but according to British census fig-
ures [which failed to take into account the myriad of Arabs 
who with the help of the British succeeded in entering the 
land illegally (Peters, 1984)), the Arab population in Pales-
tine during the British mandate period rose by 75.2% as com-
pared with a 25% increase in relatively fecund Egypt. Most 
importantly, the Arab increase was greatest in areas of in-
tensive Jewish development. For example, the Arab population 
in Haifa increased by 216%, and in Jaffa and Jerusalem by 
134% and 90% respectively. In contrast, when there was an 
absence of Jewish development the Arab population increased 
substantially less. For example, in Nablus, Jenin, and Beth-
lehem increases over the same period of time were 42%, 40%, 
and 32% respectively (Gottheil, 1975; and Palestine Royal 
Commission Report, 1937). 
The third item (r = .24) was: 
Arab hostility towards Jews began with the start of Jewish 
nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true or false? 
. Si x t y- four percent o f a 11 participants responded 
incorrectly. In light of the historical relationship between 
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Arab-Muslims and Jews delineated in Chapter I, the partic-
ipants inaccuracy requires little further corroborating evi-
dence to poignantly depict the public's mis perception of 
this highly important Mideast issue. 
The fourth item discussed in which 52% of all re-
spondents answered incorrectly (though more answered correctly 
on this item than on any other) was: 
Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that 
it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle 
East enemies put together. Is this true or false? 
Just taking into account Israel• s more active and 
verbal enemies in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq, Jordan, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran) the present land area ratio 
is more than 250 to 1, to the disadvantage of "imperialistic" 
Israel. The importance of this datum is that despite relent-
less and detailed American News coverage concerning almost 
every apparent Israeli blemish, the ignorance of facts, which 
apparently makes a substantive difference in the public's 
perception of Israel is abysmal. 
In conjunction with and corroborating the above re-
lationship between the public's misconceptions of historical 
Mideast issues and attitudes towards Israel were the relation-
ships found between the four Arab-Palestinian Issue Items 
and the Israel Attitude Scale. These questions did not ask 
for knowledge, but rather for the respondent• s opinion (which 
' is pre~umably based on his/her perception of the situation) 
on various Arab-Palestinian Issues. All four questions 
f 
• 
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(though not phrased as questions on history) requested an 
opinion based perforce on a particular historical perspec-
tive. All four items, as expected, were signficantly (p < 
.005) correlated with attitudes towards Israel. In other 
words, participants whose historical perceptions appeared 
accurate were significantly more pro-Israel than those whose 
perceptions were not. 
The significance of the above findings which revealed 
the public's unawareness of broader issues in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict with its relationship to attitudes towards Israel, 
in conjunction with the apparent efficacy of Arab propaganda 
(which appear·s to be successfully molding perceptions of 
Israel) should not be taken lightly. Hypothetically speaking, 
in times of crisis this anti-Israel propaganda (which appears 
rather innocuous at present) could be the very foundation for 
rationalizing the abandomnent of Israel, and possibly for 
even attacking American Jews. Unless Israeli, Jewish, or 
even non-Jewish organizations aggressively begin to educate 
the American public on basic Mideast issues, the above hypoth-
esized consequences, following from an American crisis, are 
not too fantastic to actually occur. 
Effects of the Media 
Democracy in the United States is based on the faith 
that the individual's best thinking will emerge if he/she 
is adeq.uately informed of the facts affecting the world around 
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him/her. "Informed people will be more likely to decide on 
reasonably practical, just, and humanitarian policies because 
in the long run it is in their interest and their countries 
to do so" (Cirino, 1974). Today's local, national, and in-
ternational news is obtained by most people in the public 
marketplace of the mass media. It was estimated in 1974 
that over 90 percent of the people in America depended ex-
clusively for their information on magazines (e.g., Time, 
Newsweek), daily newspapers, radio, and television (Epstein, 
1974). If the basic purpose of disseminating news information 
is, in the words of the Federal Communications Commission 
"the right of the public to be informed, rather than any 
right on the part of the government, any broadcasting 1 icense 
or any individual members of the public to broa~cast his 
own particular views on the matter" (Epstein, 1974), then 
the transmitting of factual, unbiased, and historically ac-
curate news is an indispensable element seemingly inherent 
in news coverage. 
Unfortunately, concerning the media's coverage of 
Israel over the last three years, this idea has rarely been 
met. Much non-factual reporting and slanted opinions con-
cerning the Israeli invasion into Lebanon was promulgated 
by the most respected and influential news media of today 
(Muravchik, 1983). In addition, it is the opinion of the 
present author that the American news media in general has 
focused the public's attention on non-representative scenarios 
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concerning the more general Arab-Israeli conflict. In light 
of at 1 east the last forty years of hi story, sympathetic 
stereotypic scenarios of the Palestinian plight, and the 
"friendly moderate" Arab States taken together with the "bel-
ligerent" State of Israel appears to be a distortion of facts 
at best. 
In light of the role slanderous material and misin-
formation has played historically in both the express ion 
and cause (secondary in nature) of anti-Jewish hosti 1 i ty, 
the content and perceptual effects of four news periodicals 
we r e ex am in ed • Periodicals representing American, Arab, 
Jewish Secular, and Jewish Religious orientations were content 
analyzed with regards to their portrayal of the Arab-Pales-
tinian refuge problem. Subsequently, the perceptual effect 
these seemingly different periodicals had on the Chicago 
public were compared. 
It was predicted that the periodical representing 
mainstream America, together with the Arab periodical, given 
a latitude of var ia ti on, would be significantly less pro-
Israel than the Jewish religious periodical. In addition, 
it was predicted that the Jewish secular magazine, depicted 
as indirectly echoing the ideology of Reform and Conservative 
Judaism, would show no less hostility towards Israel, nor 
less sympathy towards the Arab-Palestinians than its American 
counterpart. 
Results supported the above predictions that the 
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Jewish religious periodical would present the Arab-Palestinian 
problem in a significantly more pro-Israel perspective than 
the other three magazines, and would likewise produce a sig-
nificantly more pro-Israel cognitive effect than the others. 
The surprising and troubling (i.e., to pro-Israel advocates) 
aspect of this analysis is that, after content analysis, 
when the periodicals' paragraphs were categorized on a pro-
Israel vs. pro-Arab scale regarding the Arab-Palestinian 
problem, it was found that the American and Jewish secular 
(which can be conceptualized as implicitly espousing the 
Reform and Conservative philosophy) magazines were respec-
tively 89 and 85 percent pro-Arab. The Arab magazine proved 
96 percent pro-Arab, and in contrast, the Jewish religious 
magazine was 92 percent pro-Israel. 
The above results are very disturbing for people 
who believe in the Jewish version of the Arab-Palestinian 
problem, for they imply that during the times of international 
pressure and condemnation the general American and American-
Jewish secular media will most probably take (whether volun-
tarily or not) pro-Arab positions. Potentially this could 
lead an economically independent Israel into doing what it 
did in 1973 (the Yorn Kippur war). Although receiving intel-
ligence reports ~n full that Egypt and Syria were about to 
attack, the Israeli government opted ~to make a pre-emptive 
strike, for fear of world-wide condemnation (Sachar, 1980). 
This irresponsible move on the part of the Israeli government 
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cost the state of Israel thousands of Jewish lives. 
In the opinion of the author, Israel's primary propa-
ganda foe is not the Arabs (i.e., the explicit and avowed 
enemies of Israel can be dealt with) but rather the American 
and American-Jewish secular media. Their danger is that 
while displaying a guise of objectivity (and even pro-Jewish 
concern) these media, as depicted in the above analysis (which 
was investigated during a time of international crisis, seven 
months following the initial Lebanese invasion) , appear 
latently pro-Arab. The peril involved is that the American 
public (both non-Jew and Jew alike) most probably accept 
their Middle-East scenarios in light of their seemingly objec-
tive (or pro-Israel) positions. 
These results are representative of the news media 
in general during the first several months of Israel's in-
vasi'on into Lebanon (Muravchik, 1983; Chafets, 1985). In 
the following discussion five reasons are given to explain 
the news media's seemingly latent anti-Israeli position. 
It is important to bear in mind that these reasons are not 
mutually exclusive. 
1. Arab Monies: Granted the present author has little 
support for the present claim, but based on Arab pocketbook 
power in conjunction with their "special" relationship with 
many large American corporations, the possibility that the 
major American (not Jewish) news media are to some. extent 
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cooperating with the Arabs appears not totally slanderous. 
For example, according to a 1974 report of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, the 
ARAMCO consortium (Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and SOCAL) attempted 
to block America's emergency airlift to Israel in 1973 during 
exceedingly desperate times (in the beginning of the Yom 
Kippur War). During the same war these companies also coop-
erated closely with Saudi Arabia to deny oil and fuel to 
the United States Navy (Davis et al., 1982). 
2. Latent Anti-Jewish Hostility: This latent hos-
tility could derive from a myriad of sources. Some of the 
more salient sources could be jealousy of American-Jewish 
success, negative past experiences with Jews whether vicarious 
or real, and/or negative religious orientations concerning 
Jews and Judaism. 
3. Intimidation: The physical intimidation constantly 
present while covering Mideast happenings in Arab lands was 
described in Chapter II. 
4. The Liberal Media's Identification with the Left: 
Many Jews are aware that they are not the only group reviled 
and condemned, but fewer are aware that they are the only 
group against whom discrimination has been officially sanc-
tioned by both the Far Right and Far Left (Perlmutter, 1982). 
An incisive essay, written by Jack Newfield a liberal journal-
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ist in a Leftist periodical The Village Voice sums up the 
present-day American Leftist movement's relationship with 
Jews and Israel. It is this leftwing ideological thrust 
which the American and Jewish secular news media, in general, 
identify with: // 
/,,// 
The tlllng that troubles me about a part of the Amer-
ican left doesn't have an official sociological name. 
It's more than anti-Zionism, and different from tradi-
tional anti-Semitism. Its impact is often in omissions 
--the injustice not mentioned, the article not written, 
the petition not signed. It is often communicated in 
code words. ~ut it is essentially a series of dual 
standards. It is a dual standard for the human rights 
of Jews in certain countries. It is a dual standard 
that questions Israel's right to exist by denying to 
Zionism the same moral legitimacy that is granted to 
every other expression of nationalism in the world. 
And it is an amnesia of conscience about the creation 
of Israel, and about the Holocaust, symbolized by Noam 
Chomsky writing an introduction to an insane, anti-Semi tic 
book that alleges the Holocaust is a Zionist hoax. And 
by Jesse Jackson saying he is sick and tired of hear-
ing about the Holocaust. (Perlmutter, 1982, p. 137). 
s. Jewish Self-Hate: It is known that a large num-
ber of Jews hold very important and influential positions 
in the major American news media (Chafets, 1984). Therefore 
the question is asked "Why would Jews (both in the American 
and Jewish secular media) blatantly misrepresent their own 
people?" Answers to this perplexing question may possibly 
be found in Satre's (1976) Anti-Semite and Jew in which Satre 
presents a psychological exposition of the assimilated Jew. 
He writes: 
He (the assimilated Jew) has allowed himself to be 
persuaded by the anti-Semites, he is the first victim 
of their propaganda. He admits with them that, if there 
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is a Jew, he must have the characteristics with which 
popular malevolence endows him, and his effort is to 
constitute himself a martyr, in the proper sense of the 
term, that is, to prove in his person that there 
are no Jews• (pp. 94-95) 
They (assimilated Jews) have allowed themselves to 
be poisoned by the stereotype that others have of them, 
and they 1 i ve in fear that their acts wi 11 correspond 
to this stereotype •••• Thus many inauthentic Jews play 
at not being Jews. • • • (pp. 95-96) 
The Jew who encounters another Jew in the drawing 
room of a Christian is a little like a Frenchman who 
meets a compatriot abroad. Yet the Frenchman derives 
pleasure from asserting to the world that he is a French-
man, whereas the Jew, even if he were the only Israelite 
in a non-Jewish company, would force himself not to feel 
that he was a Jew. When there is another Jew with him, 
he feels himself endangered before the others, and he 
who a moment before could not even see the ethnic char-
acteristics of his son or his nephew now looks at his 
coreligionist with the eyes of an anti-Semite, spying 
out with a mixture of fear and fatalism the objective 
signs of their common origin •••• 
He is so afraid of the discoveries the Christians 
are going to make that he hastens to give them warning, 
he becomes himself an anti-Semite by impatience and for 
the sake of others. Each Jewish trait he detects is 
like a dagger thrust, for it seems to him that he finds 
it in himself, but out of reach, objective, incurable, 
and published to the world. • • • (pp. 102-3) 
, ••• in anti-Semitism he (the Jew) denies his race 
in order to be no more than a pure individual, a man 
without blemish in the midst of other men. (p. 109) 
Accordingly, many Jews in the news media could be 
depicted as bending-over-backwards in an attempt to sympa-
thetically portray the Arab position for fear of being accused 
of partisan reporting, and in effect the fear of being pub-
licly exposed as Jewish (something they had tried so des-
perately in the past to escape). 
The above points are disturbing to pro-Israel ad-
vocates, for they imply that during times of international 
pressure and condemnation the general American and American 
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Jewish secular news media will most probably adopt pro-Arab 
positions. To repeat, the primary propaganda antagonist of 
Israel does not appear to be the Arabs, but rather the Amer i-
can and American Jewish secular news media. Their dire threat 
is that while ostensibly displaying a guise of objectivity, 
these media are latently pro-Arab (or more appropriately 
anti-Israel). The grave danger involved is that the American 
public will most probably accept their news coverage as fact, 
in light of their apparently evenhanded political stance. 
Limitations of Analyses and Directions 
for Future Study 
Some major limitations will be talked about in the 
following discussion. 
1. In the present study a total of 400 people were 
randomly sampled from the city of Chicago proper. In addi-
ti on, the only sizable racial groups in the sample were Whites 
and Blacks. Orientals and Hispanics were conspicuously miss-
ing and Jews and Arabs were screened out initially in order 
to prevent their biasing effects (i.e., In light of limited 
financial resources which precluded sufficiently large samples 
of Jews and Arabs for individual group comparisons, it was 
felt that Jews and Arabs would be inordinately pro-Jewish 
or pro-Arab respectively, and that their biases when combined 
indiscriminately with the general Christian population would 
introduce undesired extra variance into the analysis). 
In future studies it will be important to measure 
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attitudes and knowledge from other geographical locations 
other than the Midwest, and to sample from suburban and rural 
areas as well as the big city (the population sampled in 
the present study was~limited in light of insufficient finan-
cing). It will also be important to obtain sizable samples 
of Orientals, Hispanics, Arabs, and Jews to determine both 
geographical and group differences. 
2. The Mideast Knowledge Scale was not a particularly 
reliable instrument (reliability coefficient = .SS). One 
reason given above for its relative unreliability was that 
responses were of a True-False-Don't Know nature which left 
ample room for guesswork. In order to deal effectively with 
this confound, it would be wise in the future to create a 
new Mideast Knowledge Scale whose questions would be open-
ended. 
3. In the. above content analyses and contrasts, 
only the news media of magazines were empirically compared. 
Based on these comparisons results were generalized to other 
news media. This extrapolation is not necessarily correct 
or even logical. Accordingly, it is important in future 
experimentation to content analyze other forms of news media 
(e.g., television, newspapers, radio) and, like the above, 
to examine the effects these media forms have on the American 
public. 
4. In the present study the link between news media 
content and attitudes towards Israel was only indirect (i.e., 
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via content analysis). Future studies should explore the 
relationship more directly. For example, magazine or news-
paper articles may be read by subjects and subsequently their 
attitudes, perceptions, and knowledge may be tapped. In 
addition, radio or television news broadcasts may be played 
to participants and afterwards their attitudes and perception 
measured. By implementing it directly, the problem of cre-
ating a highly valid representation (e.g., via content anal-
ysis) of the particular news media under investigation is 
eliminated. 
5. Another area unexplored in the present study 
(yet very important for practical application purposes) deals 
with the public's exposure to and acceptance of news reports 
via the mass media. In essence, if the news media cannot 
be pressured to refrain from biased reporting concerning 
Israel, then people's trust (pending there is some) in the 
"evenhandedness" and "objectivity" of the news media may be 
mitigated. In other words, if the mass news media refuses 
to change (which it almost certainly will) a strategy can 
theoretically be devised to sensitize the public to the news 
media's implicit bias against Israel. 
In the author's opinion a potent way to sensitize 
the American population would be to expose publicly the 
media's bias, and their exploitative play on the emotions of 
the public. By vividly delineating the news media's selective 
processing procedures in conjunciton with a brief background 
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sketch of what is actually happening (and has happened) in 
the reg ion, the American public should get an idea of how 
they have been emotionally manipulated, and consequently 
should become more difficult to sell in the future. 
The above strategy corresponds to "i nocula ti on theory" 
(McGuire, 1964). McGuire suggested that people could be 
made more resistant to a persuasive message by inoculating 
their initial attitudes. According to Petty and Cacioppo 
(1981): 
The inoculation treatment consists of exposing people 
to a few pieces of counter-attitudinal propaganda prior 
to exposure to the threatening message and showing them 
how to refute this initial discrepant information. The 
presentation of refuted weak counter-arguments presumably 
produces resistance to subsequent stronger attacks, be-
cause the inoculation poses a threat that motivates people 
to develop bolstering arguments for their somewhat weak-
ened attitude, and it helps them counter-argue the attack-
ing message. (p. 230) 
Accordingly, exposing to the American public how they have 
been perceptually manipulated regarding happenings in the 
Middle East may enable the public to produce their own 
counter-arguments when faced with similar reporting in the 
future. 
6. The origins of any news media bias should be more 
fully investigated. In the above discussion several reasons 
were given why the news media might promote a pro-Arab slant 
(in light of recent history any balance of blame showed to 
both the Arab and Israeli camps is itself considered poi-
gnantly pro-Arab) but the discussion was overly simplistic. 
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Therefore, in future studies these overly superficial guide-
lines (as well as others) should be more thoroughly examined 
(e.g., via archival data, content analyses, personal inter-
viewing of media personnel, etc.). 
Chapter III Conclusions 
The following discourse will be divided ito two sec-
tions (Demographic and Psychological variables) • Afterwards, 
the 1 imitations of the analyses and directions for future 
study will be discussed. 
Demographics 
In the subsequent discourse only the variables of 
educational level, age, and race in their relationship to 
attitudes towards Jews and Israel will be discussed. The 
reason is, that these variables produced significant differ-
ences (i.e., p < .005) on, at least, one of the two attitude 
scales. 
Educational Level 
The significant correlation obtained between Educa-
tional Level and attitudes towards both Jews and Israel sug-
gests that the more educated a person is the more pro-Jewish 
and pro-Israel he/she is likely to be. However, after a 
multiple regression analysis was implemented in which both 
Jewish and Israel attitude scales were simultaneously re-
gressed on Education only the Jewish scale's partialed cor-
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relation proved significant (Partialed Corelations were: 
Jewish Scale = .22, p < .001; and Israel Scale = .04, p > 
.OS). This implies that the relationship between Education 
and Attitudes towards Israel is primarily an artifact of 
the relationship between Attitudes towards Jews with Attitudes 
towards Israel. 
Quinley and Glock (1983) suggest,ed three general 
reasons why educational level may be related to attitudes 
towards Jews: (1) education enables individuals to develop 
their rational abilities and to think critically and inde-
pendently, (2) attending school is a social phenomenon. It 
exposes individuals to environments which are more liberal 
and tolerant than most others, and (3) education is one way 
of purchasing a ticket of admission into middle class soci-
ety. It may favorably influence attitudes towards Jews by 
placing individuals in settings where prejudice is less ac-
ceptable or less likely. 
Although it seems highly illogical to push for the 
education of the masses with the intent of attenuating 
anti-Jewish hostility (even if the total American popula-
tion could be "fully" educated there will always be a lower 
and lower-middle socio-economic class in America regardless 
of the educational level of its people), the clue that less 
educated people are more potentially hostile towards Jews 
and in~irectly towards Israel is an important finding. Its 
importance lies in the observation that any educational cam-
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paign waged to counter anti-Jewish and/or anti-Israel prop-
aganda must not be monolithic but varied in its instructive 
strategies, in order to reach individuals of diverse intel-
lectual and socio-economic strata. Quinley and Glock (1983) 
in their book Anti-Semitism in America have presented several 
strategies for combatting anti-Jewish prejudice, of which 
three appear to have special application in the present dis-
cussion. They are: 
1. • •• instruction should deal with minority group stereo-
types both openly and directly. That anti-Semitic beliefs 
exist should be acknowledged •••• Pointing out the 
distortions in such beliefs will serve to expose factual 
errors ••• and should expose the ideological character 
of anti-Semitic thinking. (p. 201) 
2. To teach people how to use the rules of logic and infer-
ence and to understand what can or cannot be said about 
group differences •••• Instruction is also needed to 
assist people to look beyond surface characteristics and 
easy explanations and to discover the more subtle and 
important reasons for human behavior. (p. 201) 
and, 
3. • • • special instruction is needed about how group dif-
ferences came about. This involves instruction in the 
historical background of different religious, ethnic, 
and racial groups in America, the unique cultural heritage 
and values of these groups, and the social and economic 
positions they have come to occupy in society. (p. 202) 
Race 
The significant correlation between *~ and atti-
tudes towards both Jews and Israel suggests that Whites are 
*The variable Race after being par ti a led by the var i-
ables Age, Education, and Gender remained significantly cor-
related with both the Jewish Scale (p < .007) and the Israel 
Attitude Scale (p = .001). 
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more likely to be pro-Jewish and pro-Israel than their Black 
counterparts. However, like Education, after a multiple 
regression analysis was implemented in which both Jewish and 
Israel Attitude Scales were simultaneously regressed on ~, 
only the Jewish Scale's partialed correlation proved signifi-
cant (Partialed Correlations were: Jewish Scale= .17, p < 
.008; and Israel Scale• .06, p > .OS). This implies that 
the relationship between Race and Attitudes towards Israel 
is primarily a function of the relationship between Attitudes 
towards Jews and Attitudes towards Israel. 
Quinley and Glock (1983) interpeted this relationship 
in economic terms. They cite the fact that Blacks who have 
more dependent economic contacts with Jews via patronizing 
Jewish-owned stores, working for Jewish employers, or having 
Jewish landlords have considerably more negative attitudes 
towards Jews than Blacks that do not. In other words, un-
equal-status-contact between Blacks and Jews seems to be 
the primary variable in accounting for anti-Jewish prejudice 
among Blacks. 
To counter Black anti-Jewish attitudes it is important 
to know the source of this potentially hostile mindset. 
Is it directed specifically towards Jews or is it more a 
reaction to overall White-American society? Black Americans 
may not be responding to having a Jew as a landlord or boss 
per se, but rather in experiencing a White person in a posi-
tion of superiority over them. 
298 
Selznick and Steinberg's (1969) findings suggest 
that most Blacks see little difference between having a Jew 
or having another White as an employer, store owner, or land-
lord. The authors found a close correspondence between Black 
respondents' positions on a White (non-Jewish) attitude scale 
and on their Jewish attitude scale. In total, only 4 percent 
of city-dwelling Blacks scored as anti-Semitic but not anti-
White (non-Jewish White), while another 4 percent were anti-
White but not anti-Semitic. 
Although the above may be comforting to some (i.e., 
misery loves company) it is disconcerting to others for to 
break Black hos ti 1 i ty towards White America (and consequently 
towards Jews) appears to be an unusually formidable task. 
In addition, because Jews (in the minds of Blacks) seem to 
represent the "exploiting" White race, and in addition present 
a highly vulnerable minority group, they could easily become 
the stimuli upon which Blacks may someday actively vent their 
hostilities. 
In light of the Jews' particularly precarious situa-
tion vis-a-vis Blacks it behooves Jewish leaders and organi-
zations to aggressively remind Blacks that it was not Jews 
who enslaved them for hundreds of years in Christi an and 
Moslem lands. In fact, it would be hard to find another 
group in America who have taken such an active role in the 
civil-rights movement, in the nourishment of the infant NAACP 
and the Urban League as the Jewish people have done in hehalf 
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of American Blacks. It is these facts which need to be con-
sistently communicated to the Black population and not the 
"facts" of Jesse Jackson and Louis Farahkan. 
In addition, if Blacks knew the real relationship 
of moderen Zionism to their own cause vis a vis Arab sujuga-
tion of Blacks, their sympathies in the Middle East would 
probably be reversed and very few would probably adopt for 
themselves the religion of Islam. For example, modern secular 
Zionism's founder Theodore Herzl wrote in 1902 in his book 
Old-New Land: 
••• There is still one other question ar1s1ng out 
of the disaster of the nations which remains unsolved 
to this day, and whose profound tragedy only a Jew can 
comprehend. This is the African question. Just call 
to mind all those terrible episodes of the slave trade, 
of human beings who, merely because they were black, 
were stolen like cattle, taken prisoner, captured and 
sold. Their children grew up in strange lands, the ob-
jects of contempt and hostility because their complexions 
were different. I am not ashamed to say, though I may 
expose myself to ridicule in saying so, that once I have 
witnessed the redemption of the Jews, my people, I wish 
also to assist in the redemption of the Africans. (Perl-
mutter, 1982, p. 186) 
In contrast to the above, it is interesting to note 
Arab-Muslim's historical treatment of Blacks (whom a signifi-
cant number of Black Americans today identify with, in the 
. Arab's ongoing war with Israel). The following excerpts 
are taken from Davis (1985): 
The Arabs, who ran the world's black slave markets 
for centuries, continue to engage in the slave trade 
among themselves. 
Recent incidents of chattel slavery have been cited 
in· Saudi Arabia--which "abolished" it years ago--and in 
Mauritania, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, and Sudan, ac-
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cording to British correspondents and observers. 
Britain's Anti-Slavery Society notes that slavery 
was legal in much of the Arab world until 1962 and that 
vestiges of the practice survive today. 
In the case of Mauritania, however, the Anti-Slavery 
Society charges that slavery still flourishes openly to 
this day. In late 1981, the society accused the Arab 
League members of maintaining "at least 100,000 slaves 
and 300,000 semi-slaves." although the Mauritanian gov-
errnnent decreed the abolition of slavery in July 1980, 
the British anti-slavery group labelled the decree a 
maneuver to improve Mauritania's international standing. 
Former Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver, who 
returned to the United States in 1975 from exile in Al-
geria, reported in The Boston Herald in January 1977, 
that "having lived intimately for several years among 
the Arabs, I know them to be amongst the most racist 
people on earth. This is particularly true of their 
attitude toward black people •••• Many Arab families 
that can afford it keep one or two black slaves to do 
their menial labor. Sometimes they own an entire family. 
I have seen such slaves with my own eyes." (pp. 139-
40) 
It is the present author's opinion that if the above 
type of information was intelligently disseminated among 
American Blacks, Israel would most probably have a staunch 
ally, in the Black community of America, and this positive 
relationship would invariably carry over to attitudes towards 
Jews in general. 
Age 
A slight but significant relationship was found be-
tween the variables Age and Attitudes Towards Israel. The 
direction of the relationship suggests that the older a person 
is the more pro-Israel he/she is likely to be. 
This relationship may be a function of the Arab's 
public'relations metamorphosis following their 1967 defeat 
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in the 6-Day War. This change in Arab propaganda, which 
shifted from proclamations calling for the eradication of 
Israel to sympathetic rhetoric in behalf of their Palestinian 
"brothers" can conceptually be understood to have affected 
the younger generation more than the older. It may affect 
the younger generation more because they know and viscerally 
perceive little of what was explicit before 1967, but only 
implicit thereafter, and therefore have been more effectively 
manipulated by Arab- and Communist-backed propaganda. Young 
America has seemingly only perceived Israel in the role of 
"Goliath" whereas the older generation (irrespective of their 
lack of fact) have in person witnessed the Holocaust and 
the subsequent miraculous birth of a Jewish state. 
Already in 1977, Marvin Feuerwerger wrote: 
For much of today's younger Congress ••• the Holocaust 
is a vague memory and the creation of Israel is not re-
called as a meaningful and vivid realization of an urgent 
Jewish need nor as the near-miraculous redemption of a 
persecuted people. (p. 24) 
He went on to quote from a former Administration 
official who stated: 
••• younger members ••• haven• t experienced the Holo-
caust personally or seen the newsreels depicting the 
death camps or watched the Nuremberg trials. These mem-
bers don't have a vivid image of the war, and they don't 
understand what the State of Israel means. (pp. 24-25) 
The younger generation (e.g., between the ages 18-40) 
are the future members of Congress, the future State and 
Defense Department officials, future members of the mass 
media, and the mainstream American constituency in the not 
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too distant future. Unless a concerted effort is made to 
educate the younger generation (both Gentile and Jew alike), 
the Jewish state of Israel will probably meet stiff American 
opposition in the future. In the author's opinion the younger 
generation should not only be educated regarding the more 
salient facts of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but concomitantly 
should be presented with historical anti-Jewish slander and 
hostility. Just as the older generation are seemingly able 
to connect both cognitively and emotionally the Holocaust 
with the birth of a Jewish nation, so should the younger 
generation be educated on contemporary anti-Israeli propaganda 
in light of historical anti-Jewish propaganda. 
Another interpretation concerning the discrepancy 
among age groups may be the general political alignment which 
generally varies across age groups. The older generation 
tends to be more conservative (the Right) while the. younger 
generation tends to be more liberal (the Left), oftentimes 
indiscriminately (Keniston, 1971). In light of the fact 
that Israel superficially represents the "establishment," 
or conservative Right, its image alone may repel a good many 
emotionally sincere, but cognitively shallow young Ameri-
cans. 
A further interpretation of the above data may reflect 
the emphasis and placement of Arab propaganda over the last 
twenty years, which has become increasingly more powerful 
and sophisticated. Already in 1955, Eleanor Roosevelt noted: 
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"Arab propaganda on American college campuses across the 
country is beyond the wildest imagination" (Drayer & Kanner, 
1983, p. 27). 
In October, 1964 a Near East Report special survey 
of the anti-Israel campus campaign cautioned that: 
Arab propagandists have recognized the possibilities 
for affecting American public opinion at the college 
level. College newspapers resound with their pronounce-
ments. College lecterns shake with the force of their 
oratory. As the Arab approach becomes more sophisti-
cated, Arab distortion of history becomes more palatable 
to young Americans. (p.4) 
In recent years anti-Israel propagandists in the 
United States have made college campuses a still higher pri-
ority (Kessler & Schwaber, 1984). When Harten Husseini (the 
PLO's Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations) was 
interviewed by the Saudi Report in 1982, he was asked if he 
spoke on many college campuses. He retorted that he had 
lectured "to some colleges" (Halsell, 1982). But the truth 
of the matter was that 17 of the 20 speeches Husseini de-
1 ivered in the prior six month period had been on college 
campuses. In fact, 85 percent of Husseini's lectures from 
1980 to 1984 have been on American college campuses, though 
college students in America comprise less than 1 percent of 
all Americans (Kessler & Schwaber, 1984). 
According to the above discussion the present results 
may reflect Arab propaganda over the last twenty years, which 
has targeted (and seemingly succeeded) to influence the 
younger generation of Americans. In conclusion, the above 
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three interpretations are by no means mutually exclusive, 
and the possibility that there exists a strong relationship 
between the three should not be precluded in preparing edu-
cational campaigns. Following therefrom, pro-Israel informa-
tion campaigns should probably be prepared to deal with each 
of the three interpretations separately and in combination. 
Psychological Variables 
Social scientists and historians who refrain from 
mentioning the relationship between psychological maladjust-
ment and attitudes towards Jews shun a tremendous amount of 
literature which supports this relationship (e.g., Adorno 
et al., 1980; Bettelheim et al., 1964; Saenger, 1969). How-
ever, social scientists who focus almost exclusively on this 
relationship promote little more than pessimism. In theory, 
if psychological maladjustment is the exclusive cause of 
anti-Jewish hostility as some writers imply, then by def-
initon, the only way to stamp out anti-Jewish hostility would 
be to eliminate international crises, mental illness, and 
overly frustrating experiences (or conversely to educate 
the masses on how to effectively cope with, at least, inter-
national crises and overly frustrating experiences). As 
long as the world remains as we perceive it today, the elimi-
nation of societal and individual maladies appears virtually 
impossible. Correspondingly, an attempt to arouse Jewish 
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optimism by the "reasoning" that a significant drop in col-
lective and individual suffering would considerably alleviate 
anti-Jewish hostility is analogous to passifying a frightened 
child on a ten-drop roller-coaster by informing him/her after 
the first drop, that things are getting progressively better. 
In essence, if anti-Jewish hostility was primarily 
dependent on these psycho-social illnesses, the prognosis 
for future Jewish suffering would be grim indeed. In the 
present theoretical analysis psychological variables are 
not overlooked, but are depicted as only indirectly related 
to anti-Jewish hostility. By positing various psychological 
variables as tertiary in nature the present author is not 
eschewing the empirical realities mentioned above, but is 
able to avoid describing a bleak seemingly uncontrollable 
phenomenon which could ironically cause more pessimism and 
worry than good. In fact, the constant anxiety involved in 
thinking about which individuals are maladjusted (and there-
fore according to the other theories are prone to anti-Jewish 
hostility) would most likely present serious cognitive and 
emotional discomfort. 
In contrast, the present theory posits that the Jewish 
people themselves are capable of attenuating anti-Jewish 
hostility. From making an authentic decision to remain Jewish 
or not (see Discussion in Chapter I) to fighting against 
the pr~liferation of anti-Jewish propaganda (see Discussion 
in Chapter II) to organizing educational campaigns to reach 
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those groups most susceptible to anti-Jewish and/or anti-
Israel i propaganda the present theory (and action following 
therefrom) is by no means pessimistic, as opposed to other 
theories which posit the etiology of anti-Jewish prejudice 
as primarily pathological in nature. 
The primary reasons for bringing these psychological 
variables into the present study (even though they, by them-
selves, lead to little positive application) was twofold, 
(1) to provide a comprehensive theory of anti-Jewish hostility 
which is consistent with other empirical findings, and (2) 
to further test several of these empirical findings in an 
attempt to detect the more salient sources of fear, frustra-
tion, and/or pain which when the primary and secondary causes 
of anti-Jewish hostility are operative, would be considered 
the catalyst needed to produce further discrimination and 
persecution of Jews. 
Two variables found to correlate significantly with 
Attitudes Towards Jews both in bivariate and multivariate 
analyses were the Anomie Scale, and the Abridged Purpose in 
Life Scale. The Anomie Scale corresponds to the disintegra-
tion of societal structure and values in times of rapid social 
change. The progressively heightened pace of American society 
(or, in fact, the world in general) with its concommitant 
weakening of traditional values, in an atmosphere of "living 
for t~day" for fear of future happenings should logically 
create a heightened degree of anomie. Accordingly, the lack 
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of a structured and predictable social environment should 
only exacerbate anti-Jewish hostility all the while misinfor-
mation of Jews, Judaism, and Israel is believed. 
The Abridged Purpose in Life Scale corresponds to 
the lack of meaning and purpose the individual may experience 
in life. Although any prognostication must be considerably 
tempered by the instrument's relatively low reliability co-
efficient (.56), the fact that an optimistic future outlook 
may appear to many people today as highly unrealistic, the 
relationship of the above two variables is logically consis-
tent, and therefore if left unchecked should increasingly 
become more intense in the future. 
The Opinion-Fear Rating Scale was found to correlate 
significantly with Attitudes Towards Jews and with Attitudes 
Towards Israel in both bivariate and multivariate regression 
analyses. However, the relationship between Attitudes To-
wards Jews and the Opinion-Fear Crises Scale was understood 
as a corollary of the latter scale's relationship to Attitudes 
Towards Israel. Conceptually, perceptions of an impending 
national catastrophe or crisis places the individual in a 
state of helplessness. In this disturbing state of mind 
the individual may (1) stoically resign himself/herself to 
getting-on-with-life despite the many obstacles, (2) become 
depressed, or (3) strike out at a tangible and vulnerable 
entity .whose direct actions have little to do with the ongoing 
crisis. 
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A case in point is the recent hijacking (June of 
'85) of a T.W.A. airline, with many American citizens on 
board, by Arab terrorists. The main demand of the terrorists 
was the release of over 700 Arabs from Israeli detainee 
camps. These detainees were taken as prisoners while Israel 
was in the process of expeditiously departing from Lebanon, 
in an effort to ward off any more terrorist attacks (which 
were consistently taking place) against Israeli soldiers, 
who were very visibly making their way out. At the outset, 
the Israeli government made it clear that these detainees 
would be released once Israel had fully retreated, and once 
there was relative calm on the Israeli-Lebanese border. In 
fact, before the hijacking took place Israel had already 
begun releasing prisoners. Despite the above scenario, public 
opinion towards Israel, when the hostages' fate was as yet 
unde,cided, dropped to an all-time low. 
Following from the above, it does not require too 
much imagination to understand what could be the American 
people's reaction to future Mideast outbreaks, where quanti-
tatively and qualitatively the crisis may be more intense than 
the above episode. Although the above scenario is not a 
pleasant one (for all parties concerned), it is believed that 
had the American news media not shown implicit sympathy for 
the terrorists (in the Mideast in general and in Lebanon in 
particular the word terrorist can be applied to a large net-
work of individuals and political entities all working towards 
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a common goal), and had not been previously inclined to pro-
vide for the terrorists a platform for influencing the Ameri-
can public, the hijacking probably never would have occurred. 
In fact, future terrorist attacks against American targets 
throughout the world would probably have been significantly 
reduced. 
Another interpretation of the relationship between 
the apprehension or anticipation of an impending national 
crisis and attitudes towards Israel can be described on a 
cognitive level (as opposed to an emotional level discussed 
above). Theoretically, the association between anticipation 
of crisis and attitudes specifically towards Israel may be 
seen as manipulated by Arab and Communist propagandists and 
further buttressed by the American news media. 
The general message (as discussed in Chapter II) 
rece'ived in the West (via our own news media) is that the 
Palestinian problem lies at the heart of Middle East insta-
bility. According to the message, once this problem is re-
solved (via an abrogation of the Jewish state, or the granting 
of a second Arab-Palestinian state on the west Bank) there 
should be peace in the region, and the u.s. which is often 
the target of Arab hostility will then enjoy a stable and 
enduring alliance with the Arab world. Conversely, another 
Arab-Israeli war could produce an economic er i sis in the 
Western world (as it was seen to have done in 1973) which 
could have serious political ramifications. In addition, 
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the superpowers could get drawn into the action. 
Portraying Mideast tension almost exclusively in terms 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while simultaneously casting 
blame on Israel for creating or at least exacerbating the 
situation, depicts Israel, at best, as the perennial trouble-
maker, and at worst, as humanity's arch adversary. Accord-
ingly, it is possible that the above misrepresented stereotype 
of Israel vis a vis Mideast instability may have significantly 
helped to produce the present statistical relationship. As 
Benjamin Netanyahu (1983), Israel's present ambassador to 
the U.N. wrote, this portrayal of the Mideast conflict fails 
to correspond with many other realities in the region: 
In the last 30 years, virtually every Arab state has 
been at war or on the verge of war with at least one of 
its Arab neighbors •••• In North Africa, Libya has 
cl ashed with Egypt and Tunisia, threatened Sudan and 
financed efforts to topple other Arab regimes. Egypt 
under Nasser invaded Yemen and now trades threats with 
·ouadhafi. Algeria has waged surrogate warfare against 
Morocco using the Polisario forces in the Sahara. 
In the Arabian peninsula, the two Yemens have been 
warring intermittently for years. Saudi Arabia, while 
trying to buy off all potential enemies in the Arab world 
in turn seeks to dominate the smaller states of the Gulf 
and has pressed territorial claims against all of them. 
Kuwait frets over Saudi encroachment on its territory, 
but worries even more about Iraq, which claims Kuwait 
in its entirety. And in the heart of the Middle East, 
Syria has attacked Jordan, jostles with Iraq and has 
made a shambles of Lebanon in seven years of ruthless 
occupation •••• 
The Arab world is littered with broken agreements. 
At the first sign of a neighbor's vulnerability, aggres-
sion erupts against the potential victim, to be checked 
only by the perception or presence of countervailing 
power. Thus when Saadam Hussein of Iraq perceived post-
revolutionary Iran as weak and ripe for plunder, he 
sw1 ftly revoked the border agreement he had signed five 
years earlier with the Shah and invaded Iran's oil-rich 
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provinces. As early as 1928, T. E. Lawrence characterized 
the Arab regimes as "tyrannies cemented with blood" and 
said that "it will be generations before any two Arab 
states join voluntarily." Fifty-five years later nothing 
has changed •••• 
None of these conflicts has anything to do with Is-
rael. None of this violence has Israel as its target. 
Yet most of the discussions about achieving "peace" in 
the Middle East focus exclusively on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and ignore the pervasive violence that charac-
terizes the Arab world. 
Irrespective of the above, it may also be argued that 
people who are generally apprehensive may also be generally 
prejudiced. In other words the above relationship may not 
be Israel-specific, but rather prejudice-specific which may 
target any arbitrary out-group regardless of race, creed, 
activity, or region. This latter interpretation is also 
consistent with the theoretical tertiary nature of prejudice 
discussed above (in the present chapter and in Chapter III). 
Limitations of the Analyses and Directions 
for Future Study 
1. Although the variable Age proved to be signif-
icantly correlated with Attitudes towards Israel it is hy-
pothesized that this relationship would be even stronger if 
a broader range of age groups were more thoroughly sampled. 
For example, in the present study only adults 25 years of 
age and older were sampled (the author initially did not 
want to mix college students who generally live in a more 
isolated and sheltered environment with the general working 
population). In addition, only 19 percent of the respondents 
were 55 years of age and older while 49 percent were between 
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25 and 40. In future studies a broader and more proportional 
cross section of the population should be required. 
2. In the present analyses two of the psychological 
scales, The Abridged Purpose in Life Scale, and the Ego-
Strength Scale produced relatively low reliability coeffi-
cients (.56 and .40 respectively) which made their relation-
ship with the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales suspect. 
Therefore, it is important to develop or adopt other psycho-
logical scales (or revised versions of the present ones) 
which measure comparable constructs in order to more fully 
investigate their true relationship. 
3. In the present study respondents were asked all 
questions orally over the telephone. It is highly possible 
that respondents consciously refrained from portraying them-
selves in a negative light to the study's anonymous inter-
viewers (irrespective of the interviewer's claim that they 
were calling for Loyola University of Chicago). In essence, 
the relationships between the several psychological variables 
and attitudes towards Jews and Israel may in actuality be 
significantly greater than the present results showed, but 
because of the stigma (albeit justified) involved in candidly 
revealing oneself to a stranger, the real correlations may 
have been substantively diminished. Therefore, future studies 
should attempt to gather this information in a less threat-
ening manner (e.g., via in-person interviews, mail, or group 
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sit-down administrations) and then only correlate the data 
with attitudes towards Jews and Israel. 
4. A major limitation of the present study is the 
amount of variance in both the Jewish and Israel attitude 
scales unaccounted for. After simultaneously regressing 
most of the variables in the present study on both the Jewish 
and Israel scales, over 50% of the Israel scale's variance 
and approximately 70% of the Jewish scale's variance remained 
unaccounted for. The following points attempt to explain 
where some of the unaccounted for variance may be: 
A. According to the Jewish and Israel scales' fre-
quency count they both are considerably skewed (negatively). 
The skewness may reflect the actual population distribution 
or it may be an artifact of the instruments themselves. In 
either case, the skewness may have significantly attenuated 
the 'strength of the relationship between many of the inde-
pendent variables and the two scales. Further research should 
attempt to discern the approximate population distribution 
of the two constructs, and if one or more truly approximates 
the ·normal distribution a more valid instrument should sub-
sequently be de- signed. 
B. There are several variables that may have produced 
significant relationships (e.g., social mobility, authori-
tarian personality type, general index of prejudice, media 
believ~bility, etc.), but because the data of one of the 
original variables (i.e., social mobility) was l'ost, others 
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discounted because of limited interviewing time, and still 
others were only thought of post-hoc, these potential rela-
tionships were not examined. It seems fairly certain that 
had the above variables and others been more rigorously mea-
sured in the present study, the variance of both scales would 
probably have been substantially affected. However, in 1 ight 
of the limitations of a telephone survey in conjunction with 
the novel nature of the present study (i.e., there was 1 i ttle 
literature direction for choosing the most appropriate vari-
ables for the present theoretical scheme) several important 
variables were inadvertently missing. 
c. There were certain variables in the study which 
although theorized to be significantly related to anti-Jewish 
hostility were not found to be significant (i.e., Ego-Strength 
Scale, Life Satisfaction Scale). Although these scales were 
checked for their reliability and/or validity before the 
study was implemented, the fact that most of the psychological 
scales implemented in the present study were previously tested 
as self-administering scales, but in the present study were 
used in a telephone interviewing situation may have consider-
ably damaged their construct validity (i.e., they were oper-
ationalized as self-administering scales and not as tele-
phone interviewing scales). Even those scales which obtained 
significance (e.g., Anomie, Purpose in Life) may have been 
signif~cantly hampered by the interviewing situation, which 
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may have substantially 1 imi ted the amount of variance these 
variables were actually capable of accounting for. In future 
analyses of this type, all variables under investigation 
should be tested in the same setting as their eventual im-
plemen ta ti on. 
D. Certain theories or approaches to prejudice do 
not lend themselves to inclusion in cross-sectional, limited 
geographical area survey methods. This is especially true 
of theories which are historical in nature. For example, 
two approaches to prejudice discusssed above (i.e., histori-
cal, and socio-cultural type theories) demand, in most part, 
longitudinal or post-hoc archival type methodologies to ade-
quately deal with their inherent historical nature. In light 
of the present di sser ta ti on' s emphasis on hi story, these types 
of variables are seen as highly relevant components of the 
over.all anti-Jewish scheme, and conceptually may account 
for a substantial proportion of the total variance. 
Broader Implications 
The present discussion will endeavor to go beyond 
the overall theoretical analysis heretofore presented. This 
will be attempted by using the dissertation's comprehensive 
analysis as a base from which to theoretically explore solu-
tions to the ever-spreading cancerous anti-Jewish phenomenon. 
In 1 ight of the limitations of space usually allotted to 
this concluding section the following discourse will,· per-
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force, be superficial. A more thorough discussion would neces-
sitate a second dissertation, as will become evident in the 
forthcoming discussion. 
Twenty to forty years ago major interpreters of the 
anti-Jewish phenomenon (e.g., Adorno, et al., 1950; Allport, 
1954; and Bettelhe im, et al., 1964) depicted the etiology 
of the problem primarily in terms of psychological maladjust-
ment and/or unfortunate social circumstances. The primary 
problem with these types of theories (as already discussed 
in the present chapter) was that they were inherently pessi-
mistic. Pessimistic in the sense, that the anti-Jewish phe-
nomenon was seen as primarily dependent on individual and 
social well being, and if history be our guide, a world or 
nation relatively free (for any extended period of time) 
from considerable social and psychological disease is ex-
tremely unlikely. In fact, an argument may be made that 
despite the money and human energy devoted to social and 
individual ills over the last twenty-five years in Western 
countries (particularly America), the proportion of collective 
suffering is on the increase. 
Over the last twenty years the cognitive (phenomeno-
logical) approach to understanding the origins of anti-Jewish 
prejudice (e.g., Quinley et al., 1983; Selznick et al., 1969) 
has superceded the above pathological-type theories. Accord-
ing to these authors, the solution to the problem is not some 
elusive strategy to prevent or alleviate universal illness 
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(and presumably curtailing the anti-Jewish cancer in the 
process), but rather the concrete implementation of mass 
educational campaigns to directly combat the phenomenon. 
If hostility and prejudice towards Jews is primarily a cog-
nitive phenomenon, then a reeducation program, en masse, 
concerning Jews and Judaism would seem to be the logical solu-
tion. 
Unfortunately, these last theorists and experimenters 
who spent many years (and absorbed .$500,000 of Jewish organi-
zational money in the process) investigating the anti-Jewish 
phenomenon in America, failed to see the shallowness of their 
half-million dollar solution. In the process of teaching 
us "all" about anti-Jewish hostility and prejudice in America, 
th.ese authors themselves failed to research the problem ade-
quately. If they would have investigated the phenomenon 
hist'orically, they would have discovered (as seen in the 
present dissertation) that the vile slander and misinforma-
tion historically disseminated about Jews, which consequently 
resulted in untold suffering was primarily generated, aug-
mented, and fervently pursued by the ruling national or inter-
national power. If these ruling powers had not been preoc-
cupied in condemning Jews and Judaism the residual anti-Jewish 
Prejudice (i.e., the carry-over effect from preceding anti-
Jewish epochs) would have been relatively innocuous. Conse-
quentl}"., in non-anti-Jewish environments (i.e., when the 
ruling power is not psychologically threatened by the Jewish 
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presence) where the problem is of a relatively minor nature 
(i.e., a residual nature) a mass reeducation program can 
(as the above authors suggest) be implemented. However, in 
an anti-Jewish environment (where this educational process 
would be of utmost necessity) any effort to benevolently 
educate the masses would logically be thwarted from its in-
ception. In other words, the very places where these educa-
tional programs would be truly needed are the very places 
where they could never be realized in practice! 
An Evolving Solution 
According to the analysis in Chapter I the primary 
cause of anti-Jewish hostility is Jewish distinctiveness 
(with its corollary psychological threat represented by three 
core components). Historically, this Jewish "threat" has 
been the catalyst for the most severe persecution (both in 
terms of its extensiveness and intensity) of any one group 
throughout recorded history. Correspondingly, in the present 
discourse the onus of change is seen devolving on the Jews 
themselves (expecting competitive-type movements or groups 
to refrain from discriminating or persecuting Jews is, ac-
cording to the present analysis, a psychological impossi-
bility). Therefore, in order to free themselves and posterity 
from further psychological and physical torment, Jews should 
relinquish their distinctive Jewish identity. Just as Jews 
historically have obstinately and consciously made every 
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effort to salvage their distinctiveness (when logically 
speaking, no immutable difference was apparent) so must they 
now in the enlightened latter part of the twentieth century 
make every effort possible to disband and become one with 
the majority. 
Jews in general (as visible to all), are not a cog-
nitively and psychologically fixated people. They are in-
herently a dynamic, intellectual, adaptable, and even pace-
setting minority group functioning exceptionally well in 
every society where they reside (or have resided). They 
quickly learn the laws, customs, language, dialect, and even 
begin to look like the majority population in an unusually 
short period of time. In other words, their intellect, sim-
ilar physical characteristics, and adaptable psychology should 
present little problem in totally assimilating with the re-
spective majority population wherein they reside. The Jewish 
culture could remain in the form of historical archives (as 
is the case with every great culture [e.g., Egyptian, Greek, 
Roman, etc.]) where all humanity could unabashedly learn, 
without the unpleasant consequences of being different, from 
traditional Jewish culture. In order to live unmolested 
and without fear in the real world Jews must make a concerted 
organized effort to totally disband and become one with the 
respective majority population wherein they, at present re-
side. 
Although the above strategy may seem outlandish to 
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some, the truth of the matter is that it is currently taking 
place. (Therefore the present author is not espousing some-
thing fantastic, but is rather granting intellectual legit-
imacy to the ongoing process.) This process can be seen 
worldwide. For example, there are roughly thirteen million 
Jews today. Approximately six million reside in the United 
States where intermarriage is rampant (i.e., anywhere from 
40 to 60 percent of all American Jews today are marrying 
non-Jews). Of these intermarriages only a small minority of 
non-Jewish spouses convert to Judaism. (In the present study 
42 percent of all Non-Affiliated Jews were intermarried where 
the spouse did not convert.) In Russia where approximately 
two and one half million Jews live, Jewish culture, for all 
practical purposes is banned. The younger generation, for 
the most part knows little to nothing of its Jewish roots. 
In such circumstances (over a period of another generation 
or two), in both America and Russia, the identifiable Jewish 
community should, naturally speaking, be reduced to a small 
number of diehards, which according to the present perspective 
would save literally millions of Jews from future suffering. 
In France, where a quarter of a million Jews reside there 
is approximately a 70 percent intermarriage rate today. 
In other regions throughout the world (excluding Israel) 
there appears to be a similar assimilation process as the 
one des~r ibed above taking place. Oral Law Jews will probably 
not assimilate, but world Jewry is approximately 90 percent 
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non-Oral Law, and therefore the multitude of Jews to be saved 
in the process is potentially and realistically immense (in 
the present context there appears to be no solution for Oral 
Law adherents, but then again, they are a small minority). 
In Israel the picture is not as bleak as it may first 
appear. Hundreds of thousands of Jews are emmigrating from 
Israel to the lands of opportunity and will probably assim-
ilate (given an extra generation or so) like their more in-
digenous Jewish kin. Jews remaining in Israel could en masse 
convert to Islam which would most probably redefine the "il-
legitimate" nature of the state. Such a strategy is not 
too farfetched for the founder of modern Zionism, Theodore 
Herzl, after ruminating on Jewish suffering originally sug-
gested that all Jews convert to Christianity. Only after 
realizing that a Jewish state was more palatable to the Jewish 
masses than conversion did Herzl vigorously and tenaciously 
beg in advocating mass return to the Jewish homeland. The 
-
present author is of the belief that had Herzl known that a 
Jewish state would bring more (not less) Jewish suffering 
in its wake, he would probably have persevered in his original 
strategy. Today in light of the serious Jewish situation 
in Israel and in the spirit of Theodore Herzl the founder 
and father of modern-day secular Zionism, it follows that all 
secularists should aggressively pursue the alleviation of 
Jewish suffering via the mass conversion (of remaining 
Israelis) to Islam. In conclusion, it is the author's opinion 
322 
that educational campaigns, instead of targeting non-Jewish 
populations, should target Jewish populations with the same 
amount of money, organization, and energy in an effort to 
influence and educate world Jewry on the dire need for total 
assimilation. 
The Historical Paradox 
Notwithstanding the above, an unusual phenomenon which 
appears to militate against the above strategy pertains to 
the inconsistent policy non-Jewish national or international 
powers have had, historically, towards Jews. This incon-
sistency does not find a place in most (if any) scholarly 
analyses of anti-Jewish hostility. The inconsistency (or 
more properly termed paradox) is that although anti-Jewish 
powers throughout history have always fervently attempted 
to completely assimilate the Jews into their respective em-
pires, and have most often been met by intransigence, the 
various periods in history (e.g., late medieval Spain, Russia 
during the late nineteen th and early twentieth centuries, 
and nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany) when large 
Jewish populations were visibly in the process of relinquish-
ing their Jewish identity (and logically speaking, within a 
generation or two there would have been few Jews left) they 
were met by unprecedented persecution. In fact, the unbridled 
contempt for Jews during those trying times was aimed pr i-
mar ily. at those assimilated Jews, which only by a stretch 
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of the imagination could still be considered Jews. Although 
in these periods of assimilation ill Jews suffered (i.e., 
both the assimilated and unassimilated ones) the prime focus 
of attack was specifically those Jews who so fervently desired 
to be one with their non-Jewish compatriots, and who for 
many years prior (in those very lands) were the primary tar-
gets for assimilation. 
The special import of this phenomenon rests in its 
ability to counter the claim that Jewish suffering is a direct 
consequence of the Jews' historical stiff-necked and obstinate 
refusal to assimilate. Ironically, the very forces which 
so incessantly tried to assimilate Jews were now the chief 
antagonists obstructing the rampant assimilation process, 
and creating an incisive division between Jew and non-Jew 
which even Jewish separatism, in its most extreme form, could 
not compare with. 
The importance of this historical paradox is that 
it seriously challenges the claim that Jewish suffering is 
a direct consequence of the Jews' stiff-necked and almost 
arrogant refusal to assimilate. In the opinion of the present 
author, the above paradoxical phenomenon is as historically 
unprecedented as Jewish longevity. As with Jewish longevity, 
the claim could be made that this paradox is just coincidence, 
a quirk of fate, serendipity which just happened to befall 
the Jewish people, or one could transcend secular social, 
psychological, and political theory (which is predicated on 
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commonalities and consistencies among individuals, groups, 
and political entities) to the realm of theology which has 
its own peculiar interpretations of Jewish suffering. 
An important general approach to anti-Jewish prejudice 
that Gordon Allport (1954) did ~ speak of in his classic 
work The Nature of Prejudice is the theological approach. 
Three major religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) all 
have well-defined but divergent opinions concerning the anti-
Jewish phenomenon. 
The Quran (the Moslem Scripture) explains that by 
the Jews' unwillingness to accept Allah's revelations, as 
communicated by his prophet Muhammad, were cursed for all 
time to live an existence of "humiliation and wretchedness" 
(Prager, et al., 1983). The curse is obvioulsy not binding 
once the Jew converts to Islam (Grosser et al., 1978). 
Christianity's interpretation of Jewish suffering 
was officially enunciated by St. John Chrysostom and St. 
Augustine in the fourth century. Both envisaged for the 
Jew, an endless state of misery for their role in the cruci-
fixion of Christ. This "rejection and dispersion" by G-d 
would only be terminated by an acceptance of Jesus (Flannery, 
1965). 
Both Islam and Christian interpretations appear in-
adequate for at least two major reasons. One, Jewish dis-
cr imin?tion, persecution, and expulsion (from the Land of 
Israel) predates both Islam and Christianity by several hun-
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dred years. Two, from the inception of both Islam and Chris-
tianity up to the twentieth century, the vast majority of 
discrimination and persecution has been meted out in the 
name of these two religions themselves. This point is not 
meant to deprecate or discredit the teachings or beliefs of 
the two religions, but rather to indicate that their inter-
pretations of the anti-Jewish phenomenon appear inadequate. 
The Jewish Theory 
Why were Jews so different from other groups and 
nations who stayed together (in both a national and religious 
sense) only while in the majority or in the capacity of 
rulers, but quickly disbanded (if given the opportunity) 
after being conquered (and certainly after being dispersed). 
The Jews not only remained separate in such circumstances, 
but amidst the most brutal persecution and multiple expulsions 
over an extraordinarily long period of time tenaciously main-
tained a separate identity and lifestyle (while a good deal 
Of the time becoming an integral part of the larger society). 
A traditional Jewish explanation which accounts for the Jews 
continued existence (and contradictory and paradoxical status 
vis a vis the ruling power) is expressed in traditional Jewish 
literature, which to a great extent, is the foundation of 
traditonal Christianity and Islam as well. The following 
are examples of traditional Jewish literature which (accord-
ing to.these sources) seem to explain both the Jewish secret 
326 
of longevity, and their apparent incapacity to totally assim-
ilate. 
1. In the Hebrew Bible written over 3, 000 years 
ago, G-d promised that the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob would never be completely abandoned (Exodus 32:13) 
even if they transgressed his Torah (Law) (Leviticus 26:44). 
2. In the Jerusalem Talmud (Tractate Taanith 2: 6) 
redacted some 1,500 years ago, but having its origin 1,700 
years prior (Talmud-Ber akoth SA) states that Jacob's (his name 
later to be changed to Israel) offspring would always survive 
as a distinctive group. 
3. In Leviticus (20:26) "I have set you apart from 
all other peoples" (translation Kaplan, 1979). 
4. In Isaiah (54:17) "No weapon that is raised 
against you shall be sucessful. Every tongue that sh al 1 
rise against you in judgment shall be condemned by you. 
This is the heritage of G-d's servants, and their reward from 
Me" (translation Kaplan, 1979). 
s. Isaiah (60: 15) "Although you have been hated 
and foresaken, so that no man is concerned with you, I will 
make you an object of eternal pride and never-ending joy." 
6. Despite the Jewish people's backslidings G-d 
promised that they would always continue to exist as a nation 
as is written in Isaiah 54:10: "The mountains may depart,and 
the hills may be removed, but My kindness will not depart 
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from you, neither will My covenant of peace be removed" 
(translation Kaplan, 1969). 
7. The non-Jewish prophet Bilam prophesized concern-
ing the people of Israel "They are a people who will dwell 
separately and among the nations of the world will not be 
counted" (Numbers 23:9) (translation Kaplan, 1979). 
The before-the-fact (some thousands of years before) 
predictions above seem to explain the secret behind Jewish 
longevity. According to these traditional Jewish sources 
I 
the secret force accounting for Jewish longevity and their 
paradoxical circumstances (vis a vis the non-Jew) is the 
G-d of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who is considered G-d of 
the entire universe, but has chosen Jacob's sons and their 
descendents (and anyone else who has seriously adopted Juda-
ism) in a mutual covenant for all time to create a model 
society in their own land. This model civilization is to 
be based on G-d' s many commandments from which all non-Jewish 
nations, throughout the world, may learn and derive benefit. 
Jewish Suffering 
A question which needs to be asked at this time is: 
If Jews are supposedly so intimately conected to G-d (as 
expressed via Biblical and Talmudic sources) how and why have 
they been so savagely treated throughout history? The tra-
ditional Jewish source for interpreting Jewish suffering is 
derived from the Jewish Bible (the Old Testament). In the 
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five Books of Moses written some 3,200 years ago (Bieberfeld, 
1948), the concept of future Jewish suffering plays a prom-
inent role. Jewish suffering is predicted and elaborated 
on in the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and throughout 
the Old Testament Books of the Prophets and Holy Writings. 
Suffering is said to be contingent on the actions of the 
Jewish people collectively. Benedictions are to be forth-
coming for following the Torah (The Law), and maledictions 
for acting to the contrary. The covenant of G-d with the 
Jewish people is understood as irreversible, obligating the 
Jewish nation to remain separate among the nations of the 
world via adherence to the Mosaic Law, or conversely (i.e., 
they will perforce remain separate) through severe suffering. 
According to Rabbi Sh'muel Eliezer (one of the leading 
Talmudic scholars in Poland during the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries and better known as the Maharsha) this severe 
suffering does not emanate from G-d for only goodness emanates 
from G-d. Rather, it is the Jewish people's unwillingness 
to keep G-d' s commandments which causes Divine protection 
to depart from the Jewish people, and consequently leaves 
them highly vulnerable vis a vis their most ruthless adver-
saries (Maharsha, Talmud Baba Kama 60B). Unfortunately for 
the Jews, in light of their unique situation which has created 
a people fated to be distinct (according to the above Biblical 
sources), this means that when they collectively (i.e., a 
considerable proportion) ignore the Commandments, they (all 
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of them) are inevitably and inadvertently pitted against 
any and all totalitarian-like (and therefore psychologically 
threatened by the Jewish presence) hostile (i.e., towards 
outsiders) nations and international movements. 
The following Biblical excerpts (transcribed over 
3,000 years ago) present a taste of Jewish prophesy (which 
can be found throughout traditonal Jewish literature) whose 
unprecedented validity (i.e., the total range of prophesy 
and not just the following) can be attested to by anyone 
who possesses a solid knowledge of Jewish history. 
In the third book of the Pentateuch (Leviticus) Chap-
ter 26 it states: 
If you follow My laws and are careful to keep My 
commandments, I will provide you with rain at the right 
time, so that the land will bear its crops and the trees 
of the field will provide fruit. [You will have so much 
that] your threshing season will last until your grape 
harvest, and your grape harvest will last until the time 
you plant. You will have your fill of food, and [you 
will] live securely in the land. 
I will grant peace in the land so that you will sleep 
without fear. I will rid the land of dangerous animals, 
and the sword will not pass through your land. You will 
chase away your enemies, and they will fall before your 
sword. Five of you will be able to chase away a hundred, 
and a hundred of you will defeat ten thousand, as ,your 
enemies fall before your sword. 
I will turn to you, making you fertile and numerous, 
thus keeping My covenant with you. 
You will continue eating the previous year's crops 
long after their time, and you will eventually have to 
clear out the old crops because of the new. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
[But this is what will happen] if you do not listen 
to Me, and do not keep all these commandments. If you 
come to denigrate My decrees, and grow tired of My laws, 
••• I will then do the same to you. I will bring upon 
you feelings of anxiety, along with depression and ex-
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citement, destroying your outlook and making life hope-
less. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
You will plant your crop in vain, because your enemies 
will eat it. I will direct My anger against you, so 
that you will be defeated by your foes, and your enemies 
will dominate you. You will flee even when no one is 
chasing you. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
If this is not enough to discipline you, and you 
are still indifferent to Me, then I will also be indif-
ferent to you, but I will again increase the punishment 
for your sins sevenfold. I will bring a vengeful sword 
against you to avenge [Hy] covenant, so that you will 
huddle in your cities. I will send the plague against 
you, and give you over to your enemies. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I will thus have grown tired of you. I will let your 
cities fall into ruins, and make your sanctuaries deso-
late. No longer will I accept the appeasing fragrance 
[of your sacrifices]. I will make the land so desolate 
that [even] your enemies who live there will be aston-
ished. I will scatter you among the nations, and keep 
the sword drawn against you. Your land will remain deso-
late, and your cities in ruins. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
I will bring such insecurity upon those of you who 
survive in your enemies' land that the sound of a rustling 
leaf will make them flee from the sword. They will fall 
with no one chasing them. They will fall over one another 
'as if [chased] by the sword, even when there is no one 
pursuing. You will have no means of standing up before 
your ·foes. 
You will thus be destroyed among the nations. The 
land of your enemies will consume you. 
The few of you who survive in your enemies' lands 
will [realize that] your survival is threatened as a 
result of your nonobservance. [These few] will also 
[realize] that their survival has been threatened because 
of the nonobservance of their fathers. They will then 
confess their sins and the sins of their fathers for 
being false and remaining indifferent to He. [It was 
for this] that I also remained indifferent to them, and 
brought them into their enemies' land. 
But when the time finally comes that their stubborn 
spirit is humbled, I will forgive their sin. I will 
remember My covenant with Jacob as well as Hy covenant 
with Isaac and Hy covenant with Abraham. I will remember 
the land. [For] the land will have been left behind by 
them, and will have enjoyed its sabbaths while it lay 
in desolation without them. The sin [they had committed] 
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by denigrating My laws and growing tired of My decrees, 
will [also] have been expiated. 
Thus, even when they are in their enemies' land, I 
will not grow so disgusted with them nor so tired of them 
that I would destroy them and break My covenant with them, 
since I am God their Lord. I will therefore remember 
the covenant with their original ancestors whom I brought 
out of Egypt in the sight of the nations, so as to be a 
God to them. I am God. (translation Kaplan, 1985) 
In Deuteronomy Chapters 28-30 it further says: 
If you obey God your Lord, carefully keeping all 
His commandments as I am prescribing them to you today, 
then God will make you highest of all the nations on 
earth. As long as you listen to God your Lord, all these 
blessings will come to bear on you. 
Blessed will you be in the city, and blessed in the 
field. 
Blessed will be the fruit of your womb, the fruit 
of your soil, and the fruit of your livestock, the calves 
of your herds and the lambs of your flock. 
Blessed will be your food basket and your kneading 
bowl. 
Blessed will you be when you come and blessed when 
you go. 
If any enemies attack you, God will make them flee 
from you in panic. They may march against you on one 
road, but they will flee from you in seven directions. 
God will grant a blessing in your granaries and all 
your [other] endeavors. He will bless you in the land 
that He, God your Lord, is giving you. 
If only you keep the commandments of God your Lord 
and walk in His paths, God will establish you as His 
holy nation, as He promised you. All the nations of 
the world will realize that God's name is associated with 
you, and they will be in awe of you. 
God will grant you good surplus in the fruit of your 
womb, the fruit of your livestock, and the fruit of your 
land. [You will thus flourish] on the good land that 
God promised your ancestors to give you. God will open 
His good treasury in heaven to give your land rain at 
precisely the right time, and to bless everything you 
do. You will lend many nations, but you will not have 
to borrow. 
God wi 11 make you a leader and never a follower. 
You will be on the top and never on the bottom. You 
must merely obey the commandments of God your Lord, as 
I am prescribing them to you today, carefully keeping 
them. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
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If you do not obey God your Lord and do not carefully 
keep all His commandments and decrees as I am prescribing 
them for you today, then all these curses will come to 
bear on you. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
God will send misfortune, confusion and frustration 
against you in all you undertake. It will destroy you 
and make you rapidly vanish because of your evil ways 
in forsaking my [teachings]. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The skies above you will be like brass, and the earth 
below you like iron. God will turn your rain into powder 
and dust, and it wi 11 come down from the skies to destroy 
you. 
God will make you panic before your enemies. You 
will march out in one column, but flee from them in 
seven. You will become a terrifying example to all the 
world's kingdoms. Your corpses will be food for all 
the birds of the sky and beasts of the land, and no one 
will chase them away. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
When you betroth a woman, another man will sleep 
with her. When you build a house, you will not live in 
it. When you plant a vineyard, you will not enjoy its 
fruit. Your ox will be slaughtered before your eyes, 
but you will not eat from it. Your donkey will be stolen 
right in front of you, but you will not be able to get 
it back. Your sheep will be given to your enemies, and 
no one will come to your aid. 
Your sons and daughters will be given to a foreign 
nation. You will see it happening with your own eyes, 
and will long for them all day long, but you will be 
powerless. A strange nation will consume the fruit of 
your land and all your toil. You will be constantly 
cheated and crushed. 
You will go insane from what you will have to wit-
ness •••• 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • You will be an object of horror, a by-word and an 
abject lesson among all the nations where God will lead 
you. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
You will have sons and daughters, but they will not 
remain yours, since they will be taken into captivity. 
. . . 
The alien among you will rise higher and higher over 
you, while you will descend lower and lower. He will 
make loans to you, but you will not be able to lend him 
anything. He will become the master, while you will be 
the vassal. 
All these curses will thus have come upon you, pur-
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suing you and catching you so as to destroy you, all 
because you did not obey God your Lord, and [did not] 
keep the commandments and decrees that He prescribed to 
you. 
[These curses] will be a sign and proof to you and 
your children forever. 
When you had plenty of everything, you would not 
serve God your Lord with happiness and a glad heart. 
You will therefore serve your enemies when God sends 
them against you, and it will be in hunger, thirst, naked-
ness and universal want. [Your enemy] will place an 
iron yoke on your neck so as to destroy you. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Where you were once as numerous as the stars of the 
sky, the survivors among you will be few in number, all 
because you did not obey God your Lord. As happy as 
God was to be good to you and increase you, so will He 
be happy to exile you and destroy you. You will be torn 
up from the land which you are about to occupy. 
God will scatter you among the nations, from one 
end of the earth to the other. There you will serve 
idol a tors who worship gods of wood and stone, unknown 
to you and your fathers. Among those nations you will 
feel insecure, and there will be no place for your foot 
to rest. There God will make you cowardly, destroying 
your outlook and making life hopeless. 
Your life will hang in suspense.; Day and night, 
you will be so terrified that you will not believe that 
you are alive •••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
A future generation, consisting of your descendants, 
who rise up after you, along with the foreigner from a 
distant land, shall see the punishment directed against 
that land, and the plague with which God has struck it, 
and they will say, "Sulphur and salt has burned all its 
oil. Nothing can be planted and nothing can grow--not 
even grass can grow on it. It is like the destruction 
of Sodom, Gomorrah, Adma and Tzevoyim, [the cities] that 
God overturned in His anger and rage." 
All the nations will ask, "Why did God do this to 
the land? what was the reason for this great display 
of anger?" 
They shall answer, "It is because they abandoned 
the covenant that God, Lord of their fathers, made with 
them when He brought them out of Egypt •••• God dis-
played anger against this nation, bringing upon it the 
entire curse written in this book. God drove them from 
their land with anger, rage and great fury, and He exiled 
them to another land, where they remain even today." 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
There shall come a time when you shall experience 
334 
all the words of blessing and curse that I have presented 
to you. There, among the nations where God will have 
banished you, you will reflect on the situation. You 
will then return to God your Lord, and you will obey 
Him, doing everything that I am commanding you today. 
You and your children [will repent] with all your heart 
and with all your soul. 
God will then bring back your remnants and have mercy 
on you. God your Lord will once again gather you from 
among all the nations where He scattered you. Even if 
your diaspora is at the ends of the heavens, God your Lord 
will gather you up from there and He will take you back. 
God your Lord will then bring you to the land that 
your ancestors occupied, and you too will occupy it. 
God will be good to you and make you flourish even more 
than your ancestors. God will remove the barriers from 
your hearts and from the hearts of your descendants, 
so that you will love God your Lord with all your heart 
and soul. Thus will you survive. 
God will then direct all these curses against your 
enemies and against the foes who pursued you. 
You will repent and obey God, keeping all His com-
mandments, as I prescribe them to you today. God will 
then grant you a good surplus in all the work of your 
hands, in the fruit of your womb, the fruit of your live-
stock, and the fruit of your land. God will once again 
rejoice in you for good, just as He rejoiced in your 
fathers. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
This mandate that I am prescribing to you today is 
not too mysterious or remote from you. It is not in 
heaven, so [that you should] say, "Who shall go up to 
heaven and bring it to us so that we can hear it and 
keep it?" It is not over the sea so [that you should] 
say, "Who will cross the sea and get it for us, so that 
we will be able to hear it and keep it?" It is something 
that is very close to you •••• 
Seel Today I have set be fore you [a free choice] 
between life and good [on one side], and death and evil 
[on the other]. 
I have commanded you today to love God your Lord, 
to walk in His paths, and to keep His commandments, de-
crees and laws. You will then surv'ive and flourish, 
and God your Lord will bless you in the land that you 
are about to occupy. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
I call heaven and earth as witnesses! Before you I 
have placed life and death, the blessing and the curse. 
You must choose life, so that you and your descendants 
wiil survive. (translation Kaplan, 1985) 
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The correspondence between ancient Hebrew prophesy 
and events which ensued over the following 3,200 years was 
expressed by one Jewish traditionalist, Simcha Meiri (1984): 
Try to imagine how amazed we would be if we were to 
uncover an ancient papyrus thousands of years old which 
describes events that actually occurred generations later, 
or even in modern times. It would be that much more 
astounding if those events were of an extraordinary 
nature, as were those recorded in Jewish history. But 
such a manuscript does exist, in fact several do--the 
books of the Scriptures, which are unquestionably older 
than the events they describe, and although these events 
could not have been anticipated as they run counter to 
all accepted laws of history, they did, in fact, occur 
just as the prophets foretold (as corroborated by hundreds 
of archeological finds over the last hundred years) 
[p. 104]. 
The Academic Bias 
If the above is so obvious why have contemporary 
hi st or ians and social sc ien ti sts so conspicuously "failed" 
to see the qualitatively unique aspects of the anti-Jewish 
phen.omenon (as discussed throughout the present disserta-
tion). In the author's opinion the answer to this question 
lies specifically in the almost inevitable implications of 
the analysis. 
Jewish history seems to run counter to the laws of 
hi story, which every other nation throughout history has 
·fallen prey to. According to the historic laws of nations 
Where "Might Is ~ight" only the Hebrew nation has conspicu-
ously survived as an extreme deviation from the rule. (Chris-
tianity and Islam are religious belief systems which have 
no national origin, and by their own definitions are universal 
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in doctrine and perspective. In addition, their ability to 
grow [and even to survive] had depended almost exclusively 
on their majority status.) Jews have not only survived under 
the most insurmountable odds, but amid their generally hostile 
and predatory type environments have managed to create soci-
eties which have grown intellectually, spiritually, and when 
allowed economically throughout millenia (Grayzel, 1968). 
Just as the odds against a random Big Bang cosmic 
phenomenon creating the universe, or spontaneous formation 
of a living cell from inanimate matter are astronomically 
fantastic (Levi, 1983), so does the continued existence of 
the Jewish people, their paradoxical status in non-Jewish 
lands, the realization of their millenia-old prophesies, 
and other anomalous characteristics (too lengthy to be dis-
cussed in the present dissertation) seem to defy the natural 
(or consistent) laws of history. And just as the physical 
science community accepts almost religiously the above phys-
ical theories (and many would argue laws) of evolution despite 
much evidence to the contrary (e.g., Etkin, 1978; Goldman, 
1978; Gross, 1978; Marcell, 1978; Rifkin, 1983; Simon, 1978; 
Spetner, 1978) without ever positing the possibility of a 
Prime Creator, so have the social science and historical 
comm uni ties "explained" unfl inc hi ngly the Jewish phenomenon 
without having to acknowledge the possible involvement of 
the su~er physical (and certainly not a Jewish One!). 
William Etkin (1978), explains the philosophical 
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origins of the scientific perspective today which many con-
temporary academicians unwittingly accept as truth. 
To the intellectual of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries the rationality of nature attested to the ra-
tionality of the Creator •••• Thus the Argument From 
Design reconciled science with the belief in a G-d. 
• • • 
Darwinism, the concept of evolution by natural selec-
tion, turned the Argument From Design upside down to 
reverse the conclusion. • • • Types of thinking and be-
havior that were not consistent with nature were elim-
inated in the course of human evolution and what was 
left is then, of course, a method of thinking called 
rational which is consonant with the way nature is con-
structed. Reason, then, mirrors nature, and not the 
other way around •••• Like them, its success testifies 
not to the mind and intention of the Creator but to the 
efficiency of natural selection. (pp. 31-32) 
Elkin then cogently demonstrates that progress of 
contemporary science has forced an overturning of the Dar-
winian view in much the same way that Darwinism had reversed 
the previous outlook. He explains how much of science today 
"ope~ates on the basis of a self-confidence in the ability 
of the human mind to transcend common-sense rat ion al i ty" 
which parallels the mode of thinking that lies at the founda-
tion of religious faith. Accordingly, in interpreting anti-
Jewish hostility (and indirectly the phenomenal continuity 
of the Jewish people), a rationale based on the natural laws 
of history appears schizophrenic. 
Another reason why many scientists may shy away from 
theological support is that secular academia, predicated on 
the ideals and objectives of the Enlightenment, represents 
in its.original form a severance from the dogmatism.of or-
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ganized religion. Although a severance seemed to be in order 
in light of the many barbarous activities legitimized in 
the name of G-d, an academia (based on the scientific method) 
ostensibly seeking truth which blatantly avoids the psycho-
logical, social, political, and historical ramifications of 
a religious perspective (i.e., from an absolute perspective 
as well as a ·relative one) is itself dogmatically ignoring 
a most popularly accepted phenomenon. The present author 
is not, by any means, espousing that scientists accept re-
ligious dogma, but rather, that various religious perspectives 
need to be investigated objectively (i.e. 1 as best we are 
able), for whether we like it or not, the social ramifications 
of religious dogma are still the most powerful motivating 
soc ia 1 forces known to man. Par ad ox ically, contemporary 
social scientists (following their physical science counter-
parts' lead) may feel great professional and/or personal 
pressure to "justify" their obsessive non-theological stance 
concerning the Jewish phenomenon in the name of good science 
itself l 
Universal Interests 
"Rabbi Yochanan said: woe to the non-Jews who lost 
something (extremely important) and are not even aware of 
what they lost. When the Beit Hamikdash (the Temple in Jeru-
salem) was standing it would atone (and bring good fortune) 
for them and now who (or what) atones for them?" (Talmud, 
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succah SSB) (translation mine). According to Rabbi Sh'muel 
Eliezer (The Maharsha) based on the Midrash, the non-Jewish 
loss should be considered even greater than the Jewish one. 
Not all of Jewish prophesies have been fulfilled. 
The last and most important (for both Jew and non-Jew alike) 
prophesies concerning the End of Days has yet to be realized: 
"And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain 
of the Lord's house shall be established on the top of the 
mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all 
the nations shall flow unto it" (Isaiah 2: 2). 
According to traditional Jewish literature the Final 
Redemption for all humanity is assured, but the process of 
getting there (i.e., via worldwide destruction or supernal 
benevolence) is dependent primarily on the collective actions 
of the Jewish people. For instance, in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 
98A)~ it states: 
The son of Levi cites a contradiction, in the prophet 
Isaiah it is written "in its time" (i.e., the Final Re-
demption will come in its time) and it is also written 
there "I will hurry it up" (i.e., G-d will bring the Final 
Redemption before its appointed time)? (The Talmud ex-
plains) If they (the Jews) merit I (G-d) will hurry it 
up, if they do not merit, it will come in its prescribed 
time. (translation mine) 
The Maharsha explains: If the Jews merit by repenting and 
coming back to G-d's Torah, G-d will have compassion on them 
(and indirectly on the entire world), but if they do not 
return to the Torah (i.e., do not merit) G-d will delay the 
Redemption until the prescribed final period in history, 
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and will only then redeem them (admidst great destruction 
and suffering for them and the non-Jewish world, as will be 
seen in the following pages) even if they are not repentant. 
In the Zohar (Acharey Mot, p. 66), which is the pri-
mary classic of Jewish mysticism attributed to the school 
of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (approximately 120 C.E.), it is 
written: 
We learned that all the time Israel (i.e., the people 
of Israel) are in exile, if they merit G-d will have com-
passion and take them out of exile, and if they do not 
merit (G-d) will delay them until the prescribed time. 
If the time comes and they are not fit to be redeemed, 
then G-d in the honor of His own Name will not forget 
them completely. (translation mine) 
It should be emphasized from the beginning that it 
is not the Jews per se who are held responsible for the 
prophesized great destruction (to be discussed in the forth-
coming pages) before the "End of Days" (or better known as 
the pre-Messianic era) if it comes in its prescribed time. 
However, they are seen as having the potential of preventing 
it. The Oral Law tradition gives many signs of what life will 
be like before (the term "before" is used loosely ,and may 
represent a period of one year or one hundred years depending 
on one's personal understanding of the following signs) the 
Messianic age, if the Final redemption comes in its prescribed 
time. For example: 
1. In the future the sons of Ishmael (i.e., the Muslims, 
for Mohammad claimed to be a direct descendent of 
Abraham's first son Ishmael) will ,rule in the holy 
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land while it is a wasteland for a prolonged period 
of time, and will hinder Israel from returning to 
their (i.e., Israel's) land (Zohar, Vaara, p. 32). 
2. There is no surer sign for the "immediate" coming 
of the Messianic era than when the land of Israel 
becomes fertile again for the Jewish people (Talmud, 
Sanhedrin 98A) • 
3. If you see a period of time where constant and fright-
ful sorrow confronts the Jewish people, anticipate 
the arrival of the son (i.e., descendent) of King 
David (who according to tradition is said to be the 
Messiah) (Sanhedrin, 98A). 
4. Before the "immediate" coming of the Messiah all 
the peoples of the earth will be frightened and dis-
mayed by the excess of ongoing wars and tension be-
tween nations (Midrash, Bereshet raba 42; and Mid-
rash Yalkut Shemoni, Isaiah 60). 
5. In the future G-d will pay heed to the people of 
Israel's sorrow from what the sons of Ishmael will 
attempt to do to them (Midrash, Pirkey Rabbi Eliezer, 
32). 
6. The Talmud Sotah (49B) enumerates various happenings 
that will occur "immediately" before the Messianic 
era, some of them are: 
A. The Jewish government will be run by non-Oral 
Law adherents. 
and, 
342 
B. The wisdom of the Rabbis will be laughed at. 
c. Pious Jews will be scorned. 
o. There will be great inflation. 
E. This inflation will not be on account of lack 
of supply, 
F. Truth will be conspicuously missing. 
In addition, the wars predicted to occur immediately 
before the Messianic era (i.e., if the Redemption comes in 
its prescribed time) are briefly reviewed in the following: 
1. "The son of (King) Dav id (i.e., the Messiah) wi 11 
not appear until the 'Roman• nation spreads out over 
the entire world" (Talmud Yoma, lOA). 
2. According to the prophet Daniel (7:23-24) ten nations 
will spring forth from the fourth empire (Rome), 
and the last of the ten will be different from the 
others. 
3. According to the Talmud (Yoma, lOA), it is this last 
nation from Rome who will eventually spread out and 
consume the entire world. 
4. According to the prophet Ezekiel (38: 2) this tenth 
nation from Rome will come from the land of Magog. 
s. According to Josephus (Book of Antiquities), who 1 ived 
during the first century C.E., the land of Magog is 
Scythia. ("According to the ancient Greeks [Scythia 
was] a vast, undefined region lying north and east 
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of the Black and Caspian Seas" [i.e., present day 
Russia]) (Brittanica World Language, 1954). 
6. The Jerusalem Talmud (Megilla 1: 9) says that the 
land of Magog is Gothia (Goth). 
According to the Encyclopaedia Brittanica (1954) the 
Goths (first century C.E.) inhabited the middle part of the 
basin of the Vistula River (i.e., central to eastern Poland), 
but under their sixth king (who was more contemporary in 
time with the redaction of the Talmud) migrated into Scythia 
(i.e., present day Russia). 
After the destruction of the Western Roman Empire 
by the Teutons, only Constantinople remained as the capital 
of the (Eastern) Roman Empire (i.e., the Byzantine empire). 
And from the day the Russian king (Ivan III) betrothed the 
only niece (Sophia) of the last Byzantine emperor (Constantine 
Palaeologus), the Russian autocrats considered themselves 
the successors of the Byzantine emperors. In addition, the 
Russian aristocracy claimed that since the Greeks had been 
punished for their apostasy, their succession had to pass 
to the third Rome (Constantinople was the second) which was 
Moscow (Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1954). The Russians also 
carried on their flag the double eagle sign of the Byzantine 
(Roman) empire (Eisenberg, 1970). 
7. According to the Zohar (Vaara, p. 32) the mechanics 
of the final war (again if the Redemption comes in 
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its prescribed time) will proceed in the following 
manner: 
A. The sons of Ishmael (the Muslims) will attempt 
to keep Israel from returning to their homeland. 
B. The Sons of Ishmael (Muslims) will effect fierce 
wars in the world, and Rome (Russia) will wage 
war against them in order to take over their 
land and the land of Israel. 
C. Rome (Russia) will succeed in taking over Muslim 
lands but the land of Israel will not be taken 
over. 
D. One nation at the end of the world together with 
many other nations will come to fight Russia, 
but these nations after a period of three months, 
will eventually fall to Russia. 
E. After all the nations have fallen, then will 
Russia attempt an all out concerted attack against 
Israel. At that time G-d will defend Israel, 
and Russia together with her allies will fall. 
The Final Resolution 
The upshot of the present dissertation is that the 
primary responsibility for ameliorating or conversely, ex-
acerbating anti-Jewish hostility devolves primarily on the 
Jews themselves. If G-d did not give the Jewish people in 
particular, special commandments to follow, then why be dis-
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tinctly Jewish? (To suggest that G-d chose the Jewish people 
to be a model for mankind without instructing them on how 
to create that model is absurd and borders on racism.) Why 
in the name of some man-made ideology (which most Jews desist 
from following in any case) or historical identity (which 
most conquered nations, who have the opportunity, eventually 
relinquish) should individuals allow themselves and posterity 
to be hated, discriminated against, persecuted, and even 
slain? Hust Jews continue to make the same errors as their 
forefathers who for reasons of ignorance, obstinacy, arrogance 
or others preferred poverty, torture, and murder to fraternity 
and opportunity? If the only reason for sticking together 
is to promote the most hated man-made ideology and lifestyle 
in history, then Jews must immediately disband. 
However, if G-d, indeed, gave the Torah with its mul-
tiple commandments specifically to the Jewish people, then 
by abandoning their responsibilities (regardless of whether 
they remain Jews in name or not) they are again creating 
their own misfortune and indirectly the misfortune of the 
non-Jew. Just as some 2,700 years ago Alijah the prophet 
(Kings I, 18:21) said to the Jewish people "How long will 
you waver between two opinions? if the Lord be G-d, follow 
Him; but if (you believe in) Baal (the most popular form of 
idol worship at the time), follow him" so must contemporary 
Jewish leaders demand no less from the Jewish people today 
(if the people are truly their first concern). 
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From a purely social-psychological perspective both 
Christianity and Islam do not need to be true in order to 
defend their constituencies, for in their respective regions 
they are the majority and most powerful force. Christian 
and Moslem masses are less obligated (via external forces) 
to come to terms with their religious convictions in light 
of their majority status. Jews, both in the diaspora and in 
Israel (in light of Israel's externally inflicted isolation), 
are not as fortunate, and must be more intellectually and emo-
tionally honest with themselves. They cannot straddle between 
two opinions (and remain undisturbed), but must categorically 
decide for their own sake, the sake of their children, and 
possibly for all of mankind what they truly believe (i.e., 
after intelligent investigation) and to follow accordingly. 
In conclusion, it is highly ironic (although irony 
when concerning Jews appears more the rule) that the very 
people (i.e., the Jews) whom Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) so often 
cites as representing the proverbial inauthentic existence, 
are the very people whose authenticity has in the past and 
continues to be in the present so thoroughly tested. 
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Study No. 1 
Reliability Coefficients for All Scales Used in the Fol-
lowing Analyses: 
A. Jewish Religious 10-Item Observance Scale 
(N=546), .91 Kuder-Richardson 20. 
B. Abridged Jewish Religious 3-Item Observance Scale 
(N=800), .93 Kuder-Richardson 20. (Items 2, 3, 
and 7). 
c. Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale 
(N=637), .92 Kuder-Richardson 26. 
D. Israel Attitude Scale 
(N=637), .72 Cronbach Alpha. 
E. Israel Attitude Positive-Items Scale 
(N=64 7) , • 51 Cronbach Alpha. (I terns 2, 4, S, and 
9) • 
F. Israel Attitude Negative-Item Scale 
(N=647), .71 Cronbach Alpha. (Items 1, 2, 6, 7, 
8) • 
G. Middle-East Information Scale 
(N=637), .47 Kuder-Richardson 20. 
Abbreviation and Directional Key for All Variables 
Used in the Following Analyses: 
A. TS = Type of Synagogue Affiliation: 
l"°= Non-Affiliated, 2 = Reform, 3 = Conservative, 
4 = Orthodox. 
B. PA = Parents Affiliations: 
1"°= Non-Affiliated, 2 = Reform, 3 = Conservative, 
4 = Orthodox. 
C. C = Number of Children 
D. MS = Marital Status: 
r-= Married, 2 = Widowed, 3 = Separated or Divorced 
4 = Single. 
E. OA = Jewish Organization Membership: 
r-= No, 2 = Yes. 
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F. SR = Spouses' Religion: 
Y-= Non-Jewish Spouse, 2 = Born or Converted Jewish 
Spouse. 
G. E = Last Year of Formal Education Completed. 
H. SCR = Jewish Religious Observance Scale (10 items). 
The higher the scaled score the more observant. 
I. SCR 2 = Abridged Jewish Religious Observance Scale 
(3 i terns) • 
The higher the scaled score the more observant. 
(Items 2, 3, and 7). 
J. II = Intention to Settle in Israel 
r-= No, 2 = Yes. 
K. NVI = Number of Visits to Israel. 
L. SCI = Israel Attitude Scale. 
The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. 
M. SCIP = Israel Attitude Positive-Items Scale. 
The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. (Items 2, 4, S, and 9.) 
N. SCIN = Israel Attitude Negative-Items Scale. 
The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. (Items 1, 3, 6, 7, 8.) 
o. SCRK = Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale. 
~higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable 
the respondent. 
P. SCK = Middle East Knowledge Scale. 
The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable 
the respondent. 
~orrerat1ona1 Matr1x and S1gn1f1cance Levels (n • 676) 
** TS PA c SCI< OA *SR E SCR SCRZ II NVI SCI SCIP SCIN SCRK 
TS .4Z .37 .Zl .46 .ZS -.06 .79 • 79 .4Z .zz .36 .13 .37 .66 
p>.05 p•.001 
PA .27 .14 .32 .24 -.14 .48 .43 .24 .14 .33 .23 .30 .39 
c .18 .38 .20 -.12 .38 .39 .15 .20 .25 .05 .28 .37 
p•.001 p>.05 
SCK .20 .19 .23 .22 .23 .21 .21 .35 .13 .37 .39 
p•.001 
OA .26 .08 • 43 .40 .19 .22 .33 .23 .29 .34 
p•.05 
*SR -.13 .34 -.23 -.16 .12 .35 .17 .34 .21 
p•.003 p•.007 
E -.09 -.02. .01 .01 -.03 -.06 .oo .19 
p•.02 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 p>.05 ""' °' N 
SCR .90 .51 .23 .36 .16 .36 .73 
SCR2 .54 .24 .29 .06 .32 .77 
p•.04 
II .20 .21 .05 .23 .53 
p>.05 
NYI .16 .05 .17 .26 
p>.05 
SCI .61 .94 .31 
SCIP .31 .02 
p>.05 
SCIN .37 
SCRK 
*The correlations of SR are based on a n of 501. 
**When significance-level probability is missing p(:OOl. 
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Midwest Knowledge Scale 
(N=80) 
R 
(N=ll4) 
c 
(N=231) 
0 
(N=324) 
NA 
1. Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over 
the last 300 years until the creation of Israel. Is 
this ~rue or false? 
True 
False 
Don't Know 
17% 
74% 
10% 
18% 
71% 
11% 
7% 
86% 
7% 
17% 
74% 
10% 
2. From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine 
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948, 
thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the 
Jewish settlers. Is this true or false? 
True 6% 11% 4% 12% 
False 89% 84% 90% 80% 
DK 10% 5% 6% 8% 
3. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of 
Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true 
or false? 
True 24% 26% 31% 24% 
False 48% 51% 57% 54% 
DK 29% 23% 12% 22% 
4. Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State 
of Israel have spent over three times the amount of 
money in military equipment than Israel has. Is this 
true or false? 
True 
False 
DK 
56% 
16% 
28% 
60% 
13% 
27% 
76% 
5% 
19% 
53% 
17% 
30% 
5. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting record 
in the United Nations has shown a strong connection 
between itself and the United Startes. Is this true 
or false? 
True 
False 
DK 
33% 
44% 
24% 
27% 
46% 
27% 
20% 
56% 
24% 
28% 
42% 
30% 
(N=80) 
R 
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(N=ll4) 
c 
(N=231) 
0 
(N=324) 
NA 
6. Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that 
it now almost equals in size the area of all its Mid-
dle-E9st enemies put together. Is this true or false? 
True 5% 6% 4% 4% 
False 90% 90% 94% 88% 
DK 5% 4% 2% 9% 
7. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been openly 
dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is this true 
or false? 
True 65% 73% 78% 63% 
False 25% 15% 14% 24% 
DK 10% 12% 9% 13% 
8. In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth of 
the land identified by the League of Nations as Pales-
tine. Is this true or false? 
True 63% 57% 60% 57% 
False 10% 13% 11% 12% 
DK 28% 30% 29% 31% 
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Israel Attitude Scale 
(N=78) 
R 
(N=l08) 
c 
(N=225) 
0 
(N=309) 
NA 
1. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of 
IsLael's warlike behavior. Do you ••• 
Strongly Agree 1% 
Somewhat Agree 8% 
Somewhat Disagree 18% 
Strongly Disagree 73% 
2% 
4% 
17% 
79% 
1% 
1% 
9% 
89% 
3% 
9% 
23% 
66% 
2. The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working 
people. Do you • • • 
Strongly Agree 88% 84% 85% 79% 
Somewhat Agree 12% 15% 12% 18% 
Somewhat Disagree 0% 1% 2% 2% 
Strongly Disagree 0% 1% 1% 1% 
3. The State of Israel is too warlike. Do you . . • 
Strongly Agree 5% 5% 2% 9% 
Somewhat Agree 20% 15% 6% 21% 
Somewhat Disagree 35% 19% 19% 29% 
Strongly Disagree 39% 62% 73% 42% 
4. The u.s. needs to continue to support Israel. Do you 
• • • 
Strongly Agree 91% 92% 94% 87% 
Somewhat Agree 8% 7% 4% 11% 
Somewhat Disagree 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Strongly Disagree 0% 0% 1% 2% 
5. I greatly respect the State of Israel. Do you . • . 
Strongly Agree 84% 92% 82% 77% 
Somewhat Agree 13% 8% 13% 21% 
Somewhat Disagree 1% 0% 3% 2% 
Strongly Disagree 3% 0% 2% 1% 
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(N=78) (N=l08) (N=225) (N=309) 
R c 0 NA 
6. Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon. Do 
you • • . 
Strongly Agree 7% 7% 3% 11% 
Somewhat Agree 22% 11% 3% 20% 
Somewhat Disagree 32% 23% 19% 25% 
Strongly Disagree 39% 59% 75% 44% 
7. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-
Israel conflict. Do you ••• 
Strongly Agree 11% 10% 7% 14% 
Somewhat Agree 15% 17% 10% 22% 
Somewhat Disagree 31% 28% 24% 24% 
Strongly Disagree 43% 44% 58% 39% 
8. Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its 
Arab neighbors. Do you . • • 
Strongly Agree 1% 5% 1% 4% 
Somewhat Agree 13% 4% 2% 8% 
Somewhat Disagree 17% 16% 11% 20% 
Strongly Disagree 69% 76% 86% 68% 
9. The State of Israel must be militarily strong because 
of all its hostile neighbors. Do you • • . 
Strongly Agree 90% 90% 96% 86% 
Somewhat Agree 8% 10% 4% 11% 
Somewhat Disagree 1% 0% 0% 1% 
Strongly Disagree 1% 0% 0% 2% 
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Jewish Religious Knowledge Scale 
(N=80) 
R 
(N=ll2) 
c 
(N=231) 
0 
(N=323) 
NA 
1. Could you tell me the name of the Jewish New Year? 
Correct 
Incorrect 
80% 
20% 
80% 
20% 
96% 
4% 
76% 
24% 
2. On what date was the 1st and 2nd Temple in Jerusalem 
(The Beit Hamikdosh) destroyed? 
3. 
4. 
Correct 
Incorrect 
16% 
84% 
On which Jewish holiday 
branch (A Lulav)? 
Correct 
Incorrect 
What were 
Correct 
Incorrect 
the 
55% 
45% 
names 
47% 
53% 
of 
21% 
79% 
do some 
61% 
39% 
the three 
45% 
55% 
Jews 
78% 
22% 
wave 
95% 
5% 
around 
10% 
90% 
a palm 
36% 
64% 
Jewish Patriarchs? 
89% 
11% 
33% 
67% 
5. Could you give me an example of what is meant in the 
,Bible by an Eye For an Eye? 
Correct 
Incorrect 
3% 
98% 
8% 
92% 
59% 
41% 
7% 
93% 
6. Who brought the Jewish people into the Land of Canaan 
after they had left Egypt? 
Correct 
Incorrect 
14% 
86% 
7. What is the Oral Law? 
Correct 
Incorrect 
17% 
84% 
17% 
83% 
21% 
80% 
66% 
34% 
69% 
31% 
8. What is the name of the morning prayer? 
Correct 
Incorrect 
11% 
89% 
28% 
72% 
88% 
12% 
13% 
87% 
14% 
86% 
10% 
90% 
9. 
10. 
(N=80) 
R 
368 
(N=ll2) 
c 
(N=231) 
0 
(N=323) 
NA 
Could you tell me who the chief commentator of the Talmud 
is whose commentary is found on the same page as the 
Talmud itself? 
Correct 11% 26% 74% 12% 
Incorrect 89% 74% 26% 88% 
And finally, could you spell for me the word Shabbat 
in Hebrew? 
Correct 22% 29% 83% 19% 
Incorrect 79% 71% 17% 81% 
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Formal Education Level (N = 785) 
Last Grade Completed 
Freg,uenc:i:: 1. 12 and under 18% 
2. Some College or Vocational School 23% 
3. Bachelors Degree 23% 
4. Some Graduate School 8% 
5. Masters Degree 16% 
*6. Doctorate Degree 12% 
Reform (N = 78) Non-Affiliated (N = 318) 
1 18% 1 20% 
2 17% 2 21% 
3 28% 3 20% 
4 12% 4 8% 
5 17% 5 18% 
6 9% 6 14% 
Mean = 3.19 Mean = 3.25 
*A Law Degree was considered a doctorate degree in the study. 
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Conservative (N = 112~ Orthodox (ti = 229) 
1 18% 1 15% 
2 28% 2 25% 
3 19% 3 27% 
4 10% 4 8% 
5 8% 5 18% 
6 18% 6 8% 
Mean = 3.16 Mean = 3.12 
F = .29, df (3,733), p > .05. 
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II. Abbreviation and Directional Key for Variables Used in 
the Following Analyses 
A. Scale K = Middle-East Knowledge Scale. 
The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable 
the respondent. 
B. Scale J = Jewish Attitude Scale. 
The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. 
c. Scale I = Israel Attitude Scale. 
The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. 
D. Scale Ips = Israel Positive-Items Attitude Scale. 
(Items 2, 4, 5, and 9). 
The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. 
E. Scale Ing = Israel Negative-Items Attitude Scale. 
(Items 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8). 
The higher the scaled score the more positive the 
attitude. 
F. Scale P = Abridged and Modified Purpose in Life Scale. 
The higher the score the more positive the attitude. 
G. Scale An = Anomie Scale. 
The higher the score the more positive the attitude. 
H. Scale ES = Ego-Strength Scale. 
The higher the score the more positive the attitude. 
I. Scale CF =Combination Opinion-Fear Crises Scale. 
The higher the score the more negative the attitude. 
J. Scale CO =Crises Opinion Scale. 
The higher the score the more negative the attitude. 
K. Scale F = Crises Fear Scale. 
The higher the score the more negative the attitude. 
L. Scale CFl = Nuclear War Crisis Scale. 
The higher the score the more negative the attitude. 
M. Scale CF2 = Economic Crisis Scale. 
The higher the score the more negative the attitude. 
N. Scale CF3 = Political Crisis Scale. 
The higher the score the more negative the attitude. 
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o. G = Gender 
Male • l; Female = 2. 
P. E = Education 
Last year of formal education completed. 
Q. Inc = Individual Income for 1984. 
R. SAT = Life Satisfaction Scale. 
The higher the score the more positive the attitude. 
374 
*Correlation and Level of Significance (N = 360) 
Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale 
K J I Ips Ing 
Scale K 1.000 .189 .256 .209 • 227 
.999 .ooo .ooo .ooo .ooo 
Scale J .189 1.000 • 565 .402 .492 
.ooo • 999 .ooo .ooo .ooo 
Scale I .256 .565 1.000 .741 .861 
.ooo .ooo .999 .ooo .ooo 
Scale Ips .209 .402 .741 1.000 • 323 
.ooo .ooo .ooo .999 .ooo 
Scale Ing .227 .492 .861 .323 1. 000 
.ooo .ooo .ooo .ooo .999 
Scale AN -.037 .253 .140 .067 .133 
.483 .ooo .008 .202 .011 
Scale EP .089 .218 .153 .101 .166 
• 092 .ooo • 004 .055 .002 
Scale ES .113 .064 .118 .080 .104 
.033 .226 .025 .129 • 049 
Scale CF -.006 -.173 -.219 -.090 -.259 
• 906 .001 .ooo .088 .ooo 
Scale co .006 -.168 -.213 -.082 -.255 
.905 .001 .ooo .119 .ooo 
Scale F -.013 -.132 -.173 -.082 -.197 
.000 .012 .001 .120 .ooo 
**G -.059 .038 -.143 -.066 -.173 
.295 .496 .011 .236 .002 
**Age .047 -.009 .168 .193 .083 
.401 .867 .003 .001 .140 
**E .176 .265 .183 .050 .227 
.002 .ooo .001 .375 .ooo 
**Inc .146 .126 .177 .114 .182 
.009 .024 .001 .042 .001 
*All correlations appear twice in the present matrix. 
**N=320 for all correlations involving this variable. 
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Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale 
AN EP ES CF co F 
-.037 .089 .113 -.006 .006 -.013 
.483 .092 • 033 • 906 • 905 .800 
.253 .218 .064 -.173 -.168 -.132 
.000 .ooo .226 .001 .001 .012 
.140 .153 .118 -.219 -.213 -.173 
.008 .004 .025 .ooo .ooo .001 
.067 .101 .080 -.090 -.082 -.082 
.202 .055 .129 .088 .119 .120 
.133 .166 .104 -.259 -.255 -.197 
• 011 .002 .049 .ooo .ooo .ooo 
1.000 .163 • 231 -.240 -.245 -.182 
.999 .ooo .ooo .ooo .ooo .001 
.263 1. 000 .330 -.132 -.099 -.126 
.ooo .999 .ooo .012 .062 .017 
.231 .330 1.000 -.133 -.075 -.150 
.ooo .ooo .999 .011 .156 • 004 
-.240 -.132 -.133 1.000 • 867 .879 
.ooo .012 .011 .999 • 000 .ooo 
-.245 -.099 -.075 • 867 1.000 • 527 
.ooo .062 .156 .ooo .999 .ooo 
-.182 -.126 -.150 • 879 • 527 1.000 
.001 .017 .004 .ooo .ooo .999 
.100 .097 -.132 .208 .158 • 210 
.075 .085 .018 .ooo .005 .ooo 
-.013 .121 .278 -.121 -.086 -.127 
.822 .030 • 000 .030 .123 .023 
.350 .208 .233 -.246 -.266 -.206 
.ooo .ooo .ooo .ooo .ooo .ooo 
.173 .147 .202 -.153 -.131 -.136 
.002 .008 .ooo .006 • 019 .015 
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Continued 
Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale 
K J I Ips Ing 
*Scale CFl -.012 -.127 -.198 -.107 -.208 
.830 .023 .ooo .056 .ooo 
*Scale CF2 .030 -.129 -.154 -.084 -.166 
.591 .021 .006 .132 .003 
*Scale CF3 .025 -.193 -.221 -.066 -.276 
.657 .001 • 000 .242 .ooo 
*SAT .001 .061 .051 .ooo .087 
• 991 .280 .361 .999 .122 
* N = 320 for all correlations involving this variable. 
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Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale 
AN p ES CF co F 
-.166 -.056 -.187 • 797 • 641 • 749 
.003 • 320 .001 .ooo .ooo .ooo 
-.219 -.085 -.064 • 848 • 727 • 74 7 
.ooo .128 .254 .ooo .ooo .ooo 
-.262 -.082 -.032 .764 • 713 .630 
.ooo .144 .563 .ooo .ooo .ooo 
.181 .416 .260 -.137 -.127 -.113 
.001 • 000 .ooo .014 .023 • 043 
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Continued 
Scale Scale Scale 
G Age E Inc CFl CF2 CF3 SAT 
Scale K -.059 .047 .176 .146 -.012 .030 .025 .001 
.295 .401 .002 .009 .830 .591 .657 .991 
Scale J .038 -.009 .265 .126 -.127 -.129 -.193 .061 
.496 .867 .ooo .024 .023 .021 .001 .280 
Scale I -.143 .168 .183 .177 -.198 -.154 -.221 .052 
.011 .003 .001 .001 .ooo .006 .ooo .361 
Scale Ip; -.066 .193 .050 .114 -.107 -.084 .066 .ooo 
.236 .001 .375 .042 .056 .132 .242 .999 
Scale Ing -.173 0.83 .227 .182 -.208 -.166 -.276 .087 
.002 .140 .ooo .001 .ooo .003 .ooo .122 
Scale An .100 -.013 .350 .173 -.166 -.219 -.262 .181 
.075 .822 .ooo .002 .003 .ooo .ooo .001 
Scale P .097 .121 .208 .147 -.0-56 -.085 -.082 .416 
.085 .030 .ooo .008 .320 .128 .ooo 
Scale ES -.132 .278 .233 .202 -.187 -.064 -.032 .260 
.018 .ooo .ooo .ooo .001 .254 .563 .ooo 
Scale CF .208 .121 -.246 -.153 • 797 .848 • 764 -.137 
.ooo .030 .ooo .006 .ooo .ooo .ooo .014 
Scale a> .158 -.086 -.226 -.131 .641 • 727 • 713 -.127 
.005 .123 .ooo .019 .ooo .ooo .ooo .023 
Scale F .210 -.127 -.206 -.136 • 749 • 747 .630 -.113 
.ooo .023 .ooo .015 .001 .ooo .ooo .043 
G 1.000 .012 -.099 -.249 .182 .129 .186 -.027 
.999 .827 .078 .ooo .001 .021 .001 .624 
Age .012 1.000 -.131 .040 -.172 -.081 -.1029 .076 
.827 .999 .019 .480 .002 .147 .610 .175 
E -.099 -.131 1.000 .354 -.149 -.170 -.283 .181 
.078 .019 .999 .ooo .008 .002 .ooo .001 
Inc -.249 .040 .354 1.000 -.157 -.102 -.113 .097 
.ooo .480 .ooo .999 .005 .067 .044 .082 
379 
Scale Scale Scale 
G Age E Inc CFl CF2 CF3 SAT 
Scale CFl .182 -.172 .149 -.157 1.000 .542 .364 -.107 
.001 .002 .008 .005 .999 .ooo .ooo .055 
Scale CF2 .129 -.081 -.170 -.102 .542 1.000 .501 -.155 
.021 .147 .002 .067 .ooo .999 .ooo .006 
Scale CF3 .186 -.029 -.283 -.113 .364 .501 1.000 -.064 
.001 .610 .ooo .044 .ooo .ooo .999 .255 
SAT -.027 .076 .181 .097 -.107 -.155 -.064 1.000 
.624 .175 .001 .082 .055 .006 .255 .999 
*Frequency 
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Israel Attitude Scale 
N = 378 
Strong Negative Attitudes = 2% 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes = 28% 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes = 57% 
Strong Positive Attitudes = 13% 
*A scaled score based on the mean of all nine items in the 
scale produced a range of 3 (minimum = 1, maximum = 4). 
The individual mean scores were then rounded to the nearest 
integer which resulted in the following ranges for each of 
the above categories. 
Strong Negative Attitudes = 1.00 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes = 1.50 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes = 2.50 
Strong Positive Attitudes = 3.50 
to 1.49 
to 2.49 
to 3.49 
to 4.00 
The same categorization process was done for the Jewish atti-
tude scale. 
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1. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's 
war-like behavior. Do you 
(N=332) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 14% 
= 25% 
= 36% 
= 25% 
2. The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working 
people. Do you 
(N=348) 
3. The State 
(N=348) 
4. The U.S. 
(N=350) 
5. I greatly 
(N=345) 
STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 62% 
= 31% 
= 5% 
= 2% 
of Israel is too war-like. Do you 
STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
needs to continue to 
STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
respect the State of 
STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 31% 
• 26% 
= 23% 
= 21% 
support Israel. 
= 35% 
= 26% 
= 19% 
• 19% 
Israel. 
= 37% 
= 39% 
= 15% 
= 10% 
Do you 
Do you 
6. Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon. Do 
you 
(N=316) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 26% 
= 30% 
= 25% 
= 19% 
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7. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-
Israel conflict. Do you 
(N=316) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 27% 
• 29% 
= 26% 
• 18% 
8. Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its 
Arab neighbors. Do you 
(N=334) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 25% 
= 23% 
= 27% 
= 26% 
9. The State of Israel must be militarily strong because 
of all its hostile neighbors. Do you 
(N=348) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 57% 
= 26% 
• 10% 
= 7% 
Frequency: 
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Jewish Attitude Scale 
(N = 388) 
Strong Negative Attitudes 
Somewhat Negative Attitudes 
Somewhat Positive Attitudes 
Strong Positive Attitudes 
= 3% 
= 17% 
= 49% 
= 31% 
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1. Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices 
to get ahead. Do you 
(N=365) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DIS~GREE 
• 13% 
• 13% 
• 33% 
• 42% 
2. Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own 
kind. Do you 
(N=373) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 10% 
= 8% 
• 32% 
= 50% 
3. When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews 
will choose money. Do you 
4. 
(N=354) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Jews take the proper interest 
good government. Do you 
(N=360) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
in 
= 19% 
= 11% 
= 27% 
= 42% 
community 
= 44% 
= 36% 
= 13% 
= 7% 
problems and 
5. Jews may have moral standards which they apply in their 
dealings with other Jews, but with Christians they are 
ruthless. Do you 
(N=350) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 11% 
= 12% 
= 33% 
= 45% 
6. A major fault of the Jews is their conceit and overbearing 
pride. Do you 
(N=357) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 16% 
= 18% 
= 30% 
= 36% 
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7. Jews are a revengeful people. Do you 
(N=350) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
= 13% 
• 11% 
= 29% 
= 47% 
8. In general, Jews are a people filled with prejudice. 
9. 
10. 
Do you 
(N=364) 
Jews have 
Do you 
(N=363) 
STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
too much power in 
STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
the 
= 10% 
= 16% 
= 31% 
= 43% 
United 
== 17% 
= 10% 
• 32% 
= 41% 
States today. 
Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America. Do you 
(N=339) STRONGLY AGREE 
SOMEWHAT AGREE 
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 
a 20% 
= 15% 
= 32% 
= 33% 
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Comparison of the Three-Item Scale Administered Immediately 
After the Respective Readings, with the Identical Scale 
Administered at the Completion of the Interview 
(N=230) (N=l65) 
After At 
Magazine Completion of 
Readin2s Interview 
Reliabilit~ Coefficients . .47 . .47 . I 
Means . 1.55 . 1. 70 . 
' Variances : .24 ; .21 
Inter-Item Correlation Mens • 23 ; • 22 
SeEarate Item Means 
Item 1 1.47 ; 1.65 
Item 2 1. 51 ; 1.70 
Item 3 1.67 ; 1.74 
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Factor Analysis on the Eight Questions Following the 
Readings, After Varimax Rotation 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Version Question 1 • 76 .24 
Version Question 2 :-15 .23 
Version Question 3 :-26 .66 
Version Question 4 .22 .45 
Version Question 5 .49 .22 
Version Question 6 :7I" -.06 
Version Question 7 .09 • 52 
Versio'n Question 8 -.01 -:-76 
-
The eight questions were then broken down into two 
scales based on the above analysis and a Kuder-Richardson-
20 reliability coefficient was obtained for each, as shown 
below. 
Factor 1 
(Questions 1, 2, 5, & 6) 
with (N=l 72) = 
.66 
Factor 2 
(Questions 3, 4, 7, & 8) 
with (N=l72) = 
22. 
Israel 
Attitude 
Scale 
Questions 
(Complete) 
(8 I terns) 
Questions 
(Factor 1) 
Questions 
(Factor 2) 
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Correlation Matrix (N=335) 
Israel 
Attitude 
Scale 
Questions 
(Complete) 
(8 I terns) 
.22 
p < .001 
Questions Questions 
(Factor 1) (Factor 2) 
.23 
p < .001 
.as 
p < .001 
.15 
p = .007 
• 82 
p < .001 
.42 
p < .001 
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Correlations between 8-item scale and 
A) Jewish Attitude Scale (Scale J) 
B) M.E. Knowledge Scale (Scale K) 
C) Israel Attitude Scale (Scale I) 
Respondents receiving 
1) Arab Version (N=-89) 
B-Item Scale 
Scale J -
Scale K -
Scale I -
.00, p > .os 
.00, p > .os 
.20, p > .os 
Respondents receiving 
2) American Version (n=84) 
8-Item Scale 
Scale J - -.03. p > .os 
Scale K - .01, p > .os 
Scale I 
-
.13, p > .os 
Respondents receiving 
3) Jewish 
8-Item 
Scale J -
Scale K -
Scale I -
Secular Version 
Scale 
-.13, p > .os 
.04, p > .os 
-.06, p > .os 
~N=821 
Respondents receiving 
4) Jewish Religious Version (N=921 
8-Item Scale 
Scale J -
Scale K -
Scale I -
.35, p = .001 
.os, p > .os 
• 42' p < • 001 
APPENDIX C 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY NO. 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
He 11 o , is th is ? 
~~~~---~~~~~~-
My name is , and I'm calling for the Jewish 
Social Research Center of Chicago. We're conducting a survey of Chicago 
area residents' opinions concerning issues in the Middle East. All answers 
will be confidential and participation is voluntary. 
For this survey, I need to speak with a man or woman over 21 who is Jewish 
or of Jewish descent. Does anyone in your household fit this category? 
[IF ABOVE CRITERIA ARE NOT MET, POLITELY TERMINATE] 
[IF ELIGIBLE PERSON IS NOT HOME, DETERMINE WHEN TO CALL BACK] 
Ql. GENDER: MA.LE •• .••..•.•• • 1 
FEMALE ............ 2 
[CONTINUE WHEN SPEAKING TO ELIGIBLE PERSON; REPEAT INTRO IF NECESSARY] 
In addition to questions about issues in the Middle East, throughout the 
survey I'll also be asking you some background questions. 
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STARTING TIME 
------
Q2. What is your primary source of news about international affairs? 
Is it ••• 
Radio ...................... 1 
Television ........•.••.•... 2 
Newspapers ................. 3 
Magazines, or .•.•......•.•. 4 
Some other source ••.•..•••. 5 (Specify ) 
------DK • ••••••••••••.••••••••.•• 9 
Q3. What is your primary source of news about the Middle East? 
Radio ...................... 1 
Television •••...•...•••.•.• 2 
Newspapers .....•....•.•.... 3 
Magazines, or •....•..••.••• 4 
Some other source ...•.•.•.. 5 (Specify ) 
------DK • •••.•••••••••.••.••••.•• 9 
Q4. What are your two most widely read Jewish magazines or newspapers? 
Q5. Of these two, which one would you say is more widely read? 
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During the past 30 years, Americans have heard a lot about the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. It's important for us to learn what people know about the history 
of the conflict. For each statement I read, please tell me if it's true, 
false, or if you don't know. If you don't hear or understand the question 
completely, I'll be happy to repeat it for you. 
T F DK 
Q6. Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over 
the last 300 years until the creation of Israel. 
Is this true or false? .........•..•.•....•.............• 1 
Q7. From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine 
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 
1948, thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land 
by the Jewish settlers. Is this true or false? ......... 1 
QB. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of 
Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this 
true or false? .......................................... 1 
Q9. Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State 
of Israel have spent over three times the amount of 
money in military equipment than Israel has. Is 
this true or false? ..................................... 1 
QlO. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting 
record in the United Nations has shown a strong 
connection between itself and the United States. 
Is this true or false? •.••........•.•.•.•....•....•..... 1 
Qll. Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so 
that it now almost equals in size the area of all 
its Middle-East enemies put together. Is this 
true or false? .......................................... 1 
Ql2. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been 
openly dedicated to the destruction of Israel. 
Is this true or false? •...•....•.•......•.•.•..••....... 1 
Ql3. In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth 
of the land identified by the League of Nations as 
Palestine. Is this true or false? .•...•.•.............. 1 
2 9 
2 9 
2 9 
2 9 
2 9 
2 9 
2 9 
2 9 
I 
( 
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I now need to read some statements with which some people agree and others 
disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. For each one, please tell 
me if you agree or disagree. 
Ql4A. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's war-like 
behavior. Do you ..• 
Agree, or ............ l 
Disagree ..•..••...... 2 
Don't Know .•.•••.•..• 9 [Skip to Q15A] 
Ql4B. Strongly {dis)agree or somewhat {dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ..•.•.•••..•. ! 
SOMEWHAT .•.•••...•..• 2 
Q15A. The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working people. Do you ..• 
Agree, or .••.••...•.. l 
Disagree ............. 2 
Don't Know •.•••.•.... 9 [Skip to Ql6A] 
Q15B. Strongly {dis)agree or somewhat {dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •.•.•........ ! 
SOMEWHAT ..•...•...... 2 
Q16A. The State of Israel is too war-like. Do you •.• 
Agree, or .......... .. 1 
Disagree •.•.......... 2 
Don't Know .......•... 9 [Skip to Q17A] 
Ql6B. Strongly {dis)agree or somewhat {dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••.•...•..•.. ! 
SOMEWHAT •.•.•......•. 2 
Q17A. The U. S. needs to continue to support Israel. Do you ... 
Agree, or •.•.....•... 1 
Disagree ..•...•.••.•. 2 
Don't Know •......•.•. 9 [Skip to Ql8A] 
Q17B. Strongly {dis)agree or somewhat {dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •.•..••••.••• ! 
SOMEWHAT •......••.•.• 2 
Q18A. I greatly respect the State of Israel. Do you ••• 
Agree, or ............ 1 
Disagree •.•.•.••••••. 2 
Don't Know •••••.•.••. 9 [Skip to Q19A] 
Q18B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ..•.•...•.•.. ! 
SOMEWHAT •••••.•..••.• 2 
Q19A. Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon. Do you ..• 
Agree, or •.•.•...•••• 1 
Disagree .•.•••.•.•.•• 2 
Don't Know ••••.•.•.•. 9 [Skip to Q20A] 
Q19B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •..•••..•..•. 1 
SOMEWHAT •...•..•.••.. 2 
Q20A. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Do you ••• 
Agree, or .•.•.•...•.. 1 
Disagree ....•...•.•.. 2 
Don't Know ..•.•.•...• 9 [Skip to Q21A] 
Q20B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY .•.•.•...•... 1 
SOMEWHAT •............ 2 
Q21A. Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its Arab neighbors. 
Do you •.• 
Agree, or •.••.•...... 1 
Disagree ........••... 2 
Don't Know •.•.•..•... 9 [Skip to Q22A] 
Q21B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ......•..•..• ! 
SOMEWHAT ........•.... 2 
Q22A. The State of Israel must be militarily strong because of all its 
hostile neighbors. Do you .•. 
Agree, or •.•.•....••• 1 
Disagree •..•••..•.••• 2 
Don't Know .•.•..•.•.•. 9 [Skip to Q23] 
Q22B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••••.•.•.•.•. 1 
SOMEWHAT •••.•.•.•..•• 2 
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I now am going to ask you some questions about several religious activities 
which some Jewish people do and some Jewish people do not do. 
[NA MEANS NO ANSWER, REFUSED, OR DON'T KNOW] 
Q23. Do you refrain from eating bread and bread 
products on Passover? ••.••.•...•....•••.•••.••..• 
Q24. Do you refrain from driving on Saturday? •.••...•. 
Q25. Do you keep Kosher? . ..•....................•...•. 
Q26. Do you believe in G-d? ....••••...•......•.•..••.. 
Q27. Do you fast on Yorn Kippur? .•••...•....•.•..•..•.. 
Q28. Do you eat pork? . ............................... . 
Q29A. Do you Fast on Tish Abav? ••.......•.•...•.•...... 
Q29B. Do you believe in a "world to come" after 
one dies in this world? ........................ .. 
Q30. Do you believe that the Bible was given 
to the Jews by G-d? . ............................ . 
Q31. Do you attend Synagogue services weekly? •.•..•... 
[FOR MEN ONLY] 
Q32A. Do you put on Tefillin daily? •....•.•...•..•..... 
[FOR WOMEN ONLY] 
Q32B. Do you light Sabath candles? .•......•...•.••.•... 
YES 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.1 
1 
NO 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
NA 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
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Now I'd like to finish by asking some background questions to help analyze 
the data. 
Q33. Have you had some type of formal Jewish education? 
Yes •••••. ..• . 1 
No ...••....•. 2 [SKIP TO Q36] 
Q34A. What type of Jewish education was it? ___________ _ 
Q34B. Was this educational institution affiliated with the Reform, 
Conservative, Orthodox, or some other Jewish movement? 
Q35. How many years of this education did you have? 
------
Q36. Do you presently belong to a synagogue? 
Yes • ..••.••• • 1 
No •.•.••.•••. 2 [SKIP TO Q38] 
Q37. Is your synagogue Reform, Conservative, Traditional, or Orthodox? 
REFORM • •••••.•.••.•• • 1 
CONSERVATIVE ...••.•.• 2 
TRADITIONAL •.•••.••.• 3 
ORTHODOX •..•.•.....•. 4 
OTHER .....•....•..••. 5 [SPECIFY ] 
-------NOTHING ......•.•.•... 6 
REFUSED .••.•.•.•...•. 8 
Q38. Would you consider yourself Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or non-
affil iated? 
[IF RESPONDENT SAYS TRADITIONAL, ASK: Would you say you are 
closer to Conservative or Orthodox?] 
REFORM ...••.•.•...••• 1 
CONSERVATIVE •.•.•.•.• 2 
ORTHODOX .•.••.•••.•.• 3 
OTHER ................ 4 [SPECIFY ] 
NON-AFFILIATED •.•.•.• 5 -------
REFUSED •..•.....•.•.• 8 
Q39. Are or were your parents Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or non-
Affil iated? 
REFORM ...•...•.•..... 1 
CONSERVATIVE ...•.•... 2 
ORTHODOX ....••.•••.•. 3 
NON-AFFILIATED .•.•..• 4 
OTHER ...... ~ ......... 5 [SPECIFY ] 
-------REFUSED ...••..••.•... 8 
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Q40. Are or were your grandparents Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or 
Non-Affiliated? 
REFORM • ••••••••••••• • 1 
CONSERVATIVE •••....•. 2 
ORTHODOX •.......•..•. 3 
NON-AFFILIATED •....•. 4 
OTHER •.......••.•.... 5 [SPECIFY ] 
-------REFUSED .•.....•.•.... 8 
Q41. Do you belong to a Jewish organization aside from a synago~ue or 
Q42. 
synagogue-related group? 
Yes •.....••..•.•..•.. 1 [SPECIFY ] 
No ................... 2 {no more than two) 
Refused . ............. 8 
Are you presently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have 
you never been married? · 
MARRIED .....•........ 1 
WIDOWED .............. 2 
DIVORCED ............. 3 
SEPARATED ............ 4 
NEVER MARRIED •....... 5 [SKIP TO Q58] 
REFUSED .•............ 8 [SKIP TO Q58] 
Q43. Is (was) your spouse Jewish or of Jewish descent? 
Yes . .........•...... . 1 
NQ • •••••••••••••••••• 2 
Convert .......••.•... 3 [SPECIFY BY WHOM] 
-----Refused .............. 8 
Q44. How many children do you have? 
Q45. What are your children's ages? 
[IF NO CHILDREN 21 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER, SKIP TO Q58] 
Q46. Do your children who are 21 years of age or older belong to a synagogue 
or attend synagogue services regularly? 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH CHILD OVER 21] 
[IF NONE BELONG OR ATTEND, SKIP TO Q48] 
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Q47. What type of synagogue do these children belong to or attend? 
Is it .•• 
Reform . .....•.••..•.... . 1 
Conservative ..•.••.••... 2 
Traditional, or ....•..•• 3 
Orthodox •..•..••..•.•.•. 4 
Other .•.•.•.•.•••.•....• 5 [Specify ______ ] 
Ref used . •............... 8 
Q48. Do your children 21 and over belong to a Jewish organization aside 
from a synagogue or synagogue-related group? 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH] 
Q49. Are your children presently married, widowed, divorced, separated, 
or have they never been married? 
[IF NONE HAVE EVER BEEN MARRIED, SKIP TO Q58] 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH] 
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QSO. Of your children who are, or were married. are or were their spouses 
Jewish or non-Jewish? 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH] 
Q51. Do your married children have children of their own? 
952. 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH CHILD AND OBTAIN SPECIFIC AGES OF GRANDCHILDREN] 
[IF NONE, SKIP TO Q58] 
[IF NONE 21 OR OLDER, SKIP TO Q58] 
Do your grandchildren 21 years of age or older belong to a synagogue 
or attend synagogue services regularly? 
[SPECIFY YES OR NO FOR EACH] 
[IF NONE BELONG OR ATTEND, SKIP TO Q54] 
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Q53. What type of synagogue do these grandchildren belong to or attend? 
Is it ..• 
Reform . ........... ·• .... • 1 
Conservative •...•...•.•. 2 
Traditional, or ••.•.•••• 3 
Orthodox ••••...••••••... 4 
OTHER ..•.........•..... 5 [SPECIFY _____ .] 
REFUSED ........•......•. 8 
Q54. Do your grandchildren 21 and over belong to a Jewish organization 
aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group? 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH] 
Q55. Are your grandchildren presently married, widowed, divorced, 
separated, or have they never been married? 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH] 
[IF NONE HAVE EVER BEEN MARRIED, SKIP TO Q58] 
Q56. 
Q57. 
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Of your grandchildren who are or were married, are or were their 
spouses Jewish or non-Jewish? 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH] 
Do your grandchildren have any children of their own? 
j 
NO • • • • • • · • • • • • 1 YES· •••••.•.•.• 2 
[SPECIFY FOR EACH GRANDCHILD AND OBTAIN AGES] 
Q58. In what year were you born? 
----
REFUSEQ. .•...... 88 
Q59. Were you born in the United States? 
YES ............•. l [SKIP TO Q62] 
NO . ..•.•.•.•..... 2 
Q60. In what country were you born? 
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Q61. What was the highest grade or year of school you completed? 
NONE . ....•••.•.•••.•.••.•..••......•.• · •• 00 
ELEMENTARY~.01 .• 02 •• 03 •• 04 .. 05 •. 06 .. 07 •. 08 
HIGH SCHOOL ..•.•.•.•........ 09 .• 10 .• 11 .. 12 
SOME COLLEGE ••••.•••••.•.••.•.••••.•.•• . 13 
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL •..••....•.•••..•.•.... 14 
BACHELOR DEGREE. ...•.•.•••.••.•......... 15 
SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL .•.•....••..•..•.... 16 
MASTER DEGREE. ..•....••.....•........... 17 
DOCTORATE DEGREE. •.•...•....•.•...•.•... 18 
REFUSED • •••••••••••••.•.•••••••••••••••. 88 
_j 
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Finally to conclude this survey, I need to ask you some questions about 
Zionism and Judaism. 
Q62. Have you ever visited Israel? 
YES . ••••••••••••.•.•••.. 1 
N0 •••••••••••••••••••••• 2 [SKIP TO Q64] 
REFUSED .....•....•...... 8 
Q63. How many times have you visited Israel? 
Q64. If things in the U. S. remain as they are, do you have any real 
intention of ever settling in Israel? 
YES •.••••..•••.••••••• • 1 
NO • •.•.•••.••••.•••••••• 2 
REFUSED ................. 8 
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Q65. Could you tell me the name of the Jewish New Year? 
Q66. On what date was the lst and 2nd Temple in Jerusalem (The Beit 
Hamikdosh) destroyed? 
Q67. On which Jewish holiday do some Jews wave around a palm branch 
(A Lulav)? 
Q68. What were the names of the three Jewish Patriarchs? 
Q69. Could you give me an example of what is meant in the Bible by an 
Eye·For an Eye? 
Q70. Who brought the Jewish people into the Land of Canaan after they 
had left Egypt? 
Q71. What is the Oral Law? 
Q72. What is the name of the morning prayer? 
Q73. Could you tell me who the chief commentator of the Talmud is whose 
commentary is found on the same page as the Talmud itself? 
Q74. And finally, could you spell for me the word Shabbat in Hebrew? 
Thank you, that completes the survey. Thanks very much for your cooperation. 
FINISHING TIME 
-----
APPENDIX D 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY NO. 2 
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SURVEY INTRODUCTION 
Hello• is this _______ ? [VERIFY TELEPHONE NUMBER] 
My name is • and I'm calling for Loyola University of 
Chicago. We are conducting a survey concerning Chicago residents' opinions 
about international affairs, and specifically concerning issues in the Middle 
East. All answers will be confidential and participation is voluntary. 
For this survey, I need to speak with a man [woman] 25 years of age or older. 
Does anyone in your household fit into this category? 
[IF MAN (WOMAN) IN HOUSEHOLD IS NOT 25 YEARS OR OLDER, POLITELY TERMINATE] 
[IF ELIGIBLE MALE (FEMALE) IS NOT HOME, DETERMINE 'WHEN TO CALL BACK] 
[IF TOLD NO MAN (WOMAN) LIVES IN HOUSEHOLD, POLITELY TERMINATE] 
***************************************************************************** 
Sl. GENDER: MALE •••••••••••••••• 1 
FDIA.LE ••••••••••••• 2 
[CONTINUE WHEN SPEAKING TO ELIGIBLE MALE (FEMALE), REPEAT INTRO IF NECESSARY:] 
In addition to questions about international affairs and the Middle East, 
throughout the survey I will also be asking you some questions about yourself. 
Now I'll begin by asking you three short background questions. 
S2. What is your racial background? Are you ••• 
Asian •••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 [POLITELY TERMINATE] 
Black •••••••••••••••••••••••• 2 
Hispanic, or ••••••••••••••••• 3 [POLITELY TERMINATE] 
'Wllite? .•.•••.•••••••••••••••• 4 
OTHER • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
REFUSED • ••••••••••••••••••••• 8 
S3. Are you of Arabic or Jewish decent? 
[POLITELY TERMINATE] [POLITELY TERMINATE] 
YES •••••••••••••••••••••••••• l [POLITELY TERMINATE] 
NO • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2 
REFUSED •••••••••••••••••••••• 8 [POLITELY TERMINATE] 
S4. What is your religious preference? Are you ••• 
Ca tho lie . ....................•.•.•.. . 1 
Protestant ••••••••••••••••••••••••.•• 2 
Jewish, or ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 [POLITELY TERMINATE] 
Something else? (specify 4 
REFUSED •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8 [POLITELY TERMINATE] 
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STARTING TIME 
-----
During the past 30 years, Americans have heard a lot about the Arab~Israeli 
conflict. It's important for us to ·learn what people know about the history 
of the conflict. For each statement I read, please tell me if it's true, 
false, or if you don't know. If you don't hear or understand the question 
completely, I'll be happy to repeat it for you. 
Ql. Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over 
the last 300 years until the creation of Israel. 
Is that true or false? ••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••.•••• 
Q2. From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine 
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 
1948, thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land 
by the Jewish settler~. Is that trµe or false? •••••••• 
Q3. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of 
Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is that true 
or false? ... .......................................... . 
Q4. Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State 
of Israel have spent over three times the amount of 
money in military equipment than Israel has. Is that 
true or false? ........................ ................ . 
Q5. Over the last ten years Saudi Arabia's voting record 
in the United Nations has shown a strong connection 
between itself and the United States. Is that true 
or false? .............................................. . 
Q6. Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that 
it now almost equals in size the area of all its 
Middle-East enemies put together. Is that true or 
false? ................................................ . 
Q7. Over the last ten years Saudi Arabia has been openly 
dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is that 
true or false? ........................................ . 
QB. In 1948 Israel took control of less than one-fifth 
of the land identified by the League of Nations as 
Palestine. Is that true or false? •.••••••••••••••••••• 
T F DK 
1 2 9 
l 2 9 
1 9 
1 ' 2 9 
-r. 2 9 
1 2 9 
1 2 9 
1 2 9 
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Now I'll read some statements that describe the way some people feel about 
themselves. For each statement, please tell me how true they are for you. 
Q9. "No one cares much about what happens to me." Thinking about yourself, 
is that ••• 
very true ....................... 1 
pretty true, or ••••••••••••••••• 2 
not true at all ••••••••••••••••• 3 
DON ' T KNOW • • • • •••••••••••••••••• 9 
QlO. "I often wish that people would listen to me more." Is that ••• 
very true . ..................... . 1 
pretty true, or •••••••••••••••• \_2 
not true at all ••••••••••••••••• 3 
DON ' T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Qll. "I often wish that people liked me more than they do." Is that ••• 
very true ....................... 1 
pretty true, or ••••••••••••••••• 2 
not true at all ••••••••••••••••• ~ 
DON ' T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Ql2. "These days I really don't know who I can count on for help." Is that ••• 
very true ...................... ~1 
pretty true, or •••••••••••••••• ,2 
not true.at all ••••••••••••••••• 3 
DON I T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
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Now I'm going to read some statements about how people are spending their 
lives these days. Please tell me how these statements apply to you. 
Ql3. lalen thinking about your life, do you more often wonder why you exist, or 
do you more of ten see a reason for being here? 
. . . . - • • 1 M'.>NDER YIY ••••• 
SEE A REASON •••• . . . 
RF• 
DK. 
. . .. . . . . 
. . . . . 
. . . .. 
. . . . 
• • • • 2 
.. • .. • 8 
• • .. • 9 
Ql4 •. Would you say your life is • • • 
empty, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
somewhat empty, or • • • • • • • ~· 2 
not at al 1 empty? • • • • • • • .... ~l 
R.F. • • • .. .. • .. • • • • • • .. • 8 
.DIC • • • • • • • • . . . . . . • • 9 
Ql5. Is facing your daily tasks more often a source of pleasure and 
satisfaction, or is it more often a painful and boring experience. 
PLEASURE/SATISFACTION • • • • • ~ .. 1 
PAINFUL/ B:>RING • • • • • • • • 2 
RF • ............ , .... 8 
DK. • •••••••••• ,. "9 
Ql6. If you should die today, would you feel that your life has been ••• 
very worthwhile, • • • • • • • • • 3 
somewhat worthwhile, or ••••• 2 
not at all worthwhile? •••••• 1 
DON IT KNOW. • • • • • • • • • • • 9 
*****************************************************************************~ 
Ql7. In general, how satisfying do you find the way you 're spending your life 
these days? Would you call it ••• 
completely satisfying, ••••• 
pretty satisfying, or ••••• 
not very satisfying? •••••• 
DK. • • • • • • • .. • . . . . . 
• 3. 
• 2 
• 1 
• 9 
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[VERSION PPP] 
I now need to read you a group of sentences and 
then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only on your 
understanding of these sentences. 
The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular 
political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily 
represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it. 
[READ SENTENCES:] 
A Jewish professor stated that the Israeli army has committed atrocities 
against the Palestinian people. 
The racist character of Zionism is amply manifested in Israel's imperialistic 
and settler-state policies. 
During Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army trampled on its victims 
destroying everything in its path and unleashed on Beirut a rain of death 
and destruction. 
The Palestinians have been victims of extermination, persecution, and indif-
ference since 1948. 
Most of the world's governments today have come to reeognize that the 
Palestinian problem is the root-cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Jews have displaced the Palestinians from their land via abominations. 
Jews have no real Biblical justiciation for building a Jewish State in 
Palestine. 
The polls have shown that the American people think that the Palestinian 
struggle to return to their land is justified. 
Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat 
the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.) 
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{VERSION JRP] 
Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of sentences 
and then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only 
on your understanding of these sentences. 
The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular 
political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily 
represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it. 
[READ SENTENCES:] 
The State of Israel is the historic homeland of the Jews. 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, is an unprincipled terrorist 
organization. 
The PLO has vied for the total liquidation of Israel. 
PLO operations in Lebanon up to 1982 ~as the center for international terrorism 
worldwide. 
Up until 1982, Israel's northern border has been consistently bombed by PLO 
terrorists. 
Since June of 1981 to December of 1982, a total of 150 terrorist attacks 
have been made against Israel by the PLO. 
The President of Lebanon said, in Paris, that Arafat, the leader of the PLO, 
is the cause of the Palestinian's problems. 
Jordan is the key obstructionist in settling the Palestinian refugee problem 
by not admitting that his state is actually Palestine. 
Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat 
the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.) 
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[VERSION JSMP] 
Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of se~tences 
and then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only 
on your understanding of these sentences. 
The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular 
political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily 
represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it. 
[READ SENTENCES:] 
Israel will never obtain the security it wants by using force. 
The Israeli government has tried to destroy the Arab political elite in the 
occupied territories by ousting mayors, closing universities, and restricting 
the circulation of literature in the Arab-dominated areas •. 
Many governments throughout the world have held Israel responsible for the 
massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Palestinian refugee camps. 
According to the U. s. State Department, there are 4,300,000 Palestinians 
scattered around the world. 
The European Parliament Assembly has expressed solidarity with the Palestinian 
people. 
The Arabs call for a Palestinian State represented by the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, the PLO. 
The moderate Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, are troubled by 
the Palestinian plight. 
A PLO leader who surrendered to the Israelis said that he was ashamed of 
its terrorist tactics. 
Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat 
the sentences one more time? {IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.) 
[VERSION ASMP] 414 
Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of sentences 
and then ask you a few questions'which you are asked to answer based only 
on your understanding of these sentenc~s. 
The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular 
political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily 
represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it. 
[READ SENTENCES:] 
President carter said that the continued deprivation of Palestinian rights 
by the Israelis is con.t.;rary to moral and ethical principles of both the U. s. 
and Israel. 
The Israelis arranged for the Christian militiamen to enter the Palestinian 
refugee camps in 1982 where there were very bloody consequences. 
Senior American officials feel the necessity for solving the Palestinian 
plight on the West· Bank. 
An Israeli victory in Lebanon did not settle the issue of a place for the 
Palestinians to live. 
Because the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, suffered defeat in 
Lebanon, the moderate policies of Yasser Arafat may be rejected for more 
ruthless tactics. 
The Arab .leaders of the Middle-East have called for the creation of an 
independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
The leader of the PLO Yasser Arafat has unflagging energy and absolute 
determination to regain a homeland for his people. 
The Lebanese President stated that the Palestinians should be allowed to 
live in peace and freedom with self-determination in their land. 
Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat 
the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.) 
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Now, please remember, base your answers only on the sentences you have Just 
heard and not on any prior knowledge or attitudes you might have. 
Ql8. 
Ql9. 
Q20. 
Q21. 
Q22. 
According to what you just heard, who is to blame for causing the 
Palestinian refugee problem? Is it ••• 
Israel, or . ................... . 1 
The Arabs? •.•.•.•.••••••••.•••• 2 
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
NEITHER • •••••.••••••••••.••••• • 4 
DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
DON ' T KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9 
According to what you heard, who is to blame for the continuing 
Palestinian refugee problem. Is it ••• 
Israel, or ••.•.••••••••.•.••••• l 
Th.e Arabs? • •••••••••••••••••••• 2 
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
NEITHER • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
DON 'T KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9 
DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
Who are the rightful inhabitants of the land which today is called 
Israel and before 1948 was called Palestine? Is it ••• 
The Jews, or ................... 1 
The Arabs? ••••••• •••••.•••••••• 2 
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
NEITHER ••• ••••••••••••••.••••• • 4 
DON IT KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9 
DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
Who is responsible for the Jewish refugee problem from the Arab lands? 
The Arabs, or . ........•....... . 1 
The Jews? • ••••••••••••••••••••• 2 
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
NEITHER • •••••••••••••••••.••.•• 4 
DON'T KN'OW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9 
DIDN'T SAY •..•.•.•.••••.•..•••. 5 
Who is to blame for the harsh treatment of the Palestinian Arabs? 
ls it ••• 
The Israelis, or .•••••••••••••• l 
The Arabs? •••••.•.•••••••..•• • 2 
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••.•••••• 3 
NEITHER • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
DON 'T KNOW • •••••••.••••••••••••• 9 
DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
Q23. 
Q24. 
Q25. 
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Who is to blame for Palestinian Arab assaults on Israeli civilians? 
Is it ••• 
The Arabs, or ••••.••••••••••••• l 
The Israelis? •••••••••••••••••• 2 
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
NEITHER • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
DON ' T KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9 
DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5 
The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would be 
.resettlement in ••• 
Israel ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ! 
Jordan. or . .......•......•...•. 2 
Some other place? •••••••••••••• 3 
BOTH PLACES •••••••••••••••••••• 4 
NO RESETTLEMENT •••••••••••••••• 5 
DON ' T KNOW ••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
DIDN'T SAY • ••••••.••••••••••••• 6 
Love for the land once called Palestine and presently called Israel 
has been traditionally expressed most by ••• 
The Palestinian Arabs, or •••••• 1 
The Jewish People? ••••••••••••• 2 
DON ' T KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9 
DIDN'T SA.Y ••••••••••••••• · .••••• 3 
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Now I'm going to ask you some questions about where you get your news about 
world affairs. 
Q26. What is your primary source of news about international affairs. 
Q27. 
Is it ••• 
Radio . ......•........•.•••. 1 
Television ••••••••••••••••• 2 
Newspapers ••••••••••••••••• 3 
Magazines, or •••••••••••••• 4 
Some other source •••••••••• 5 
DK • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Now after [READ ABOVE SOURCE] , what's your next main source 
of news about international aff ai-rs-?~-
RADIO •••••••••••••••••••••• 1 
TELEVISION ••••••••••••••••• 2 
NEWSPAPERS ••••••••••••••••• 3 
MAGAZINES, or •••••••••••••• 4 
SOME OTHER SOURCE? ••••••••• 5 
DK • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Q28. What is your primary source of news about the Middle East? Is it ••• 
&adio •••••••••••••••••••••• l [Skip to Q30A] 
Television ••••••••••••••••• 2 
Newspapers ••••••••••••••••• 3 [Skip to Q31A] 
Magazines, or •••••••••••••• 4 [Skip to Q32A] 
Some other source •••••••••• 5 [Skip to Q33 ] 
DK ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q34, PAGE9] 
Q29A. From which local channel do you get most of your international news 
and information? (PROBE FOR ONLY ONE CHANNEL). 
CHANNEL 2 (WBBM) ••••••••••• l 
CHANNEL 5 (WMAQ) ••••••••••• 2 
CHANNEL 7 (WLS) •••••••••••• J 
CHANNEL 9 (WGN) •••••••••••• 4 
CHANNEL 11 (WTTW) ••••••••••• 5 
OTHER • •••••••••••••••••••• • 6 
DK • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 7 
Q29B. What time of the day do you usually watch international news on that 
channel? 
AM PM (Circle one) 
---
Q29C From which TV news person do you get your largest amount of international 
news? 
[SKIP To Q34] 
418 
Q30A. From which radio station do you get most of your international news? 
Q30B. From which radio news person do you get your largest amount of 
international news? 
[SKIP TO Q34] 
Q31A· From which newspaper do you get most of your international news? 
Q31B. From which columnist or section of the paper do you get your largest 
amount of international news? 
[SKIP TO Q34] 
QJ2A. From which magazine do you get most of your international news? 
Q32B. From which columnist or section of the magazine do you get your 
largest amount of international news? 
[SKIP TO Q34] 
Q33. Where do you get most of your news about the Middle East? 
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Now, please tell me if the following are True or False for you. 
T F DK 
Q34. I have very definite established goals in life 
which I intend to pursue at all cost •••••••••••••••••••• 1 •••• 2 •••• 9 
Q35. Of ten I find myself doing and saying things that turn 
out to be things that shouldn't have been done or said •• !. .•. 2 •••• 9 
Q36. Sometimes I don't care whether I get anywhere in 
life or not ............................................. 1 .... 2 .... 9 
Q37. There are odd moments now and then when I suspect 
I might go to pieces ..................................... 1 .... 2 .... 9 
Q38. Every now and then I lose my temper when 
things go wrong . ........................................ .. 1 . ... 2 . ... 9 
Q39. Every now and then I can't seem to make up my 
mind about things .. •..••..•.................•.......••... 1 . ..• 2 . ..• 9 
Q40. I am one who never gets excited when things 
go wrong . •.•....•......•...•....•...........•....•...... 1 .•.• 2 ..•• 9 
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The following are statements about Jewish people with which some people agree 
and others disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. For each one, 
please tell me if you agree or disagree. 
Q41A. Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get 
ahead. Do you ••• 
Agree, or . .......•... . 1 
Disagree •••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW ••.•••.••••• 9 [Skip toQ42A) 
Q41B. Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••.••• 1 
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2 
Q42A Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind. Do you ••• 
Agree, or .. .......... . 1 
Disagree •.•.....••.•.• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q43A]. 
Q42B. Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l 
SOMEWHAT ..•.•........• 2 
Q43A. When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will 
choose money. Do you ••• 
Agree, or ............. 1 
Disagree •••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••.•.•••••• 9 (Skip toQ44A) 
Q43B. Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• 1 
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2 
Q44A. Jews take the proper interest in community problems and good 
govenment. Do you ••• 
Agree, or •...•..•.•.•. 1 
Disagree ••••••.••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q45A] 
Q44B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• ! 
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2 
Q45A. 
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Jews may have moral standards which they apply in their dealings with 
other Jews. but with Christians they are ruthless. Do you ••• 
Agree, or •••.•.••••••• l 
Disagree ••...•.•...••• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q46A] 
Q45B~ Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• ! 
SOMEWHA.T • ••••••••••••• 2 
Q46A. A major fault of the Jews is their conceit and overbearing pride. 
Do you ••• Agree, or ........•.... 1 
Disagree •••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q47A] 
Q46B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l 
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2 
Q47A. Jews are a revengeful people. Do you ••• 
Agree, or . •.......... . 1 
Disagree •••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q48A] 
Q47B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l 
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2 
Q48A. In general, Jews are a people filled with prejudice. Do you ••• 
Agree, or ....... , ..... 1 
Disagree •••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q49A] 
Q48B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l 
SOMEWHAT .•...•.•....•. 2 
Q49A. Jews have too much power in the United States today. Do you ••• 
Agree, or •••.•.•.••••. 1 
Disagree •••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW ••••.••••••• 9 [Skip to Q&>A) 
Q49B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••••.••••••••• l 
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2 
QSOA. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America. Do you ••• 
Agree, or ............. 1 
Disagree •••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 [Ski P to Q51] 
Q50B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l 
SOMEWHAT •.•.•.•..•.•.. 2 
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Q51. In your opinion, how likely is it that the United States will 
experience a nuclear war by the year 2000? Is it ••• 
Very likely •.•..•.•.•••••••••••••• l 
Somewhat likely, or ••••••••••••••• 2 
Very unlikely? •••••••••••••••••••• ! 
DON ' T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Q52. How likely is it that the U. S. economy will become much worse in the 
near future? Is it ••• 
Very 1 ikely . ...................... 3 
Somewhat likely, or ••••••••••••••• 2 
Very unlikely? •••••••••••••••••••• ! 
I>C>N ' T KNOW. • • • • • • . • ••••••••••••••• 9 
Q53. With the large political differences in the U. S. today, how likely 
is it that extreme political changes will occur in the near future? 
Is it ••• 
Very likely ....................... 3 
Somewhat likely, or ••••••••••••••• 2 
Very unlikely? •••••••••••••••••••• ! 
OON I T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Q54. How fearful are you of the possibility of nuclear war in your life-
time? Are you ••• 
Quite fearful . .................... 3 
Somewhat fearful, or ••••••••.••••• 2 
Not at all fearful? ••••••••••••••• ! 
DON ' T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Q55. How fearful are you of the possibility of a serious economic crisis 
in the U. S. in your lifetime? Are you ••• 
Q56. 
Quite fearful . .................... J 
Somewhat fearful, or •••••••••••••• 2 
Not at all fearful? ••••••••••••••• ! 
DON ' T KNOW. • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••••••• 9 
How fearful are you of the possibility of an extreme political change 
in the U. S. in your lifetime? Are you ••• 
Quite fearful ••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
Somewhat fearful, or .••••••••••••• 2 
Not at all fearful? ••••••••••••••• ! 
DON ' T KNOW • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 
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Now I'd like to finish by asking some background questions to help analyze 
the data. 
Q57. In what year were you born? 
Refused ••••••••••• 8888 
Q58. Are you presently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you 
never been married? 
MARRIED ••••••••••.••••••••.••• 5 
WIDOWED ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
DIVORCED •••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
SEP A.RATED •••••••••••••• · ••••••• 2 
NEVER MARRIED •.•••••••••••••••• 1 
RF •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8 
Q59. Are you a U. S. citizen? 
YES ••••••••••••••••••••.•••••• l [Skip to Q61] 
NO •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2 
Q60. What is your country of citizenship? 
[SKIP TO Q62] 
Q61. Were you born in the United States? 
• YES ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• l (Skip tOQ63] 
NO •••••••••••••••••••••••••• ·• • 2 
Q62. In what country were you born? 
[IF BLACK, SKIP TO Q64] 
Q63. Which country do your ancestors come from? 
[IF MORE THAN ONE, PROBE: "Of these, with which group do you 
most identify with?"] 
Q64. What was the highest grade or year of school you completed? 
NONE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 00 
ELEMENTARY: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
HIGH SCHOOL ••••••• ·•• • • • 09 10 11 12 
SOME COLLEGE •••••••••••.••••••••• 13 
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL •••••••••••••••• 14 
BACHELOR DEGREE •••••••••••••••••• 15 
SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL ••••••••••••• 16 
MASTER DEGREE •••••••••••••••••••• 17 
DOCTORATE DEGREE ••••.•.•••••••••• 18 
RF ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 88 
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Q65. Are you employed full time, part time, unemployed, retired, a student 
or something else? • 
EMPLOYED FULL TIME •••••••••••••••• 6 
EMPLOYED PART TIME •••••••••••••••• 5 
UN:mfPLOYED • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
RETIRED ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
STUDENT • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2 
SOMETHING ELSE •••••••••••••••••••• 1 
RF •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Q66. What do you presently do to support yourself? 
[Skip to 67] [SKIP TO 67] 
[SKIP TO 67] 
[SKIP TO 67] 
[SKIP TO 67] 
Qli?. In 1984, is your own personal income before taxes [NOT HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME] going to be more than ••• 
$10,000? ••••••• NO •••.••••••••••••• 2 
$15 • 000? • •••••• NO • •••••••••••••••• 3 
$20,000? •••• · ••• NO ••••••••••••••••• 4 
$30,0001 •.•.••• No •.•••••••.••••.•. s 
$~0,000? ••••••• NO ••••••••••••••••• 6 
YES ••••••••••••••••• 7 
REFUSED •••• ••••••••••••• 8 
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••••••••• 9 
Q68. What did you do five years ago, in 1979, to support yourself? 
[IF RETIRED, ASK OCCUPATION BEFORE TIME OF RETIREMENT] 
(FOR MALE RESPONDENTS) 
Q69A. What does or did your father do for a living? 
[IF RETIRED, ASK FATHER'S OCCUPATION AT TIME OF RETIREMENT] 
(FOR FEMALE RESPONDENTS) 
Q69B. What is or was your mother's ·occupation? 
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Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read some statements with which 
some people agree and others disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. 
For each one, please tell me if you agree or disagree. 
Q70A. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's war-like 
behavior • Do you. • • · 
Agree. or ••••••.•••.• 1 
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q71A] 
Q70B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••••••••••••• ! 
SOMEWHAT ••••••••••••• 2 
Q71A. The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working people. 
Do you ••• 
Agree, or •.•...•..•.• 1 
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q72A] 
Q71B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••••••••••••• 1 
SOMEWHAT ••••••••••••• 2 
Q72A. The State of Israel is too war-like. Do you ••• 
Agree, or •••••••••••• l 
Disagree ••••••••••••. 2 
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••. 9 [Skip to Q73A] 
Q72B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••••••.••••• 1 
SOMEWHAT ..•.•.•.•.•.. 2 
Q73A. The U. S. needs to continue to support Israel. Do you ••• 
Agree, or .. ...•...•. . 1 
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q74A] 
Q73B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••••••••••••• l 
SOMEWHAT •••••••••• • •• 2 
Q74A. I greatly respect the State of Israel~ Do you ••• 
Agree, or ............ 1 
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q75A] 
Q74B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••••••••••••• ! 
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••.• 2 
Q75A. Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon. Do you ••• 
Agree, ·or •••••••••••• 1 
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q76A] 
Q75B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••••••••••.•. ! 
SOMEWHAT •........•... 2 
Q76A. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-Israel 
conflict. Do you ••• 
Agree, or •••••••••••• 1 
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T. KNOW ••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q77A] 
Q76B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY ••••••••••••• 1 
SOMEWHAT ••••••••••••• 2 
Q77A. Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its Arab neighbors. 
Do you ••• 
Agree, or .. ......... . 1 
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW •••••••.••• 9 [Skip to Q78A] 
Q77B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
Q78A. 
STRONGLY •••••••••••.• 1 
SOMEWHAT •..•......•.• 2 
The State of Israel must be militarily strong because of all its 
hostile neighbors. Do you ••• 
Agree, or ••• ~········l 
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2 
DON'T KNOW ••••••••.•• 9 [Skip to Q79A] 
Q78B. Strongiy (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree? 
STRONGLY •••.••••••••• l 
SOMEWHAT ....•.•.•.••• 2 
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Q79. In your opinion, who is to blame for causing the Palestinian refugee 
problem? Is it ••• 
Israel, or ••.•.•.•••.•.••••...•• l 
Tlle Arabs? ••••••••• •'• ••••••••••• 2 
BOTH • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
NEITHER • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
DON'T KNOW ••.•.•••...•.•.•••..•. 9 
Q80. In your opinion, who are the rightful inhabitants of the land which 
today is called Israel and before 1948 was called Palestine? Are 
the rightful inhabitants ••• 
The Arabs, or • .........•...•... . 1 
Tlle Jews? •••••••••.••••••••••••• 2 
BOTH • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
NEITHER • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
DON ' T KNOW •••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Q81. The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would be 
resettlement in ••• 
Israel •••••••••••••••••••••••••• l 
Jordan, or . ............•......•. 2 
Some other place? ••••••••••••••• 3 
NO RESETTLEMENT ••••••••••••••••• 4 
DON 'T KN'OW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Q82. In your opinion, is the Palestinian Refugee Problem the underlying 
and central problem in the Arab-Israel conflict? 
YES • •.••••••••••••••••••••••.•• • 1 
NO • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2 
DON ' T KN"OW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9 
Thank you, that completes the survey. Thanks very much for your cooperation, 
and have a good evening. 
FINISHING TIME 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
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